Keeping Shadow Banking from Going Shady: Financial Regulation Beyond Traditional Banks

Moments of disruption provide clarity on structural issues that previously went unnoticed. If vulnerabilities permeating the financial system prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) had been obscured by investor optimism, fervent ideological support from academic circles embodied in the efficient market hypothesis, and normative attachment to laissez-faire capitalism, the system’s near-collapse in 2008 brought to the surface the shortcomings of financial practices of the time. Opaque financial products (including the so-called “exotic derivatives” – complex credit instruments whose risk is hard to calculate) had been proliferating at economically unsustainable and unjustifiable rates for decades. Their growth reduced transparency of the financial sector while helping it expand in size relative to the real economy. Compensation and bonus payment schemes in top financial firms were rewarding excessive risk-taking and creating an environment of perverse incentives with a focus on short-term profits. Some experts might have correctly recognized these simultaneously existing conditions as alarming even before financial markets worldwide hit their lowest points. Yet, it was not enough to contain a boom destined to burst. Leverage continued rising, liquidity kept shrinking, and regulatory agencies remained idle until the fateful collapse of Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the U.S., in September 2008. 

This propensity to allow markets to self-regulate under lax government supervision until a crisis hits is known in political economy literature as “procyclical regulation.” In good times, like the 2006 housing market peak, investors and policymakers tend to be overly optimistic about the soundness of the financial system; in bad times, like the September 2008 turmoil, fears about a complete meltdown of the global economy lead to haphazard political and regulatory backlash. In a revised version of his testimony to the U.S. Congress, Dr. Andrew W. Lo of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology put it bluntly: market panics birth unreasoned emotional responses, which lead to more, but not always better, regulation.

Now that the smoke of the GFC has mostly cleared and the global financial system is in a benign cycle, it is a fitting moment to revisit the post-2007 regime while our collective consciousness is not clouded with the “unreasoned emotional responses” that Dr. Lo refers to. The truth is, regulatory powers that are often portrayed as omnipresent do not reach all corners of financial markets – or even all systemically important ones. One of the riskiest domains of financial activity, which the catastrophe of 2007 originated from, shadow banking, remains weakly regulated or altogether unsupervised. As the present prevailing sentiment is that the global financial market is doing well, no one is willing to expend their political capital on pushing for stricter oversight of shadow banking. Meanwhile, the very nature of activities this industry entities engage in puts the entire financial system at risk – yet again. 

Shadow banking, also referred to as nonbank financial intermediation to underscore its separateness from the traditional banking industry, is hard to define due to the diversity of activities it encompasses. Various definitions of nonbank financing formulated by scholars and practitioners of finance seem to agree on the following: at its essence, shadow banking is the provision of financial services and products by institutions other than banks, not subject to regulatory oversight. It is a web of financial markets and payment mechanisms alternative to conventional depository institutions, banks. Think money market mutual funds, private equity funds, broker-dealers, financial holding companies, Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) created by banks, and asset-backed commercial paper conduits. Think all the imaginable obscure corners of the financial world, whose purpose and activities are incomprehensible for a member of the general audience. Most importantly, think mortgage-backed securities packed with subprime loans – one of the inventions of the shadow banking industry that led to a near-collapse of the global economy when the U.S. housing market went south in 2007-8. Shadow banks are innovative, diverse in structure and function, and systemically important: in 2018, nonbank financial institutions represented 30 percent of total global financial assets, according to the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB).

The prominence of the so-called nonbanks demands more thorough and complete comprehension of what the growing industry is and does. Shadow banks perform functions similar to that of traditional banks, yet do so without the direct and explicit access to insurance from the central bank that traditional banks enjoy. They tend to attract cash-rich, short-term investors – a factor that doubtfully makes the system any more stable. At the same time, shadow banks are not subject to normal banking regulation. An undeniably important source of financial innovation and additional supply of financing during economic booms, when more lucrative investment projects arise than banks can satisfy, entities operating in the shadow banking sector are still more fragile by the virtue of being backed by funding from the private sector. When the private sector fails to account for adverse market shocks and does not provide enough support to shadow banks by neglecting or understating risks – as it did in the U.S. in 2007 – nonbank financial entities are at risk of failure. If enough systemically important shadow banks fail, the stability of the entire financial system is threatened, due to the interconnectedness of shadow banking and traditional banking. Moreover, shadow banking tends to encourage decentralization and opacity of financial systems, which makes panic more likely by reducing transparency and exacerbating information asymmetry among market participants. 

None of these facts are not universally known or acknowledged by financial sector supervisors. Yet, despite its pernicious potential, the shadow banking industry remains outside of the macroprudential regulatory perimeter. If the turmoil of the GFC provided plenty of inspiration for the current traditional banking regulatory framework, nonbank financial institutions continue to operate under little oversight. Immunity from supervision has become one of the prime characteristics of shadow banking and is frequently included in its very definition.

A scenario in which shadow banking creates turbulence in the traditional banking system and, eventually, in the real economy would not play out within the confines of one country’s borders. Nowadays, financial and economic crises are almost inescapably international. Acknowledged contagion risks in the global financial market emanating from shadow banking call for an internationally coordinated approach to supervising nonbank entities. This would allow to more easily identify and measure cross-border interconnectedness of nonbank financial institutions, both with each other and with banks. Further underscoring the importance of some form of global nonbank supervision standards is the possibility of cross-country regulatory arbitrage. Inter-country differences in the various ways shadow banking is regulated have the potential to trigger a “race to the bottom” in oversight and supervision in which countries would try to relax respective regulatory regimes to attract more investors than other jurisdictions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims the forms of shadow banking most detrimental to the resilience of financial markets have been eliminated since the post-2008 regulatory reform. However, this conclusion does not rule out, or even simply address, the possibility that new, unanticipated threats to financial stability can originate in nonbanks and spill over the entire system again. 

One of the primary challenges to an international effort to devise global standards of effective supervisory tools for nonbanks is limited data availability. The IMF identifies closing data gaps as the main objective of shadow banking regulation at its current stage. The complexity of some of shadow banking activities makes information disclosure difficult – according to some authors, nearly impossible. Improved data collection methodologies would facilitate transparency of the shadow banking industry and advance our understanding of the size and scope of nonbank financial intermediation. 

The economic efficiencies and innovation nonbank financial intermediation generates are hard to overlook, and even a possibility of suffocating the industry in regulation similar to bank supervision is enough for some to argue against any oversight of nonbanks. Yet, shadow banks are also capable of triggering and transmitting systemic risk, increasing interconnectedness and decentralization of the global financial system, and creating spaces in which overly complicated and obscure credit instruments, like mortgage-backed securities, are created and used unconstrained. As the importance of shadow banks grows, so should the body of our knowledge about them. This knowledge can be applied to strengthen the productive, socially optimal capabilities of nonbanks and minimize the risks they create for the global financial system. Understanding the pitfalls of the past appears to be the focus of much research on financial regulation, but it is not enough to deter future crises. Regulators worldwide must keep pace with the developments in the financial industry, accelerating at an astonishing rate. This, among other things, means directing utmost attention to the USD 52 trillion shadow banking industry and its even more impressive, hidden potential – benevolent, or else.

The State of Women in National Security

Many are familiar with the “Women in STEM” initiatives that are percolating throughout all levels of education in the United States and elsewhere. From Michelle Obama to Karlie Kloss, celebrity advocates of the inclusion of women and girls in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) have drawn international attention to the lack of female representation and the need to improve diversity. Though, statistically, women pursue social science degrees at higher rates than they do STEM degrees in the United States, there has been a quieter, yet steadily growing, movement to promote the inclusion of women at the highest levels of political decision-making, especially in contexts pertaining to national security. Groups like The Leadership Council for Women in National Security and #NatSecGirlSquad have increased in membership and notoriety in recent years while other, less specialized women’s empowerment organizations have made a point to add national security as an area of concern. As gender inclusion initiatives across the board become more popular, what has drawn attention to the national security field in particular?

Each organization states their purpose slightly differently, but the common circumstance they seek to remedy is the low percentage of women in high-ranking national security positions in the public and private sectors. As the Leadership Council for Women in National Security puts it, “The problem isn’t that there aren’t enough women from which to choose for national security positions, the problem is that hiring managers—often men—lack diversity in their own networks, and leaders fail to make gender diversity a top priority.” At the same time, #NatSecGirlSquad aims to support women in developing skills that might mean the difference between getting hired or not. In their own words, they are “focused on building expertise among women, confidence in that expertise, and creating systems to institutionalize success.” Still, the reasoning for the focus on national security in particular can seem opaque. If one were to replace the words “national security” in the above statements with any other professional field, they would still hold true. 

The beginnings of conversation of women in security can most clearly be traced to the 20th century trope of women as successful peacemakers. Francis Fukuyama popularized the notion of women as benevolent peacebuilders in his 1998 essay, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics.” His argument that women are biologically less inclined to be violent or support violence is controversial at best in today’s academic conversation, yet it has guided researchers to further investigate the concept of women as peacebuilders. The International Peace Institute published a study in 2015 drawing correlations between the percentage of women at the so-called “table” of peace negotiations and the longevity and success of the resulting agreements. According to the study, a peace deal is 35 percent more likely to last 15 years if women take part in its creation. This statistic and others like it have been advertised by the United Nations and other prominent international organizations as rallying cries for women to be offered spots in political decision-making bodies.

Though, on their face, narratives promoting women as benevolent peacemakers are supportive or even complimentary of women’s ability to create sustainable peace, they may be harmful to the integration of women into the public and private security sectors in a meaningful way that reflects true equality. These narratives may uplift women in the short term in calling for the immediate hire of more female professionals to senior positions in the peacebuilding sphere, but run the risk of pigeonholing women into roles in what some consider “soft security,” or preventative peace measures which refrain from intrusive military tactics, as opposed to “hard security,” which focuses on weaponry and combat. The New York Times noted that when women do hold roles in security, they “have been more welcomed in offices involved with arms control and nonproliferation, which center on negotiating limits on weapons rather than developing or using them.”

