American Swords, Somali Shields

Part I: A Tragedy in Somalia

Around five in the morning of August 25th, 2017, gunfire broke out near the small town of Bariire in Southern Somalia. The Somali National Army, aided by United States (US) special forces, was sweeping through the area, conducting a counterterrorism raid against the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab. Yet when the smoke had cleared, it was not terrorists, but civilians who were left dead. The incident provoked a furious backlash in Somalia, as well as from the international community.

In the face of public scrutiny, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the military apparatus in charge of US operations in Somalia, was quick to release a statement saying American troops had only been present “in a supporting role.” Indeed, AFRICOM often claims that American soldiers do not take part in the conflicts they oversee, but rather follow behind local allies, providing advice during missions but never directly engaging the enemy. In the case of the Bariire raid, however, this claim was disputed, and an investigation by the Daily Beast found American bullet casings were present, in chilling quantity, at the scene. According to the same investigation, eyewitnesses further testified that American soldiers had lead the way, not followed.

The tragedy in Bariire exemplifies the confusing state of US counterterrorism strategy in Africa, where the line between combatant and advisor is often blurred, and information about military operations is withheld from the public wherever possible. This article will look at the reasons why US soldiers are playing a “supporting role” in the Somali bush, analyze the military footprint involved in such operations, and evaluate the risks and benefits of an “advise and assist” approach to the global War on Terror.

Part II - How US special forces ended up in Somalia

The doctrine that guides US military strategy in Africa is encapsulated in the phrase “by, with, through,” which refers to the relationship between US troops and their local counterparts, called partner forces. According to this doctrine, military operations should either be done by partner forces, with partner forces, or through partner forces. These options are preferred because they keep US soldiers out of harm’s way, leading to a policy known as indirect engagement. In theory, this “by, with, through” approach should mean providing training, equipment, military-to-military communication, and drone strikes. Yet US soldiers do not always watch from the sidelines, as was demonstrated in the Bariire raid.

When US troops join partner forces on the ground, the concept of “by, with, through” falls into question. AFRICOM calls these joint operations “advise and assist” missions, a mundane term for an important, and controversial, part of US counterterrorism policy. Soldiers on advise and assist missions are supposed to accompany and direct a partner force during an operation, while staying out of the line of fire and avoiding a direct engagement with the enemy. But if the enemy ambushes US soldiers, surprises them, or simply advances on their position, they are allowed to fight back. These exceptions create problems when it becomes unclear which side fired first, or whether American troops ever intended to stay on the back line. Adding to this confusion, advise and assist missions are extremely secretive because US soldiers are rarely injured or killedー which is often how the public learns of special forces operations. The result is cases like Bariire, where the exact role American soldiers played is uncertain, making it difficult to attribute blame when civilians are killed.

Part III -  Partner Forces

The forces that accompany US soldiers on advise and assist missions are deceptively called “partners,” despite the fact that they have often been organized, trained, and deployed by the US. In many cases, the loyalty of these forces to their own government is called into question. They are housed in secretive US bases, flown to operation sites by US helicopters, and accompanied by American special forces on their missions, which may have been ordered by the US without their own government’s approval. Hence, the idea of US soldiers serving as advisors to an independent ally is misleading, because the material, command, and logistic backbone of advise and assist missions is often the same as those led by US forces, but with partner forces providing the final manpower of the operations.

Yet while these partner forces may operate alongside, or at the direction of, the United States’ military, they are not subject to the same oversight as their American counterparts. Partner forces have been accused of torturing prisoners, including at bases where US special forces were present. Moreover, the US has trained partner forces in countries where the national army is subject to accusations of human rights abuse, such as in Cameroon, where Amnesty International alleges mass extrajudicial arrests, torture, and killings. Working by, with, or through partner forces linked to such abuse undermines America’s credibility in pushing for human rights in these countries, and risks souring relations with the population at large. Another concern with partner forces’ reliability is the risk of providing them weaponry they may not be able to secure. In Libya, the US military provided the country’s special forces with training and large amounts of equipment, only to see the special forces’ base overrun by militants, giving them possession of its arsenal.

Part IV - Evaluating “Advise and Assist”    

The argument in favor of advise and assist missions is a pragmatic one. First, they require a minimal US presence on the ground, because partner forces will augment even a small number of troops’ capabilities, and provide the manpower for dangerous operations. Second, advise and assist missions avoid putting American lives on the line as much as possible, reducing their human cost. Finally, while the “by, with, through” doctrine is limited in its goals when compared to direct military engagement, it can still enable progress in the fight against terrorism. As AFRICOM commander Thomas Waldhauser stated, “these strikes are not going to defeat al Shabaab, but they are going to provide the opportunity for the Federal Government and the Somali National Army to grow and assume the security of that country.”

Conversely, the argument against a “by, with, through” approach to counterterrorism in Africa centers on the role it plays in expanding America’s shadowy security apparatus, one that sent US special forces to 20 African countries in 2016. Advise and assist missions are approved liberally, on the grounds that deploying soldiers in a supporting role is a lesser commitment than sending them to engage the enemy directly. Yet this distinction is difficult to enforce in the field, where soldiers can set their own mandates in deciding whether to fight on the frontlines or remain behind their partners. These missions are also not without risk,  as sending US soldiers to the field is inherently dangerous, and examples such as the catastrophe in Niger show that the public may not be willing to expend American lives in foreign places. Moreover, US soldiers being killed creates the risk of escalation, potentially drawing Washington into unnecessary conflicts. Another source of uncertainty is the partner forces that are required for such operations work. These forces are not always reliable and may act in ways that run counter to US interests or values, or even cross the line into atrocities. Finally, advise and assist missions have allowed the military to expand without asking congress, or the public, for approval, and the true scope of these operations in Africa is unknown, creating a dangerous lack of accountability. In the end, while the “by, with, through” doctrine may be an effective, restrained approach to fighting the global War on Terror, it places control dangerously far from civilian oversight, and fails to guarantee that tragedies like those in Somalia and Niger will not happen again.

¡Cuba! ¿Libre?

Changing American policy has recently allowed more Americans to visit Cuba – an opportunity that many are taking advantage of, and while American tourism trends are changing at a fast rate, social policy changes in regards to gay marriage in Cuba are relatively slower. American tourists want to visit a country they see as stuck in time; however, what they do not see is the extraordinary changes afoot in Cuba. Cuba has changed radically in the last 20 years, a fact that is evident in its social policy. While Cubans still face egregious restrictions on personal freedoms, some subsets of the population are gaining more liberty. Notably, gay people in Cuba are closer than ever to gaining the right to same sex marriage. Last year Cuba began the process of constitutional reform, which included language specifically defining marriage as being between two people with “absolutely equal rights and obligations.” This change would have allowed same-sex couples to marry. However, dominantly evangelical protesters in Havana lobbied for the language to be excluded from the reforms. The Cuban people have not historically spoken against their government (which still regularly jails dissidents), making the protest especially surprising. Indeed, the movement was even more unexpected in light of changing social sentiments in Cuba, making for a more inclusive society than in the past. While sexual discrimination is still a reality in Cuba, more people are accepting of varied sexual relations and identities today than ever before. Regardless, the protests were successful in blocking the language in the reform, showing that Cuba still has farther to go. For now, the national assembly is debating policy change separately from the constitutional reform. While this derailing of the policy may sound discouraging, the mere possibility of same sex marriage in Cuba was once an outrageous ideal and debate on the topic stands to prove how far the country has come on some social issues. Moreover, the relative change apparent in the last twenty years indicate that Cuba will continue to reform. However, this change must start from the outside. While citizens are not as free to demand change, Cuba is eager to please its business partners. International bodies and countries that conduct business with Cuba should increase their insistence for social change. Since the Cuban government is already willing to consider the matter, international insistence could superseded the demonstrations in Havana.  

LGBTQ issues have long been a divisive topic in Cuba. After toppling the Batista regime in 1959, the revolutionaries started constructing a country based on their movements ideals; ideals which include a distinct image of what a good revolutionary was. Many Cubans did not fit the mold, including LGBTQ individuals. The Castro regime defined homosexuality as dissident behavior and treated such individuals as such. In a 1965 interview Castro told a reporter:

We would never come to believe that a homosexual could embody the conditions and requirements of conduct that would enable us to consider him a true revolutionary, a true communist militant. […] A deviation of that nature clashes with the concept we have of what a militant communist should be.

Che Guevara is also cited as rejecting homosexuality and believed that it was a bourgeois decadence, incompatible with the revolution. To understand this sentiment, it is important to acknowledge Machismo. Machismo is a strong sentiment of male pride that permeates Spanish speaking societies. Its cultural importance substantial enough to define ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups, and ‘out’ groups are shunned by society. Interestingly the history of machismo does not infer homophobic sentiments necessarily. The stereotype of the Latin Gay is still considered within the bounds of Machismo, as long as he remains dominant. It is not a requirement to be straight, it is a requirement of domination: that the man maintains the power structure he was born into. As stated by Annick Prieur from the University of Chicago, “contempt for the effeminate homosexual is exactly what makes bisexuality acceptance [sic] for masculine men, and this is why homophobia, machismo and widespread male bisexuality make a perfect fit.” Therefore, bisexual or gay man are not necessarily condomed per their sexuality, only by their behavior. It is not the violation of sexuality that offends others, it is the degradation of being submissive. However, this contradiction explicitly persecutes transgender women who face even greater discrimination for fully breaking with machismo to switch or want to switch gender to the less desirable and less powerful gender: a sentiment that completely goes against Machismo. In regard to gay or bisexual men, the different sentiments tied to sexual ‘roles’ goes back to the Aztecs. When two men were caught having sex during the time of the Aztecs the ‘active’ partner was tied to a stake and left to die while the ‘passive’ man was tortured to death. Neither is accepting of course, but in one case the individual completely violated cultural norms while the other maintained their prescribed identity while engaging in an illegal activity. A shadow of resemblance to this system is reflected in Cuba.

To suppress the perceived gay ‘thereat’ to the Castro regime Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP) were created in 1965. These ‘units’ were forced labor camps to reeducate a variety of persons deemed ‘anti-revolutionary,’ including gay people.  An estimated 800 LGBTQ individuals were imprisoned in the camps. There is not an abundance of information on UMAPs, however one former inmate, Emilio Izquierdo, stated that gay people were “separated … from the rest and put together work teams with just gay people, those who were active and passive.” While this fact alone cannot confirm a standing cultural norm, it does indicate similar sentiments. In 1968, the camps closed, but discrimination against LGBTQ individuals did not end, causing many to hide behind public personas. Homosexuality was finally decriminalized in 1979, but the change in legality did little to affect people’s lives as all ‘publicly manifested’ homosexuality remained illegal. While this legal change did offer some reprieve, violent crackdowns were common. In August 1997, Cuban police infiltrated a gay nightclub, arresting 800 people and beating many of the gay Cubans in attendance. During the whole month of August an estimated 500 LGBTQ individuals were arrested. Indeed, many more incidents have gone unpublicized. Since 1980, small policy changes have eased hardships formerly endured by the LGBTQ population. As the Castro government sought international aid and acceptance, it altered a number of its social policies.

Changing Cuban sentiment is indicated by two specific policies passed since 2008. In 2008 the state announced that gender-reassignment surgeries and hormone replacement therapy would become available to qualified Cubans. Cuban healthcare is state provided and therefore under state control. There had been one previous operation in 1988 but widespread public opposition caused the government to end the program. The reignition of the policy in 2008 clearly demonstrates a change in public opinion from 1988. The 2008 policy was lobbied for by Mariela Castro (daughter of Raul Castro), who represented 28 Cubans who petitioned for the surgery at the time. Cuban doctors do not yet have the expertise to perform the surgeries, so the government invited Dutch surgeons to the island each year to perform up to five sex reassignments. Mariela Castro leads National Center for Sex Education (CENESEX). CENESEX is the only LQBT organization in Cuba because it is state-run. Other organizations are not allotted state support and are therefore illegal. The organization is a visible and globally acclaimed group that has successfully lobbied the government for many LGBT initiatives. While the organization benefits the Cuban people, it is important to note that it is led by a member of the Castro family and is given priority and funding by the state. These recognitions both empower and undermine the organization. Other organizations are not allowed in Cuba and likely the organization is favored because of Mariela Castro’s familial status. Also, due to the backing of the government, the organization is careful to promote initiatives within certain boundaries. Mariela Castro has spoken abroad on the situation in Cuba and is always careful to use state approved language, even referring to UMAP as training camps. LGBT Cubans have referred to her as a government propaganda machine designed to garner international support from LGBTQ accepting countries. However, regardless of the drawbacks of the program, it has prompted real change and benefitted many Cubans.

In addition to state provided sex reassignment surgeries, CENESEX also lobbied for improved sexual education and access to antiretroviral drugs and condoms— policies that are now in effect. Many of these policies are radical in a country that was strongly opposed to LGBTQ rights fairly recently. The government also passed anti-discrimination law in employment based on sexual orientation in 2016. Notably, Mariela Castro (a Cuban Assembly member) cast the only dissenting vote in Cuban history when voting on this policy as it did not protect transgender people. While her dissent is of little political consequence as the policy was going to vote regardless, it still drew attention to the drawbacks of the policy and antiquated sentiments of the Assembly. This balancing act is one perfected by CENESEX as it pushes the government to reform from the safety of its umbrella provided to it by the Castro family name. However, regardless of the drawbacks of the policy, the improvements that Cuba made in favor of LGBTQ rights in recently times have elevated it to one of the best countries in the Caribbean for LGBTQ individuals. Amnesty International’s Caribbean Team has stated that Cuba is “one of the most advanced countries in the protection and promotion of the rights of LGBTI people in the sub-region.” While more changes are needed, Cuba is leading the region with changing policy, changing public sentiment, and even changing government attitudes.

One of the most surprising changes for LGBTQ individuals in Cuba arrived by way of an interview with Fidel Castro. In 2010 Castro interviews with La Jornada newspapers in Mexico claiming responsibility for the negative treatment of gays. In an article titled “Soy el responsable de la persecución a homosexuales que hubo en Cuba” (I am responsible for the persecution of homosexuals in Cuba), Fidel blames himself for the persecution of LGBTQ individuals and called the regime’s past actions a ‘great injustice.’ Castro then continues to explain that after the regime’s actions it was hard to find alliances with European countries as their image of Cuba had deteriorated. This need for international alliance likely sparked some of the aforementioned changes. Also notable is the changing sentiment of Miami Cubans. Cuba is dependent on support from Miami Cubans and received $5.1 billion in remittances from Miami in 2013 alone: the number has continued to grow ever since. While Cubans in Miami are historically conservative, younger Cuban-Americans are leaning further left. Today they are about 50-50 on voting records and could be affecting change as Cuba looks to please a large source of its income. Regardless of Cuban-American political sentiments in the coming years, it is evident that Cuba is already warming to social change.

Cuba has changed significantly since the beginning of the revolution. LGBTQ individuals today are less discriminated against in both an official-state capacity and by the greater population. The community has a quasi-leader in Mariela Castro and has a valiant cause to support. With each step, LGBTQ Cubans come that more closer to a free Cuba. What is necessary to push the legislation is an outpouring of international support and resistance. As stated by Human Rights Watch, “given the effectiveness of Cuba’s repressive machinery and the Castro government’s firm grip on power, the pressure needed to bring progress on human rights cannot come solely from within Cuba.” Therefore, the international community is responsible for encouraging further change within Cuba. Given the demonstrated willingness and dependence of the government on the international community, pressure should be exerted to revolutionize Cuban social policy. Pressure can come in the form of increased economic support or trade, or the withholding of such relations. Issues that need to be addressed include same-sex marriage, the ability to adopt children regardless of sex or sexuality, and further protections for the LGBTQ community. Should Cuba incorporate these changes, it will be a leader of social policy in the Caribbean and help disseminate further change. Indeed, the situation is in such a state of flex that it can be spurred in either direction and international support will guarantee that the situation tips in favor of the LGBTQ community. Action should be taken quickly while the situation is still at a culmination. With luck, time, and support, the Cuban people will win their rights.

Addendum

2/25/19

On February 24th the Cuban people voted in favor of the new Constitution. The constitution did not include the aforementioned language regarding marriage. However, the voting statistics marked notable dissent in Cuba. 87% of voters were in favor of the new constitution while 9% of votes counted were in dissent and 4% of ballots were left blank. Both the dissenting and refraining votes, in addition to those who chose not to vote, highlight a growing ease of dissent in Cuba.

The Digital Frontier: Virtual Care After Natural Disasters

Virtual care is a growing facet of the medical world, with 77% of Americans indicating interest in it. If utilized in response to natural disasters, it could help keep hospitals from being overrun, treat patients who would otherwise be unable to seek care due to inclement conditions, and generally, improve both access to and quality of health care during such times.

Natural Disasters in the U.S.

Each year the United States faces natural disasters, and while many are predictable, their aftermath often presents unforeseen challenges. Hurricanes cause the most damage, but by definition natural disasters also include wildfires, drought, severe weather, flooding, tornadoes, and some winter storms. Between 2013 and 2016 natural disasters cost the United States between $18 billion and $34 billion annually. In 2017 the costs totaled a record $195.2 billion following major storms including Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Costs in 2018 topped $91 billion, making it the fourth most expensive year for natural disasters.  2018 also broke the record for most single disasters with losses exceeding $1 billion; 14 total with 1 drought event, 8 severe storm events, 2 tropical cyclone events, 1 wildfire event, and 2 winter storm events. Despite the scale of funding currently allocated to natural disaster management, there are numerous aspects of preparation and response policies which could be improved. Access to and quality of healthcare is a major issue during all types of natural disasters, as inclement weather, damaged infrastructure, and other factors prevent potential patients and medical staff from reaching care centers. Virtual care services enable patients to seek efficient, confidential medical advice from certified physicians anywhere they have wireless, internet, 4G or LTE connection capability.

Policy Solutions

In the past 16 years New Orleans, eastern Kentucky, and central/eastern Massachusetts have suffered serious and financially costly storms and natural disasters with greater frequency than almost any other area of the country. Each area endures different types of natural disasters, New Orleans with tropical storms and hurricanes, eastern Kentucky with severe weather, tornadoes, flooding, and Massachusetts with severe winter storms. Due to their varied disaster types and the frequency with which they experience such events,  FEMA and HHS should allocate $105,000 for a trial of providing discounted virtual care services to individuals affected by natural disasters in these three areas for a period of one year. The breakdown of funds designates $35,000 to each of the three areas, covering up to half of a ‘visit’ to a virtual care physician. As average price for a visit ranges from $15 to $75, depending on insurance type and status, the aforementioned funds would cover approximately 1,000-2000 visits in each area. An initial run of this size would ensure funds are not over-allocated; people are often wary of new technologies, and a larger trial run could lead to a large number of virtual slots going unused and wasting valuable dollars. Agencies should disburse the funds across 5-10 virtual care companies, to spread risk and decrease the chances that a technical issue or other systematic factor prevents individuals from utilizing the service.

In order to access the discounted rates, individuals would enter their street address and zip-code on the virtual care portal entry page, which would recognize or deny their location as being part of the impact zone at declared by FEMA. The agencies should also encourage NGOs already incorporated into the National Response Framework, such as the American Red Cross, to establish virtual care platforms. Such expansions could further promote the virtual care platform, and support improved quality of and access to care at no additional cost to the government.

As previously mentioned, virtual care can be accessed from anywhere there is a charged device with internet capability. This access can help reduce issues of hospital crowding and the use of limited resources and time on patients with non-life-threatening injuries. It can also prevent people from putting themselves in further danger by leaving a safe area and entering inclement conditions to attempt to reach a care center because they are unsure if they or a loved one need immediate medical attention. Virtual care visits typically last less than fifteen minutes, and doctors can; assess cuts, burns, and bruises for severity; help a pregnant woman discern if she is in labor and guide her through the next steps; determine if chest pain or anxiety is cause for emergency care; guide individuals through putting an injured limb in a makeshift sling or splint; provide necessary dietary alterations or pharmaceutical advice; etc. Most virtual care companies employ physicians who speak hundreds of languages, meaning that language is not a barrier to care as it may be during an in-person medical visit.

The US Army utilizes virtual health platforms throughout their Europe based operations, and for soldiers stationed in remote locations across the globe. Dr. Steve Cain, the Army’s Virtual Health Deputy for Regional Health Command Europe (RHCE) said of the program, "We have an ever-expanding group of people we need to care for. Virtual health provides us the capabilities to do so." Physicians involved in the programs reported they experienced no changes in the quality of care provided, with soldiers also indicating the service was more convenient and less expensive than alternatives. A 2017 study of virtual care visits in Canada found that 93.2% of participants rated their virtual visit as high quality and 91.2% reported it was “very” or “somewhat” helpful in caring for their health issue.

There are potential pitfalls within the trial as well. Cell towers may be damaged during the disasters, leading to difficulties accessing the virtual portals. The four major carriers - Verizon, Sprint, AT&T and T-Mobile - have taken steps to protect against this, and after Hurricane Harvey 98% of Verizon customers’ cellular service remained in tact. The technological aspect of care is likely to be challenging for elderly patients navigating it on their own, or possibly to individuals seeking care under duress. Individuals whose homes were damaged or who had to flee suddenly may not have their insurance information and may be reluctant to pay higher costs for care without their plan information. Additionally, medical records may be lost in the disasters, and if individuals are unsure of their medical history or current medications, providing safe quality care can become difficult. Individuals who are unfamiliar with virtual care may find it an untrustworthy source of medical advice, leading to low use rates and failure of the trial.  While hospitals and care centers may push back against the loss of patients, their revenue source, researchers found “…. only 12 percent of telemedicine visits replaced an in-person provider visit, while 88 percent represented new demand.” Even a slight drop in patients may allow them to better care for the considerable remaining inflow they will experience post-disaster; and possibly avoid damaging lawsuits and credit reviews which typically plague care centers post natural disasters.

Every year the frequency and often severity of disasters grow, leaving trails of devastation in their wake. Virtual care provides an immediate, accessible solution to relieving part of the disruptions of quality of and access to healthcare which arises in the wake of natural disasters. By funding a trial in three different part of the United States, researchers will be able to track who uses virtual care, and also who benefits the most from it. Virtual care is growing in government and public healthcare systems. For those facing the consequences of natural disasters, it represents the possibility of faster, safer, and more efficient healthcare.