If, however, putting more women in peacebuilding roles means longer lasting peace deals and therefore a less violent world, is ushering women into these roles worth the imperfect gender equality? Rather than take the statistics on female peacebuilders on their face, one should consider the wider scope of research on diversity in the workplace. According to a 2014 MIT study, greater diversity of all kinds in a workplace increases productivity. This suggests that women’s involvement in peace deals leads to greater success not because women are somehow more inclined to be less violent, as Fukuyama argues, but because any increase in diversity of the demographic of diplomats and those making peace deals will improve the success rates.

A recent call for “gender parity in national security appointments” by the Leadership Council for Women in National Security has garnered national support, even being adopted by the official 2020 platforms of fifteen of the twenty-odd Democratic presidential candidates. If adhered to, this pledge could provide a meaningful shift in the demographics of the national security field. However, fluid definitions of national security may render any resulting policy less disruptive in its implementation. Progress on this front should be celebrated warily. Considering women were banned from many combat positions in the United States Military until as recently as 2015, issues will undoubtedly arise in subtler ways. Women who, by the design of the United States government, were unable to serve in combat roles for most of the nation’s history may have their experience deemed less appropriate for high ranking defense positions.

According to men and women working in the national security field at present, quota policies alone may not be enough to improve the day-to-day of women looking to advance their careers. A source working in the industry told the Washington Post that there is a “culture of assumption perpetuated by both men and women that women don’t have a role to play in security and foreign policy.” These implicit biases are perhaps the most difficult to overcome. Senior United States Foreign Service Officer, Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, explained to NPR that she still faces unwelcome reactions to her presence at meetings that she feels are a result of her race and gender.

In discussing the progress and achievements of cisgender women asking for representation in the security field, it is also vital to acknowledge efforts by the current presidential administration to ban transgender women and other transgender individuals from serving in the United States military completely. Gender representation in national security attaining any level of attention from national media sources should be considered progress. However, as in any fight of its kind, the struggle for gender equality in the field of national security will be long and arduous.

It is critical for those concerned with the state of women in national security to seek a cultural shift within the industry simultaneous to the pending policy changes. Former senior Pentagon official, Michèle Flournoy, who was expected by many to have been Hillary Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, explained that her male mentors in the field were able to guide her career in a way that allowed her to avoid the same discrimination many other women face. While passing legislation supporting measures such as gender parity in political appointments, security education for young women and girls, and more equitable hiring processes is essential in the pursuit of equality, these processes inevitably take time. There is no reason, however, for men and women currently in the field to wait for these policy changes to be implemented before starting to mentor more young women and support them as they work their way through the security sphere.

Huawei and 5G in the Tech Cold War: China vs the United States

Although the White House publicly stated they oppose a government-lead deployment of a national 5G network, they reportedly considered it for over a year. The gravity of this idea —a federal takeover— sheds light on the current situation: China appears to be ahead of Silicon Valley on this technology. 5G is “a type of wireless networking infrastructure designed for fast connectivity of self-driving cars, virtual reality, the internet-of-things, and other technologies that are emerging after the smartphone-centric 4G era we’re currently in.” This means that whichever country leads 5G will dominate the technology sector and benefit from the economic and national security advantages that come with it. The strongest supplier of 5G technology is Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company which has been doused in controversy since its beginning, and one that should be an important part of trade talks between the United States (U.S.) and China.

In the 1990s, the company made its first big deal with the People’s Liberation Army. Next, India intelligence agencies placed Huawei on a watchlist in 2001 for allegedly supplying the Taliban. When Huawei attempted to buy part of the U.S. company 3COM in 2007, the United States Congress blocked the deal due to security concerns. This was followed by the launch of an FBI investigation regarding possible violations of U.S. trade sanctions in Iran. In 2009, British spy chiefs “reportedly briefed ministers that Huawei hardware bought by BT Mobile could be hijacked by China to cripple the UK's communications infrastructure.” In security briefings by British company Vodafone, backdoors and other flaws were found in Huawei’s equipment. Huawei tried to buy the Sprint network and build a national wireless network for emergency services in the U.S., but both requests were denied by the United States government. A United States investigation surrounding Huawei and ZTE concluded in 2012 that neither company “cooperated fully with the investigation” and “the risks associated with Huawei’s and ZTE’s provision of equipment to U.S. critical infrastructure could undermine core U.S. national-security interests.” At about the same time, Australia blocked Huawei from its National Broadband Network and a Huawei CFO was linked to Skycom, a firm that offered HP equipment to Iran despite U.S. sanctions. Information leaked by Edward Snowden revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency hacked Huawei in order to spy on them through Operation Shotgiant, which was allegedly successful. In 2018, bans on certain Huawei products were implemented in several countries, including Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Chief financial officer and the CEO’s daughter, Meng Wanzhou, was arrested by Canadian officials with plans for extradition to the United States and a court date set for September.

On the other hand, Huawei does not concede that they are a security concern or that they are undermining the United States. In an open letter to the Obama Administration, the company claimed that “the allegation of [Chinese] military ties rests on nothing but the fact that Huawei’s founder and CEO, Mr. Ren Zhengfei, once served in the People’s Liberation Army.” Additionally, Mr. Zhengfei stated in 2015, “of course we support the Chinese Communist Party and love our country. But we don’t compromise the interest of other countries. We comply with the laws of every country we operate in.” In an attempt to further show the company’s commitment to fight corruption, he cited their “confess for leniency” program: employees that came forward with violations before a certain deadline would receive leniency, while cases uncovered afterwards would be turned over to Chinese authorities. Furthermore, Huawei openly encouraged the United States to come forward with any evidence of its accusations.

This year is full of new developments. More countries banned certain Huawei products, major Silicon Valley companies cut ties, and the United States formally charged the company with thirteen crimes. These charges include violating United States sanctions on Iran but “prosecutors convinced a federal judge that releasing too much [evidence] would pose a risk to national security and other governmental concerns.” Clearly, this is bigger than just one company. The Wall Street Journal described these charges as just “the latest to accuse the Chinese government or Chinese companies of stealing intellectual property from U.S. firms through a combination of cyberattacks, traditional espionage and other means.”

Continuing down this path toward a “digital iron curtain” will negatively impact both China and the United States by limiting their access to necessary technological components, but the trade war is rapidly escalating. President Trump issued an executive order which restricted U.S. tech purchases, raised tariffs from 10 percent to 25 percent on $200 billion worth of goods, and the government added Huawei to a blacklist. President Trump stepped back by stating that American companies can once again sell to Huawei since “the companies were not exactly happy that they couldn’t sell because they had nothing to do with whatever it was potentially happening with respect to Huawei,” but it is unclear whether the U.S. will be able to purchase components from Huawei in the coming years. 

These tech tensions are shaping up to be a ‘technological cold war’ and the potential to alleviate the issues through trade talks seems rough. A Chinese government advisor said that the United States requested “enormous [amounts], even hundreds” of legislative modifications and an advisor to the Chinese State Cabinet explained that “China and the U.S. have fundamentally contradictory attitudes as to what would be a good deal.” Additionally, President Trump seems to think that China is desperate after experiencing what he claims was “the worst year they’ve had in 27 years.” However, as analyst Michael Ivanovitch notes, “nobody seemed to notice that the Chinese were laughing all the way to the bank with $137.1 billion of surpluses on their U.S. trades.” Although a trade deal could potentially benefit both countries and may be the only feasible solution, China does not think it is worth meeting the lengthy list of demands by the United States. 

On the other hand, editor-in-chief of the Chinese newspaper Global Times, Hu Xijin, mentioned that he expects in-person talks to come soon. Reuters reflected that the “Global Times is not an official mouthpiece for the Communist Party, though its views are believed to at times represent those of its leaders.” Despite conflicting expectations, perhaps the U.S. and China will be able to collaborate and end the turmoil that “upended” the markets.

The Huawei allegations prove that 5G stands at the forefront of international relations and a tech cold war between the U.S. and China is imminent if trade negotiations regarding 5G fail. Instead of considering aggressive government intervention with the private tech sector, such as nationalizing a 5G network, the United States should focus on strengthening diplomatic relations with China to make a deal that both countries can benefit from. Both sides need to be prepared to meet in the middle in order to prevent a much bigger conflict.

Defender tu derecho: The Rise of Maduro’s Dictatorship

“A people that loves freedom will in the end be free.” – Simon Bolivar

The Bolivarian Revolution 

On December 6, 1998, over 3.5 million Venezuelans showed up to polls across the country to elect Hugo Chávez of the Movimiento Quinta República Party (MVR) as the 45th President of Venezuela. With the message of taking from the rich and giving to the poor, Chávez quickly enacted socialist policies and programs which became known as the Bolivarian Revolution. This ideology created a keen focus on encouraging both nationalism and government control over the country’s economy. In the early stages, Chávez’s vision proved fruitful for the average Venezuelan; his social welfare policies subsidized food, improved the educational system, and built an enviable healthcare system. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean (ECLAC), Chávez's policies cut Venezuela’s poverty rates in half. 

Nicolás Maduro’s Impact on Venezuela

When Nicolás Maduro was elected as the 46th President of Venezuela in 2013, he echoed the sentiments of the late Hugo Chávez and promised the continuation of those same policies. Yet, in just six years, we have seen the meteoric rise of Venezuela crumble to the ground, evident by a widespread lack of food and medical supplies, constant riots, and the nosedive of both its economy and democratic institutions. Between 2013 and 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports that Venezuela’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has fallen by over 35 percent. To put that into perspective, it’s a sharper drop than the one seen during the Great Depression in the United States. So what went wrong?  

PDVSA’s Role in the Venezuelan Crisis

For a country in crisis, it’s interesting to note that Venezuela is home to the largest oil reserves in the world, specifically in the Orinoco Belt. The Orinoco oil reserves, however, consists of extra-heavy crude oil that is challenging to produce. This dilemma incentivized the Venezuelan government to reach out to international companies such as ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips for help with extracting the oil. But when oil prices started to skyrocket, the Venezuelan government under the Chávez administration began expropriating assets from these companies (usually illegally). With near control of all oil exports, Venezuela consolidated their assets into Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), the state-owned oil and natural gas company. This flood of revenue is what allowed Hugo Chávez to invest heavily in his socialist policies. The problem was that with Chávez’s unwavering ability to scale back on Venezuela’s dependence towards oil meant that these programs would come tumbling down if oil prices began to fall.