The Politics of Belonging: Fearful Nationalism and its Ramifications for Global Stateless Populations

Nationalism is the fruit that blooms from the tree of fear. When populations fear that their resources and government institutions are insufficient to provide for their imagined ‘native’ populations, they subsequently become fearful of the incursion of populations believed to be different from the national ‘in’ group. This fearful, paranoid nationalism leads to discussions of who does or does not belong within a nation, often delineated along ethnic or religious lines. Stateless populations, who exist at the fringes of state control or who are the subject of targeted campaigns of expulsion, face the direct consequences of exclusionary conceptions of the nation state. In the summer of 2018, statelessness catapulted into the international eye through the harrowing escape of the Moo Pa, or ‘Wild Boars,’ soccer team from a flooded cave in the Chiang Rai province of Thailand. This area of Thailand borders Myanmar, and its relative isolation from the metropole of state power in Bangkok results in the local population facing significant difficulties in receiving state support. The territorially-envisioned nation state struggles to adequately accommodate populations such as those in Chiang Rai, whose ethnic and linguistic boundaries do not cleanly align with national boundaries. Some local populations in Chiang Rai are nomadic, and separated from much of the world by treacherous mountainous terrain. Following the rescue of the Moo Pa team, three of the players and their coach were granted citizenship by the Thai government, highlighting many local populations’ struggles with statelessness. While the state may not play a large role in daily life in Chiang Rai, without recognition as citizens, people cannot vote, buy land, travel, or even be legally employed. Stateless populations the world over share these hardships, and the UNHCR identifies Southeast Asia as home to the world’s largest stateless population. Yet, despite this, it is impossible to pinpoint a single cause for statelessness. Statelessness occurs for many disparate reasons, and the analysis of the enclaves along the Indian-Bangladeshi Border, the persecution of the Lhotsampa population in Bhutan, and the nomadic Bajau Laut in the Sulu Sea near Malaysia will exemplify the different causes of statelessness. Through this comparison, an overarching narrative of fearful nationalism counterproductively diverting state efforts away from extending the benefits of citizenship to their populations and instead increasing border security emerges. In order to end statelessness, national governments must reconceptualize their role, prioritizing guaranteeing the right to citizenship over preventing undocumented migration.

Statistics on statelessness fail to paint a full picture of the problem, given that they primarily rely on estimates. Still, Myanmar and Thailand are two of the three nations with the largest stateless populations on the globe. The issue is rife across Southeast Asia, with the majority of Southeast Asian nations hosting stateless populations. UNHCR is unable to calculate the stateless populations in China and India, yet given that these are the two most populous nations, it is safe to assume that both host sizeable stateless populations as well. In Myanmar, the Rohingya population in Rakhine state faces an explicit campaign of expulsion perpetrated by Buddhist state leaders due to the formers Muslim faith, resulting in the majority of all stateless people in Southeast Asia hailing from Myanmar. The Khmer Krom population living in Vietnam similarly faces statelessness, due to the perceived alterity associated with their residence close to the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Malaysia hosts a sizeable population of descendants of Sri Lankan, Filipino, and Indonesian migrant workers, from both pre- and post-colonial times, who remain stateless. Many Bangladeshi Biharis are stateless, due to beliefs of their ‘otherness’ stemming from the Bangladesh Liberation War nearly half a century ago. Ethnically Han Chinese populations in India and Indonesia are similarly often stateless. A loosely defined area termed ‘Zomia’ that stretches through the remote hill-regions of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar is home to many stateless indigenous peoples known as ‘Hill Tribes.’ Refugee populations across the entire region are also at acute risk of statelessness. All of these populations experience undue difficulties accessing state resources, yet states’ fears of undocumented migration obfuscate efforts to extend citizenship to stateless populations.

Data from UNHCR via Marie McAuliffe

Statelessness primarily stems from targeted discrimination, exclusionary legal structures, complex histories, and inadequate state capacity, and each of these causes fall under the larger umbrella of fearful nationalism, for nations focus on keeping perceived outsiders out of their nations. Nations fears’ of undocumented members of groups outside of their imagined national ‘in’ group result in policies that overemphasize bureaucratic procedures and documentation that stateless populations are often unable to produce, and fail to achieve nations’ core goal of providing for their populations’ basic needs. Willem Van Schendel explains in his writing in The Journal of Asian Studies that “the contiguous, uninterrupted homeland is a fiction, as is obvious from the fact that many nations and states have learned to live with discontinuous territories,” yet still, states focus on preventing undocumented migration from these discontinuous territories rather than developing solutions to extend citizenship to the residents of such areas.

The politics of belonging plays a key role in this securitization, because groups native to a nation may be deemed ‘outsiders’ and thus forcefully expelled from states in the purported interest of security. The well-documented plight of the Rohingya population in Myanmar exhibits the most pronounced example of this, with the discriminatory 1982 Burmese citizenship law delineating citizenship as exclusively open to 135 recognized ethnic groups. The Rohingya population is not one of these recognized groups, and thus the 1.1 million Burmese Rohingya have no documentation to verify their legal residence, and can thereby be forcefully expelled through targeted military action. The government’s refusal to grant them citizenship results in the Rohingya’s inability to legally marry or own property. The government claims that they are all illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, referencing the similarities between the Rohingya’s language and the Bangladeshi language Chittagong, despite the long history that the Rohingya have in Myanmar. Based on these claims, the Burmese government inhibits the Rohingya’s movement, healthcare, and education. Following the Burmese military’s systematic campaigns of expulsion, nearly one million Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, yet the Bangladeshi government prohibited these refugees from marrying its own citizens, hoping to prevent them from gaining Bangladeshi citizenship. These actions are the direct result of fearful conceptions of the nation state that attempt to exclude populations deemed to not belong from utilizing state institutions.

Fearful nationalism further incurs statelessness in areas on the fringes of state control.  This fear motivates states to dedicate efforts to combatting undocumented migration that would be more effectively spent building state institutional capacity in such areas. In Chiang Rai, Thailand, where the Moo Pa soccer team hails from, more than half a million members of Thai minority hill tribes are stateless, despite generations of residence in Thailand. The bureaucratic process to obtain citizenship in Thailand is especially arduous, in an attempt to ensure that economic migrants deemed to ‘illegitimate’ cannot gain citizenship. No matter the number of ancestral generations who lived in Thailand, Thai citizenship is inseparably tied to possession of a blue citizenship ID card. Procuring such an ID card no small task, with the required paperwork stretching roughly 50 pages, and a stateless hill tribe population that has little access to the formal schooling necessary to successfully complete such paperwork. While the application process for citizenship is intended to last three months, some applications have floundered in administrative limbo for up to 15 years. Lucy McCray of the International Justice Mission (IJM) elucidates that this protracted application process results from the fact that “district officers’ confusion about the law frequently leads to the refusal in acceptance of citizenship applications. While the punishment for approving ineligible citizenship application can result in the officers’ dismissal, there is no punishment for inaction.” While Thailand’s government has a stated goal of eradicating statelessness by 2024, the obstacles faced by rural populations near Thailand’s borders illustrate how fearful nationalism drives nations to prioritize securitization of the expansion of state capacity.

Graphic from the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion

The ramifications of stateless status inimically propel populations into cyclical poverty without the documentation necessary to access state resources during times of hardship. These ramifications are far reaching, with Robyn N. Lui identifying that stateless populations have no legal protection, face impaired physical, economic, and psycho-social well-being, and often strain both their own and their host communities. Furthermore, the populations who incur these negative consequences often became stateless when fleeing even more hostile circumstances. Emphasizing the prevention of undocumented migration rather than the protection of human rights directly harms stateless refugee populations such as the Rohingya currently living in refugee camps in Bangladesh near the border to Myanmar. Stateless populations’ economic potential is incredibly diminished by their lack of documentation. In Thailand, national immigration law that originally restricted stateless people’s movement to the district they lived in was amended in 2016 to allow travel through their entire province, yet this limited mobility still impairs their ability to seek adequate work and receive government-sponsored education and training. Moreover, without legal status, stateless populations have no access to credit or land ownership, both of which are important prerequisites for upward economic mobility in rural economies. Without sufficient documentation and resources, many stateless people are forced to participate in the informal economy. They may seek work through a third party, and without legal protections such third parties can exploit the stateless. Stateless women, in particular, are at risk of exploitation, leading to high rates of sex trafficking. This begins a ruinous cycle, for women may see the paltry pay received through sex work as preferable to destitution, yet this survival sex forces its participants to avoid government interaction for fear of arrest and lost income, thereby preventing trafficked stateless women from ever receiving the benefits of citizenship through official channels. A Thai hill tribe member succinctly explains the harm caused by statelessness, saying that “my life would’ve been very different if I had citizenship from when I was born, because then, I would’ve been able to plan and dream about what I wanted to do in the future. Instead I have spent my life chasing after citizenship, using a lot of money, and losing out on so many opportunities.”

Graphic from UNHCR

A global obsession with who belongs rather than what rights are guaranteed equally harms stateless populations resulting from complex history, exclusionary legal structures, and insufficient state capacity, as demonstrated through analysis of the enclaves of India and Bangladesh, the Lhotsampa of Bhutan, and the Bajau Laut of Malaysia.

The Enclaves of India and Bangladesh

The idiosyncrasies of India’s decolonization, the partition of India and Pakistan, and the Bangladesh Liberation War left borders that do not neatly conform to Westphalian visions of territorial continuity, yet parochial machinations of border protection fail to adequately adapt to such incongruous state borders. In India, the estimated size of the stateless population ranges from four to ten million people. Significant efforts have been made to combat undocumented migration, with more than 100 special courts established near the borders to Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh to decide who legally belongs in the nation, declaring upwards of 85,000 people foreigners since 1985. Yet, there have not been similar efforts dedicated to resolving the tribulations of the populations living in the 123 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and the 74 Bangladeshi enclaves in India. These populations are isolated from their own state resources by their territorial separation, and common Indian and Bangladeshi emphasis on border security inhibits the free movement of the sequestered enclave populations. Entirely surrounded by foreign nations hostile to their passage, the enclaves’ populations’ access to resources is exclusively limited to those in their own town. The enclaves do not have their own independent passport offices, nor do they have consular offices for the nation surrounding them. As a result, in order to receive the documentation necessary to access their own state’s resources, enclave populations must break the law of the nation that surrounds them and cross through it illegally to reach their own nation’s main territory. There, they can either break their own nation’s law by entering illegally, or travel long distances to reach an official entry point and hope that the border guards will be sympathetic to their situation. After entering their own nation, enclave people must first apply for and receive a national passport, and then travel a long distance to a consular office of the nation that surrounds their enclave and apply for a visa. This visa will allow them the freedom of movement necessary to access their own nation’s institutions, yet when the visa expires, the entire cycle starts over. The strong emphasis both India and Bangladesh place on combating undocumented migration places enclave populations at risk of being shot and killed if they are discovered crossing through the nation that surrounds them without the proper documentation, documentation that is not available to them within their enclave. An opportunity to resolve this problem presented itself at the 1953 passport conference, where ‘multiple entry visas’ were proposed to allow the free movement of enclave peoples, yet this was never implemented, and the situation persists more than half a century later. Willem Van Schendel explains the ramifications of this failure, for “…by omitting the enclave people from the passport agreement, both India and Pakistan abandoned them as citizens. Marooned in their enclaves, they could not leave without infringing the laws of both countries.” Without freedom of movement, the enclaves persist without access to their own governments’ institutions, rendering their populations stateless. The enclaves’ residents cannot register new births, attend state universities, or even vote in their own nation’s elections, highlighting how fearful nationalism that emphasizes border protection damages populations living in territorial gray areas due to complex histories.

Map via Hosna J. Shewly

The Lhotsampa of Bhutan

The global emphasis on the politics of belonging also allows nations to construct narratives of alterity to justify the expulsion of unwanted populations, and such is the case with the Lhotsampa of Bhutan. Although similar to the recent expulsion of the Rohingya population in Myanmar, the persecution of the Lhotsampa began in the 1980s and receives far less attention. Currently, there are more than 120,000 exiled Lhotsampa living in Nepal and between 15,000 and 30,000 living in India. The Lhotsampa practice Hindu traditions and speak Nepali, neither of which were problems until a new king assumed the throne and began to implement nationalist policies based on support for the Drukpa sect of Buddhism. Previously, King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck held a pluralistic view of Bhutanese society, and worked with the Bhutan National Assembly to pass the Royal Edict on Lhotsampa Citizenship Act, which granted citizenship to migrants from Nepal who were living and working in the country. King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck also enacted several reforms that began to secularize the nation. In 1972, he died and power transferred to his son, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck. Initially, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck continued his father’s legacy, but the Drukpa political elite gained the new king’s support in the late 1980s, resulting in resurgence in fearful nationalism that felt intimidated by the presence of the Hindu Lhotsampa. The Drukpa and the Lhotsampa are not the only populations in Bhutan, with other ethnic groups such as the Ngalung, the Sharchop, and multiple groups of indigenous peoples, yet under guidance by the Drukpa elite, the king adopted a ‘One Nation, One People’ policy that heavy-handedly glossed over such ethnic differences. Under this policy, Buddhism became the national religion and Drukpa symbols and traditions became national, ignoring the multifaceted heritage of the Bhutanese population. Part and parcel with this shift came a new fear of the Lhotsampa minority, who were the second largest group to the Drukpa, and thus perceived as the most threatening.

The government of Bhutan weaponized citizenship laws to achieve their goal of Buddhist supremacy, constructing a narrative that the Hindu Lhotsampa did not belong in the country. In 1985, a new Citizenship Act was passed that restricted routes to citizenship to those that the Lhotsampa cannot fulfill: birth, registration, and naturalization. Birth citizenship in Bhutan is based on jus sanguinis, or blood, requiring that both parents of a child be Bhutanese citizens for a child to receive citizenship, rather than jus soli, or soil, where all children born in a nation receive citizenship, as guaranteed by the American 14th amendment. Registering for citizenship requires land-tax receipts from before 1958 to prove historical residence in Bhutan, which is excessively difficult for Lhotsampa to produce in 1985 not only because of the nearly 30 years passed, but also because some Lhotsampa only began to pay taxes after they were granted citizenship by royal edict in 1958. Even in cases where Lhotsampa could produce such documentation, government officials have evicted them nonetheless. Finally, the prerequisites for naturalization are designed to exclude the Lhotsampa, including a requirement to speak Dzongkha, given that the majority of Lhotsampa speak only Nepali. These laws rendered the majority of the Bhutanese Lhotsampa population stateless, forcing the majority of the Lhotsampa to flee to refugee camps in Nepal. Fearful nationalist leaders also attempted to deter Bhutanese citizens from marrying Lhotsampa, with the constitution declaring that you cannot receive land or loans from the state or hold an elected office if you marry a non-citizen. The systematic discrimination against the Lhotsampa is evidenced by the almost total lack of representation of Lhotsampa in public offices, as illustrated by the image below. In 1990, the Lhotsampa population demonstrated for the restoration of their rights, yet the government instead reacted with punitive measures that require Lhotsampa to carry No Objection Certificates in order to receive a passport, receive scholarships, apply for government jobs, or even for their children to attend school. These policies demonstrate how narratives of belonging and state security allow for the use of citizenship laws to exclude populations, ignoring the denial of human rights that such laws incur.

Data from UNDP via Dhurba Rizal

The Bajau Laut in Eastern Sabah, Malaysia

Legal statehood is often tied to a fixed, terrestrial home, and the seafaring, nomadic Bajau Laut who live in floating villages in the Sulu Sea near Eastern Sabah, Malaysia, suffer from statelessness due to the Malaysian state’s inability to accommodate their non-terrestrial residence. The Sulu Sea sits between the Malaysian portion of the island of Borneo and the Philippines, although the Bajau Laut are not strictly confined to this region, and can sometimes be found as far north as the South China Sea and as far south as the Arafura sea between Papua New Guinea and Australia. The Bajau Laut did not always live an exclusively aquatic lifestyle, initially splitting their time between cultivating rice on land during the wet season and living at sea to fish during the dry season, yet the addition of ‘laut’ to Bajau specifically denotes ‘sea Bajau.’ Today, some Bajau Laut still blur the line between Bajau and Bajau Laut, living on houseboats in port towns such as Semporna, Malaysia, or living along the eastern coast of Sabah and only occasionally venturing out to sea. Still, the majority of the Bajau Laut live at sea in transborder regions, beyond the reach of many Malaysian state institutions.

The Bajau Laut’s aquatic home outside of traditional territorial delineations results in the Malaysian government’s reticence to extend them the rights of citizenship, electing to prioritize strict immigration policy over provision for the Bajau Laut’s needs. Malaysian immigration policy makes no distinction between undocumented immigrants, stateless people, refugees, and asylum seekers, because Malaysia is neither a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention nor to the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Combined with the Malaysian government’s characterization of the Bajau Laut as illegal immigrants and recent transplants, the Bajau Laut have little protection from arbitrary arrest and no guarantee of legal due process. Indeed, their stateless status impairs the wellbeing of the Bajau Laut in many ways, for, as Greg Acciaioli, Helen Brunt, and Julian Clifton explain in the Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, “where only ‘genuine’ or ‘authentic’ citizens have access to civil registration, education, legal employment, and affordable health care, groups such as the Bajau Laut face insurmountable barriers when even attempting to register their births.” Beyond this, new discussions surrounding environmental protection areas intersect with the Bajau Laut’s subsistence, for it is entirely possible that fishing in traditional areas may be banned under new protections dictated by a political process that the Bajau Laut are deprived any say in. The alterity of the Bajau Laut was heightened by the ‘Tanduo Incident’ in 2013, wherein rogue Filipino militants invaded eastern Sabah, and the Malaysia military was forced to intervene. Following this, fears of foreign incursion and migration control efforts intensified, damaging the Bajau Laut, who are perceived as outsiders by the Malaysian government. A security zone established in the sea between the Philippines and Borneo following the Tanduo Incident restricts all nighttime sea travel, limiting the Bajau Laut’s ability to both work and live in waters in which some have spent their entire lives. This security zone increased the number of undocumented migrants in neighboring areas of Indonesian Borneo, plausibly the result of Bajau Laut attempting to comply with the curfew. Yet, Indonesia deports these undocumented immigrants to Malaysian Borneo, where Malaysian authorities may subsequently deport them again to the Philippines, with all governments involved persistently avoiding the root cause of the problem: a lack of adequate state capacity to accommodate populations who do not fit into traditional territorial ideas of statehood. As further explained by Acciaioli, Brunt, and Clifton, “against a backdrop of ultranationalism, ethnocentrism, and the politics of alterity, groups such as the Bajau Laut, living in…the ‘ungoverned periphery’ of contemporary nation-states, are rejected as ‘outsiders’ and subjected to either forced sedentarization or expulsion.” Categorizing the Bajau Laut as ‘outsiders’ allows governments to justify choosing the solution nearest at hand and increase border security rather than undertaking the more difficult process of expanding state capacity to extend the rights of citizenship to the Bajau Laut.

Prioritizing Belonging over Borders

Beginning the work to end statelessness entails a three-pronged approach, wherein national birth registration programs must be established to ensure that all people born within nations receive citizenship, regional funding mechanism must be established to prevent implementation costs from inhibiting birth registration programs, and, most importantly, nations must prioritize belonging over borders.

Expanding birth registration addresses statelessness at the root, laying the foundation for a future without statelessness. Any initiative seeking to expand access to birth registration must not only expedite the registration process, but also build state capacity to reach populations on the fringes of tradition state power, such as the Bajau Laut and the Thai hill tribes. Birth registration initiatives should focus on areas and times where their efforts will yield the most benefit, such as at marketplaces on holidays when remote populations are likely to congregate. Technology should concurrently be used to increase awareness of registration campaigns, utilizing the types of technology that remote populations are most likely to have access to, such as radios. Registration programs must also be open to adults in order to retroactively address those who were not registered at their time of birth. Cambodia exhibits the efficacy of a robust state effort to prioritize birth registration. A team of 13,000 people was trained to begin a massive registration campaign, transforming the nation from having less than 5 percent of births registered before 2000 to having 91 percent of all people registered by 2005, with an astounding 7 million people registered in the first 10 months of the initiative. Crucially, the program coordinated cross-cutting participation from the entire population, including monks and school teachers. Registration was also made free for newborns and financially accessible for late registrations, ensuring that poverty would not preclude citizenship. Funding from the Asian Development Bank also rewarded those volunteers who registered more than 100 people, ensuring high participation. The important role of the Asian Development Bank in the success of Cambodia’s registration drive highlights the importance of funding mechanisms.

Nations must be enabled to enact birth registration programs without fear of sacrificing other national initiatives through regionally coordinated funding mechanisms. ASEAN’s regional immigration agreements focus almost exclusively on skilled migration, neglecting to address the prevention of statelessness. Adopting a regional policy on statelessness is difficult because ASEAN operates based on consensus, yet establishing a regional funding mechanism to allow nations to independently undertake their own birth registration programs would conform to the ‘ASEAN way’ of emphasizing national sovereignty. ASEAN is not the only multilateral organization that should fund such initiatives, given that the problem extends far beyond the organization’s bounds, as evidenced by Bhutan, which is not an ASEAN member. Given the incongruity of Southeast Asian states’ ratification of international conventions, a funding mechanism could also enable a regional review of legal shortcomings.

Above all else, a new conception of the nation state must be promoted that emphasizes citizenship as an inalienable right, transcending legal structures that currently reinforce ethnic nepotism and the patrilineal passage of citizenship. While it is impossible to entirely transcend the divided sovereignty of the global nation state system, it is possible to reconceptualize ‘belonging’ as a right for all people rather than a guarded quantity.  Thailand is a clear example of a successful reconception of the right to statehood as universal. The 2008 Civil Registration Act confirms a jus soli idea of citizenship, with all children born in Thailand receiving Thai citizenship, regardless of the status of their parents. While questions still linger regarding the total implementation of this law, with populations in remote areas often still not receiving birth registration, this legal change is a crucial step to eliminating statelessness in Thailand. Indonesia also took a productive step in the year 2000 when it naturalized 110,000 stateless ethnic Chinese living within its borders. Fearful nationalism can be stifled by a destigmatization of migrants and a change in tone in the rhetoric surrounding migration. Rather than discussing the ‘threat’ of migrants, political leaders and media outlets should make a conscious effort to emphasize the ‘deservingness’ of all people of a set of basic rights, including citizenship. Too often, nations conflate people's’ identity with their right to belong, as was the case in India after partition, where Hindus were assumed to be Indian and Muslims were assumed to be Pakistani, regardless of their actual place of residence. Acciaioli, Brunt, and Clifton expound that “such policies, based on the necessity of extruding an alien ‘Other’ to bolster the sense of security of an increasingly demoralized citizenry, have contributed to the increasing pressures to deny political belonging to groups such as the Bajau Laut.” Nations must adopt the not-so-radical stance that all humans deserve to belong somewhere, and develop policies that reflect such an attitude. Citizenship cannot be restricted to pass through only one parent, as this perpetuates pernicious gender disparities. Legal structures must ensure to remove all exclusionary requirements from citizenship, such as requirements of any specific ethnicity, religion, or language. The development of the state capacity required to permanently end statelessness can only occur through a shift away from a fearful nationalism that emphasizes border security to a progressive nationalism that extends the right to belong to all people.