Hyperinflation and Mismanagement

Shortly a year after Maduro was elected as President, this concern became a reality; oil prices rapidly fell in 2014, and Maduro failed to adjust. With his mismanagement of the PDVSA and acts of cronyism that left his close friends in charge of the company, hyperinflation rocked Venezuela. The IMF notes that inflation has hit a shocking 800,000 percent in 2019 compared to just 19 percent before Nicolás Maduro took office. With food and medical supplies that were once subsidized and offered to the poorest of the Venezuelans now gone, most of the population suffered, creating a massive human rights crisis. In 2017, the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida Venezuela  (National Survey of Living Conditions of Venezuelan Life) noted that nine out of 10 Venezuelans can’t afford to buy food and over 60 percent of the country reported going to bed hungry.

First Steps Towards a Dictatorship

So if Maduro is the cause of these major problems, why not just wait out his term limit and then vote in someone else? In fact, many local polls in 2016 showed that around 80 percent of Venezuelans want him removed from office. However, Maduro has taken numerous steps in the past few years to consolidate his power. Maduro’s political ambitions became apparent in December of 2015 after the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly which put Maduro’s rule at risk. With the Supreme Court and the National Assembly as the two biggest checks against his power, Maduro quickly began amalgamating his rule; he forced out Supreme Court justices and replaced them with governmental loyalists and political allies.

The Creation of a National Constituent Assembly

In July of 2017, Maduro took another major controversial step by invoking Article 347 of the Venezuelan Constitution which allowed him to hold a vote to create what is now known as the National Constituent Assembly; a body that would have the power to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution, subsequently replacing the current National Assembly. This action would leave virtually no opposition to Maduro’s rule. July 30, 2017 was set as the date of the vote but Venezuelans were only given the choice to vote for its members, not whether there should be a National Constituent Assembly in the first place. All opposition groups boycotted the vote calling it illegitimate which lead to the National Constituent Assembly consisting of a pro-Maduro majority being elected. One of the first moves it took as an Assembly was to remove Luis Ortega, leader of the opposition, from his position as Attorney General.

Controlling the Currency

The final step that Maduro took was to ensure that close military allies would remain loyal to him and not attempt a coup d’état. To do this, Maduro used a convoluted currency system that he carried over from the Chávez regime. He exploited the system by setting the official exchange rate of 10 bolivars to 1 US dollar which he only gave access to his friends and military allies. With the mismanagement of the economy, hyperinflation had rapidly devalued the currency, making the exchange rate 12,163 bolivars to 1 US dollar which is what the rest of the Venezuelan people were given access to. Moreover, Maduro gave full access of the food supply in Venezuela to military officials. This action allowed them to import food at the 10:1 exchange rate and then sell it on the black market at the 12,163:1 exchange rate wielding major profits and keeping them loyal to the Maduro administration.

Food for Vote Schemes

With the military on his side and all other opposition nearly gone, Nicolás Maduro took the final step to maintain his rule in May of 2018 in which he was re-elected as President of Venezuela in what many call a massively fraudulent election. Venezuela’s National Election Council, unsurprisingly run by pro-Maduro sympathizers, reported that over 67 percent of the nine million people that went to the polls that day voted for Nicolás Maduro. The result of the 2018 election came as a shock to none as the pro-Maduro National Election Council barred many of Maduro’s opponents from running. Maduro himself enacted an “I Give and You Give” voting strategy in which he dangled food boxes for votes. With more than 5 million Venezuelans undernourished, according to the United Nations, Maduro wielded food as a political tool to either buy votes or intimidate hungry people. After Venezuelans voted, they were promptly brought to a so-called Red Spot. At these locations, they presented their special identity cards, that they had to use to vote for the election, which was used to receive their food. Maduro had figured out how to manipulate the local people into doing his bidding.

The Rise of Juan Guaidó

It wasn’t until the start of 2019 that any sort of opposition to Maduro began to make its presence felt on the streets of Caracas. On January 5 of 2019, a little known lawmaker by the name of Juan Guaidó was appointed the head of the National Assembly (not to be confused with the pro-Maduro National Constituent Assembly). After just 18 days as head of the National Assembly, sparked by the nation-wide riots and protests, Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself Venezuela’s interim president, dismissing the 2018 Presidential Election as illegitimate. In the next few months, many countries began showing their support for either Nicolás Maduro or Juan Guaidó. More than 50 countries including the United States, Canada, Brazil, Colombia and almost all the countries in Latin America expressed their support for Juan Guaidó and currently recognize him as Venezuela’s President. On the other hand, left-wing governments like Cuba and Bolivia, as well as Turkey and Iran, refused to recognize Guaidó. The most notable backer of Maduro is Russia, a country that always enjoys supporting anti-US allies.

Operacion Libertad: The Fight for a Free Future

The most recent action by Juan Guaidó was called Operacion Libertad (Operation Freedom) in which he called upon the military to switch sides and fight with him. Seen as those most crucial in breaking the impasse, Guaidó has promised amnesty if these military officials break away from Nicolás Maduro. With the murder rate in Venezuela surpassing that of the most dangerous cities in the world, swift action must be taken. Whether Maduro postpones the next presidential election or re-writes the entire constitution remains to be seen. For now, he has unprecedented power over a country that continues to spiral out of control. 

Fault Lines in the Sahel: Mali’s Patronage Politics and Regional Instability

Under the last two U.S. administrations, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has expanded beyond the Middle East to focus on fledgling Islamist insurgencies in Africa and Asia. The Sahel region in sub-Saharan Africa stands out amongst multiple hotspots. Home to numerous violent extremist actors, both local and foreign, the Sahel faces multiple conflict stressors, including porous borders, the growth of radical ideological movements, desertification, ethnic tensions and state corruption. These factors were exacerbated by the collapse of the Libyan government in 2011, leading to a flow of arms and fighters across the region. These factors play out differently across Sahelian states, with each country exhibiting its own vulnerabilities. Chad is precariously run by notorious autocrat Idriss Déby, who frequently outmaneuvers rebellions thanks to his loyal armed forces and support from the French military. Niger faces some of the world’s highest rates of poverty, with a per capita income of $420 and 44% of the population living below the poverty line. In 2016, it ranked second to last on the UN’s Human Development Index. Mauritania is witnessing a toxic combination of racial discrimination, government corruption, and revival of Islamist political groups, polarizing an already divided society. Amidst its neighbors, Mali, prior to 2011, might have seemed a beacon of stability. The government in Bamako was democratic, experimenting with positive economic reforms, and enjoyed positive relations with moderate religious leaders around the country. Yet, the region was shocked by the upheaval and violence of 2012 in Mali. The conflict in northern Mali lasted from 2012-2013, and involved a separatist movement, an Islamist insurgency, and a military coup. First, in 2011, long-running northern resentment at the lack of representation in government resurfaced, and Tuareg tribes joined together to form the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In January 2012, the MNLA launched a series of attacks across northern Mali, in Menaka, Aguelhok, and Tessalit. While the MNLA sought to create a secular ethnostate, it enlisted the support of armed Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Oneness in Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). On March 22, members of the armed forces, blaming the success of the insurgents on political corruption, overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT). On April 6, the MNLA declared the independent state of Azawad, a victory that ended when the Islamist groups turned on their Tuareg allies, forcing them to retreat to the small border town of Ansogo. The collapse of the Malian state and Islamist conquest of the north necessitated an international response, which came in the form of the UN Security Council legitimizing a regional intervention force, led by the African Union (AU), to reestablish order. While the AU force was preparing to intervene, the Islamists launched a surprise attack southward in early January 2013, taking the buffer town of Konna, putting them within striking distance of Bamako. This triggered French Operation Serval, which deployed 5,000 troops and significant air forces on January 11. Within two weeks, the Islamists were routed from their urban strongholds. While Operation Serval and subsequent French and UN missions maintain stability in the country, the root factors of the conflict remain dormant, risking future instability. Overall, Mali’s supposed resiliencies turned out to be surface deep, revealing a social contract predicated on a confusing network of patronage politics and illicit economies. Ultimately, it was these informal networks, rather than macro-level stressors, that led to the northern Mali conflict. Mali’s supposes strengths failed to prevent state collapse and civil war, and require closer analysis to understand how to support resilience to conflict. Given the informal political roots of the conflict, African and European policy makers should focus on reconfiguring the Malian social contract, emphasizing economic and political reforms over traditional security efforts.

Studies of rebellion often emphasize the effect of formal, pre-war political and economic institutions on the strategies of violence employed. In the case of northern Mali, this is best done by looking at informal networks, which allowed the state to remain influential without investing in public goods. These networks had a significant impact on the type of violence that occurred from 2012-2013, namely due to the material and political resources exchanged. While Mali lacks ‘lootable’ resources, such as oil or diamonds, it lies at the intersection of major transshipment economies. These economic systems are predicated on kinship ties, which make illicit economies ‘licit’ in the eyes of most northerners. In addition, illicit economies are crucial to economic sustenance. Prior to the conflict, 9 million northern Malians lived on less than US$1 a day and 1.6 million faced food insecurity. The decline of licit industries like pastoralism and tourism increased the importance of illicit networks. The 2012-2013 conflicts compounded this, destroying what was left of the tourism industry, disrupting basic public services, contracting growth and increasing consumer prices. In this context, criminal networks faced no shortage of local labor by offering monthly salaries of US$250-400.  While the socioeconomic benefits of illicit economies explain their durability at the local level, their political benefits create linkages between local networks and national elites. Prior to the conflict, major traffickers used their wealth to improve their standing, either running in or financing local elections, which allowed traffickers to then co opt local governments. Traffickers further consolidated their power and enhanced their legitimacy by using their profits to distribute patronage, building dams, wells, and mosques. The political nature of illicit economies created violent power dynamics, as new elites disrupted existing hierarchies and weakened the power of established elites. Traditionally dominant networks, like the Ifoghas Tuareg and Kounta Arabs, faced threats to their status from increasingly wealthy Tilemsi and Lamhar Arabs and Imghad Tuaregs. From Bamako, ATT saw these shifts as a way to consolidate his control over rebellious northern elites, and established economic and military ties to the new trafficking class through the strategy of “remote control.” With his blessing, pro-government ethnic militias emerged, led by figures like Col. Abderamane Ould Meydou, security services with deep informal ties to northern trafficking networks. While these militias were established using donor aid meant for counterterrorism purposes, they served the interests of ATT and his new northern allies, who needed a low-cost means of ensuring control without having to invest in public goods or representative armed forces. This policy increased instability in several important ways. First, it fueled intercommunal violence, as local elites engaged in kidnappings and attacks against one another. Local elections became increasingly violent, as opposing networks backed different candidates and used force to manipulate voters and polling officials. Second, ATT’s patronage approach to ruling the north created an unsustainable political economy. His support for certain networks built expectations of patronage, a form of rent. This not only made his support in the north already prone to collapse, but also generated mechanisms that would allow armed groups like the MNLA and AQIM to supplant the state by entering these networks of exchange. In fact, as certain “noble” tribes moved to support the MNLA in response to state support for their local rivals, the “vassal” tribes responded by mobilizing around AQIM and other Islamist groups. With all three Islamist groups enjoying greater economic ties to local networks, support tilted away from the MNLA, explaining its rapid defeat. Despite this initial uniform support, the Islamist groups operated with vastly different illicit networks throughout the remainder of the conflict, whose unique configurations created variations in the strategies of rebellion that they employed.