Opium, Stability, and Conflict in Afghanistan

Now it is well known that when there are many of these flowers together their odor is so powerful that anyone who breathes it falls asleep, and if the sleeper is not carried away from the scent of the flowers, he sleeps on and on forever. But Dorothy did not know this, nor could she get away from the bright red flowers that were everywhere about; so presently her eyes grew heavy and she felt she must sit down to rest and to sleep. . . . "If we leave her here she will die," said the Lion. “The smell of the flowers is killing us all.
— The Wonderful Wizard of Oz

Opium, in addition to being the milky white liquid found inside the capsule of the opium poppy flowering plant papaver somniferum, is also the lubricant for the Afghan war economy, which fuels a four decade long conflict that has killed over two million people. Over the last three decades, poppy has become a pillar of the national economy, an adhesive binding the insurgent Taliban to their rural support base, a cancer hobbling the Afghan government’s legitimacy, and a representation of a failed NATO counterinsurgency campaign. As long as top-down policies seeking to curb poppy cultivation fail to interact with the highly localized political economy of the opium market, Afghanistan will continue to face significant threats to national and human security.

Despite its highly local origin as a subsistence crop, opium underpins a vast transnational market steeped in geopolitics and economic globalization. Opium is harvested across rural Afghanistan, namely in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, where farmers use small curved blades to ‘mine’ the liquid, which then solidifies to be sold in bulk to local trafficking networks. During the second stage of production, traffickers transport raw opium to laboratories in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia for refinement. These supply networks grew out of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) when the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies identified the cross-border opium trade as a channel to deliver funds and arms to the anti-Soviet mujahideen. At the peak of the conflict, Pakistan accounted for 70% of the world’s heroin supply. However, the resulting corruption, instability, and public health crisis prompted a government crackdown in the 1990s. Widespread law enforcement action generated the ‘balloon effect,’ a widely observed phenomenon whereby efforts to disrupt supply while keeping demand constant simply ends up exporting illicit markets to neighboring regions with lower production costs. Refinement shifted to Afghanistan and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), where the Russian mafia proved to be an eager partner. Today, chemical firms based in India, China, and the European Union (EU) export the necessary precursors to these labs, such as acetic anhydride, to convert raw opium into opium base, white heroin, and varying degrees of brown heroin. From there, the refined product moves overland towards the Pakistani coast and Turkey, or by air to Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, before reaching cities like London and New York.

Opium is a high value-added industry. According to the UNDP, farmers harvesting poppy receive less than 1% of the profits, with the remaining divided between 2.5% to local dealers, 5% spread across transshipment routes, and more than 90% to established criminal networks in the global north. While the selling price for heroin in a city like Washington, D.C. is fifty times greater than the value received by Afghan farmers, the revenue still represents a crucial lifeline for Afghanistan’s rural poor. In 2000, around one million Afghans generated US$100 million by cultivating poppies. In fact, poppy generates between one third to one half of total GDP, with benefits accruing to both the rural poor who harvest the crop and urban traders who are involved in transshipment. Poppy is much more than a simple economic industry. It stems from a weak formal market, poor post-conflict infrastructure and irrigation (the Soviets devastated agricultural infrastructure during their counterinsurgency operations to deny the mujahideen a sustainable rural support network), weak value-added chains, and an absence of micro-credit strategies. To this day, informal money lenders in rural areas, who provide much needed credit to the agricultural sector, demand guarantees in the form of opium stocks, and many rural households keep their savings in raw opium. Therefore, the Afghan poppy economy represents a complex socioeconomic phenomenon with far-ranging political impacts.

As an important symbol of socio economic issues in Afghanistan, the opium economy was bound to become involved in the country’s many conflicts. In his seminal work, On Guerilla Warfare (论游击战), Mao Tse-Tung defines revolutionary warfare as the combination of guerilla tactics and political ideology, with broad popular support underpinning both. While the Taliban have not always operated as a purely guerilla force, they have used classic insurgent tactics for most of their existence and therefore maintain a complex but deep relationship with their rural Pashtun support base. Despite their conservative zeal and hardline form of governance, the Taliban are major proponents of the opium economy. While the production and use of hashish is strictly forbidden and punished harshly, opium production is justified since heroin is allegedly only “consumed by kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans,” according to Abdul Rashid, former head of the Taliban’s anti-drug force in Kandahar province. A cursory glance at heroin addiction rates in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan dispels this claim, and the true reason for the Taliban’s embrace of the poppy industry is likely a strategic necessity rather than an ideological choice.

When the Taliban first emerged in Kandahar and Helmand provinces in 1994, they opposed poppy cultivation on ideological grounds and banned the activity, resulting in a significant drop in local production. However, the resulting backlash threatened the nascent insurgent group as alienated Pashtun farmers increasingly turned to the powerful Akhundzada power-brokers for protection. The Taliban, fearing the loss of their support base, reversed course and began offering security to farmers in return for zakat, or religious taxes, of up to 20%. During the following years, they became deeply involved in the opium economy, raising revenues of between US$50-200 million annually. Their participation extended across the supply chain. Many fighters provided labor, working part-time as farmers before returning to fight after the spring harvest. Local commanders levied taxes in return for assurances of protection and transnational criminal groups paid a flat rate toll to ensure safe shipment.

The Taliban’s early embrace of the opium economy led to rapid market growth. Licit and illicit markets are fairly similar, and both require stability to operate, which the Taliban provided through harsh yet predictable rule. As they expanded across the country, the risk of predation by capricious warlords fell, encouraging farmers to invest in long term poppy cultivation and traffickers to develop new transshipment routes. This significantly affected the global opium market. From 1992 to 1997, poppy cultivation per hectare in Afghanistan grew by 25% annually. By 1997, Afghanistan surpassed Myanmar as the world’s largest opium producer, accounting for more than 50% of the global supply of heroin at a market value of US$3 billion. However, the Taliban abruptly reversed course in 2000. In a unsuccessful bid to receive international recognition from Western states, Mullah Omar declared a nationwide ban on poppy cultivation, resulting in a dramatic 75% drop in the global supply of heroin. While deeply unpopular, the long-term effects of this policy on Taliban control were interrupted by the 2001 U.S. invasion and removal of the Taliban government.

In post-American invasion Afghanistan, the Taliban, having returned to classic insurgent tactics, use the opium economy to financially and politically sustain their campaign of violence. Opium is their largest revenue stream, accounting for 40-60% of total funds. Beyond direct revenue, the political economy of opium provides them with crucial political capital. Using the same narratives adopted to delegitimize the abusive mujahideen warlords during the 1990s, the Taliban now contrasts itself against the highly corrupt and extractive ruling Afghan government and the overly harsh counternarcotics policies adopted by NATO forces. The Taliban’s shift between banning poppy, supporting it, re-banning it, and supporting it once more appears to be a response to varying degrees of their control over the country. When the Taliban wages insurgent warfare against dominant forces and lacks a comparative advantage in physical resources, it taps into local grievances to win popular support, which in the case of rural Afghanistan, is rooted in the poppy fields. However, once it maintains a monopoly on force and lacks immediate foes, it can afford to take controversial stances like poppy cultivation to achieve external benefits. Therefore, the Taliban’s stance on opium should be seen neither as a function of ideology nor profit seeking behavior, but rather a rational response to structural constraints. Simply put, if the Taliban needs resources and cracking down on the poppy economy is costly, the Taliban will embrace opium.

While the Taliban were quick to realize the importance of cooperating with the opium economy, NATO faced a far steeper learning curve. Early on, they correctly identified economic security as one of the two pillars needed to legitimize Hamid Karzai’s Western-backed transitional government. The opium economy threatened this due to its deleterious effects on good governance and its tradeoff with formal market activity. However, the resulting counternarcotics policies failed to address the importance of poppy cultivation to rural Afghans who as a result, would once again become a crucial support base for the Taliban.

During the initial years following the 2001 invasion, the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) initiated a massive poppy eradication campaign undertaken by DynCorp-trained Afghan security forces. Despite an initial 21% decrease in cultivation by hectare, total opium output only fell by 2%. Success was largely limited to Nangarhar province, while the rest of the country saw widespread unrest in response. In Kandahar province, local backlash put a halt to eradication efforts after only 217 hectares of poppy were destroyed. This pattern continued throughout the duration of the Bush presidency, generating alienation among rural Afghans. Under President Obama, counternarcotics policies were tailored to avoid this backlash by selectively focusing efforts on high-level, Taliban-linked trafficking instead of more widespread, subsistence poppy cultivation. Extremely high levels of corruption in local government doomed the policy from the start. Local power brokers who were assigned by ISAF to implement these strategies were often deeply involved in the opium market themselves and used their newfound power to target their competitors. As a result, the Afghan drug market vertically integrated as local elites consolidated their control over the market and increased their profits. Meanwhile, poor farmers, unable to pay bribes, watched their yearly production and household savings wiped out by eradication efforts.

NATO planners have yet to find a sustainable counternarcotics policy. While poppy cultivation grew significantly under the Taliban government, it boomed following the U.S. invasion. Rare successes occurred when popular local leaders credibly partnered with outside support to suppress poppy cultivation. In Nangarhar province, Governor Haji Din Muhammad and Police Chief Hazrat Ali credibly threatened farmers with jail time to ensure large-scale eradication of poppy fields, resulting in a 96% drop in cultivation. However, coercion is only one side of successful eradication, as provinces with the highest reductions in cultivation, including Nangarhar and Badakhshan, also received the highest amounts of alternative development funds. Even within the development side of counternarcotics, major problems remain. Alternative livelihoods programs, designed to replace poppy cultivation with legal crops, are extremely limited and give little relief to farmers who can see their incomes drop by up to 80%. These programs are designed to start out as quick-impact, cash-for-work projects before evolving into long-term development, but rarely pass the first stage due to insecurity and local corruption. Since many Taliban fighters are part-time laborers, the (overwhelmingly male) workers recruited are no less likely to lay down their arms permanently. High levels of local corruption worsen this trend, since spending on alternative development programs increased in response to upcoming elections, with few incentives to see the projects to completion.  Under NATO administration, a lack of engagement with local political economy and power structures resulted in failed counternarcotics policies across rural Afghanistan with opium production growing steadily as Kabul’s legitimacy plummeted.

At the heart of these problems is government corruption, as Afghan officials are deeply involved in the opium economy. Corruption goes all the way to the top. Until his assassination in 2011, Ahmed Wali Karzai, brother of former President Hamid Karzai, was widely seen by the U.S. government as the key facilitator of the Afghan heroin trade. Government bodies designed to fight drug trafficking, like the Ministry of the Interior, are fully compromised, with one police commander in eastern Afghanistan receiving US$400,000 monthly from heroin smuggling. This widespread graft explains how locally tailored eradication campaigns become tools for criminal expansion. While criminality and corruption can be sources of stability in some parts of the world, as power brokers use their profits to fund public goods, Afghan warlords and government officials are extremely abusive, even by international standards. Afghan elites use the resulting instability for personal benefit. Foreign actors operating in insecure provinces are more dependent on local power brokers while local instability provides a convenient cover for violent criminal expansion. Before his death, Ahmed Wali Karzai and then Governor of Nangarhar province, Gul Agha Sherzai, blamed the Taliban for the wave of assassinations targeting local officials and businessmen, creating a front for the bloody power struggle between them for control over provincial-level illicit networks. Massive government corruption, bolstered by drug trafficking, seriously undermines conflict stabilization efforts by weakening government legitimacy, hobbling the emergent legal system, and leeching off development funds. Worryingly, Afghan populations that report the highest levels of local and national government corruption also exhibit significantly higher support for the Taliban. In fact, the Taliban have recalibrated their messaging in post-invasion rural Afghanistan with a focus on government corruption, promising justice and proper governance in return for support.

Without successful alternative development programs, the security implications of eradication are extremely worrying. Alienated farmers halt intelligence sharing with NATO forces and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). With their economic base eroded, rural communities witness increased competition and conflict over land, water, and humanitarian assistance. When security forces destroy opium stores, representing household savings, deeply indebted farmers resort to selling their daughters as child brides for income or fleeing to Pakistan. Economic refugees fleeing deep rural poverty often end up in camps near the Pakistani border where young men are easily recruited to local madrassas, which serve as crucial recruitment hubs for the Taliban. Therefore, poorly planned eradication campaigns undermine both state and human security.

The international communities’ misfires on counternarcotics policy sacrificed an important opportunity to promote economic development, engage with rural Afghans, and bolster Kabul’s credibility. If the Taliban and the Afghan government reach an agreement under current peace talks, and NATO forces withdraw, the international community has a vested interested in promoting human security in Afghanistan. Even if elites agree to a political compromise, the recent history of the opium economy shows that successful transitions away from poppy require stability at the local level and a broader understanding of local corruption. Colombia’s peace process provides some lessons for how peace agreements can positively transform illicit economies. The international community must walk a fine line between substantial support for rural development and avoid exacerbating corruption at the local level. Here, working on a community-level to engage in visible development could help test models of alternative livelihoods that are gender-inclusive and sustainable before being reproduced at the provincial or national level. Crop substitution must be voluntary and provide ample time for farmers to fully transition. Given the role of local corruption in preventing such policy solutions, the international community must prioritize anti-corruption as part of any development initiatives. All of these require careful considerations of local dynamics, as past initiatives highlighted the perils of well-intentioned national campaigns that backfired spectacularly at the local level. The most important steps to take may begin at home, with Western governments working on reducing heroin demand to drive down profits for trafficking networks and increasing the attractiveness of legal crops. The international community has a strong interest in addressing the severe security and public health threats posed by the global heroin trade. In doing so, security and development experts must keep in mind the overused but relevant adage by Rep. Tip O’Neill, that “all politics is local,” and ensure that efforts to eradicate Afghan poppy cultivation be rooted in broader development and anti-corruption initiatives.

Kissing Kissinger: The American Love of Foreign Policy’s Most Dangerous Mind

It is negligent to engage in a discussion of contemporary foreign policy without mentioning former Secretary of State Henry M. Kissinger. Kissinger, a Jewish refugee, became a household name during the Cold War era when he served as President Nixon’s secretary of state. Kissinger is considered by many contemporary scholars and politicians to be a leading statesman and one of the most well-known faces in the sphere of foreign affairs. Indeed, Kissinger’s tenure as secretary of state had a global impact still visible in countless countries. However, while Kissinger was an influential thinker, it is critical not to overlook his policies in the global south and how quickly he condoned acts of violence within these regions.

Henry Kissinger first came to the United States as a Jewish refugee after escaping Nazi Germany with the rest of his family. From his humble immigrant roots, Kissinger quickly rose to the center of US politics, serving as secretary of state and national security advisor under the administrations of Nixon and Ford, respectively. In 1973, Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize for his involvement in negotiating the ceasefire to end the Vietnam War. However, Henry Kissinger is perhaps best known for his work in opening up relations with China, and establishing a friendly rapport with one of the world’s emerging powers. His’s legacy extends far beyond his career as secretary of state. Indeed, Kissinger established a formidable reputation as a dramatic diplomat, and influenced diplomats within the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. To this day, Kissinger is considered by many to be the leading voice in foreign policy analysis. While Kissinger’s influence has extended across continents and decades, not all of his actions resulted in the bettering of the world and the spread of so-called American ideals of freedom and justice. Although scholars excuse some of his more controversial policy decisions, saying that few policies stand the test of time, Kissinger’s policies and actions affected not just people in the past but also those very much in the present. To this end in addition to his impressive diplomatic career, Henry Kissinger also demonstrates how not to be a statesman.

Kissinger reached the height of his career during the Cold War - his reach far and widespread. In order to analyze the impact of his policies on a detailed level, it does not suffice to give a brief view of his involvement in different countries and regions. Rather, this analysis will focus on Kissinger’s impact within South America in order to give a more comprehensive explanation of who Kissinger and his beliefs really are. During the 1970s and 80s, fearing the spread of communism, the US government and the CIA helped back right-wing governments and organize military coups to oust leftist governments they felt posed a threat to U.S. interests.

In 1973, with funding and training from the CIA, Augusto Pinochet and Chilean military forces led a coup to overthrow the Salvador Allende, the first democratically-elected socialist leader. Throughout Pinochet’s bloody 17-year dictatorship, over 25,000 people were tortured and more than 3,000 were ‘forcibly disappeared.’ Kissinger, far from seeing Pinochet’s regime as a human rights concern, assured Pinochet that he “...did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende.” In order to address the communist wave that was threatening to flood Latin America, Kissinger played a key role in green-lighting Operation Condor - a joint military operation with far-right dictatorships aimed at capturing and torturing political dissidents. Henry Kissinger did not play a observatory role within the dictatorships in Latin America, rather he was an active accessory to regimes that were responsible for murder, torture, and forced disappearances. In a memo from 1976, Kissinger urged Argentina’s military junta to act faster to establish government authority, “before U.S. opposition to its human rights violations gained momentum.” As secretary of state, Kissinger not only had the authority to approve US involvement in these coups, but to also further aid and encourage the individuals committing mass human rights atrocities.

Kissinger’s Latin American policy establishes him as de facto co-conspirator in the numerous coups d’etats and military dictatorships that quickly took root in Latin America. Immediately after the Argentine coup, Kissinger recommended increased security assistance. As a result, the US Congress approved 50 million dollars in security assistance to the junta, with an additional 30 million granted at the end of the 1967. Decades later, Kissinger refuses to cede culpability for the ramifications of his actions within the region. In a recent interview, Kissinger stated that “...when the charge of war criminal becomes an accepted form of discourse, the prospects of national cohesion disintegrate. Diplomacy loses its flexibility and strategy its force.” It is not always simple to rationalize past policies but in this example, Kissinger demonstrates that ethics and morality are desirable only as long as they don’t become a nuisance.

Latin America still faces the consequences of their dictatorships, visible in everything from social institutions to public policy. In Chile and Argentina, families still seeking justice for their murdered loved ones have been calling for decades for the prosecution of those at the top who allowed these atrocities to occur.  Ali Beydoun, of the Washington College of Law, brought forth a lawsuit against Kissinger on behalf of Chilean victims seeking reparations for wrongful deaths. While many academics still study and promote Kissinger’s ideas, many members of the global community have become outspoken in their characterization of Kissinger as a war criminal. Most famously, Christopher Hitchens wrote a book and produced a documentary entitled “The Trial of Henry Kissinger” where he explained the case for Kissinger to be charged for international crimes, among which war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture. Hitchens also went as far as to argue that Kissinger himself was directly involved in the kidnapping and murder of Chilean general René Schneider, one of the actions leading up to the military coup. Schneider’s family also attempted to sue Kissinger for his murder, but were also unsuccessful.

The primary issue in any analysis of the legacy and global impact of Kissinger is howto weight the value of both the good and bad he his policies and advise contributed to across several presidential administrations. Many continue to praise the statesman for his “opening” of China to the West as well as his role in the end of the cold war. Meanwhile, Kissinger’s fingerprints are clearly imprinted on the landscapes of Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as in the shadows of the thousands of persons disappeared under the military dictatorships in South America. The evaluation of whether Kissinger is inherently good or evil lies involves asking some of the hardest questions in the heart of politics, ethics, and world affairs -  what actors matter, whose lives have more worth, and to what extent is the West willing to justify the death of innocents as a just tradeoff for the winning of wars, the spread of democracy, and US global hegemony.

The Deficit the EU Should Really Worry About Is Not Fiscal – It’s Democratic

Earlier in February, the European Commission – the executive arm of the EU – published a report outlining a pessimistic economic outlook and persistent substantial market risks in the region, with the projected real GDP growth rate under 2 percent for 2020. The report came at a time the strength of European institutions is tested not only by poor macroeconomic indicators but also by declining citizen confidence in the ability of supranational governance to be transparent and accountable. According to a 2018 Eurobarometer poll, less than two-thirds of Europeans are satisfied with the opportunities for individual citizens to participate in political life. More alarmingly, voter turnout for the European Parliament elections has fallen by over 30 percent since 1980s and now constitutes only 40 percent of the EU population.

Weakening citizen trust – the main symptom of the EU’s growing ‘democratic deficit’ – and worsening economic performance are, however, not just coinciding with one another by chance. The perceived legitimacy of the EU, more so than that of the majority of political arrangements, is highly dependent on its delivery of satisfactory economic results to member-states. Economic self-interest, as illustrated by Britain’s break from Brussels, is a powerful driver of both regional integration and disintegration. Despite the limitations of examining the European project through a performance efficiency lens, the notion that a single common market – with standardized regulations and supervisory mechanisms – is good for member states continues to prevail in explanations of the EU’s emergence and survival.

The 2010 crisis, low levels of growth, high unemployment, and Italy’s current standoff with Brussels over its 2019 budget all undermine result-based legitimacy of the EU and can leave lasting damage on its authority. National governments and the public might be prompted to question the economic desirability of staying in the Union. While unlikely to follow the path of the UK and withdraw completely, countries can potentially model their conduct after Italy and undermine the internal cohesion of the EU by disregarding its rules.

No less urgent are concerns about the transparency and accountability of the European system of governance, oftentimes perceived as an elitist, unelected technocracy. Many citizens believe that supranational decision-making is becoming only more inaccessible to them due to its increasing complexity. The worsening of regional democratic deficit manifests itself in lower voter turnout and overall weaker citizen support for the European project.

The perceived failure of regional institutions to provide member-states with clear and otherwise unattainable economic benefits and the unresponsiveness of EU governance to the concerns of ordinary citizens both pose a major threat to the continuous success and even survival of the European project. However, the debate surrounding these two shortcomings of the current institutional setup not only tends to overlook the interconnectedness of the two issues but oftentimes portrays democratization of regional governance and economically optimal outcomes as being at odds with each other. From the ancient Greeks to the modern-day libertarians, the ‘short-sightedness and ignorance’ of the masses are cited as the reasons institutional arrangements – especially in spheres so technical as fiscal and monetary policy – should be protected from excessive popular influence if they are to yield desirable results. In the sphere of European economic and financial governance, however, the opposite seems to be true.

The undemocratic procedures by which European budgets and money are managed erode not only citizen confidence but the performance efficiency of European institutions. Greece provides perhaps the most telling lesson in the importance of transparency and accountability in economic governance on the national level, which is no less applicable to supranational institutions. It was, after all, falsification of data on the levels of sovereign debt that triggered the country’s crisis in 2010 and its subsequent spillover into the rest of the eurozone. The Greek government’s failure to accurately report on the country’s financial standing led to dramatic downgrades of Greek government bonds and overall reduced the attractiveness of the country’s financial markets.