The most powerful Islamist group during the conflict was AQIM, as it had the most well-trained and equipped fighting force, which numbered around 1,000 combatants in 2013. AQIM emerged at the end of the Algerian Civil war (1992-1998) as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an offshoot of the brutal Armed Islamic Group (GIA). From 1998-2003, it experienced considerable turmoil, as its membership defected to the Algerian government’s amnesty program or was killed by security forces. In 2004, newly established National Emir Abdelmalek Droukdel led the group south into the Sahel. With his subcommanders Abou Zeid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Droukdel built an enclave for the GSPC in remote northern Mali around Léré, from which the group launched attacks into neighboring Algeria and Mauritania. In order to ensure survival in an inhospitable terrain, the GSPC forged ties with the local Tuareg and Berabiche communities, using intermarriage and distributing SIM cards and medicine to build trust. These ties gave the GSPC access to existing networks of smuggling and trafficking. These networks extended beyond the local level, with Droukdel respecting an informal code in which kidnappings took place outside of Mali; in return, Bamako turned a blind eye to insurgent activities in the north. These strong social ties helped the GSPC rebuild, to the point where it attracted the attention of Al Qaeda central. In 2006, Droukdel pledged formal allegiance to bin Laden and renamed his organization AQIM. In terms of involvement in illicit economies, AQIM depended primarily on kidnapping for ransom. The importance of kidnapping is highlighted by internal communications, which stated that “Kidnappings are at the top of military action in the Sahara region…We don’t know of a single case that the Emirate [name for the collective of AQIM rulers] did not oversee.” Between 2003 and 2012, AQIM kidnapped around 60 individuals, a combination of Western tourists, aid workers, and diplomats, for a total profit of US$90-175 million. While the revenue was key to AQIM’s expansion, it was also relatively limited in its importance to the local economy. Prior to 2003, kidnapping was infrequent and carried out by small criminal gangs with little to no standing. As a result, AQIM generated little political capital from its vertical integration across an industry with limited social network involvement. During the conflict, AQIM settled in the region of Timbuktu, where Abou Zeid administered the regional capital. Within Timbuktu, Zeid sought to ensure continued local support by creating recruitment quotas to include local ethnic groups. His fighters distributed their cell phone numbers as hotlines to report criminal activity. Additional revenue was spent on distributing goods and paying medical staff to operate the local hospital. Expenses from AQIM account books recovered in Timbuktu show payments for services such as US$4 for medicine for a sick child, and US$100 for a local wedding. While these initial actions generated significant support from AQIM, its ideological approach to governance eroded this support base. Initially, Droukdel established a clear line about governance and Islamic law in his letters to his sub commanders. He called for them to avoid imposing all of their laws at once, although they must immediately ban places of “immorality” where drugs and alcohol were consumed. He instead emphasized a focus on providing public goods such as healthcare, water and electricity. According to Droukdel, “the aim of building these bridges it to make it clear that our Mujahideen are no longer isolated in society, and to integrate with the different factions, including the big tribes and the main rebel movement [the MNLA] and tribal chiefs.” Further support can be found in his recommendation to AQIM commanders in Timbuktu written in 2012; “You should limit the circle of confrontation and of your enemies to the maximum... You are walking in a minefield full of tribalism, conspiracy, and revenge, corruption and arrogance.” Despite these warnings, Zeid implemented an Islamic Police force that used beatings to enforce a strict code of Islamic law. These tactics generated strong resistance, as women’s groups launched non-violent protests. Droukdel would later criticize his sub commanders for the rapid pace with which they implemented their interpretation of Islamic law, which triggered a strong backlash by the local population. Among other factors, AQIM’s limited dependence on patrimonial networks explains how local commanders misfired in their provision of public goods. Absent dependence on local networks, Zeid faced lower costs from implementing unpopular forms of governance to pursue his personal ideological goals. While AQIM nonetheless invested in basic administrative services, it enjoyed low levels of public support.

This outcome differs from MUJAO’s approach towards governance. MUJAO emerged as an offshoot from AQIM, due to internal disagreements over the distribution of ransom money and the racist treatment of non-Arab fighters by the Algerian leadership. As a result, when Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou founded the group in late 2011, his leadership included a diverse membership with commanders originating from Western Sahara, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. MUJAO quickly emerged as a key player in the regional drug trade, at a time when West Africa’s role in global trafficking routes was growing. Starting in the early 2000s, increased interdiction along traditional routes and growing European demand shifted trafficking for Latin American cocaine and Moroccan cannabis to the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. As of 2012, the market was worth US$1.8 billion. MUJAO’s involvement was strictly indirect, as it never touched the actual drug shipments, but rather taxed local trafficking elites in return for providing protection for them against rival criminal networks. In the Gao region, where MUJAO was active, Kheirou built strong ties with Lamhar and Tilemsi Arab trafficking elites, who, in return for protection, provided donations and recruits. This alliance emerged in part due to mutual enemies, as Lamhar and Tilemsi Arab traffickers were competing with Ifoghas and Idnan Tuareg traffickers who were mobilizing to support the MNLA. This bottom-up competition eventually led to clashes between MUJAO and the MNLA, as their local support bases fiercely competed for control over Gao’s transshipment routes. In terms of governance, MUJAO provided significant levels of economic and political goods. It invested in public transit, establishing a bus network called ‘Mohamed Transports’ to circulate the region. More importantly, it created two political structures that allowed for local political participation. The Executive Council was staffed by MUJAO commanders elected by locals, and carried out tasks including law enforcement, religious education, public health, managing relations with foreign aid organizations, and transmitting directives to the population. MUJAO’s highest ranking commander in the city of Gao, Abdel Hakim, also commissioned the creation of the Cercles des notables, a body staffed by local elites with strong ties to trafficking networks and the Malian government. This form of public goods provision stands in stark contrast to AQIM in Timbuktu, in that it demonstrates how insurgent dependence on strong local networks forces the provision of more inclusive public goods. One outcome of this was the administration of ideological forms of governance, in that Gao witnessed relatively less human rights abuses at the hands of the Islamic Police than Timbuktu. Another was strong support, as MUJAO, the youngest, poorest, and smallest of the three Islamist groups was able to outcompete the much larger MNLA thanks to significant support by powerful trafficking elites.

In order to respond to future conflicts, the Malian government and its partners should critically analyze informal power networks. The strategy of remote policy pursued by ATT is by no means unique, it was equally critical to the dominance (and later collapse) of the Qadaffi and Saleh governments in Libya and Yemen, respectively. These cases reveal three important lessons for policymakers. First, institution building is critical, as it reduces grievances and creates safeguards for national leaders that extend their time horizons. ATT’s corruption and lack of influence in northern Mali forced him to rely on a fragile patronage system which ultimately led to his government’s collapse. These systems of power are dependent on continued transfer of wealth and power from the center, which requires a degree of economic growth and stability rarely present in resource-rich, developing economies. Policymakers should continue to prioritize the growth of accountable governance at the national and local level as a means to prevent conflict. The second lesson is “ungoverned spaces” are a myth and a poor analytical tool for predicting conflict. Groups like AQIM and MUJAO emerged in northern Mali not because of a lack of formal institutions but rather the existence of informal institutions willing to support their goals. These complex networks not only provide resources for insurgents to operate, but their unique configurations explain variations in insurgent strategies towards governance. Policymakers seeking to understand conflict in periphery areas ranging from dense megacities to rural border zones should understand informal networks of power that exist prior to conflict. The third lesson is that illicit economies are highly complex markets that can’t be solved through interdiction alone. A combination of state neglect and complicity led to the emergence of drug trafficking and kidnapping in the Sahel, and efforts to disrupt criminal networks will fail insofar as local populations lack alternative livelihoods to turn towards. Regional governments and their partners must use the lessons from the 2012-2013 Mali conflict to design a strategy that avoids neglecting genuine economic development and institution building at the local level in the north.

“Princess Charming of Wall Street:” Forgotten Legacy of Sylvia Porter and Persisting Gender Inequality in Finance

A holder of fourteen honorary doctoral degrees and a syndicated columnist with a readership of over 40 million people, Sylvia F. Porter once was America’s most famous financial editor. She was the first woman in the history of U.S. journalism to challenge the male-dominated world of business and economics writing. Porter’s works on personal money management, income taxes, and United States government securities, span across more than four decades – from the turbulent 1930s, through the booming 1950s, and to the crisis-stricken early 1980s.

However, Sylvia Porter’s legacy has since faded away, and few are now familiar with the name that used to be synonymous with financial journalism. As the ongoing conversation on gender equality in finance is expanding to include women’s role not only as receivers and providers of financial services but as leaders and decision-makers, shaping the fundamental ways in which the financial system is structured, it is a fitting moment to revive the memories of Porter’s immense contribution to the field of finance, which she made through her writing, policy advising, and public appearances. While considerable progress has been made on providing women access to the financial sector of the economy, most of those efforts are focused on ensuring women’s essential rights to open a bank account separate from their husbands’, receive a business degree, and compete with men for employment at financial institutions on fair terms. Countless decades after Sylvia Porter’s extraordinary career took off, it is time to expand this focus and work on closing the gender gap not only in MBA programs and hedge funds or investment banks but in the establishments that oversee the operations of the entire financial system and have the power to profoundly impact it: central banks, regulatory institutions, and international organizations.

Sylvia Porter’s career is a telling example of the significance women leadership can carry in a male-dominated professional world. Although her leadership was mostly ideational by the virtue of her occupation as a journalist, Porter left a long-lasting mark on numerous aspects of America’s financial life. In 1935, shortly after graduating Hunter College, New York, magna cum laude with a degree in economics, Porter wrote an article for The American Banker that vocally criticized then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr.’s handling of government debt. The article carried the byline of S.F. Porter to conceal her gender. When Secretary Morgenthau sent a request to meet with the author of the piece, presuming in his letter that S. F. Porter was a man, The American Banker responded with a vague note, from which all pronouns were conspicuously missing. Nevertheless, the Secretary persisted and eventually succeeded in his attempts to meet the author of the piece. Sylvia Porter arrived in Washington, D.C. in 1940 to advise senior policymakers on the issuance of a new class of government bonds. Porter was only twenty-two when she wrote the milestone article that would make her column a must-read for every secretary of treasury since Morgenthau. Despite her tremendous professional achievements and undeniable expertise, it was not until 1942 – eight years after the beginning of her career as a financial editor – that S.F. Porter revealed her full name and gender to the readers.

Nicknamed by the press the “glamour girl of finance” and the “Princess Charming of Wall Street” once her identity became public, Porter wrote about complex business and economics issues with authority assumed only by men at the time. Not only did she tremendously influence the way ordinary Americans handled their money but also worked to shape U.S. fiscal and monetary policy. Throughout the 1960s, she advised presidents Gerald R. Ford and Lyndon B. Johnson on the anti-inflation fight and export financing. In 1966 Porter recommended President Johnson the appointment of Andrew Brimmer, the first African American to serve on the Federal Reserve Board. She was regularly invited to speak on radio and television and gave hundreds of speeches to the audiences of financiers and policymakers.

Porter passed away in 1991, leaving as legacy of a score of books on money management and investment and a daily financial column circulated by 450 newspapers, read virtually by every economics professional in the nation. Her hope throughout a half-a-century-long professional journey was that women take charge of their personal finances. Today, nearly ninety years after Porter’s transformative career began to shape the landscape of the financial world controlled by men, at stake is something even more important: women’s access to spaces where critical decisions about the functioning of the financial system are made.

Financial regulation is not something we think of when gender equality is brought up. But it is exactly because the topic has not been given the attention it deserves in the echelons of powerful financial authorities. When the conversation on gender in global and national financial governance is initiated, it tends to be confined to the feminine-stereotyped and masculine-stereotyped features of women’s and men’s leadership styles. Such traits as lower risk tolerance, weaker propensity for competitive behavior, and natural “protectiveness” are typically attributed to women and deemed desirable for individuals overseeing the functioning of financial institutions and markets, due to unsustainable leverage appetites and irresponsible risk management policies financial actors are susceptible to. In May 2010, almost two years after Lehman Brothers filed for what was the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history, Time magazine featured Elizabeth Warren, Sheila Blair, and Mary Schapiro on its cover, with a subheading that read: “The women charged with cleaning up the mess.” Times was among the dozens of prominent publications advancing the narrative that female leadership in financial governance is the key to “cleaning up the mess” in the short run and economic stability and sustainable growth in the long run. The world needed less of self-interested, risk-taking male financiers and regulators and more of cooperative, caring female leaders.

Those narratives of expanding women’s involvement in supervision and oversight for the sake of safer financial practices - aside from being products of binary thinking grounded in poorly supported behavioral psychology research and gender essentialism - never materialized. National and international regulatory institution have indeed gained salience since the crisis exposed hidden fragilities of the modern financial system. Establishments like the European Banking Authority, the Bank for International Settlements, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Monetary Fund are now looked upon as upholders of global financial stability. While those organizations gained a considerably more prominent role in the operations of the global financial system since the devastating turmoil of 2007, women did not.

From 2007 to 2018, only four of the twenty-eight member-states of European Monetary Union - Cyprus, Serbia, Macedonia, and Norway - had a woman central bank governor. Despite the fact that global financial governance institutions did witness some improvement in its gender composition, women still comprise only 21 percent of all key decision-making bodies in national central banks across Europe, and an overwhelming 76 percent of leaders in supervision agencies globally are men. All twenty-four members of the IMF’s executive board are men, and the Basel Committee, established in 1974, is yet to have a woman chair.

The current state of gender equality in financial governance is therefore not much different from that of the business and economics world at the time Sylvia Porter was carving out her extraordinary professional path as one of America’s most celebrated financial experts. While women now have more liberties as consumers and providers of financial services, an astoundingly high proportion of seats at the tables where critical decisions about the global financial system are made still belongs to men. In her famously controversial 1959 speech to women journalism students, Porter expressed frustration with media hysteria surrounding the growing number of women joining the labor force, and the financial industry in particular, in which, as Porter noted, American women had been active since the 19th century. Exasperated, Porter proclaimed finance to be a “woman’s field,” hoping to once and forever put an end to the debate over whether women belong on Wall Street as authoritative decision-makers shaping the financial world. Regrettably, more than five decades later, the case is still being pondered.

The Longue Durée of Borders

While the defenders of sovereign territory delineated by national borders are quick to claim that borders have always exist and will always continue to exist, such claims misrepresent the nuanced circumstances that borders originate from and the serious ramifications of borders’ sustained existence. Our modern conception of borders arose from a set of specific economic and political circumstances during a specific time period in a specific place, and the idea of sovereign control over defined territory spread due to yet another set of specific historical circumstances, yet too often pundits ignore the happenstance of borders’ origins and falsely paint them as both inevitable and universally necessary. Sovereign nation states were able to out compete feudal organization, churches, empires, city-states, and city-state confederations, but this fact alone does not serve as sufficient justification for the continued reliance on borders to order our world. A direct outgrowth of our modern world’s acceptance of borders as a prerequisite for effective governance is the belief that people are unassimilable. Given that many of today’s modern borders are the direct result of the colonial project, true decolonization requires that we understand the roots of modern systems, and that we understand the ramifications of such systems today, so that we may one day be able to escape the inherent inequality written into global power structures. In order to begin to construct such a world, we must fight against ideologies that ahistorically attempt to defend vestigial traits of specific historical circumstances, such as national borders, as necessary for effective governance. Cameroonian political theorist Achille Mbembe explains that “the belief that the world would be safer, if only risks, ambiguity and uncertainty could be controlled and if only identities could be fixed once and for all, is gaining momentum,” and this momentum is due to the widespread political salience of xenophobia. In order to counteract such dangerous ideology, and to escape the inimical effects of antiquated systems of governance, one must first understand that borders arose due to specific historical circumstances, not historical destiny, and thus, the problems that arise from territorial borders can only be transcended by questioning the institution itself.

It is a fact that all peoples occupy space, but conceptions of how that space should be controlled have fluctuated over time. The territorially delineated sovereign space emerged out of a multitude of distinct ideas surrounding control over space. Feudalistic societies allowed for shared control over territory, due to their lack of specific hierarchy. Local feudal rulers swore allegiance to multiple more powerful rulers in order to accumulate more lands that they were given in exchange for their loyalty. Despite this allegiance, those dominant figures did not assert direct control over the lands of their subordinates. Instead, the subordinate rulers administered the lands, and the dominant rulers would call on their subordinates to rally raise an army and fight for them when necessary. This could become complicated, with Hendrik Spruyt explaining that feudalism was “…a highly decentralized system of political organization which is based on personal ties,” and the entities who intermediate rulers swore their allegiance to did not always coexist peacefully. The lack of a specific hierarchy of control is exemplified by instances when two or more leaders, all of whom a feudal ruler had sworn allegiance to fought amongst themselves, that ruler had no specific protocol to follow. In one such instance, an intermediate ruler raised an army and split it, sending a portion to fight on one side of the conflict and going himself with the other portion of his army to fight against his own men. Thus, borders were not always as salient as they are today, given that no single entity had exclusive control over territories.

Other forms of asserting control over space similarly abstained from limiting the extent of their rule to specific territory, such as religious organizations and empires. Religious organizations believed their control to be universal, coexisting with existing rulers by using spiritual means to validate their rule. The church played a part in a two-way relationship with these rulers, wherein it needed the rulers’ armies to protect it, and in return it served as a mean to legitimate those rulers’ battles against non-believers. Still, things such as the investiture conflict, which began in 1075, complicated this relationship, due to the lack of explicit control over areas. The church and German leaders such as Frederick Barbarossa conflicted over who was endowed with the ability to select new bishops. This would eventually erode the ability of church administration to function simultaneously with local administrations. Empires similarly posited themselves as universal. While there were hypothetical central leaders, empires truly took the form of heteronomous constituencies, ruled by different intermediate sovereigns who had little accountability to the central sovereign, due to limited communication and mobility. Confederacies of city states also formed, seeking to mutually protect their independence from external control.  Yet these entities, similar to empires, were loosely attached, and their member cities operated largely independent of their other members.

Out of the myriad methods of exerting control, ranging from feudalism and city state confederacies to organized religion and empires, sovereign states emerged as a front runner due to both shifts in the socioeconomic and epistemological atmosphere during the early modern period at the end of the middle ages. The bellicist school of thought points to states’ need for a centralization and concentration of military power as the reason for the rise of territorial delineated divided sovereignty, referencing efficiencies of scale as illustrated by the Prussian military to argue that the territorial sovereign state was able to more adroitly defeat other forms of organization. This line of reasoning further leads to arguments of state formation from a political bargain to gain protection from a more powerful central monarch, yet this relies on a false teleology. The end result of specific historical circumstances cannot be misleadingly characterized as a preordained destiny that was inevitable to occur. Indeed, advancements in military technology did not occur at a uniform rate, and the presence of central monarchs was also not ubiquitous, so it is ahistorical to argue that military prowess alone enabled the territorially bounded sovereign nation state to prevail.