That same year, several EU audit institutions published a joined report that acknowledged the importance of fiscal transparency and proper oversight of public finance management in crisis prevention and mitigation. Following the financial turmoil of 2010, a new strategy for the development of the European Monetary Union (EMU) identified “democratic legitimacy and accountability” as one of the five building blocks forming a more robust monetary system. All in all, EU officials seem to be coming to the realization that democratic accountability is more than a just complementary dimension of political legitimacy. It is an essential component of a sound economic and financial structure, upheld by both voter and investor confidence.

The unwillingness of technocratic elites to introduce democratic controls to the procedures that govern EU’s financial and monetary affairs will only strengthen the appeal of populism. Arguments pointing out the benefits of a technocratic form of governance over national economies and public finance are typically underpinned by the assumption that the average voter cannot be trusted with control over her country’s power of the purse. Such contempt for the ordinary citizen is what gives validity to claims like that of Michael Grove, who, at the height of Brexit, announced that the UK people “have had enough of experts.”

What makes technocratic arguments more dangerous is their propensity to shy away from the evident need for greater economic and financial literacy among the populace. Aside from the established associations this form of literacy has with countries’ national prosperity, citizens with a clearer understanding of the issues discussed away from the prying eyes of the public have better chances of becoming legitimate participates in policy debates that affect their everyday lives. It is, of course, unreasonable to expect an ordinary European to acquire the technical expertise necessary to understand all the intricacies of fiscal and monetary affairs of their countries and the EU, yet unelected officials deliberating on vital issues behind closed doors out of an irrational fear of the masses should seem no less absurd.

The Electoral College – The Good, Bad, and Ugly of our Democracy

Although the electoral college is widely regarded as an undemocratic system, and some even advocate its removal, its critics offer scant few alternatives that accomplish the same goals as the electoral college. Around 65 percent of Americans support electing the president solely by a national popular vote, with just one-third of the country still supporting the electoral college. The people advocating for the abolition of  the Electoral College are correct in saying that the Electoral College method is not democratic in a modern sense. The Constitution states that “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.” It is these electors who elect the president, not the people. When you vote for a presidential candidate you’re actually voting for a slate of electors, but each party selects a slate of electors trusted to vote for the party’s nominee (and that trust is rarely betrayed).

Some opponents of the Electoral College point out its failure to accurately reflect the national popular vote. This has to be one of the biggest and most known issue with the electoral college - it doesn’t determine who wins by popular vote and sometimes popular vote is different than how the electorate votes. The elections of 1876, 1888, 2000, and  2016 produced an Electoral College winner who did not receive at least a plurality of the nationwide popular vote.

Opponents also say the distribution of Electoral votes in the College tends to favor people in rural States. This is because the number of Electors for each State is determined by the number of members it has in the House (which more or less reflects the State's population size) plus the number of members it has in the Senate (which is always two regardless of the State's population). If you look at the election of 1988, for example, the combined voting age population (3,119,000) of the seven least populous districts in Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming carried the same voting strength in the Electoral College (21 Electoral votes) as the 9,614,000 persons of voting age in the State of Florida. Each Floridian's potential vote, then, carried about one third the weight of a potential vote in the other States listed. Another way the Electoral College fails to accurately reflect the national popular vote stems primarily from the winner-take-all system where the presidential candidate who wins the most popular votes in the State wins all the Electoral votes of that State. This makes it extremely difficult for third-party or independent candidates to make much of a showing in the Electoral College. If, for example, a third-party or independent candidate were to win the support of even as many as 25% of the voters nationwide, they might still end up with no Electoral College votes at all unless they won a plurality of votes in at least one State. And even if that candidate managed to win a few States, his support elsewhere would not be reflected.

Despite these shortcomings, the Electoral College does have its benefits. While it is true that almost all states award all their electoral votes to the winner of the popular vote in the state and it is also true that because the Electoral College weighs the less populous states more heavily, it is possible that the winner of the electoral vote will not win the national popular vote. However, critics of the system fail to recognize that this happens very rarely. It happened in 2000 when then Vice President Al Gore had more popular votes than President George W. Bush, yet fewer electoral votes. It also happened 16 years later, in the 2016 election, with Secretary Hillary Clinton receiving more popular votes than President Donald Trump. However, these were the only two times since 1888 where the winner of the popular vote differed from the winner of the electoral college. We also have to consider several factors before just getting rid of this important facet of our republic. We also have to keep in mind that this is a system run by people, so there are bound to be a few flaws in it.

The Electoral College also provides us with a clear winner, with no run offs and no recounts. Let’s say the country had a system where just the popular vote could produce a winner. What would happen if each candidate gets a very close margin of victory, like what happened with President Obama and then Governor Romney in 2012. This could (and probably would) provoke some sort of an outcry and there would be runoffs, unrest, and uncertainty. Presidents Nixon and Clinton, in 1968 and 1992 respectively, both had only 43 percent of the popular vote so they had to rely on the electoral college to determine winners in both cases instead of having to use run offs.

The Electoral College also keeps a system of fair representation and ensures smaller, rural populations get a say.  Let’s go back to the 2012 Election of President Obama. President Obama swept the urban metropolises, getting 3.6 million more votes that Governor Romney in just Chicago, Philadelphia, New York City, and Los Angeles. If we went by popular vote President Obama would have easily won solely because these places are more populated and areas that aren’t metropolises would have been overlooked. Also, it is not as if the electoral college took away victory from President Obama in this election, as he did get 3.2 million more votes than Mitt Romney which the college reflected.

Our current system also makes sure we get a transregional president. Not one region has power to elect president, so each region and their specific needs are not overlooked. The Electoral College takes the midwest, north, northeastern coast, west, the west coastal, south, etc… into consideration. If popular vote was the decider, two possible situations could arise. Candidates would have to really travel around the whole country multiple times. This means candidates would need a lot more money to finance all this traveling, giving PACs and people with more money more leverage, more pull, and more power in our elections. Or you could see a situation where candidates would have no motivation to campaign in rural and less-densely populated areas, so they would only go to cities. Without the electoral college, no candidate would visit certain states like Idaho, for example. Elections would become more about reaching out for money or the places with the biggest populations and become less need and issue based.

There is also a lot of talk on keeping the electoral college, but changing it. One option for reform that gets floated around is the congressional district plan. The congressional district plan will allow one elector to be chosen by the voters for each congressional district, while an additional two, representing the two “senatorial” are allocated to each state regardless of population, would be chosen by the voters at large. If the vote results in a tie, whichever candidate won a plurality of the district votes would win. If the electoral vote count still failed to produce a winner, the plan would require the Senate and House to meet in joint session to elect President and VP by majority vote, with each Member having one vote, from the three candidate tickets winning the most electoral votes. Nebraska and Maine currently implement the district method of allocating electoral votes; Maine has never used it, though, since all candidates who have won the state swept its two districts, while Nebraska split its electoral votes once, in 2008, when Obama won one district. Breaking up electors by congressional district would get rid of winner take all, but you would need to ensure districts are drawn properly and fairly.

Another plan for reform is the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. This compact would be an agreement between states to award their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote.  The compact is designed to ensure that the candidate who wins the most popular votes is elected president, and it would come into effect only when it would guarantee that outcome. As of February 2019, it has been adopted by eleven states and the District of Columbia. Together, they have 172 electoral votes, which is 32.0% of the Electoral College and 63.7% of the 270 votes needed to give the compact legal force.

The Electoral College doesn’t guarantee the president elect will have received the most popular votes, but it does guarantee we have a president with substantial popular support and their support will not be restricted to one region of the country or to metropolises. In just five of the 58 elections we had, the winner did not have the popular vote so at the end of the day how bad and how undemocratic could this system really be?

An Appeal to Geneva: Racial Politics and Discrimination at the Founding of the United Nations

Human rights often pose a paradox - foundational human truths, such as freedom from oppression and discrimination are arguably some of the most contested rights in the world, spanning all continents, all countries, all races, all religions, and all peoples. Human rights were formally institutionalized by the United Nations in 1948. The UN definition of human rights inaugurated norms of such basic rights and the prioritization of them within a Western context and notions of world order post-WWII. With human rights established for the first time, it is important to be critical of the time frame and historical significance of political and societal culture of the West - most notably in the United States with racial segregation. With the US playing a critical role in the creation of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), by-products of politics and racism - the UN Declaration of Human Rights at its founding is inherently racists and discriminatory. How the UN defined, wrote and prioritized the UDHR and subsequent application of the declaration, fail to acknowledge the oppression and human rights abuses in the United States. The United States is insincere in regards to the role the US played in the creation and policies of the United Nations UDHR. The United Nations was created at a time when basic human rights were being denied to many citizens of African, Asian, South American and Indigenous descent in the United States. Forced segregation, Jim Crow laws, mob lynching and institutionalized racism, classism and sexism were experienced across the country. With a particular look at racism and the creation of the United Nations, a sense of injustice, inequality and Western ideology are at the core of the founding of the institution that represents the world. With the United States being the most influential leader in the creation of the United Nations, it is important to scrutinize the role the U.S. had in the creation of the institutional flaws of the UN.

The United States has one of the most complex and paradoxical histories of a democracy; built on the enslavement of Brown and Black bodies. Institutional racism will be defined and used within the context of the U.S. “...as the policies, programs, and practices of public and private institutions that result in greater rates of poverty, dispossession, criminalization, illness, and ultimately mortality of African Americans. Most importantly, it is the outcome that matters, not the intentions of the individuals involved.” This definition comes from African and Black Diaspora scholar, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor. The fight for racial equality has been present in the US since the founding. Similarities between Frederick Douglass’ 1852 speech, “What is the fourth of July to a slave?” have similar tones to W.E.B. Dubois’ Introduction to Appeal to the World: A Statement of Denial of the Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress (The Appeal). While a key difference from 1852 to 1947 was that slavery was unconstitutional in 1947, the rough 100 years, however, did little to change the oppression and institutionalized racism of Brown and Black bodies in the United States. However, with the creation of the United Nations as an international institution, a mode of redress was able to be amplified beyond the borders of the so-called Land of the Free. An Appeal to the World began the foundational movement for future Black power and race-related rights to be addressed, recognized and contemporary ideologies to be contested through the use of international institutions such as the UN on an international level. The elevated attention and body of nations allowed for racial oppression in the U.S. to be heard on a much larger platform than previously in human history.

The Appeal

The Appeal was not the first document presented to the United Nations on the racial oppression and discrimination in the United States. On June 6, 1946, the National Negro Congresses (NNC) petitioned the United Nations’ Secretary General’s Office with A Petition to the United Nations on Behalf of the 13 Million oppressed Negro Citizens of the United States of America (the Petition). This 15-page petition outlines the “economic, social, political, and physical machine of oppression” experienced by Black bodies in the U.S. The Petition was distributed and gained positive responses around the world from Bolivia to the West Indies along with support from American groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). While the NNC was known for communist ideologies, the U.S. Government and primarily the FBI tried to discredit the Petition as communist propaganda and ‘un-American’. The UN required evidence to be gathered as proof that the rights of African Americans were being violated. Because of the organizational structure of the NNC, collection of evidence was almost impossible for the organization and the Petition was dropped. The NAACP leaders Walter White and W.E. Burghardt Du Bois’ inspiration came from the Petition and began to craft their own appeal. The chair of the Human Rights Commission was Eleanor Roosevelt, who was also on the Board of Directors of the NAACP, Du Bois and White believed they had a fighting chance at the idea and believed Roosevelt would support their work (Anderson 2003, 93).

The Appeal to the World: A Statement of Denial of the Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress was written by W.E. Burghardt Du Bois; Earl B. Dickerson, Milton R. Konvitz; William R. Ming, Jr; Leslie S. Perry; Rayford W. Logan and presented to the United Nations

On October 23, 1947. Where the Petition was ideologically driven, it failed in being able to provide the appropriate structure that was required by the UN. The Appeal was able to fulfill the instructional bureaucracy, provide in-depth analysis and evidence, all while creating a compelling argument. The Appeal sought to change the way in which rights were conceptually understood and realized in the racial context of America. A movement and discourse to change from civil rights to human rights. The discourse was all within the freedom and equality struggle not just in the U.S. but racial equality around the world. Scholar Carol Anderson emphasizes that this was a critical move because equality from the perspective of white America and institutionalized racism understood equality as a slow progression to ‘equalness’ rather than the literal definition of equal. Through the conceptual shift to human rights, Du Bois then contends that the greatest threat to the US is within its own racist ideology. Du Bois gives a powerful introduction stating that, “When will nations learn that their enemies are quite as often within their own country as without? It is not Russia that threatens the United States so much as Mississippi; not Stalin and Molotov, but Bilbo and Rankin; internal injustice done to one’s brothers is far more dangerous than the aggression of strangers from abroad.” While history agrees with Du Bois in the importance of dealing with domestic issues, it is important to acknowledge that while simplistic, slavery, the Civil War, lynching, police brutality and racism at this time had killed more Americans than the Cold War ever did and ever would (including any proxy wars). The Appeal is a 94-page document and history of the grievances of Black and African-Americans organized chronologically; providing examples of oppression and discrimination. Organized by chapters from the USA's founding to pre-World War I; Black Legal status since WWI, present Black legal status from WWI to WWII; Patterns of Discrimination in Fundamental Human Rights; and concluding with the efforts made by the UN for Human Rights and rights of Minorities. The Appeal provides basic statistics, facts, and evidence, most of which was in the NNC’s Petition but dramatically expanded upon. The international component not only points of the hypocrisy of Western nations in DuBois stating that,

To disarm the hidebound minds of men is the only path to peace; and as long as Great Britain and the United States profess democracy with one hand and deny it to millions with the other, they convince none of their sincerity, least of all themselves… Most people of the world are more or less colored in skin; their presence at the meetings of the United Nations as participants, and as visitors, renders them always liable to insult and to discrimination; because they may be mistaken for Americans of Negro descent...

A critical aspect of The Appeal was the lack of state sponsorship, and the US had zero intention of sponsoring the document. While the African-American Black populations was larger than the population of some member states in the UN, the Petition was nonetheless dismissed as a domestic grievance and inapplicable.

The symbolism behind both the NNC’s Petition and the NAACP’s Appeal was one of the first instances of requesting redress beyond and acknowledgment of oppression within your own state to an international audience. The Petition and The Appeal at the time were politically disruptive towards American Foreign policy because of the danger of UN jurisdiction over “domestic affairs” and Cold War politics. The Soviet Union used America’s failings in racial equality in political attacks against the U.S. and democracy. On June 22, 1946, India filed a complaint with the UN with the South African Apartheid Government over racial discrimination laws that violated treaties. The Union of South African government claimed the mater outside the jurisdiction of the UN and that no internationally recognized human rights existed at the time.The matters of jurisdiction, defined and recognized rights became ever more a political discussion. Scholar Mary Dudziak emphasized the idea that if Apartheid human rights violations were enforceable by the UN, subsequently Jim Crow laws could be next and vice-versa. The U.S. had no interest in allowing for that to happen and neither did other nation-states’ such as Union of South Africa that had human rights violations occurring in their country and used what power they had to influence the UN to think and act in the interest of the US.

The Impact of the Appeal

The Appeal set into motion key Cold War ideological debates as well as provided a new international platform for the oppression of African-Americans and Blacks’ voices to be heard. One key and important response that The Appeal had was that of Eleanor Roosevelt’s refusal to be present and disdain to have The Appeal be presented to the United Nations. Roosevelt herself, who was a known critic of racial discrimination, refused to acknowledge The Appeal in fear of what The Appeal would do to America’s fight against communism. Her concern was sound in that the Soviet Union proposed that the NAACP’s charges be investigated. “On December 4, 1947, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights rejected the proposal, and the United Nations took no action on the petition”. The image of the US as a racial opressor, however, remained a significant battle for US foreign policy during the Cold War. As scholar Mary Dudziak points out in her book, Cold War Civil Rights, “If the [US] could not eradicate the conditions that gave rise to foreign criticism [racism in the US], it could at least place them ‘in context’... Rehabilitating the moral character of American democracy would become an important focus of Cold War diplomacy”. And so the United States, rather than foundational challenging and changing the racialized country created justifications and defenses for post-WWII segregated America.

The Appeal to the World not only significantly pointed out the flaws in American democracy, but the document also inspired documents of the like to be continuously presented to the UN. The petition, We Charge Genocide was presented to the UN in 1951 in Paris. We Charge Genocide created a linkage between police brutality and the inhumane targeting, profiling, and killing of a group of people based on notions of race specifically in the United States. The petition argued that police brutality crimes should be punishable by the UN Genocide Convention. The Appeal, and the subsequent We Charge Genocide created a notion for future Black Power leaders such as Malcolm X who in his famous speech, The Ballot or the Bullet in 1964 directly calls out the UN and highlights the need to define the oppression and the Civil Rights movement as a human rights issue, which appeared as well in the Appeal to the World.

Conclusion

“To forget them, to pass lightly over their wrongs, and to chime in with the popular theme, would be treason most scandalous and shocking, and would make me a reproach before God and the world”. - Frederick Douglass

To apply to modern times, to not acknowledge and scrutinize the motives, power politics and manipulation by the United States’ interest into the foundation of the creation of the first human rights laws is a server injustice not only the people whose human rights were violated but to also concede defeat to the belief that human rights only apply to certain people. While An Appeal to the World did not address, restore or equalize the rights of African-Americans and Black people in America, it did foster the scholarship and language in regards to how racial rights and therefore human rights are discussed in the context of the US. However the question remains, does the United Nations, or any international organization, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) serve in modern notions as a platform for human rights denials to be heard and addressed in the United States? Answering this question requires a realistic analysis of these institutions - particularly looking at the UN and ICC, two institutions based on the protection and defense of human rights. The hope of redress through the United Nations in 1947 was also centered on the hope of international support from South American states and in recently decolonized states in Africa. With the development of power and politics within the last 50 years - the hope of redress through the United Nations, in particular, is less likely.  In regards to the ICC, the United States while signed the Rome Statute, that instituted the ICC, never ratified it and thus ICC does not have jurisdiction unless the United States consents to involve the ICC. Institutions such as the UN and ICC are forces of good and do valuable international work. While the creation of the United Nations was groundbreaking, it is critical to be mindful of the process that still needs to happen. The concepts and arguments created in The Appeal and in the formation go beyond the domestic sphere through international institutions and politics. Progress has been made, in that the UN now has a committee on The Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the United States is recognized as an obvious violator of racial equality. Racial inequality still exists in the world and in the United State. With movements such as #BlackLivesMatter, the fight for true equality continues.

Hope, Fear and the Unknown in Thailand’s Upcoming Elections

This March, Thailand is scheduled to have their first elections since the military coup of 2014. As the election date approaches, there is hesitation on the legitimacy of the voting process that will occur in the coming weeks. Thailand has experienced multiple coups, this one being the twelfth successful instance  since 1932. The most notable ones occured in 1991, 2006, and with the most recent coup occuring in 2014. Since the 2014 military coup, norms and expected behaviors have not followed the previous pattern of the other military takeovers. The typical script being: coup takes over power, control over broadcasting and media entities, a parade of military power, and then the drafting of a new constitution with promises of elections within a year. However, the transitional government established after the 2014 coup was unprepared, taking five years before scheduled elections - which are officially scheduled for Sunday, March 24, 2019.

The history of Thailand’s government and civil society is one still trying to figure itself out – constantly tilting from dictatorial conservatism and democratic rule. Thailand has brought forth the vibrant democratic values seen in the 1997 Constitution. However much civil progress has receded in the past 20 years with Thailand now shifting more towards authoritarianism.

A key player in Thai politics is Thaksin Shinawatra, the influential leader of the Pheu Thai Party and former prime minister. Thaksin was elected as prime minister in 2001 and represented an unprecedented victory in elections. Thaksin came into power by optimizing elector support, a seeming obvious in politics, however a tool that went unused and propelled him to the highest office. After the victory in 2001, the Pheu Thai party has won the past five elections only to be forcibly removed by courts or Thai military in 2006 and 2014. The Pheu Thai Party is known for authoritarian practices, dismissal of checks and balances, and human rights violations. The 2006 coup, also known as the ‘good coup’ was an attempt to re-democratize Thailand, however, the 2011 election of Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra brought back the authoritarian practices that lead to the 2014 coup. Both Thaksin and Yingluck are in self-imposed exile, however, Thaksin’s influence in Thai politics is still seen today. The newest Constitution, a product of the 2014 coup, has attempted to remove the influence of elected officials and place more power into the hands of the military.

It is important mentioning that other motivations for this upcoming election might have, in part, to do with Thailand hosting the 2019 Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit this June. Placing Thailand on an international stage will invite international attention and scrutiny if these upcoming elections go poorly.

The Political Parties and Presidential Candidates:

The belief that this election will be any different from the past is hopeful yet hesitant. The political map of Thailand is currently being contested by three key parties as the elections will be held on March 24th. The suffrage age is 18 in Thailand and it is a compulsory system.

Palang Pracharat Party is the current political party in power, led by current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and backed by the military. This party was established in 2018. Along with Mr. Prayuth, deputy prime minister Somkid Jatusripitak and party leader Uttama Savanayana will have their names on the ballot in the general election.  Leaders of this party lead the 2014 coup and have been pushing the election date farther back in order to ensure fair elections as well as for their own benefit as they gain political support.

Pheu Thai Party’s The political ties to the controversial former of prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is both damaging and attracting depending on the point of view. The party, however, picked Viroj Pao-in as the representative for the general election.

Thai Raksa Chart party has connections to the Pheu Thai party as well as to former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The Raksa party is preparing to nominate Princess Ubolratana, the older sister of King Vajiralongkorn. She was stripped of her royal title when she married an American, so notions against speaking ill of Thai royalty/sacred monarchy no longer apply to the princess. King Vajiralongkorn decreed that her bid was ‘inappropriate.’ The combination of her royal past and her connection to Thaksin made her an unpredictable candidate both in intention and popularity in turning the election in her favor. Ubolratana was disqualified from the elections by the election commission and the Thai Raksa Chart party is now in process of termination via the election commission requesting the constitutional court to officially dissolve the party. The Court is expected to rule against Thai Raksa Chart.

Democrat Party is currently being lead by former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva who served from 2008 to 2011. Unique to Vejjajiva was that he was born in the United Kingdom and Western educated. He is known for being outspoken on corruption and authoritarian rule. It is believed that the Democrat party is the least popular among the key players and compromised/concessions would have to be made in order for the party to rise to power.