Instead, the role of factors such as economic interests and ideological frameworks must also be considered. Towns began to declare allegiance to central monarchs in order to avoid the need to pay taxes to multiple middling authorities, thus creating a form of political and economic bargain. As the burgher class rose thanks to growing trade during the early modern period, and as people were increasingly freed from feudal servitude, they found it worthwhile to sacrifice some levels of their freedom in order for a sovereign to ensure that merchants could travel safely through territory to reach towns, thus encouraging greater local trade. Concurrently, a mutual epistemological shift occurred in Europe, wherein the king became the adjudicator and guarantor of legal concerns, creating a single font for the rule of law to flow from. Spruyt contributes a more liberal line of reasoning, forwarding that sovereignly delineated states borders emerged due to their ability to more adroitly outcompete their competitors, and to reduce interaction costs for both other states and merchants by creating a centralized point of authority. This unified central seat of power also encouraged the spread of the territorial sovereign state model of governance, allowing like units to more easily interact with one another. Other structural changes at this time cannot be ignored, for the European crusades enabled access to new trading networks and the invention of the heavy plow enabled greater crop yields. Both of these factors contributed to the shift to a monetary system guaranteed by central sovereigns. This monetary system enabled administrations to expand their size and capabilities without the sovereign sacrificing all of their land, by paying their bureaucrats with money instead of with land as had been the practice under feudalism. Furthermore, centralized state power conferred a sense of legitimacy to governments, avoiding the stumbling blocks that the divided sovereignty of feudalism and city state confederacies encountered, and leading to deliberate mimicry by other organizations hoping to achieve similar perceived legitimacy. The ideological shift occurring during this timeframe is also key. Not only did sovereignty change conceptions of legitimacy, but it also changed ideas of territorial control. As printing presses rose in prevalence, map makers would use colors to denote territory in order to make maps more visually appealing and entice rich patrons to purchase their expensive product. This changed both sovereigns’ and subjects’ ideas of territorial control, and shifted the goals of sovereigns to focus on such territory. Jordan Branch elucidates this ideological shift, using examples from the language used to dictate territorial control in treaties from the time to illustrate the new emphasis placed on territorial control during the early modern period. It is key to recognize that, throughout all of these specific circumstances that led to the rise of the territorially bounded sovereign nation state in Europe, the rest of the world was by no means latent. Instead, Europe was a backwater at the time, with governments taking in upwards of 25 times that of European monarchs, and African forges smithing far higher quality steel than European forges were capable of at the time. Indeed, trading networks moving across the Asian steppes, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean were far more developed than those in Europe at the time. Yet, the advent of the Black Plague impacted these areas more severely due to their deeper trading relationships, and as Europe gained access to new ideas and technologies through greater interaction with the rest of the world during the crusades. Europe was able to recover from the plague more quickly due to its distance from the world’s trading centers at the time and able to utilize the new technologies it had recently gained access to in order to capitalize on its historical window of opportunity, and the colonial project which would serve as the mode of dissemination for the territorially bounded sovereign state system is a direct outgrowth of such specific historical circumstances that created this window of opportunity.

The idea of divided territory, with specific territories designated for specific groups, problematically legitimizes xenophobic beliefs, for it posits that the coexistence of multiple peoples within the same spaces is a threat to security. The belief that populations’ movement and opportunities can be defined to a specific locus underpins the modern state system. When combined with ideas of cultural unassimilability, the divisions between imagine nation states become synonymous with racial divisions. The racist and imperialist belief that the movement of peoples can be restricted in the interest of purported ‘border security’ is an innate component of efforts to prolong inequitable contemporary power structures. As explained by Achille Mbembe:

Because we inherit a history in which the consistent sacrifice of some lives for the betterment of others is the norm, and because these are times of deep-seated anxieties, including anxieties of racialised others taking over the planet; because of all of that, racial violence is increasingly encoded in the language of the border and of security. As a result, contemporary borders are in danger of becoming sites of reinforcement, reproduction and intensification of vulnerability for stigmatised and dishonoured groups, for the most racially marked, the ever more disposable, those that in the era of neoliberal abandonment have been paying the heaviest price for the most expansive period of prison construction in human history.

Understanding this allows us to understand that we cannot achieve true decolonization so long as we maintain the juridical-political boundaries of the nation state. The colonial project’s historical epoch may have ended, but the work to deconstruct persistent colonial power structures requires an understanding of the historical contexts that led to the rise of such structures. The evidence of such persistent colonial oppression is clearly found in legal codes that assert control over specific groups for the supposed protection of other groups. Such legal structures go hand-in-hand with self-congratulatory conceptions of multiculturalism, which purport themselves to be accepting of all while illiberally privileging the rights of one group over the rights of ‘tolerated’ groups who are consistently considered to be outsiders. It is necessary to dismantle the epistemological power structure that consistently reifies the need for borders without substantiating such claims. Achille Mbembe writes that “asserting the boundaries of the nation goes hand in hand in that model with the assertion of the boundaries of race,” and to escape the chains of racial borders, we must first understand the history of national borders so that we can begin to dismantle them.

Brexit: The Mess That Could Set Back Years of UK-Ireland Progress

All of us are getting news notifications on our phones and computers, almost on a daily basis, on Brexit and the issues surrounding the exit deal. But what actually is Brexit and why does it really matter?

In a June 2016 referendum, voters in Britain, Wales, Scotland, and most parts of Northern Ireland chose to leave the European Union in a close vote of 51.9 to 48.1 percent. The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of 28 member states located primarily in Europe that works to promote stability and economic cooperation between its member states. Since March 2017, the United Kingdom and European Union have been engaged in negotiations on the terms of the UK’s exit and the future of their relationship. One of the main challenges to finding an agreement on a final deal has been meeting the requirements of Northern Ireland’s unique circumstances.

The UK is currently part of the EU’s customs union and single market. The customs union is a principal component of the EU. There are no tariffs or non-tariff barriers to trade between members of the customs union, and members states impose a common external tariff on all goods entering the union.The single market is made of the 28 EU member states and seeks to guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour. After Brexit, the UK will leave both the customs union and single market.

This will raise questions about the status of the Irish border, particularly whether or not the border will become a customs border with all the associated checks and controls that come with that title. A customs border is a border control that checks any items and goods crossing the border, where taxes or tariffs could be imposed.This will most likely create practical and economic challenges and could reverse relations between the US and Ireland and all the progress that has been made in recent years.

The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was a source of major conflict and violence between the two countries. When the Republic first split from the UK and Northern Ireland, the border line was insignificant. However, after some time passed, hostility between the UK and Ireland resumed. As a result, the UK established customs checks at the border. The two countries eventually entered into a trade war and tariffs were placed on agricultural produce, steel, coal, and other things. By the late 1960s, this trade war turned violent. Conflict broke out in Northern Ireland between nationalist militaries (like the Irish Republican Army) who believed that Northern Ireland was rightfully part of Ireland and the British were oppressors; and as such, there should be no restrictive border between the two states. Ireland's Nationals population unionist militaries fought back to defend their place in the UK. Both groups brought violence to the streets by blowing up buildings and setting off car bombs, among other things.

The UK deployed thousands of troops to Northern Ireland during his time, who became a common target of nationalist attacks. A lot of these attacks occurred at the border of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which for nationalists was the ultimate symbol of British occupation. The UK military secured the borderline with walls, towers, guns, and patrols. They controlled the 20 official border crossings with an iron grip and screened all people and vehicles crossing the partition. The conflict in Northern Ireland turned this into a hard border. The violence lasted for more than 30 years and killed over 3,600 people. This period of time is most commonly known as the “Troubles”.

The Good Friday Agreement, signed in 1998, brought an end to the conflict and established power-sharing in Northern Ireland. The agreement gives EU membership to the UK and Ireland, while also creating an understanding for the UK and Irish governments to cooperate on EU matters. The Good Friday Agreement also allows people born in Northern Ireland to choose either Irish citizenship, British citizenship, or both. The UK has stated that it wants this option to continue after Brexit. The agreement also established special EU funding programmes, known as PEACE, to reinforce the peace process and support cross-community projects. It also created the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC), which allows the governments in Dublin and Belfast to cooperate in various areas, including agriculture, education and transport. The UK, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the European Commission have all agreed that the withdrawal process cannot undermine the Good Friday Agreement.

Once the UK leaves the EU, the only land border will be the 310-mile line between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and decisions will have to be made on how to manage the movement of people and trade across that border. The UK, Ireland, and the EU have all said they want to maintain the Common Travel Area, which has been in place for most of the period since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. The CTA allows free movement of British and Irish citizens between the UK, Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. The agreement also gives access to various government services in each country. Ireland will continue to allow free movement for citizens in the other EU countries, while the UK is thinking about an inland control approach. Through access to labour markets and social security, the UK will enforce immigration policy without requiring checks on people crossing the Irish border. This move would greatly affect and possibly lead to the breakdown of the CTA.

The UK, Ireland, Northern Ireland and the European Commission have also all agreed there should be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, for trade as well as people (European Commission Joint Report). The UK’s decision to leave the EU Single Market and Customs Union means that it will become a “third country” to the EU, creating a land border between the UK and the EU. This is the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland and if no arrangements are made for the Irish border, the EU will have no choice but to put in place the standard checks it has at its border with other third countries. These would include both customs checks, documentation of products, proof of where the good originates, collection of tariffs, and regulatory checks, all to verify that goods comply with the EU’s standards.

Last November, UK Prime Minister Theresa May published her original Brexit plan that included an Irish border backstop. The backdrop is an insurance policy to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland if the UK leaves the EU without securing a concrete deal. Both the UK and EU agree on the need for a backstop to ensure no hard border returns.

The backstop was the most hotly debated issue in the parliamentary debates on the draft Withdrawal Agreement. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is the unionist and socially conservative party political party in Northern Ireland. The DUP is also in a coalition with May and her Conservative Party in Parliament and they are notably pro-Brexit. In January, however, their 10 MPs in Parliament voted against Prime Minister May’s Brexit Plan. The party has always been against a “special status” for Northern Ireland in the Brexit negotiations, saying any differences between Northern Ireland and Great Britain could threaten to break up the United Kingdom.

To the DUP, the backstop represents everything they don’t want for Northern Ireland: regulatory differences that mean only Northern Ireland would continue to follow some EU rules, no time limit, and the ability to exit the backstop would need to be agreed jointly by the UK and EU. On December 4, 2017, DUP leader Arlene Foster said that the DUP “will not accept any form of regulatory divergence which separates Northern Ireland economically or politically from the rest of the United Kingdom.” Foster also added that the DUP also does not want to see any changes to the current border arrangements between the North and the Republic.

A majority of people in Northern Ireland, however, support the backstop (most likely due to the fact it would give Northern Ireland special access to both the UK and EU markets). In January of this year, the UK government published proposals on how the UK can influence both the decision to use the backstop and its governance if it comes into effect. The proposals also reaffirmed the UK’s commitment that the rest of the UK will abide by the Single Market regulations being applied in Northern Ireland.

Ireland and Northern Ireland also share a single electricity market and electrical infrastructure. Keeping this arrangement will require Northern Ireland to continue to comply with EU regulation, without having any say over their development. If this agreement is not kept in tact, the single electricity market could be reversed, along with any benefits brought about by it. A notice from the UK Government published in October 2018 said if the UK leaves the EU with no deal, electrical supply from Ireland to Northern Ireland could be disrupted.

One of the problems for the Ireland is that its economy is intertwined with the economy in the UK. Currently, around 80% of the goods Ireland exports are transported to the UK or go through the UK. Ireland also sources 41% of its food imports and 55% of its fuel imports from the Britain. According to the Irish Ministry of Finance in October 2016, Brexit “is expected to have a material negative impact on the Irish economy.” A report from the Irish Government also called for “the closest possible trading relationship between the EU and the UK.”

On January 15, 2019 members of parliament rejected Prime Minister May’s Brexit deal by 432 votes to 202 - which is a historic political defeat in Britain. Then on March 12, after Theresa May had gone back to the EU to secure further legal assurances, Parliament rejected the deal again. And March 29, which was the original day that the UK was due to leave the EU, Parliament rejected the deal for a third time. Since Parliament did not approve Theresa May's withdrawal deal in a vote on March 12, May was forced to ask other EU leaders to delay Brexit. They agreed to postpone it until May 22 if MPs approved her deal in a new vote. On March 29, the UK missed that deadline and faced leaving on April 12 instead. But May has now gone back to the EU to ask for another extension - which the EU has agreed to. The new deadline is October 31. However, the UK can leave before then if May can get her deal approved by Parliament. The government will continue talks with Labour to try to come up with a solution. If the two sides do not come to an agreement, Theresa May has said she will propose additional options to members of parliament to work out a future plan.

Combating Catastrophe: The American Response to Genocide in Cambodia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Without memory, there is no culture. Without memory, there would be no civilization,

no society, no future.

– Elie Wiesel

Elie Wiesel shares insight into the collective idea of what genocide is and the impact genocide has on the world. Wiesel gives testament that the genocide is devastating not only in mass killings, but also the through the outgrowth of genocide results in the loss of culture, histories, languages, memories and subsequent generations that would have existed had it not have been for the death of millions. Often when the term genocide is used, it is connected to the Holocaust; however, genocides have occurred throughout history and continue to occur today. In order to better understand how to grasp the power and extent of mass killings, the Cambodian genocide and the Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide will be used as case studies to understand genocide, the international politics at play, and the lasting devastation.

The power in labeling a mass atrocity a genocide is the invoking of an international obligation to respond. The genocides in Cambodia committed by the Khmer Rouge and the systematic ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serb Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were both defined by the international community as genocide, while simultaneously having very complicated and political international responses. Both the Cambodian Genocide and the Bosnian Genocide are complicated by United States ideology and politics, and, by comparing the two, it will be possible to provide a better understanding and insight into the two conflicts.

For comparative purposes, genocide will be defined as “gross and systematic and severe human rights violations involving extensive political killings, or in response to humanitarian crises such as famines or massive refugee flows”  Much of the discourse on genocide came from the aftermath of Nazi concentration camps post World War II and the Nuremberg Military Tribunal following the end of the war in 1995. In 1948, the United Nations adopted The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, directly before the Universal Declaration of Human Right or the International Human Rights Covenants. The Genocide Convention defined genocide as a crime and created standards and obligations for the international response or degree of intervention in addressing the genocide. The creation of the United Nations came in the aftermath of the Allied victory in World War II – making the Allied Powers: United States, Russia/Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China all permanent members of the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council holds significant power via controlling discourse as well as international humanitarian norms. States such as the United States, Russia, and China, who are all non-members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), are also prominent members and have a significant influence in international politics. Thus, the power of a country, such as the United States, labeling something a genocide, or not, holds significant leverage and sway over the response because of the influence of the United States. An example of this is the U.S. in Indonesia, and how the “mass killings” of people of Indonesia based on political identity are at best labeled a tragedy,  but are not labeled a genocide even though it meets the various criteria.

The Genocide Convention defines genocide as “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group… calculated to bring about its destruction”. Major ideas coming out of the Genocide Convention include the idea that states have an obligation to prevent genocide and to punish the perpetrators, often in the form of international trials/court. Many wars and conflicts that were considered forms of genocide during the Cold War were from internal conflict rather than between two sovereign states: Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina being both examples of genocides committed between the government and its people.

Cambodia (1975-1978)

The Khmer Rouge was the political party in power that committed the systematic extermination of Cambodians. Saloth Sar or famously known as Pol Pot was the leader of the Khmer Rouge.  Pol Pot was raised in a farm community in Cambodia and then later received a Western education in Paris, France, where he first heard of the communist ideology that would later lead to genocide. While radical thought was, for most of Pol Pot’s peers, theoretical at best, Pol Pot was able to implement these political ideas into Cambodia when he returned home. With the help and influence of the Vietnamese Communist party and with the support of communist countries such as China and North Korea, support existed within the region that allowed for communism to grow in Cambodia. The party moved to foundational changes within Cambodian society, moving close to 2 million people from the cities, mostly the capital, Phnom Penh, to the countryside for re-education programs. Those who showed any defiance,  were unable to be re-educated, or had ties to capitalist ideology, were seen as threats to the society and the political party. Often times many women and children whose husband or father had been sent to confinement were later executed as well. This genocide only lasted about two years but killed an estimated two million people.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995)

The start of the Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide was based on the aftermath of World War I. Yugoslavia was the conglomeration of Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Istria, Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The dominant group within the conglomeration was Serbs, and while they discriminated against other groups, before World War II, the collective lived in toleration of each other. After World War II, Yugoslavia was reorganized into six designated republics and two autonomous regions united under a federal system. The rise of power of Jusip Broz Tito allowed for Yugoslavia to remain a state even though it had groups of people contending for power over the area. Over time, tension among the different groups in Yugoslavia grew and with the death of Tito, and the emergence of economic and political problems, chaos emerged. The use of nationalism by Slobodan Milosevic, that began during his rise to power in 1987, brought forth the very conditions, stereotypes and alienation tactics that fostered genocide. Milosevic depicted Muslims who lived in Serbia as the largest threat to the Serbian national society. A foundational aspect that played into the genocide was the use of religion and mythology in demonizing Muslims as “Christkillers” within Christian Serbian teachings and understandings. On April 5, 1992, Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia and conflict erupted, which lead to a civil war between the Bosniak majority was opposed by Bosnian Serbs. From 1992 to 1995,  the use of these teachings and ideologies turned into the “daily rituals of ethnoreligious purification” which was acted out through means of genocide.  The Bosnian Serbs sought to purify through mass killings of Bosnian Muslims. By the end of the war, 100,000 Bosniak and Croatian civilians were killed; it was considered the largest massacre since the end of World War II in Europe.

Extended Power - The Influence of the US both in Cambodia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The historical contexts in Cambodia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are what laid the groundwork and conditions that allowed for genocide to occur. The Cold War politics at this time played a part in the continued violence in both Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather than a more immediate response to these conflicts. The Cold War politics throughout US foreign policy is essential in understanding how both these genocides were addressed, viewed and then acted upon by the United States. The United States was one of the most powerful countries emerging post World War II. The United States was also extremely influential in the creation of the United Nations. The UN Responsibility to Protect is a cornerstone in international humanitarian law and intervention. The United Nations defines mass killings as a genocide, and generally requires some sort of response. Thus, to use the label genocide is to then invoke UN peacekeeping forces and the establishment of courts if the conflict ends.

The international law that was, in essence, created post World War II in Nuremberg and Tokyo. In these trials it proved to have a fatal flaw of being unclear regarding the terms of how to go about international humanitarian intervention, through military action, in states where mass genocide was occurring, and where intervention was not considered legal. The point of Nuremberg and the UN Security Council sanctioned trials was to hold those individuals at high levels of power, as the most accountable for the atrocities and mass extermination that occurred. However, in the case of Cambodia and Bosnia, the intervention that millions needed came too late.

The intervention that did occur was highly geopolitical for countries involved. It was only through the framework of the United Nations Security Council that could deem, “that genocide represented a threat to international peace and security. In practice, though, it never exercised that authority. The standard pattern, right through the end of the Cold War, was for the international community to wring its hands in anguish as genocide played itself out”.  Within the Security Council, you had the US, UK, and France on one ideological side and Russia/Soviet Union and China on the other, causing tension and gridlock amongst the very people who could end the genocide.

A foundational difference between the two trials was who sponsored and supported what, and the different levels of intervention that the international community had in Cambodia versus Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international response was collective and enacted thorough UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia were sanctioned by the Security Council. At this time it is important to note the changes that occurred within the Cold War – most notably the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The ideological battle and gridlock within the international community and the United Nations was significantly diminished which in turn, allowed for action.

Whereas in the case of Cambodia, the timing of the genocide itself played a key role in the redress that was expected at the time. In Asia and Southeast Asia, you have the United States in two major wars, among various other military action. Most notably the Korean War began shortly after World War II beginning in 1950 and lasting till 1953, and then the Vietnam War started in 1955 and finally concluded in 1975, the same year the Cambodian Genocide began. The United States and China, two countries who were once allies found themselves on opposite sides of an ideological battle that was being played out in proxy wars from Korea to Cambodia, to other areas around the world. A devastating consequence of the Vietnam War was the millions of bombs that the United States dropped in Laos and Cambodia. In 1975, you have domestic turmoil in the U.S. surrounding the Vietnam War, that going back to Southeast Asia with any form of U.S. military to address the Cambodian Genocide was not a feasible option. The Khmer Rouge even held the Cambodian seat in the UN till 1982. Most of those remain unaccountable for their actions, most notably the leader Pol Pot. Pol Pot died in 1998 before any trials began.