Assuming, free and fair elections, it is hard to say who will win the majority in the elections. With the current actions of the Thai government, even the legitimacy of elections is in question. The incumbent power and revised constitution give the military or Palang Pracharat Party more of an advantage, especially if the Thai Raksa party is officially dissolved and ineligible to enter new candidates in the election. The nomination of Princess Ubolratana of the Thai Raksa party and her connection with Thaksin and Pheu Thai party made her an unpredictable candidate and inherent threat to the Palang Pracharat Party. With Ubolratana now not a contending candidate, the influence of the military in current government and media outlets, the likelihood of current prime minister, Prayuth Chan-ocha of the Palang Pracharat Party to remain in power is shaping up to be the result. Which begs the question - is this democracy?

Conclusion

The Thai people have experienced constant frustration in the lack of true representation as well as corruption within Thai politics. Elections are not going smoothly. Since the beginning of 2019, protests have sprung up in an attempt to raise awareness on constant delaying of elections; Thai military has suspended a TV station critical of the military and the expected dissolution of a major contending political party. Free and fair elections are critical in developing a true democracy. At the core of this is the dismissal and denial of civil rights given to the Thai people under a ‘democratic rule’. In a Democracy, the citizens are the most important political actors in the state. In Thailand, citizens are becoming increasingly irrelevant and disregarded as political actors. As these power politics play out, hope, fear and the unknown remain as Thailand heads to the polls.

A Pattern of Apartheid: Human Rights Violations Against India’s ‘Untouchables’

The international community is no stranger to discrimination that is largely driven by ideological, racial, and social differences. Rooted in long-standing Hindu tradition, India’s caste system is a form of social stratification in Southeast Asia. Despite its longevity, the system is inherently discriminatory and unjust, specifically towards the Dalit people, India’s original inhabitants who gave themselves the name in the 1930s. However, despite banning the practice of “untouchability” in 1950, inequality is still perpetuated in India through the caste system. Even with India’s efforts to slowly stop using the ancient system, the Dalit people specifically suffer immense human rights abuses as a result of the caste system’s hierarchical structure and regressive ideology; these violations include freedom from violence, the right to health, and equal treatment before the law.

To understand the extent of these social, economic, and political abuses, the Dalit case will be compared with that of the infamous South African Apartheid; in both of these situations, extensive human rights abuses were performed through a system of segregation. Ultimately, as a result of the similar nature of the two cases, the following question is proposed: is there a valid case to be made that the blatant violence, discrimination, and abuses against the Dalit people equates to apartheid? When examined closer, the research reveals that the widespread and systematic discrimination against the Dalits, as a result of the social caste system, has indeed led to social, economic, and political human rights violations that mirror those of South Africa under apartheid.

Racial Discrimination: South African Apartheid

To better understand the human rights abuses against the Dalits, it is essential to examine violations that took place during the South African Apartheid. The apartheid movement in the mid to late 1900s, enforced by the National Party government, was an ideology that called for the separation of the various racial groups in South Africa; it was a social system that sought to marginalize and oppress the “non-whites.” The legalization and subsequent implementation of this ideology resulted in massive, institutionalized human rights violations. The most identifiable violations were South Africa’s unwillingness to uphold freedom from violence, the right to an adequate standard of living, and equality under the law.

The freedom from violence, according to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment.” During the apartheid era, South Africa violated this international human rights norms through the use of police brutality as a response to political demonstrations. For example, in the case of the black township of Sharpeville in 1960, the police fired into a crowd of unarmed black protesters, killing at least 67 and injuring more than 180 people. Additionally, as a result of the protests and the government’s various terrorism laws, most resistance leaders were captured and executed a year later. The 1967 Terrorism Act, in particular, was a crucial piece of legislation that gave immense power to the police, assisting the government’s battle against “terrorists” by allowing the police to target specific individuals who resisted the apartheid system. However, it is crucial to understand that while this law was crafted as an anti-terrorism law, it essentially allowed the government to become “an instrument of terror” themselves against the non-white citizens of South Africa.

The apartheid era also saw a violation of the international human right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of [oneself], as defined by Article 25 of the UDHR.  During apartheid, hospitals were segregated by race. While whites enjoyed pristine, clean, and functional institutions, black health facilities were subjected to underfunding along with a lack of proper resources and staff. Furthermore, the use of the migrant labor system, which drew black African men to the cities for jobs while prohibiting them to reside in “white” urban areas, also violated the right to health. These men were forced to live in nearby rural areas where there was inadequate access to clean water, electricity, or emergency services. Ultimately, the South African government prevented black South Africans from acquiring proper housing, sufficient food and drink, and satisfactory health services, thus demonstrating that this apartheid sought to discriminate in all different aspects of life.  

Lastly, there were widespread and systemic violations of the right to equality before the law where all “are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination.” The entire system of apartheid manifests this violation, as the granting of rights, privileges, and protections by the state was primarily based on racial categorizations. This act of separation by the white supremacist government was inherently a violation of the right to equality, as being black automatically eliminated an individuals’ rights and opportunities. In the end, all of these human rights violations are consequences of apartheid’s racial segregation; by separating the various racial groups in South Africa, the white minority was able to implement an ideology of inequality and discrimination that privileged one group and systematically abused the other.

Social Segregation: The Dalits

There are many similarities between the racial segregation in Africa and the system of caste oppression in India. India has had a long history of casteism, and even in the current era of rapid modernization, the Dalit people in particular still remain outcasts with little social mobility. Deemed to be part of the lowest caste and the “untouchables” of society, the Dalits continue to suffer from discrimination and oppression due to the structure of the caste system. While the cultural and historical contexts of India and South Africa are remarkably different, there are numerous parallels between the human rights abuses committed against the Dalits and black South Africans under institutionalized apartheid.

As mentioned previously, the Dalit people face immense discrimination and violence as a direct result of their birth status, much like how the brutality against black individuals in South Africa was caused by their race. In investigating the violation of the right to freedom from violence, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) found that “de facto segregation of Dalits persists” as a result of the systemic abuse, including torture, extrajudicial killing, and sexual assault against the population. This violence is often carried out by the police and government, who face little to no consequences for the actions taken.

This violation of the right to be free from violence is not a new phenomenon, as the Dalit people have faced caste-based violence and discrimination for decades. However, as India modernizes and Dalit protest movements begin to grow, violence has subsequently increased as well. For example, between 1995 and 1997, CERD found that 90,925 cases that were registered with the police were designated “crime and atrocities” against scheduled castes, most notably the Dalits due to their low social status. Furthermore, because the Dalits are often hesitant to report the crimes, or simply unable to due to police intimidation and the possible ramifications of reporting, the actual numbers and statistics may be much higher.

Further, research shows the full extent of the abuse. As CERD’s Shadow Report detailed, 58,000 cases between 2001 and 2002 were registered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, legislation that makes it a crime to abuse the Dalit population and the tribal community. These abuses, because they are widespread and systematic, highlight the prevalence of the issue, as the perpetrators of these crimes are both state and private actors. In a close similarity to the race-based South Africa Apartheid, the hatred towards a particular group, the Dalits, pervades Indian society simply due to their social status in the caste system.

There are also parallels between the violations of the international right to a standard of adequate living; the Dalits suffer from a lack of access to sufficient healthcare services, as well as poor working conditions that result in an increased risk of health-related issues. Akin to the results of the South African migrant labor system, the state intentionally limits Dalit access to government resources and facilities, as well as diminishes economic opportunities to obtain such services due to extreme poverty. Separated facilities such as bathrooms and temples are determined based on one’s caste placement, and the Dalits tend to receive the poorer and less efficient resources if they are guaranteed any rights at all.

In the rural areas where much of the Dalit population resides, residents also suffer from poor electricity, sanitation issues, and few basic amenities that are necessary to survival, such as access to water and adequate housing. The extent of this rights’ violations can be seen in the government response to the Gujarat state earthquake in 2001; it was declared one of the worst natural disasters in India’s history with over one million people left homeless, many of which were Dalits. In the wake of this disaster, the Dalits were victims of aid corruption, poor rehabilitation efforts, and insufficient access to basic amenities like food, water, and housing. Meanwhile, upper-caste populations enjoyed far better shelters, adequate access to aid, and luxuries post-disaster.

The extensive restrictions and actions taken to inhibit and degrade the physical and mental well-being of the Dalit people are a result of India’s governmental structure and the Dalits limited participation and access to positions in the government. In 2014, former Prime Minister Narendra Modi won on a platform promising economic growth and job creation for all, which resulted in tremendous support by millions of the Dalit population. However, political turmoil and the continued alienation of Dalits led to a sense of mistrust in Modi, and in April 2018, hundreds of Dalits held protests in response to a Supreme Court ruling pushing for the implementation of a thirty-year law that punishes atrocities against Dalits despite Modi’s promise of social development. Furthermore, there have also been changes to the Reservation Policy in India’s constitution, a policy that concerns caste-based quotas for government and university jobs. With the changes, there will be a decrease in the number of university jobs available to Dalits. Overall, despite holding office for five years, Modi’s efforts to bridge the gap between castes were met with little enthusiasm by Dalits, who see his actions as political shows that fail to address the real issues of segregation and discrimination, although these issues were present even before Modi took office.

Moreover, furthering this social divide is the rising Hindu nationalism across the country with a focus on “economic protectionism and increased border security,” especially in regards to the influx of Rohingya refugees. Even though he advocated for development for all peoples, Modi’s political ideology centered around increasing the sense of nationalism, shockingly similar to the actions of other right-wing nationalist movements in other areas of the world, including the United States and Europe. Modi’s nationalist goals entailed defining India’s national identity in terms of the Hindu identity, something that much of the Dalit population struggle with as many are converting to Buddhism as a means of defying upper caste mistreatment.

Things may be looking up slightly, however, as India elected new Prime Minister Ram Nath Kovind, a member of the “untouchable” Dalit population in June of 2017. While Kovind is not the first Dalit to be president, what is surprising is that the Bharatiya Janata Party, a predominantly upper caste party, backed his nomination. Yet, despite the limited political development in India, Dalits continue to face immense restrictions regarding social mobility and integration, as caste groups still play a key role in the existence of the divide between Dalits and non-Dalits.

Lastly, in association with the violation of Article 7 of the UDHR guaranteeing a right to equality before the law, the very nature of the caste system perpetuates an unjust and regressive-like ideology that mimics the effects of the racial discrimination in South Africa and ultimately characterizes the Dalits as “lesser humans.” This right, which also grants “equal protection against any discrimination,” is extensively violated. The practice of separating groups into different caste levels based on their social status at birth, a factor they cannot control, is inherently unequal and discriminatory.

Both the Dalit situation and the South African Apartheid share numerous violations in common, the greatest is the fact that race and caste discrimination have been used to divide society into groups, privileging some over others, and that one’s worth is based on uncontrollable factors, namely their race and social status at birth. In both societies, people are born into a role categorized as “undesirable” by those in power, whether that be black or Dalit, that permits discrimination and human rights violations because it was socially acceptable to do so with each respective country.

Conclusion

Discrimination and oppression are not limited to certain countries or time periods. In the case of human rights, violations are widespread and often are repeated throughout history. In South Africa, apartheid was one of the most devastating and impactful rulings of the twentieth century; characterized by riots, violence, and a system of racial segregation, it endured for over fifty years before the formation of a democratic government in 1994. For the Dalit people, the abuse and social exclusion resulting from the caste system continues to this day. While their situation has not garnered international attention in the same way that South Africa did, the comprehensive research into the same three human rights violations within both cases is enough evidence to equate the combined social, economic, and political exclusion of the Dalits to subtle but visible apartheid. Ultimately, the separation of groups based on social status and caste level in India mirrors the separation of groups based on race in South Africa, thus allowing for the use of the label “apartheid” in reference to the Dalits; both are discriminatory policies that result from a system rooted in segregation.

This continued apartheid-like ideology of repression and alienation in India, in accordance with the South African segregation, merely demonstrates the perpetuation of hierarchies, privilege, discrimination, and marginalization in what would be thought of as two very different parts of the world.

Finally Being Seen as an Equal: Chinese Investments in Latin America

In the International Trade War between the United States and China, the two nations are participating in  a geopolitical race through different agreements such as foreign investment, loans, and trade agreements in order to secure their influence across the globe. While the United States and countries in Latin America always had some form of relations, the increasing dialogue between countries in Latin America and China may change the dynamic between the US and Latin America. One way China is attempting to improve its relations in Latin America is through the Belt Road Initiative, a billion dollar investment program which helps funds infrastructure projects to enhance Chinese soft power. With countries such as Chile and the Dominican Republic as members of this initiative, could this ultimately change how Latin American states conduct relations with the United States? Or do these relations with China indicate the start of a new era for Latin America?

The most prevalent way we see the improvement of relations between China and countries in Latin America is though  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which is a practice used by countries to expand their values and social practices in different regions of the world such as Latin America.  FDI is when an individual or a company owns 10% or more of either a stake in a company or a set amount of money overseas. Overall, there are three general forms of Foreign Direct Investments: horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Horizontal forms of FDI describe investors establishing branch offices in foreign countries. A vertical FDI is when business agreements from two foreign companies are made in order for there to be a mutually beneficial result. Lastly, a conglomerate FDI is when a firm makes an investment that is unrelated to their business. All three variations of Foreign Direct Investments regardless of what form they come in benefit receiving countries in some way shape or form. Beyond establishing foreign business branches or investments overseas, FDIs include the distribution of skills and new forms of technological infrastructure that receiving nations may not have original access to. This is one of the multiple benefits that can come out of receiving foreign direct investments from foreign firms.

Over the course of ten years, China has given foreign direct investments to countries in Latin America but have only seen the results of these investments in the most recent years. The sharp increase in investments over the course of the past five years has allowed China to see the benefits of investments from the past decade. The specific case of Chinese investments in Latin America shows the lengthy process it takes for foreign firms to see any form of benefit.

The development of new sectors allows for more investments from different firms to fund innovations. One example of how foreign firms are able to see benefits from their investments from an extended period of time is through the development of infrastructure. Out of the different ways in which foreign investments can help benefit a nation, the development of infrastructure is a prime example of how investments not only improve the quality of the life of individuals in a specific nation but the general economy as well.

Infrastructure gives the basic fundamentals for an economy to function off of. According to the Brookings Institute,  infrastructure is considered to be the “heart” of the economy. Economically speaking, infrastructure allows for the flows of goods to either be increased or at least maintained. Ranging from fundamentals such as paved roads to more complex infrastructures such as telecommunication systems, infrastructure is vital and essentially affects all aspects of production from the workers to the highest level of the firms. This being said, without an established and maintained infrastructure it only makes the economy fragile and unstable. For developing nations, increasing and developing new forms of infrastructure can be quite a challenge.

Although countries in Latin America recognize the importance of infrastructure and how it will benefit their national and regional economy, many countries are still facing several obstacles. Argentina, for example, has infrastructure as their top priority and created different policies which tackle transparency, preparation, and execution. By prioritizing the fundamental planning that is needed to build infrastructure, it gives the nation a higher probability for these projects to not only be completed in a timely manner but sustainable. On one hand, economies like Argentina struggle with the foundational planning, while other countries such as Colombia struggle more on the execution aspect of developing infrastructure. Within the planning of infrastructure projects, there is a percentage that represents the amount of risk involved in developing this new infrastructure. Another important value in the planning is the expected amount of time it will take for the project to be completed. Estimated predictions and high-risk percentages are Colombia’s biggest obstacle. Whether it is a high execution risk percentage or the projects not being completed in a timely order, Peru is in a similar position to Colombia where their biggest struggle is in the execution phase of infrastructure development.

A specific way Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin American nations has attempted to increase the development of infrastructure is through the Belt and Road  Initiative which is a program that attempts to make the world more regionally connected beginning with regional cooperation and then branching out this connectivity throughout different regions. This billion dollar initiative gives money to both developing and developed nations in order to either help begin new infrastructure projects or help finish old projects that were abandoned. Recently, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have become members of this program and as a result of the new membership, countries such as Venezuela and Chile have been able to establish new infrastructure projects due to funding from China. Although the new inflow of money coming in has given Latin American countries new opportunities that were inconceivable at the time, they come at a high cost.

Money that is given to countries from the BRI is similar to a loan in which they need to be paid back in some way. In many instances for Latin America, countries have negotiated for alternative forms of repayment. Ecuador, for example, has negotiated to give China about 80% of their revenues from oil as a form of repayment. Another way Latin American countries have attempted to repay these loans is by taking out more loans which creates a vicious cycle of repayment. It is not clear whether or not many of these newly created projects have been completed, but there are special cases such as in Ecuador where these projects are currently abandoned due to the lack of labor and thorough planning. If there are such high negative costs to these risky loans which do not confirm any infrastructure project why continue?

It is the mere principle of the bilateral negotiations between the Latin American nations and China that make Latin American countries such as Chile and Ecuador to be so willing to agree to such risky terms.  It is worth noting in 2008, China promised the governments of Latin America that they would “treat each other as equals.” This distinction of being recognized as an equal nation is a term that cannot be found in US political documents.

During a time of conflict between the United States and China, Latin America geopolitically was attractive as well as a significant location for both nations. For the United States, more mutually beneficial negotiations between them and Latin American could have possibly secured even more support than already existed. While China, on the other hand, can take advantage of the dependent relationship between the US and Latin America to forge new relationships that do not have a hierarchical underlining to it. With more and more nations joining the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States must realize that Latin America no longer the country it once was. If the United States wants to maintain the relationship or improve upon the relationship they have with countries in Latin America, the United States must be mindful of these contemporary relations and what could become of it. Whether it is revisiting old agreements that have not changed or creating new agreements, if the United States ignores the situation between countries in Latin America and China then countries in Latin America could be looking at their new loyal partner.

The Illiberal West: A New Era for Central and Eastern Europe

In 1989, on the eve of the Cold War’s final chapter, Francis Fukuyama suggested that the world had come face to face with the ‘end of history’ and that the fundamental ideology behind liberal democracy would henceforth be free of any obstacles to global domination. It has become somewhat of a cliché to lambast his theory, but reflecting upon it is important as it succinctly captures the zeitgeist of the post-Cold War era. Many in the West did, and still do, believe that liberal democracy is the single most successful socio-political system; a system which was bestowed upon the people of Central and Eastern Europe in a shared victory over authoritarian Communism between 1989 and 1991. This is part of the reason why liberal democracy’s contemporary losses in the region, notably to Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński, are often received as a shock. While self-proclaimed illiberal nationalists now lead Hungary and Poland, the sentiment they harness is palpable across almost all the post-Communist states which moved to integrate with Western Europe, indicating a broad regional phenomenon. There are various theories as to why these nations are on their current path, but two principal factors stand above the rest: demographic anxiety and a rejection of what European and Western identity has come to mean.

First, it should be noted that economic decline has not played a significant part in this particular rise of illiberal nationalist sentiment, which makes the root factors of the region’s recent political shift distinct from theories explaining Western Europe’s lurch to the right. Poland, especially, has seen exponential economic growth for the past 26 years, and even managed to escape recession during the 2008 crisis. With GDP per capita growing by 6% on average over the past 20 years, it would be difficult to argue that the populace is suffering from economic grievance. This goes without mentioning that the region actually boasts high income equality, even relative to Western Europe. While Hungary has experienced some economic hardship, such as recession around 2008, the rise in illiberal thought across the region is largely unexplained by economic decline.

To fully understand Central and Eastern Europe in the decades following the end of the Cold War, one must understand its demographics. The Economist estimates that around 18 million people, or 6% of Central and Eastern Europe’s population, have left the region since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike past revolutions, in which the losers form the emigrate population, the end of Communism presented a situation in which liberal minded citizens, the winners, were the ones to depart in mass numbers. This alone has made a significant political and psychological impact on the remaining populations, but the demographic issues do not end there. The area also suffers from an incredibly low fertility rate, with the regional average coming out to a rate of about 1.4 children per a woman (the replacement rate, or the rate at which a population maintains its size, is 2 children per woman). This means that not only has the Central and Eastern Europe lost millions due to emigration, but emigrants are also not being replaced. In other words, the region is growing older and shrinking.

With these numbers in mind, it may be easier to imagine why the surge in numbers of migrants arriving in Europe, starting around 2013 and peaking in 2015, was seen by many as a threat to national survival. While almost none of the migrants arriving in Europe aspire to immigrate to post-Communist states, there was widespread fear that they would, and that nations in the region would be unable to assimilate them or preserve their national identity due to the dire demographic situation. This emerged as a driving factor in the popularity of right wing and nationalist political forces. Illiberalism is closely related to this, as skepticism in the liberal model had already begun due to the demographic impacts integration with the West had on Central and Eastern Europe. However, the perceived failure of Western European nations, seen as liberal role models, to properly deal with the migrant crisis significantly increased support for the rejection of liberal democracy, and married the sentiment to the political right.

This rejection of Western European judgment is something that has been festering for quite some time. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has striven to imitate the West and become a part of the Western world in almost every way. Governments in the region therefore allowed judgements according to Western standards, and the remaining populace often felt as though they were in some ways losers for having not left for the ‘promised land’ further west of them. However, the reality is that post-Communist Europe is very different from the rest of the continent. Social values are an important example, as the region is very much more socially traditional than its western neighbors, and while imitating God-loving Reaganite America was appealing in decades past, the West has since changed. Much of Western European and American society now embrace secularism, LGBT rights, cultural diversity, and liberal social values in general. Illiberal movements in Central and Eastern Europe are a response to this, both in terms of rejecting the idea that the region should imitate nations with different values than them, and that it should be the submissive partner in the imitation game. More specifically, they believe that roles should be reversed, and that traditional Central and Eastern Europe is, in fact, the real Europe that should be imitated across the West. This is elegantly expressed in a quote from one of Viktor Orbán’s 2017 speeches, in which he proclaims, "Twenty-seven years ago here in Central Europe we believed that Europe was our future; today we feel that we are the future of Europe.”

However, the differences between East and West go both ways, and there are some issues with spreading Hungary and Poland’s right-wing illiberal model to the rest of the continent. Most importantly is the fact that Orbán and Kaczyński are selling a model designed to prevent ethnic and cultural diversity, rather than to deal with an already diverse population. Despite this, it is very unlikely that European-wide expansion will be given up on easily. Some illiberal leaders, notably Viktor Orbán, seem to understand that the best way to remain in power is to secure the regions and institutions of which they are a part. As Orbán’s Fidesz party constitutes an important member of the largest parliamentary group in the European Union, the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), it is likely that the European Parliament will manifest as an important battleground in this struggle. More specifically, the battle over the ‘soul’ of the broader European center-right will be crucial, as a center-right more sympathetic to right-wing populist and illiberal movements could greatly shift the balance of political influence in favor of post-Communist states.

Broader strategic developments are also important to note when regarding the future of this region, especially as Chinese funds increasingly make their way into the scene. As a wealthy and authoritarian power, China’s rise may provide an opportunity for illiberal nations to reduce their reliance on Western Europe and the United States. Although some countries, such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, express sympathy towards Russia, the area’s traditional influencer is unlikely to regain significant inroads in the region due to financial constraints, as well as historical grievances with important local actors, notably Poland and Romania.

If China does signal greater interest in Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States may need to consider more dynamic responses in order to retain their level of strategic influence. This could take the form of certain concessions, such as reduced criticism of the region’s disregard for “European values”, of which both Poland and Hungary have been accused in the form of article 7 procedures filed against them by the European Parliament. This would resemble treatment towards Ukraine, or Saudi Arabia, which are not liberal democracies yet retain Western strategic support. Another possible strategy is an aim at the deeper roots behind this issue - demographics. Financial and political support for pro-natalist policies in the area could significantly boost the image of Western Europe and the United States in the eyes of the local population, along with a reduction of the demographic anxiety playing a significant part in this phenomenon.

History has come back to post-Communist Europe with a vengeance. This is true both in Fukuyama’s terms, but also as regarding the essence and flavor of the illiberal revolution taking place there. While Poland, Hungary, and other nations in the region have their differences, they are united in a common experience of demographic devastation, a search for identity, and fear in a rapidly changing world. This has lead to a rejection, in various degrees, of the liberal democratic model and the definition of Western identity in terms of social liberalism. This does not mean that Central and Eastern Europe has necessarily been “lost”, especially if Western European and American policymakers begin to demonstrate an understanding of the root causes of these developments, and adapt to them accordingly. However, they should also understand that the region is unlikely to return to its immediate post-Cold War state of mind, and this is ultimately a new era for Central and Eastern Europe.

The United States & Venezuela: Economic Influence, Despair, and One Last Chance

Venezuela, once a booming oil economy, seems to be falling into despair and no one knows when it will end. Many have deliberated about the roots of Venezuela's economic troubles, and journalists such as Patricia Sabga of Aljazeera believe that they are the result of poor economic and political policies, culminating in what could become a total economic meltdown. According to Francisco Rodriguez and Jeffrey Sachs of the New York Times, the Venezuelan economy may be seeing the light at the end of the tunnel as socialist President Nicolas Maduro, largely blamed for current economic woes, is no longer recognized by influential countries like the United States and Britain. Maduro is charged with illegitimately claiming the presidency through staged elections and laws that prevent his removal. Due to this, the United States recognizes the leader of the opposing party, the National Assembly’s Juan Guaido. While this action could alleviate some of the suffering of the Venezuelan people, the same cannot be said for other recent US actions. The essay aims to examine the different recent economic policies that the United States has taken towards Venezuela, their potential ramifications, and positive steps that should be taken.

First, it’s important to recognize the precarity of Venezuela’s situation. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Venezuela is a petrostate, listed alongside nations like Saudi Arabia and Algeria. Petrostates are characterized by weak political institutions, highly concentrated minority power, and economic reliance on exportation of oil and natural gas. Venezuela first struck oil in 1922 and foreign investors flooded in, prompting the government to put more resources into their growing energy economy, including capital and land investments. This move, while creating the groundwork for a successful oil industry, prevented Venezuela from developing other aspects of their economy, such as agriculture. Oil is highly affected by boom and bust cycles. With no other markets to rely on, when the oil market began experiencing economic problems, such as oil companies in other nations entering and exiting the market, the downward spiral became hard to prevent and the economic situation slowly grew more precarious. Furthermore, poor political decisions designed to maintain government power by helping oil industries meant that when oil prices fell in 2014, Venezuela had no money to subsidize the oil industry or invest in other areas of the economy. The Index of Economic Freedom describes the results, including ever increasing hyperinflation (according to Steve Hank of Forbes magazine, a whopping 80,000% in 2018 that is only expected to increase), food and dollar shortages, and political turmoil.  

According to the Department of State, Venezuela and the United States have a long and evolving relationship that officially began in 1835. Their relationship was previously diplomatic, but since the rise of socialist leader Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas Maduro, tensions have risen. Venezuela regularly criticizes American policies and Maduro calls the Venezuelan crisis a Western creation. While the relationship has slowly deteriorated, the United States remains the largest importer of Venezuelan products, importing approximately US $10.9 billion of crude and petroleum oil in 2016. As US dollars become largely unavailable to Venezuelans, US imports continue to decrease drastically, decreasing by 36% between 2015 and 2016, as prices of products become too expensive for Venezuelans to buy. The US continues attempts to give aid during food shortages, but Maduro has rejected every offer. After the United States recognized Guaido as president, Maduro called for a break in diplomatic ties, but the United States refused to recognize his authority by removing American diplomats from Venezuela. The culmination of worsening US-Venezuela relations, the devastated Venezuelan economy and a volatile political situation have led to the current crisis.

President Trump has taken a much more hard-lined approach than President Obama, who was criticized for not doing enough to prevent Venezuela’s economic downfall. Obama’s policies towards Venezuela began with a very soft-lined approach. According to Antonio Delgado of the Miami Herald, the Department of State was hesitant to put sanctions on Venezuela and instead hoped to stabilize the region by creating open dialogue between the two countries. While this was a move designed to maintain peaceful relations, the lack of action likely led to further deterioration. According to Teresa Welsh of U.S. News, when Obama finally issued sanctions against Venezuela for human rights abuses, it widely backfired due to contestation by Latin American nations and Venezuela’s increasing economic precarity. Despite their controversy, Obama’s sanctions only limited visas and froze assets of officials, ultimately having no real impact on the economic situation of Venezuelans. By 2016, it was too late for Obama to help end the Venezuelan crisis, but according to the Washington Post in 2017, there is still hope for Trump.

Trump’s policies put an increasingly tight leash on the Venezuelan economy, with the hope of pushing Maduro to concede the presidency to Guaido. According to Public Radio International Trump’s sanctions began similarly to those of Obama,  targeting high-ranking officials. Slowly, sanctions have also begun targeting Venezuelan oil, with the goal of using economic pressure to push Maduro to allow a peaceful transition. These economic policies have only made Maduro angrier, and with support from the Kremlin, it’s clear that these policies will fail to make a substantial difference in the crisis. PRI continues that on January 28th, 2019, the Trump Administration imposed the harshest sanctions to date, which could potentially cripple the Venezuelan economy for good. These sanctions are aimed at Venezuela’s national oil firm, Petroleo De Venezuela SA (PDVSA) and will currently freeze exchanges and block imports. Furthermore, according to Kenneth Rapoza from Forbes magazine, if Maduro refuses to relinquish control by April 28th, 2019, there will be a complete ban on PDVSA and any oil company that the Venezuelan government owns 50% or more of.

According to Frida Ghitis of CNN news, Trump’s policies could be the solution, but he must proceed with caution. The direction of his policy actions are clear; he won’t stop until the Maduro regime is destroyed, but the outcome of his actions are risky. His policies rely on an assumption that Venezuela’s allies, such as China and Cuba, will not have the means or interest to support Venezuela. It also rests on the assumption the causing such significant damage to the Venezuelan people will be enough to finally overthrow the illegitimate government. If Trump’s plan fails, Venezuelans will likely be left starving in a totally destroyed economy. Only time will tell if Trump’s policies will be successful, but one thing is true: it’s one of the only options outside of direct military action that has not yet been exhausted.   

With a failing economy, Venezuelans are desperately in need of solutions, and since the soft-lined approach failed, Trump’s plan, while viewed by many as rash, may be necessary. The United States’ policies towards Venezuela have yet to be successful, and relations are quickly deteriorating. Oil sanctions are therefore the last peaceful tool the United States can utilize to bring democracy and peace to Venezuela. While there could be significant downfalls if Trump’s proposal fails, it seems to be the only option left which is why Venezuelans and the United States government should cautiously support it.  

Myanmar and the International Criminal Courts: Finding Loopholes in International Law in the Search for Justice

For decades now, the international community has searched for a way to provide justice and accountability when addressing mass crimes against humanity, yet obstacles such as politics, legal red tape, and jurisdictional laws manage to consistently obfuscate this search. The international community struggles to make use of limited resources and abilities to provide relief and aid. In the form of legal action, they are held back by technicalities and jurisdictional issues. As the anniversary of the start of the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar passed in August, an answer to provide justice and an end to violence remains necessary, despite the difficulty entailed in finding such an answer. A solution through the legal system and the International Criminal Court was found. This solution makes use of a technicality within the jurisdictional laws for the court. If successful, working through this ‘loophole’ could finally bring about change for both the Rohingya people and the global community as a whole, creating justice for the victims and accountability towards the perpetrators.

Over a year has passed since the most recent outburst of mainly state-sponsored anti-Rohingya rhetoric and violence has broken out in the nation of Myanmar. The bloodshed led and organized by the country’s Buddhist majority, is targeting the Rohingya people: a majority-stateless Muslim minority who live in the Rakhine state along the coast of the Indian Ocean, near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Although a majority of the 1 million Rohingya who live in Myanmar are able to trace their roots back hundreds of years in the country’s history, they are denied citizenship, political representation, and are considered to be illegal migrants from the neighboring nation of Bangladesh. As a result of this, the Rohingya have managed to form a unified political, ethnic, and religious identity that is strikingly different from the rest of Myanmar’s 135 ethnic groups. Their distinct and solitary culture has led them to face severe discrimination since the 1970s, experiencing everything from the stripping of legal rights to alleged abuses by police and other officials.

In August of 2017, that persecution evolved into the latest wave of extreme violence, manifesting itself in the form of rape, murder, and arson. The violence and attacks have brought about one of the fastest growing and most pressing refugee crises of the 21st Century. The events in Myanmar have led to a mass human migration whose growth rate has reached the levels of and, in some cases, even surpassed other current refugees crises - such as Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and South Sudan - that have been going on for much longer.  In the mere year since the genocide began, over 700,000 Rohingya have fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh, where they now live in overcrowded and under-resourced refugee camps along the border. The intensity of the crisis and lack of response from the Myanmar government has led the international community into a frantic search for a remedy to the violence, and more importantly, justice for the Rohingya.

The question of how to bring aid and justice to the Rohingya people has plighted the international community since the start of the crisis in 2017. On the side of humanitarian aid, Bangladesh itself has devoted large amounts of its already limited and strained resources to take care of the refugees fleeing into its lands. The United Kingdom halted its training courses for the Myanmar military and pledged to provide 59 million pounds in aid resources for those in flight. On the other side of the coin, ASEAN (the  Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has avoided interference. This is due to the fact that ASEAN operates on consensus, and as Myanmar is a member, a full agreement will never be reached; Myanmar will always respond to measures brought to the table with dissent and disagreement. Nonetheless, a majority of the world’s countries have agreed that something must be done to end the violence in Myanmar, something outside of providing food and vaccines. What was needed is legal action in the form of international law.

In March of 2017, the United Nations Human Rights Council appointed a special panel to investigate and document the extent of the crimes that are occurring within Myanmar. A year and a half later, the panel returned with their final report, in which they established that Myanmar’s security forces are responsible for numerous “heinous crimes,” including hate rhetoric, exclusionary policies, imprisonment, arson, expulsion, torture, murder, rape, and sexual slavery. The UN Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar also concluded that the acts committed by security forces amounted to four out of the five acts prohibited by the Genocide Convention - “(a) killing, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm, (c) inflicting condition of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group or in part, and (d) imposing measures intending to prevent births.” With the evidence put forth and determination of guilt made, the panel ended their report by recommending that the international community continue to administer relief aid for the refugees, place greater pressure on the Myanmar government to end the violence and support legal action against the perpetrators. In the case of legal accountability, it was determined that any legal action should be referred to the International Criminal Court for prosecution.

In their twenty years, the International Criminal Court has prosecuted multiple nations and world leaders for crimes against humanity. Although they are more than qualified to perform the job of prosecuting Myanmar and its security forces, they are held back by a technicality in that they do not have complete jurisdiction over the case. Myanmar refused to join the ICC Rome Statute in 1998 and has yet to accept membership in the twenty years since, making them outside of the court’s general jurisdiction. However, on September 6, 2018, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I  found a loophole that allowed them to declare that the ICC does have the jurisdiction to prosecute Myanmar on the crime of the forced deportations of the Rohingya people, as well as any other crime against humanity that they deem applicable. This is due to the fact that although the International Criminal Court is unable to prosecute Myanmar for their actions inside of their borders, they are able to extend their power over the crimes that spilled over the border into Bangladesh, who is a signatory of the Statute. The nation of Myanmar responded negatively to the ‘loophole,’ stating that it goes against the 1969 United Nations Vienna Convention, as well as their general sovereignty as a nation. With the approval of the preliminary court, the case’s prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, plans to continue with her preliminary investigation, which, one would hope, will lead to indictments, arrest warrants, and a trial.

A trial targeting any and all Burmese leaders who are designated through Bensouda’s investigation is a necessity. The idea of international accountability is a relatively new concept, only having come into existence within the last century. Nations often attempt to hold one another accountable through the use of methods, such as trade sanctions, embargoes, and holding of funding. All of these methods hold complex results. In the case of trade sanctions, if not specifically targeted towards a nation’s leaders or elite, the sanctions themselves could prove harmful to civilians and non-impactful to leaders. The ability to create accountability through economic legislation is limited and focuses on merely the beginning or middle of an event, not the end or aftermath. Legal accountability is able to address issues of human rights violations or genocide after they have taken place for long periods of time or even ended. However, due to international law and accountability being relatively new terms, justice and punishment have yet to be delivered in a way that is recognized by the global community, as well as in a way that deters further incidences of human rights violations, particularly ethnic cleansing and genocide. Although Fatou Bensouda and the rest of the International Criminal Court will doubtlessly face a multitude of challenges in their fight for justice and accountability for the Rohingya people, it is a necessity that they do all they can to succeed.  The loophole of going through Bangladesh in order to prosecute its neighbor is a controversial one yet may prove to just be enough to bring about justice for those who have been affected by the actions of the nation of Myanmar and its security forces. Without the loophole, the international community would be extremely limited in their response to the crisis, as they would be trapped with humanitarian aid and economic sanctions being their only options to provide assistance to the fleeing Rohingya. If the trial is successful, the Rohingya may be able to receive justice and a sense of closure and protection from the persecution and genocide that has taken place. However, success may also lead to a debate on the rights of states and whether Myanmar’s rights as a sovereign nation were disregarded or even violated. The case will also play a major role in defining the powers and standing of international law, as well as the International Criminal Court. Whether the trial behind what has become known as the Rohingya Genocide succeeds or fails, it could pave the way for a new era of globalized law and politics, as well as a change in the way that today’s plight of human rights abuses is addressed.

Antarctic Cooperation: Challenges and Benefits to American Foreign Interests

Multinational cooperation plays an essential role in shaping the field of international relations. Throughout the years, countries have been trying to overcome and understand each other’s differences and create bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Nowadays, in Europe, Asia, North and South America, Africa, and Australia, nations have various sets of rules and regulations that all actors must abide by. Those commonly established principles make the cooperation within the continents safe and transparent, as those processes are usually overseen by the international organizations. Nevertheless, there is still one giant and geopolitically significant continent that is left out from the general attention: Antarctica. As the world’s coldest and hardest to reach continent, Antarctica has been attracting scientists and explorers from all around the planet for decades.

Countries, as a result of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, have been granted a right to share and use the continent for “peaceful purposes only.” This means that no nation is capable of owning the whole icy land, it is common by the rule of international law. The Antarctic Treaty requires nations to use the icy continent according to the following principles: “Freedom for scientific research,” “International scientific exchange shall be promoted,” and “Territorial claims shall be held in abeyance while the Treaty is in force.” The United States (US), as one of the most developed nations, has been studying Antarctica since December of 1955 when the first American base, McMurdo Station, was established on the continent.

As time went by, the US and other members of the Antarctic Treaty furthered their influence in Antarctica by increasing the number of research bases and advancing their own infrastructural features on the continent. Additionally, nations have been increasing their budgets, related to the South Pole research and exploration. The United States certainly has national ambitions and goals in Antarctica, benefits that America might not be willing to split with others. However, because of the extreme weather conditions, logistical hardships, and other shared problems, the US, together with other nations, will be better off cooperating with one another within Antarctica despite the political issues, mistrusts, and resource nationalism of the current global order.

Opportunities of Antarctica

The South Pole region is one of the most unexplored parts of our planet that possesses a great amount of material, scientific, and other types of opportunities yet to be utilized. Therefore, the United States together with other nations can get more out of the icy continent by making the Antarctic partnerships with each other. Nonetheless, while cooperating, nations in Antarctica may or may not still act with respect to their own interests and this commitment uncertainty could make the cooperation perspectives less likely. Hence, by being clear about the sharing process of goals and gains that arise from collaborations, countries will be able to have far more trust in one another and eventually achieve significantly more objectives.

The article “The Fight to Own Antarctica” that was written by Benedict Mander and Leslie Hook in the popular publication Financial Times informs the reader that Antarctica has a lot to offer and the issue of sharing the findings may bring up a number of possession related matters between the countries. The authors highlight that “At stake is the last pristine continent, one that contains the world’s largest store of freshwater, huge potential reserves of oil and gas and the key to understanding how quickly climate change will impact the world through rising sea levels.” This excerption has a relatively pessimistic and competition implying message, which is a relevant concern, based on the current global order and long-determined relationships between the world’s most powerful nations. Nevertheless, the same statement may be interpreted as evidence for a different viewpoint. Antarctica has so much to offer that nations will benefit from cooperating and can eventually advance their exploration and gains from the icy continent’s enormous potential. America is capable of leading the common work and cooperation, which eventually can contribute to strengthening the US hegemonic future.

Furthermore, by working together with other preoccupied nations, the United States will get more information and a broader picture of a highly contemporary problem as climate change. Thus, by having a superior comprehension of this issue, nations will be able to orient the essential solutions to the existing causes of the climate change and the primary matter of global warming.

Competitors on the Continent

Our planet has been a gigantic arena where nations compete for resources, power, control, and usually act in pursuit of their own interests rather than the common good; ergo, with its resources and overall potential, Antarctica may become a new battlefield for the world’s leading countries. Nowadays, there are a lot of skeptics of the Antarctic Treaty saying that the agreement needs to be modernized in order to meet the demands of current global order and implement additional regulations on the agreement signing countries.

The Financial Times authors in their Antarctica related article introduce the Royal Holloway, London University’s professor Klaus Dodds, who raises the principal question about the icy continent. The online publication provides an interview excerpt: “Resources have always been the big trigger,” says Professor Dodds. “Once you get more explicit about resource exploitation, then you raise the troubling issue of who owns Antarctica. That’s the issue that haunts the Antarctic Treaty, and the Treaty System more generally.” This concern is not random and has been one of the key talking points of the Antarctica conversations, debates, and international meetings. Professor Dodds does not mention any countries, however, it is clear that the race for resources and other Antarctic prospects might erupt between nations with the most influence in the region, which are the United States, Russia, and China. Therefore, even if America follows all the rules and favors the cooperative way of diplomacy in Antarctica, the US will not have any other option but to join the contest when Russia or China begin the resource race. In that case, we may see the Antarctic Treaty countries form clusters, bilateral groups, or act solely and eventually any likelihoods of multilateral cooperation in Antarctica would be extremely hard to work through.

It is vital to note that countries such as Great Britain, Australia, Norway, Argentina, Chile, France, and many others are also crucial actors in Antarctica with their research bases and various influence giving aspects. Moreover, since the Antarctic Treaty was signed, more and more nations have been developing their technological, logistical, and monetary capabilities and can now join the scene. Whether it will be a cooperative or competitive scene has to be decided by the nations themselves, though it is understandable that the Antarctic Treaty will need to be updated according to the current global standards and preoccupations.

Prospects of Collaboration

Cooperation in Antarctica will most likely benefit the countries with less industrial and technological capabilities on the continent, yet this partnership will also make the nations with significant powers in the region much better off. The United States, as one of the leading players in Antarctic explorations and studies, is and should strive for the cooperation with other countries, especially if such interaction can bring the American side certain optimistic outcomes. The academic article, published in the scholarly periodical The Polar Journal by Georgetown University professor Christopher C. Joyner, touches upon the significance of Antarctica for the United States in scientific, astronomical, and geopolitical ways. The author also mentions the importance for America of the science-related partnership. He argues that “The United States government strives to undertake opportunities for cooperative scientific research to understand Antarctica and other global physical and environmental systems.” Additionally, the writer calls the American efforts a “major national interest.” This statement clearly shows that the United States is open towards various research-related partnerships on the icy continent.

Moreover, the American authorities view the scientific investigations and potential knowledge, gained as a result of Antarctic research, as a vital matter for the whole country. Consequently, by collaborating with other nations in Antarctica, the United States and its researchers will be able to make new scientific advancements, and as Christopher C. Joyner suggests, acquire valuable information to understand the world we live in. The US supports the Antarctic cooperation in pursuit of the scientific discoveries and is willing to create bilateral or multilateral partnerships with other nations on the continent. However, competition between the partner countries is the obvious issue that arises and needs to be addressed, while talking about the prospects of Antarctic cooperation and potential steps that must be communicated along the way.

Real Obstacles

The process of Antarctic cooperation is not easy to commence and even more difficult to stick to; ergo, the matter of trust is vitally important with relation to the partnership formation activities on the continent. Like most situations, cooperation cannot exist without trust between the global actors. Nevertheless, it gets tricky when you have to rely on the collaborator who you have been competing with for a long time. In the article “The WikiLeaks Arctic Cables,” published in the Polar Record, Professor Klaus J. Dodds analyzes and publicizes the confidential American foreign relations records that were obtained and distributed by WikiLeaks. Those documents reveal a great number of conversations, assignments, and exchanges of advice between the State Department of the United States of America, diplomats, and embassies around the globe. The primary reference point of those records is the situation in the Arctic among the North Pole countries. This peer reviewed publication talks about the present issue, related to mistrust of the US and other NATO nations towards Russia, as one of the active leaders in the areas of Arctic research, territorial control, and resource extraction. As a result, such North Pole matter can be compared with the possible course of events in Antarctica.

The author also references the WikiLeaks website and writes, “Under the heading of ‘New WikiLeaks revelations shed light on Arctic oil “carve up”’ it rallied against the ‘new revelations’ by the whistle blowing website WikiLeaks that show how the scramble for resources in the Arctic is sparking military tension in the region, with NATO sources worried about the potential for armed conflict between the alliance and Russia… .’” The publicity of these revealed records did not benefit the United States or its allies. Moreover, American competitors, primarily Russia and to some extent China, among others, got valuable insight information that concerns the NATO countries’ activities, preoccupations, plans, and talks about the North Pole region. The WikiLeaks publication shows that in the Arctic, neither the US and its allies trust Russia or any other potential adversary, nor can the Russian Federation trust their counterparts. This conclusion can also be empirically devoted to other regions of the planet and Antarctica is one of them. Consequently, based on these materials, a reliance-building process between the three strongest Antarctic nations will demand a great amount of diplomatic work and time.

Coexisting in Peace

        It is hard to deny that the United States views other powerful countries, such as China and Russia, as evident rivals because of the decades long competition for global hegemony, resources, and political ideas. However, Antarctica is an immensely different kind of location, as it is impossible to be in power and thus, cooperation has a lot less obstacles. Taking the Antarctic Treaty into account and the possibility of gaining benefits through mutual assistance, the United States should not worry about the threat from other nations. The Global Politics report titled “The Option for U.S.–China Cooperation in Antarctica” by Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng, highlights that the Antarctic matter is not a zero-sum game and there can be multiple winners as a result of the cooperation on the icy continent. The report was published through The Heritage Foundation website and looks at the prospects and American interests from the United States-China cooperation in the Antarctic region. Cheng makes it clear that China is currently one of the biggest actors in Antarctica and will be advancing its influence in future. Beijing is spending more money in the field of South Pole research and Cheng emphasizes it by giving the information about the new Chinese base, which at the time of the report writing (2014) was close to be completed. The researcher affirms, “Once completed [the research station], it will give China one of the largest Antarctic presences. With its Antarctic budget growing from $20 million to $55 million, China clearly has the wherewithal to expand its presence even further.” By increasing the Antarctic exploration spending, China confirms its plans to stay in the South Pole region.

Throughout his report, Cheng stresses that Chinese efforts and advancements in Antarctica does not make the United States or other nations worse off, but rather that there are a lot more resources being spent in that region. So, by having China as a collaborator or a part of a partnership group, the Antarctic Treaty members, especially the United States, will be able to utilize far more joint means as opposed to working alone. Cheng through multiple examples and reasoning, emphasizes that in the South Pole region, cooperation, even with rival nations, has no particular threat for America. Cheng ends his report by concluding that “Consequently, like cooperation in the Gulf of Aden, the Antarctic is an area where the U.S. and China have much to gain through greater cooperation and little to lose. Antarctic cooperation is therefore well worth exploring, to help improve bilateral ties without infringing upon either side’s core interests.”

In his report, Cheng makes it clear that it is necessary to take into account the variation in location when talking about the national and foreign interests of the United States. Thus, relationships between China and America may be quite rival in area, such as South China Sea, Africa, or South America; nonetheless, the affairs in a place like Antarctica may be contrasting. This conclusion may also be used with correlation to Russia and other nations that are not considered allies of the United States. Ultimately, as long as America does not see any particular danger with regards to the Antarctic cooperation, benefits from future partnerships will exceed the possible disadvantages that combined efforts may present.

New Value of the Continent

Antarctica is not owned by anyone and can be freely used by humans in accordance with international law and the Antarctic Treaty; as a result, people all over the world should have equal access to the continent in years to come. While tourism in Antarctica is relatively new in the South Pole area, it is a growing activity. Visitors nowadays are willing to pay large sums of money to experience this pure and magnificent place, that only a small percentage of people have ever been to. An article in Financial Times by Leslie Hook and Benedict Mander reports,

“For most tourists — who pay between $10,000 and $100,000 for a trip — visiting Antarctica involves stepping off the boat at just a handful of highly regulated landing sites. But there are loopholes in the system, such as private yachts that flout permitting rules, as well as a growing number of tours that involve activities such as kayaking or skiing.”

The price, conditions, and available infrastructure of such Antarctic tourist journeys makes it extremely hard for the majority of people to go and visit the continent. Even though, Antarctica is undoubtedly difficult to get to and even more difficult to stay on, people are still capable of making constant progress as technology and our wealth of knowledge advances. Tourism on the icy continent is no different. Hence, this progress can be accelerated by creating new Antarctic partnerships and cooperating groups that will focus on the the processes of getting the general public in and out from the continent. In that case, nations can share experiences or focus on what they have comparative advantage in doing. It is vital to state that the United States may end up collaborating with nations that have a long and not always pleasant history with America and vice versa. As the authors of the article indicate, “The US, Russia and China all have critical infrastructure in Antarctica to aid their global positioning systems.” As the statement implies, the three countries have the dominant positions on the icy continent. Thus, it is logical to assume that for the United States, cooperating with Russia, China, or even both countries can bring the most benefits.

Yet, this potential can have a huge obstacle in its way. Significant political and cultural differences between the three nations, heated by the recent US-China trade arguments and Russia’s condemned behavior on the international arena, may primarily resist and blockade the bilateral or multilateral cooperation in Antarctica between America and the two Eastern countries. However, if the United States, through various diplomatic and scientific channels, were able to negotiate the initial South Pole cooperation deals with its two rivals, the future of humankind may see the totally unexpected outcome. Ultimately, with combined efforts, the overall travel experience, cost, and Antarctic’s own infrastructure can be drastically improved, making the Antarctic tourism more affordable and enjoyable. Also, such cooperation will improve the logistics of Antarctic research, which can upgrade the conditions scientists live and work in.

Nonetheless, the Antarctic Treaty members should also pay close attention to the environmental aspects of their future activities on and around the icy continent. Thereof, it will be essential to connect the future discoveries and progresses with new regulations, agreements, and international “manners”. The Antarctic nations will have essential tasks in the years to come: making the icy continent more accessible for travelers and reducing the environmental risks and problems.

The Antarctic cooperation is a field of international affairs that has not been thoroughly studied yet. Nonetheless, with the extraction of resources, advancement of sea level research, space observations, and Antarctic tourism development, countries will become more and more interested in the icy continent. Eventually, in spite of the different aims, cultures, governmental contradictions, and political hostility, the nations will be able to benefit from the bilateral and multilateral partnerships in Antarctica. Consequently, the United States with its capabilities and interests should not miss out on this opportunity. Moreover, America has all the resources and global recognition to become a leader in promoting, organizing, and maintaining such cooperation. By interacting in the logistic, touristic, infrastructural, and scientific fields, the world’s nations can make much greater progress together than separately. Nations like China and Russia may not be allies to the United States and are usually looked at as rivals.

Nonetheless, with combined infrastructural and other efforts, as well as by letting Antarctica shape new relationships, the cooperation on the South Pole continent is nothing but possible, even between completely different nations. The Heritage Foundation researcher Dean Cheng states that, “U.S.–China cooperation in Antarctica is a positive, admittedly limited, opportunity.” America, by leading and contributing to the partnerships in Antarctica will not only strengthen its own positions and advance its own progress on the icy continent, but will also create an example of a successful cooperation for other countries, which will ultimately benefit the whole humankind. Additionally, relationships and experiences that will be built in Antarctica can become a moving force for similar cooperation in other regions of the planet, making global affairs less hostile and more genuine.

Crisis in Nicaragua

In a letter blaming President Daniel Ortega for driving the country into a “state of terror,” Nicaraguan Supreme Court justice, Rafael Solís, resigned. According to The New York Times, Justice Solís explained that President Ortega did not follow through on his suggestions to negotiate and was pushing Nicaragua down the same path as the Somoza dictatorship they helped overthrow in the 1970s. “The country is not doing well. What is coming is worse,” he warned. With Nicaragua headed in a downward spiral, the United States has begun to step in. It is clear that something needs to change in Nicaragua, but United States intervention may not be the right option.

President Ortega played an important role in the Nicaraguan Revolution. As maintained by The New Yorker, he led the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional — the F.S.L.N., translated to the Sandinista National Liberation Front — in overthrowing the Somoza regime. Due to the Sandinistas’ communist ideology and ties to the Soviet Union, the CIA created the Contras, a rebel group that The New Yorker said ultimately “led to the economic devastation of Nicaragua and the collapse of the Sandinistas’ hold on power.” When President Ortega resumed power, he had created connections with powerful people who helped keep Nicaragua going.

Consequently, the catalyst for the latest “state of terror” began when Venezuela’s economy collapsed and reduced aid to Nicaragua, according to an article by The Economist. The Washington Post said that for a long time, “Hundreds of millions of dollars in cheap Venezuelan oil provided by Hugo Chávez’s government padded the budget and boosted social programs.” After losing the influx of oil and subsequently the aid, Nicaragua’s Social Security Institute was running out of money, so President Ortega proposed some reforms to sustain it. However, the plans announced April 2018 included reducing pensions for retired workers and increasing employer and worker contributions to social security.

In response to the controversial idea, protests broke out and police responded with a strategy that Amnesty International described as “shoot to kill.” Hundreds of people died, mainly due to the police and militias. In addition, World Politics Review said that “at least three public hospitals refused to treat people who were gravely injured during the demonstrations” and “tens of thousands of Nicaraguans have fled into exile.” Many protesters who remained in Nicaragua were arrested.

Next, already swarmed with disapproval towards the government, President Ortega was accused of ordering extreme acts to suppress the media. According to Gulf Times, President Ortega blamed “hate-sowing coup-mongers” for the violence — yet reports dispute that statement. Notably, an article by The Daily Beast reported that the Nicaraguan government tortured a detained protester, Dania Valeska Alemán Sandoval, in order to get her on tape confirming the word of the government. The Daily Beast quoted Sandoval: “They brought one of my compañeros and put him on his knees and put an AK47 to his head.” Later, BBC reported that Carlos Fernando Chamorro, a popular Nicaraguan journalist, was threatened by the government and proceeded to flee to Costa Rica. The New York Times claimed that the government also “expelled teams from two branches of the Organization of American States that were investigating allegations of human rights violations” and shut down certain human rights groups and independent media outlets within the country. Nicaraguans are extremely hesitant to let outside groups meddle in their internal affairs due to the devastating intervention by the United States in the past, however, their own government is not doing them any favors.

Even before some of these incidents were uncovered, many Nicaraguans criticized President Ortega and called for moving up the 2021 elections. It became evident last year that Nicaragua was not moving in a good direction. Nicaraguans worried that the country would repeat history and suffer through a civil war, as evident by the resignation letter of Justice Solís. The economy worsened and World Politics Review stated that the country’s GDP decreased by 4 percent in 2018, even though Nicaragua was already one of the poorest countries in Latin America. To top it off, Nicaraguans felt threatened by their government. For example, Havana Times described how “the presence of police in cemeteries all over the country alarmed Nicaraguans who had arrived to leave flowers on the graves of their deceased family members” and ended up witnessing the arrest of Alex Vanegas, “who remains in jail despite a judicial order for his release.” The Global Observatory clarified that a new Nicaraguan anti-terrorism law “is being used to criminalize political dissent.” People in Nicaragua and abroad noticed the need for change.

Due to the situation, Havana Times quoted people from the “first meeting of leaders of Nicaraguan organizations and groups in the world” supporting United States and other countries’ sanctions against violators of human rights in Nicaragua. Later that month, as stated in The Washington Post, the United States imposed sanctions on Nicaragua’s national security advisor and President Ortega’s wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo. Along with the announcement, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said, “Vice President Murillo and her political operators have systematically sought to dismantle democratic institutions and loot the wealth of Nicaragua to consolidate their grip on power.” Two months later, Reuters reported that the national security advisor of the United States, John Bolton, announced sanctions placed on Nicaragua’s petroleum company: “Through sanctioning PdVSA, the United States has also sanctioned Nicaragua’s ALBANISA, the government’s joint venture with PdVSA and slush fund of the corrupt regime of Daniel Ortega.” BBC said that the European Union threatened to place sanctions on Nicaragua as well. From an outside perspective, it may seem like implementing more international sanctions is the responsible course of action. However, Nicaragua’s ‘state of terror’ stemmed from a crashed economy and further sanctions may just contribute to the existing problem.

Despite protesters and international pressure, the Nicaraguan government revealed in late January that they are implementing the reforms, as reported by World Politics Review. According to NPR, President Ortega claimed to have scrapped the idea after the pushback from protesters, but World Politics Review reflected that “His resolve only appears to have strengthened amid the crackdown” from organizations and governments around the globe.

As France 24 pointed out, President Ortega needs to “understand that if he continues down this path, the only thing that will happen is he will bury his party and every possibility that his regime survives politically," explained sociologist Oscar Vargas. President Ortega has put himself at risk of falling from power in the same way as his predecessor. Furthermore, The Global Observatory explained that the issue in Nicaragua started a bigger complication in the region: “Costa Rican authorities recently revealed that more than 20,000 Nicaraguan citizens have applied for asylum in that country, raising alarms about a potential new refugee crisis in Central America.” Over the past year, it has become undeniable that President Ortega and the Nicaraguan government forced their country into a critical period. Although something needs to be done, it is likely that international action will be detrimental. The United States should hesitate to step in, especially given its dark history with intervention in Nicaragua.

Mumbai’s Slums: The Positives and Negatives

Mumbai, the capital of India’s state of Maharashtra, is a global city that is growing every day. It resides on the western coast of India and is comprised of several islands. It is a city full of rich history, including the infamous colonization by the British in 1924. Today it attracts many tourists, who enjoy seeing the beautiful architecture of sites such as Gateway of India and the Elephanta Caves. Though Mumbai is ever-growing, it has dire issues pertaining to its divide between the rich and the poor living in slum communities. Residents of these slum communities, which are often referenced as “slum dwellers,” make up 52% of Mumbai’s population. Mumbai’s slums represent India’s issues pertaining to overpopulation, access to drinking water, pollution, land space, poverty, unemployment, health, and waste disposal. According to Sunil Kumar Karn, Shigeo Shikura, and Hideki Harada’s Living Environment and Health of Urban Poor, India’s definition of slums is “areas where buildings are unfit for human habitation; or are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, design of buildings, narrowness of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities or any combination of these factors, are detrimental to safety, health, or morals.” The poor infrastructure of slum communities in Mumbai affect other alarming issues, particularly the access to water, overcrowding, and spread of illness amongst residents. These three factors play a role together in creating a negative effect on the growth of these areas. Though these issues are significant and must be resolved immediately, we also need to acknowledge that Mumbai’s slums are often painted in a negative light. Slum communities in Mumbai and across India obtain a sense of independence and community of their own and can sustain themselves. Though the government has not yet implemented effective solutions for the infrastructure of Mumbai’s slums, there can be a brighter future if government deregulation, overseeing, and funding of redevelopment projects are put in place.

The infrastructure of Mumbai slums affects water access for its residents. In Mumbai, slum communities are categorized as either notified or non-notified. According to Ramnath Subbaraman and Sharmila L Murthy’s The Right to Water in the Slums of Mumbai, India, notified slums are recognized by the government and “are entitled to receive security of land tenure, which means that the people who live in them cannot be arbitrarily evicted.” Residents living in notified slums have access to city services and its water supply. Non-notified slums, however, have more difficulty accessing piped water, electricity, public transportation, and other government services. This is because the residents of non-notified slums do not have property rights over their homes, therefore they cannot access municipal water supplies. Almost half of Mumbai’s slums are non-notified, so this clearly impacts a large portion of the population. To become notified, residents must show that they have lived in a slum that settled on state or city owned land before 2000. Mumbai slums owned by the central government do not apply to the notified category despite being settled for decades. For example, the Mumbai slum Kaula Bandar that resides on central government land was considered a non-notified slum despite its existence there for over 50 years.

In Mumbai, there is a chlorinated central water supply that is administered by the government. Residents in non-notified slums have not been able to legally connect to this central water supply system, so they must illegally tap into the city’s water pipes, which creates a risk of cross-contamination. Each year, 30-60% of households get affected by water-related diseases each year, and two-thirds of those households are children. And, because residents don’t boil the water before consuming it, illnesses continue to spread. During the summer, water is often contaminated with Escherichia Coli, which means that the water had been mixed with feces. People residing in non-notified slums were forced to buy water from street vendors, which cost forty times more than government provided water that residents in notified slums paid for. Each person accessed to less than 20 liters of water per day, which is under the minimum consumption level needed for basic hygiene. Unclean water causes diarrheal diseases in children and increases their mortality rate. In addition, the infant mortality rate in non-notified slums such as Kaula Bandar was more than twice than notified slums and 30% more than the rest of Mumbai. Therefore, the inability to access safe drinking water because of property rights and government policy had a major effect on the health of residents.

In 2014, an organization called Pani Haq Samiti successfully pressured the city government give access to Mumbai’s water supply to non-notified slums. They achieved this by looking at the Constitution of India, which states that every human must have the right to water. The Bombay High Court also referenced international human law, which states that it is a human right to have access to safe drinking water and sanitation. The Bombay High Court additionally stated that having property rights of a slum should not determine whether you have the right to water or not. Though this new policy is now implemented, there are still issues surrounding it. For example, the policy states that it is not necessary for the non-notified slums to pay the same price as the other slum communities, and it is not necessary for individual homes in slums to have their own tap connections. In addition, the government wants to completely remove non-notified slums, which would not only take numerous years, but also would incur forced displacement. The Bombay High Court does not have a say in central government land, which is where many of the non-notified slums reside in. The poor infrastructure of the sewage does not help either. According to Sunil Kumar Karn, Shigeo Shikura, and Hideki Harada’s Living Environment and Health of Urban Poor, “In the slums, typically a small narrow gutter (mostly open or partially covered) is found between the rows of dwellings that serves for all types of drainage including the sewage water. Since such drains are also not technically designed and laid out, they often get clogged and water spills over.” Therefore, the infrastructure and the new policy doesn’t particularly solve the problem of access to drinking water or the spread of water-related diseases in slum communities.

Aside from the fact that the lack of infrastructure and policy affects the access to water and health of the residents, housing conditions also contributes to the prevention of growth of these communities. Historically, housing has been an issue in India for over 150 years. It was furthered by Britain’s colonial administration, which did not care about the living conditions of Indians. There has been an analysis of India’s Five-Year Plans from 1951 to 2017. According to Cheryl Young’s Accommodating Housing in India: Lessons from Development Capital, Policy Frames, and Slums, India’s five-year plans prior to 1985 hadn’t mentioned slums and housing together with economic development and social equity. The 1985-1990 five-year plan was the first plan that had “strong human rights/rights-based discourse in the case for housing.” (57) The most recent five-year plan (2012-2017) mentioned that the affordable housing problem is initiated by a “demand-supply gap.” The government created a plan where they would increase affordability by lowering land prices through land readjustment and floor space index. However, there was no specific reference to slums. Throughout the years, projects by NGO’s, private developers, land-owners, and the Mumbai government have endeavoured to redevelop slums. Most of these projects required the demolishing of these communities and building medium-rise apartments over them. However, many of these initiatives were never completed. Efforts ever since 1980 by state appointed committees, such as the Moghe and Awale committee, have promoted policies to improve housing slum housing conditions. In 1991 and 1995, the Slum Redevelopment Scheme and the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme were suggested as well. However, according to Vinit Mukhija’s Squatters as Developers?: Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai, “Previous attempts at increasing the allowed intensity of development in the city were criticized and not implemented because such changes were believed to lead to an increase in the population and, therefore, more pressure on its infrastructure and environmental resources.” Despite the enormous barrier and gaping fear that overpopulation creates for the idea of redeveloping slums, all parties seem to accept the idea of redeveloping, including landowners, private developers, the state government, and slum dwellers themselves. Redeveloping projects would be a positive action that would increase profits for landowners and private developers while making Mumbai look more attractive as a city. To the government, it would mean a higher property tax collection as well.

However, there would also be many risks involved to redevelopment. The property values would have to be high enough to benefit the residents and compensate the landowners and private developers. If property values were to decrease during the construction process, it would negatively affect all parties, especially the slum dwellers because that is where they live. In addition, slum dwellers wouldn’t have a voice in these projects because they are not the ones investing in them. Those who would have a say would be the private/public sectors and non-profits organizations. In an attempt to make projects work, the government prohibited itself from profiting off redevelopment. However, private developers were still asking for financial support from the local and state government because of the high costs and, as Vinit Mukhija says, the “lack of formal institutional support for development (construction) finance.” This would initiate a variety of arguments between the multiple parties, which would further increase the risk of redeveloping projects because of their uncertainty. It is additionally difficult because of the ‘irregular’ structure of the slums themselves. According to Vinit Mukhija’s Squatters as Developers?: Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai, it would be hard to provide basic infrastructure because of the strange layout of the present slums:

The physical structure of their properties can make it difficult for the slum-dwellers to capitalize on the potentially high land values, without some form of change in the physical structure of their properties through land assembly or land readjustment. Moreover, the city’s slum-dwellers are likely to have already built-up their properties with floor areas equal to, or more than, what the legal development rights allow.

In addition, there is a lack of financing for construction and that slums are considered to be ‘risky collateral’ by investors. Lastly, pre-sales, where the buyers would finance the construction in advance, would be tough because of the fear of uncertainty and the lack of institutional funding for construction.  Because of all of these aspects together, there is a lack of attempt by the government and developers to try to improve living conditions of slum dwellers by reforming their homes.

Despite these dire issues, slums should not be seen as all negative. Slum communities, such as the famous Dharavi, create a sense of an independent community. As of 2017, it has been recorded that 700,000 people reside within the 0.8 square miles of Dharavi. According to Sunil Kumar Karn, Shigeo Shikura, and Hideki Harada’s Living Environment and Health of Urban Poor, “… Dharavi have more affection for their present social life and the type of employment, which they fear would be lost otherwise. Environmental problems appear tolerable to them when compared with the degree of social security, their present habitation offered." In other words, despite the problems that this slum community faces, residents still appreciate the unique social networks they create within the area. However, Feargus O’Sullivan’s in In Mumbai, a Push to Recognize the Successes of ‘Informal’ Development states that a Dubai-based firm is trying to demolish this slum and rebuild over it. The source states that “similar redevelopment schemes in other Indian cities have often smashed the heart out of neighborhoods, destroying social and cultural support networks without meaningfully improving conditions for displaced residents or building something sustainable and vibrant.” Dharavi additionally contains about 67 slum communities and holds a variety of identities. Its first settlers were tanners and potters who were part of different communities of numerous religions and caste affiliations. This community was made up of migrants from the center of the city as well as from rural areas of India. According to Jan Nijman’s India’s Urban Future: Views From the Slum, 70% of the population are Hindus (of a variety of sub castes, or jatis), 20% are Muslims, and 10% are Christian. Many residents come from states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh. Despite its diversity and prominent community, Dharavi is ‘untouched’ by the government. It is also difficult for outsiders to determine whether something is a public of private space. The lack of space and over-crowding creates a communal identity because no one has real privacy, which promotes social interaction and networking. Therefore, residents’ identities are ‘place-based’ and communal. In addition, 70% of residents say that the most valued aspect of this area is “community.” Jan Nijman’s India’s Urban Future: Views From the Slum states that “venturing outside their community and its territorial confines is often accompanied by apprehension, stress, and feelings of insecurity." Slum dwellers feel as if they are ‘outsiders’ despite being within a city, which strengthens their own community identity and communal feeling of insecurity. After conducting a study, 93% of residents in Dharavi say they aren’t going to move, and, interestingly, 12% even put their neighborhoods in the slum category. 62% of residents said that their lives improved within the past couple of years. Despite numerous problems pertaining to slums such as Dharavi, residents are satisfied with their lifestyles because they have the social networks to support them.

Though poor infrastructure and negative representation creates a significant barrier for them, slum dwellers can create community identities because they all simultaneously work to survive. According to Laura B. Nolan’s Slum Definitions in Urban India: Implications for the Measurement of Health Inequalities, “A slum is often not recognized and addressed by the public authorities as an integral or equal part of the city." Many sources have stated that the Indian government and media paint slums in a negative picture, not even considering them a part of the city. And, to a certain degree, a slum cannot be involved with the city because it simply can’t afford it. Laura B. Nolan continues to state that “…poor living conditions like those found in slums likely have substantial adverse consequences for productivity and human capital development. Slum residents, for example, spend significant time and resources obtaining water and waiting to use public toilets." In other words, because residents in slums are caught up with trying to survive and sustain themselves, they participate less in the city’s society and its labor force. In that sense, Mumbai’s slums have communities of their own because they are all going through the same struggle. According to Jan Nijman’s India’s Urban Future: Views From the Slum, “Cities are shaped not only by large-scale structural forces but also from the ground up, on a daily basis, by city dwellers along with their mindsets and aspirations in addition to the institutions that organize their lives." However, they are viewed negatively and are seen as more of a “burden on the city” because they are the result of overpopulation, poverty, and extreme migration from rural areas of India. In other words, people see slums as a real living example of what is going wrong in their city. The fact that many of the slums’ residents are from rural parts of India promotes the sense of community within their urban neighborhoods. In fact, many of slum dwellers migrate to the city to work but continue to keep their connections and homes in their rural villages. Migrants bring social and cultural affiliations, traditions, cultural identities, and family ties to that of their rural villages. This creates a strong connection between the urban and rural parts of India because slum dwellers continue their rural lifestyles among urban settlers.

India’s lack of job opportunities surprisingly strengthens the sense of community and economy of slums. According to Jan Nijman’s India’s Urban Future: Views From the Slum, India does not invest enough in manufacturing. Indian Manufacturing firms are quite small, where 84% of them employ less than 50 workers, unlike China, which is only 25%. In addition, India invests more in other countries such as the India-based TATA Group, which is the largest single employer in the United Kingdom. This company does not benefit India directly or increase job growth in their own country. Indian cities such as Mumbai don’t invest enough in manufacturing because the service sector is more prominent. However, jobs in services tend to give higher pay to highly educated workers or poor pay to poorly educated workers. This creates the large gap between the rich and poor in Mumbai, where the middle class is non-existent. There is no creation of jobs in the manufacturing sector, which would help Mumbai slum dwellers. Mumbai’s slums are a representation of unemployed former agricultural and industrial workers and the lack of opportunity they had back home in their rural villages. And, again, there is the lack of institutional support. There is a lack of formality of planning on how to fix problems in slums. Because there is a lack of investment towards slums as well as an absence of employment and production, slums look to themselves and create their own economies. Slums create a form of “resilience,” and Jan Nijman states “The idea is that certain slums evolve (arguably out of necessity) into a form of economic and social self-organization that goes well beyond the slum as a mere labor reservoir of residential space." Slum communities are sustaining themselves by creating jobs out of the need to survive.

Dharavi is, again, a prominent example of the ‘slum economy.’ Though it has its overcrowding issue, which would cause high unemployment, it manages to hold down its own economy. According to Jan Nijman’s India’s Urban Future: Views From the Slum, Dharavi holds approximately 1,200 manufacturing units and 8,000 shops. Trucks go in and out delivering goods to outside sources. Almost 80% of heads of the households are employed, and 83% of those unemployed are either retired or not looking for work. 29% of the heads of the households are self-employed, and most of them operate their manufacturing or retailing businesses within Dharavi. Owners of businesses also live inside Dharavi, as well as 95% of their workers. Not only is the employment high, but the job stability is as well. People keep their jobs for an average of 18 years. There is a wide variety of businesses that run in this slum economy, including in garments, food, leather products, recycling/chemicals/plastics, pottery, machinery, building materials, jewelry, and printing. These businesses create a sense of community because certain economic activities are associated with specific communities within Dharavi. All the professions cluster together in order to share the same spaces, and this creates communal identity as well. For example, Hindu men are typically leather workers, potters, or jewelers. Most companies have operated in Dharavi for an average of 15 years. The second most valued aspect by residents in Dharavi is its location and the access to jobs, schools, and hospitals. Therefore, slums are not actually areas that are solely filled with unemployed people; instead, they are extremely active and significantly contribute income in Mumbai.

Effective government policy is necessary to create opportunity to improve living situations in Mumbai's slums. Firstly, the city needs more government intervention and overseeing. Secondly, slum dwellers need to have a voice and the ability to make decisions on these projects. There would be an incentive for slum dwellers to continue to demand for redevelopment if there is a possibility “of creating property assets that have a larger area, are more marketable and have higher property values.” In terms of the local government, there should be more deregulation. They should promote more flexibility in project conceptualization and building plans, as well as remove certain building code requirements and land use plans. This would spark more ‘community entrepreneurialism,’ which would not only build the community, but support the idea that slum dwellers themselves can rebuild their communities rather than having outsiders coming in making decisions on their neighborhoods. There should also be agreements put in place by the government between the developers and the slum dwellers, so the developers don’t take advantage of them, being the dwellers are most at risk when these projects are constructed. In terms of the lack of support for construction, the government must be able to fund private developers, since it is too costly for them to do it alone. In the end, redeveloping is in the best interest of slum dwellers because it doesn’t cause displacement, but rather improves their housing conditions and makes their properties more valuable. It also solves the problem of slums being depicted as outsiders. Slums dwellers would feel less vulnerable by the rest of Mumbai if it isn’t constantly seen as a negative, filthy, poverty-stricken place. To try to solve the overpopulation and overcrowding issue of slums, medium rise living could be an option. Instead of building out, developers can build up. This would also increase the value of the houses themselves. To keep from wiping out the sense of community in these slums, construction businesses and builders must incorporate cultural traditions of these areas. For example, they can incorporate the idea of the chawl, which is a single room tenement that serves as both a living and a work space. This is a tradition that has been historically established in slums and implementing something that has been integrated in their daily life for so long will maintain and continue the culture. The biggest and most fascinating characteristic of Mumbai’s slums is the ability to use a space for multiple functions. Though it may not seem like enough, the residents make it work.

In conclusion, Mumbai slums should not be seen as wastelands or places of despair. Of course, there are many problems that must be resolved such as access to safe water, sanitation, health, and environmental sustainability. We see how these problems stem from the poor infrastructure and policy-making of these communities. If the government makes a greater effort to implement policies that could help improve housing conditions in Mumbai slums, other problems such as water access and the general health of residents could improve as well. Though there are issues that need to be resolved, we also see that slums are communities that value social interaction and work together to sustain themselves and create a unique world of their own. It has been proven that they are able to maintain their communities out of the need for survival. Therefore, Mumbai slums are not as bad as India, as well as the rest of the world, think they are.

Evolution of Contemporary Responses to Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has become increasingly responsive to human rights criticism since early 2010. The DPRK has recently begun to respond to United Nations human rights investigations, and in 2018 they  participated in bilateral meetings with South Korea and the United States to discuss their foreign relations. As a result of these historic developments, the following question is proposed: how have responses to North Korean human rights abuses evolved in the twenty-first century? The international community has attempted two different methods of addressing North Korea’s human rights abuses: The early 2010s were characterized by shaming Kim Jong Un’s regime; and the late 2010s have been characterized by international collaboration with North Korea, notably with South Korea and the United States. These distinct periods are reflected in two diverse responses from the Kim regime regarding allegations of their human rights violations.

Human Rights Abuses

North Korea has been known for its terrible human rights violations since the informal end to the Korean War in 1953. When the two Koreas split, North Korea spiraled into an inhumane dictatorship run by the Kim family. As evidence of this, North Korea placed third-to-last out of 195 countries on Freedom House’s 2018 ranking of free countries, preceded only by Syria and South Sudan.

It is well known that the Kim regime strictly dictates the lives of the North Korean people. As the executive director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, puts it, the DPRK engages in “unprecedented crimes against humanity.” The country’s isolation and prioritization of defense and military spending presents a confounding image of both nuclear armament and extreme poverty and starvation. The strict control of food rations also poses major issues for the North Korean population and the country is again at risk of falling into a famine. In a 2017 report, it was estimated that at least forty percent of the North Korean population is suffering from severe food insecurity, with only the capital city of Pyongyang exempted from this issue.

Censorship, travel bans, public executions, and political prison camps are also major human rights violations of the North Korean people. In a December 2017 report on North Korean political prisons, the DPRK was found guilty of ten crimes against humanity. These include enslavement, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearances. It is clear that the North Korean government violates the human rights of the majority of its citizens. As a recent defector explained, “if you don’t have money or power, you die in a ditch.” The international community is aware of these violations and has been increasingly addressing these issues over the past decade.

The First Wave of Responses

The first wave of responses to the human rights abuses committed by North Korea began in 2013 with the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The United Nations created this commission to investigate the widespread violations of human rights. In doing so, they called for North Korean compliance with the investigation and humanitarian assistance if deemed necessary. The Commission released their report to the public in February 2014, finding that the North Korean government was guilty of “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.” The report also includes a letter sent by Michael Kirby, chair of the commission, to Supreme Leader Kim, in which Kirby expressed his disappointment for not being granted access to travel to Pyongyang. Kirby further explains that he had been hoping to speak with the Supreme Leader and his top government officials in order to better understand the North Korean perspective on their own human rights.

North Korea’s noncompliance in the commission and their refusal to respond to various correspondences was of high concern to the United Nations. Kim, however, saw no problem with remaining silent when faced by these claims. Having just taken over power from his father Kim Jong Il in 2011, acknowledging the human rights abuses would have undermined his authority and ability to lead. Therefore, it was a rational decision of the DPRK not to respond to shaming tactics imposed by the international community.

Later in 2014, the United Nations made two more similar attempts at responding to North Korea’s human right abuses:

1. The United Nations formally added North Korea’s human rights abuses to the Security Council’s agenda as a “threat to international peace and security.”

2. The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 69/188 addressing human rights in the DPRK. The 7-page document condemns the actions of North Korea, expresses serious concern based on the commission’s findings, and strongly urges the DPRK to respect all of its citizens’ human rights.

Given the heightened importance placed on human rights in the DPRK and constant shaming tactics, North Korea responded to the United Nations by publishing their own report from the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies. In this document, the regime explains how human rights are respected by their government and, contrary to the world’s belief, North Koreans are thriving. This report described the United States and the European Union as the main obstacles to promoting human rights in North Korea and labels the United Nations reports as vicious propaganda.  

This first wave of responses to human rights abuses in the DPRK can be characterized by multiple attempts from the United Nations at shaming North Korea and by North Korea’s persistent denial of any human rights abuses. North Korean foreign relations thawed during this time, however, there was no positive impact made on the human rights of the North Korean people, nor were human rights abuses acknowledged.   

Second Wave of Responses

The second notable wave of responses to human rights abuses began in 2017. After remaining dormant for a few years and observing the UN’s failure at diplomatically engaging with North Korea, the international community shifted its focus back to North Korea’s human rights abuses. This interest was likely sparked in part by the imprisonment of American college student Otto Warmbier, who was arrested for stealing state propaganda. His case drew attention to the treatment of political prisoners in North Korea when he died three weeks after his release to the United States in June of 2017. Despite their previous lack of success, the United Nations continued to use the shaming method in an attempt to embarrass North Korea into action. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in North Korea released a report, as has been done every year since 2004, stating the UN’s increasing concern for the worsening of living conditions in North Korea. However, Kim merely continued his tradition of ignoring recommended regime changes.

Two states, South Korea and the United States, diverged from the UN and turned towards collaboration tactics in an effort to engage in dialogue with the DPRK. This was an attempt to move towards a period of tactical concessions, which would eventually move North Korea away from denial of their human rights abuses. In April, May, and September of 2018, South Korean president Moon Jae In met with Supreme Leader Kim to discuss ending the Korean War and the future of Korean relations. These historic meetings were the first time North and South Korean leaders have met in person since 1953. Kim agreed to denuclearize the peninsula before 2019 and a declaration was signed to officially end the Korean War. Plans to remove weapons and guard posts from the Demilitarized Zone were established and a united bid to host the Olympics in Korea was submitted to the Olympics Committee.

These three meetings between North and South Korea shared a key characteristic: they focused on nuclear capabilities and foreign relations, but not human rights. In order to get North Korea to open communication with the rest of the world, South Korea had to shift the dialogue to national security and improving relations. This is reflected in the Panmunjom Declaration, the resolution that came out of the first inter-Korean meeting. While the declaration was highly symbolic of a new era of peace on the Korean peninsula, it was lacking in realistic steps by which to denuclearize North Korea and improve their human rights.

The second key meeting was the US-North Korean summit in June 2018. This meeting, like the Inter-Korean summits, was highly symbolic. After the meeting, United States President Trump tweeted that “There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.” However this declaration has been undermined by recent satellite evidence from CSIS, finding that the DPRK is in fact increasing their nuclear power. This does not come as a surprise, given that the declaration signed at this meeting was lacking in realistic measures by which the DPRK would move towards denuclearization.

In summary, the second wave of responses to North Korean human rights abuses was more successful than the first in bringing about dialogue with the DPRK, especially in regards to denuclearization. However, this increased interaction with the international community will make very few improvements on the human rights of North Koreans. As North Korean defector Jang Jin-Sung says in his autobiography: “North Korea uses dialogue as a tool of deception rather than negotiation.” The DPRK is likely engaging in dialogue with the intention of manipulating hopeful South Korean and American governments into weakening sanctions and de-escalating military threats. Pyongyang is feigning interest in cooperation while continuing to ignore its people’s human rights.

The heightened global attention to North Korea and their human rights abuses, as well as the Kim regime’s recent participation in bilateral summits, offers a promising view of the future of human rights in the DPRK. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry, Resolution, and Special Rapporteur have been effective in highlighting the human rights abuses in the DPRK, but ineffective in dialogue with North Korea and in presenting realistic steps to solve problems. Ultimately, the second wave of responses was far more effective in engaging North Korea in discussion, seen through diplomacy efforts from North Korea unprecedented in contemporary years. Although the summits focused on national security, minor concessions on human rights were made by North Korea. The Kaesong Industrial Region, a South Korean-owned North Korean-operated development complex is set to reopen, which will employ thousands of North Koreans and provide the North Korean state with significant economic assistance.

While human rights were not a particular focus of the second wave, the improved foreign relations brought about by all three summits will be key in long-term eradication of human rights violations. Once the issue of denuclearization has been somewhat mediated, the focus of diplomatic efforts should shift to human rights abuses. Positive progress in the human rights of North Koreans will come about very slowly, just as diplomatic relations with North Korea have been improving slowly. More than seventy years of tension cannot easily be remedied; however, states committed to progress will eventually bring about change. Therefore, further collaboration with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is in the best interest of the United States, South Korea, and the broader international community, including the United Nations. Continuing to host summits and strengthen diplomatic ties with Kim Jong Un will bring about gradual positive progress towards recognition of human rights violations by North Korea.

Italy’s Changing Climate

The refugee crisis that reached Europe by the summer of 2015 is no stranger to anyone now, and the effects are now strongly echoing in Europe’s political climate, including the friendly, and at least until recently, very internationally minded nation of Italy. There exists significant literature concerning the relationship between the rise of the right wing in France and Spain and both nations’ acceptance of a considerable amount of refugees. This is a component of the larger discussion surrounding whether Europe, and the whole world, is headed toward a return to the traditional nation state order with distinctive national differences, little to no interaction amongst states, and absence of international institutions. Given that concerns about globalization are on the rise in many major countries, events such as Brexit and withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement confirm suspicions. Slaughter interestingly points out in her article for The Financial Times that, after the meeting between President Trump and President Putin at the Helsinki Summit this past summer, it is not inconceivable to see the world in which there is emphasis on “rule in the name of tradition, nationalism, and ethnic purity” given that both major presidential figures displayed support of more limited bilateral and international cooperation, agreeing that they will be ‘friends’ on some and ‘foes’ on other issues. Trends such as these seem to suggest that globalization, especially in the cultural sense, has exhausted its power and is now becoming a negative force leaving nations in fear for their own self-preservation. Furthermore, to make matters worse, the praise of a globalized, connected world is not only weakening, but triggering isolationist and nationalist movements to counter advancements in connectedness and blurring of the borders and cultures achieved through globalization thus far. These movements are openly supporting discrimination through their emphasis on national exceptionalism and moving the world into another extreme. Italy’s political change is following the same pattern of isolationism and exceptionalism with its, although still small, very innovative and persistent parties, increasingly attractive to the public worried about the influx of refugees and erasure of the Italian culture. This is challenging the future of the liberal international order previously seen as key to preventing another world war and promoting progress, stability, and protection of people around the globe.

Globalization did not prevent expression of positive, non-discriminating national feelings. However, history of the previous century gives clear warnings of nationalism’s potency to become a major threat to security, leading to discrimination and horrifically escalating into fascism and genocide, which is why more caution is taken with how nationalist tendencies are expressed. Europe, being the epicenter of both world wars, is no stranger to outbreaks of violent nationalist movements, which is why, as The New York Times points out, Germany went on to install laws restricting one’s freedoms of speech and expression when they are used to incite nationalistic violence and support neo-nazism, making events such as Charlottesville in the US unthinkable. Similarly, as ANSA outlines, Italy has been strictly reinforcing Muncino law since 1993, which served to dismantle continuous attempts of resurgence made by neo-fascists following Mussolini’s agenda by permitting persecution for “incitement of violence” and using symbols of hate. While Germany’s conservative Alternative for Germany (AfD) gets a lot of attention, an interesting resurgence of Italy’s right wing more often goes unnoticed. Italy’s last major formal far right political party was Alleanza Nacionale (National Alliance). National Alliance never reached the political organization and parliamentary strength of Germany’s AfD, but the party membership steadily grew with the influx of foreigners, mostly from war-stricken areas of the Balkans and the Middle East. Although National Alliance dismantled, due to mostly internal power struggles, the party still actively supported departure from the EU, emphasis on sovereignty, closing Italy’s borders, and even fought to repeal the anti-fascist Mucino law thus being the first major hint at modern resurgence of neo-fascism in Italy. Rise to power of parties such as these represents a danger to democracy and stability of international relations, and it can have devastating effects on refugees who would face nothing but more persecution and conflict that they are running from in the absence of internationally accepted laws to protect them.

Given the events of this decade and a change in migration flow, especially with the refugee crisis in 2015, some Italians are very actively and zealously returning to nationalist, conservative ideals, and some are joining CasaPound Italy-CPI. The party was formed in 2003 in Rome’s neighborhood of Esquilino. It remains situated in just a handful neighborhoods, mostly surrounding Rome, but it gives a platform to neo-fascists given that its members openly and proudly identify themselves as fascists. CPI and National Alliance both show support for sovereignty, Italian social programs (when centered around Italians), and Italian religious institutions. Many members also emphasize that their agenda matches that of the Third Position, which is political ideology that originated in France and Italy in the latter half of previous century. It is neither communist nor capitalist in nature, but rather looking for midground. This means that they themselves do not recognize classic definitions of right and left and thus do not self-identify as radical right, though their anti-immigration, anti-Zionist, and pro-sovereignty policies suggest they belong further right on the spectrum. Their persistent arguments claiming that they do assume this mid-position make their campaign misleading and draw attention of more people that then get radicalized and begin not only protecting Italian territory and unique cultural identity, but also displaying open hatred, intolerance and violence towards refugees.

CasaPound used to be under the wing of Tricolour Flame or Flamma Tricolore until it got separated in 2008 with its 6000 members. Tricolour Flame has, unsurprisingly, nationalist and neo-fascist, agenda, similar to that of CasaPound. CasaPound has only 6000 members, while Tricolour Flame has 5000, and, unlike National Alliance, neither has any seats in the Parliament,. However, both parties are embodiment of an ongoing social movement storming through Italy and finding recruits in the youth. Additional appeal comes through the passion of these groups to improve failing social program, providing public kitchens and free medical care. CasaPound has 23 families squatting in a state-owned building, owning a “fascist hostel” which provides medical and nutritional services underneath Mussolini’s fascist party flags and national symbols, as reported by Channel 4. However, it is necessary for all aid recipients to prove loyalty to Italy and Italian culture. The party also has its merchandise, but remains committed to its anti-capitalist, communist-leaning goals, though claiming additionally to be better at providing social service than the Communist Party. All of this is making the party even more attractive to young individuals looking for alternative approaches to make a better world. Were this party’s rhetoric and platform to become more dominant, or to find a way to integrate at least some of its agenda into the general public’s mindset, the effects on the marginalized would be unthinkable.

Although not strong enough to gain the 3% of the vote necessary to get into the parliament, a party such as CasaPound can still thrive within Italian provincial offices, holding a seat in Ostia council since 2017, gathering thousands of people to support it and continuously working on spreading its appeal to the youth, thus making it, provided the global trend of returning to similar isolationist right wing movements continues, a potential parliamentary active party of the future. How long will the international institutions (such as the UN, UNESCO, G20, G7) be able to sustain themselves with the pillar countries such as the US, France, and now Italy leaving the international peace and collaboration agenda? What will the world without these systems to mitigate effects of war and poverty look like and who would protect the vulnerable? Are nationalistic parties such as CasaPound really a solution to national and global problems? After all, globalization leads to deterioration of cultural norms and for some people too rapid mixing and even disappearance of cultures, thus becoming a problem and making some nationalistic concerns expressed through these parties very viable. Additionally, providing such effective social services as CasaPound does is truly admirable, as well as being innovative in regards to how resources are allocated not fully adopting either of the two economic extremes. However, it is hard to believe that a world where empathy is exclusively limited to Italians, or any specific nationality, is the key to salvation. It may be best to point out to bright, young individuals, who are willing to do such noble things as committing their valuable time and energy to help fellow party members so extensively, that they might find people worth saving outside of their conventional bubble, that it may be best for them, and their country, to consider alternatives and recognize that hopeful, young, respectful people, not so much unlike them, are willing to work on making Italy stronger together despite of having been born elsewhere.