Genocide is a difficult and horrific act to comprehend. How a society gets to that point of action is often muddled with politics, power, and self-interest. By using Cambodia and  Bosnia-Herzegovina as two key examples, one can better understand how the atrocities occurred through the historical circumstances, international politics and the very institutions and means of addressing mass violence.

Peace Walls and a Potential Hard Border: The Continued Struggle for Reconciliation after Northern Ireland’s The Troubles

When you have a conflict, that means that there are truths that have to be addressed on each side of the conflict. And when you have a conflict, then it’s an educational process to try to resolve the conflict. And to resolve that, you have to get people on both sides of the conflict involved so that they can dialogue.

— Dolores Huerta

A small state located above the Republic of Ireland and part of the nearby United Kingdom (UK), Northern Ireland is famous for its violent intrastate conflict during a thirty-year period of political violence known as The Troubles. Internal state conflict, such as the genocide between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda in the 1990s, often arises due to clashes over group territory, resources, and opposing identities. However, The Troubles was unique in that it was the final culmination of deeply-rooted ethnoreligious sectarian tension between Catholic Irish nationalists who wanted unification with the Republic of Ireland, and Loyalist Protestant unionists who favored the continuation of British rule. Nonetheless, despite the passage of the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement that formally ended the tumultuous conflict in 1998, continued social stratification, political upheaval, and overall uncertainty about the outcome of Brexit further decrease the possibility of successfully reconciling the two warring communities. As long as tension between British and Irish identities remains unresolved, Northern Ireland (NI) will continue to face potentially long-term sectarian strife.

Historical Overview of The Troubles

The seeds of The Troubles are rooted in the early 1600s with the British-supported migration of Protestant “planters” to six counties in the Ulster region of Ireland, then controlled all by Britain, thus allowing for the composition of a mostly Protestant community in NI today. In that same century, England dealt with growing sectarian politics between warring Protestant and Catholic groups who desired to establish control over the throne. This political and religious tension bled into Irish politics, as Protestant migration continued to disrupt the primarily Catholic majority that was already established on the island. In 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty officially divided Ireland into north and south and established the southern Republic as a self-governing entity while the north remained part of the UK. To better comprehend what propelled NI into social and political turmoil, the following events must be understood: the Battle of the Boyne and the impact of William of Orange on present-day Irish society, as well as the horrific events of Bloody Sunday.

The Battle of the Boyne was the culmination of extreme tension between the Catholic and Protestant communities, as well as a continuation of the grapple for power and control over the English throne. A struggle between Protestant William of Orange and deposed Catholic King James II, the battle restored Protestant power in England with the victory of William of Orange. Furthermore, the battle was and currently still is seen as a source of cultural and political pride for Protestants in the present-day, who consider it as validation and evidence of their superiority over Catholics.

The social implications of the victory of William of Orange manifest most popularly in the almost sacred annual celebratory march on July 12, otherwise known as Orangemen’s Day, which has major symbolic significance for Protestants who live in Northern Ireland. The Battle of the Boyne’s most tangible effects are seen by its yearly commemorations that are carried out by The Orange Order, a fraternal-like organization that marches to honor William’s valiant efforts to dispose of King James II and to acknowledge him as the sole individual who secured Protestant ascendancy in the country. However, these marches are quite controversial. The route that the Protestants marchers take often comes close to Catholic neighborhoods, sparking further sectarian violence for those who see this public display of victory as a way in which Protestants can blatantly rub in their historical dominance. The marchers also carry with them an assortment of flags and banners, many of which display the Union Jack (the national flag of the UK), as the UK is often seen as the founding state of The Orange Order. This creates more tension between the two communities as the Union Jack is a glaringly obvious symbol of separation, which is in direct opposition to the unified Ireland that Catholics desire. The night before on July 11, or the “Eleventh Night”, is also characterized by violence in the form of immense bonfires set ablaze in Protestant communities that intentionally burn Catholic and other non-unionist symbols. These bonfires are historically known to get out of hand, with some houses and other buildings burning down amidst chants of “No surrender!”

These societal divides continued to deepen as a result of the events that transpired on January 30, 1972, a day that is more famously known as “Bloody Sunday”. Said to be one of the darkest days of The Troubles, Bloody Sunday started out as a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march against internment that mirrored the efforts to combat discrimination and prejudice by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States. While some marchers stopped at the now iconic ‘Free Derry Corner’, others continued until they reached army barricades and were stopped by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), NI’s police force at the time. Violence, then an everyday occurrence, soon erupted between the RUC and members of the crowd; the British Army ultimately killed 13 civilians and wounded 14 others. Bloody Sunday was critical in shaping the course of the conflict and fueling the efforts made by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), the core paramilitary group that aimed to end British rule and reunify Ireland. As a result of the massacre of unarmed protesters that day and the subsequent cover-up by the state, the conflict became increasingly militarized from thereon out, leading to increased IRA recruitment.

Due to the complex nature of The Troubles, it is important to discern which groups and parties belonged to which side of the conflict. Of the Republican paramilitaries involved in the hostility, the most infamous was the IRA, which was responsible for many of the violent attacks that characterized The Troubles. On the Loyalist Protestant side, there was the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the predominantly Ulster paramilitary group, and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), another large vigilante group. Furthermore, British security forces were involved in the form of the law enforcement-based RUC, as well as numerous activists, politicians, and political parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the primary unionist political party in NI, and the opposing Sinn Féin, the left-wing Irish party that is still active in both NI and the Republic of Ireland.

Ongoing Divisive Issues

Efforts to put an end to the unrelenting conflict seemingly concluded with the formal passage of the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement that was signed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish politician Taoiseach Bertie Ahern in Belfast, NI in 1998. The terms of the peace agreement included, but were not limited to, the decommissioning of paramilitary groups, the establishment of a power-sharing government split between the DUP and Sinn Féin, the demilitarization of the hard border between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and the release of political prisoners on the condition that they won’t re-engage with their former organizations. However, while the conditions of the treaty were attractive in principle, deep divisions are still evident within Northern Irish society, acting as roadblocks in the peace and reconciliation process.

While the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement attempted to quell all domestic issues, full implementation of the peace treaty has been challenging as various forms of social stratification remain unresolved due to enduring societal norms and attitudes. While Orangemen’s Day and the Eleventh Night bonfires are merely annual demonstrations of Protestant pride, the persistence of segregation and sectarianism is still visible in the structural layout of many communities in NI, most notably in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry where the infamous ‘Peace Walls’ continue to physically divide Protestant and Catholic communities from one another. These walls, which separate the two communities at contentious intersections in the hopes of minimizing violent interactions, serve as blank canvases for political statements and are decorated in a variety of colorful murals detailing the thirty years of conflict. Common images include messages of revenge and oppression, as well as famous figures such as Bobby Sands, a member of the Provisional IRA and the UK Parliament who died while on a hunger strike in prison and was ultimately seen as a martyr for the Irish Republican cause. However, while these walls are meant to act as peaceful dividers, their mere existence perpetuates an “us versus them” mentality that makes it difficult to reconcile the two communities with one another. Some murals in Derry, where Bloody Sunday occurred, even go as far as to compare the IRA to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

In addition to the use of imagery to further the divide between Protestants and Catholics, inequality in unemployment, housing, and education persists. Historically, Irish Catholics have experienced higher unemployment rates and less housing availability than their Protestant counterparts. The disparity was evident in 1992 towards the tail end of The Troubles, as the Protestant unemployment rate was 9% in comparison to 18% for Catholics. While those rates have decreased, dropping to 5% and 7% for each respective group in 2016, this economic inactivity still heavily impacts the Catholic community to a greater degree. In fact, one study conducted by R. L. Miller and R. D. Osborne, drawing upon a government survey that monitored over 3,500 unemployed males during 1976-1977 at the height of the conflict, found that Catholics were “more likely to have been unemployed in the previous three years, for that unemployment to have last longer, to experience a longer period before securing a job, [and] to receive from Employment Offices fewer job submissions… [which] could not be accounted for by variations in education, skill level, geographical mobility or general motivation”. Despite the government’s attempts to level out the playing field, Catholics, namely ex-terrorists, have faced far more social barriers than Protestants in terms of their inability to get public sector jobs, insurance, or even travel to other countries. This pervasive inequality acts as a breeding ground of sorts for paramilitary activity, who view the lack of government intervention as siding with the Protestant community. Furthermore, research conducted by scholars at Ulster University shows that welfare dependency rose, suicide rates doubled, and men’s life expectancy fell in the areas most affected by The Troubles. Ironically these areas, such as Derry/Londonderry in NI, are primarily Catholic.

Pervasive social norms and stigmas have also obstructed the peace process, especially in regards to education. Schooling in Northern Ireland is heavily segregated, and its persistence often fuels the debate that the education system in the state is acting as more of a perpetuator of division than one of peace. With a population of only about 1.8 million, analysis of the fragmented school structure shows that 93% of children in primary school (ages 4-11), and post-primary school (ages 11-18), attend segregated schools that are either majority Catholic or majority Protestant. This blatant academic separation demonstrates the passing of sectarian views through the generations, as many adults who were involved or impacted by the events of The Troubles have chosen to further the divide and hinder the peace process by having their children attend segregated schools. This ultimately limits the opportunity that children and adolescents have to interact with and form their own perceptions of “the other side”.

Political Upheaval

A core component of the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement was the establishment of a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland, commonly known as Stormont, between the mainly Protestant DUP and the Catholic-leaning Sinn Féin. The dynamics of this relationship essentially meant that the two groups both had a say in the political sphere within NI. However, recent events have made it difficult for any progress to be made at all, ultimately leading to the collapse of the regional governing body in NI. In January 2017, Sinn Féin’s leader, Martin McGuinness, resigned as deputy First Minister. The party then let the deadline for the nomination of a replacement pass, which goes against the conditions of the peace agreement, thereby forcing an early election, an action that the DUP saw as Sinn Féin “putting its partisan interests ahead of the public good”. Adding to the divide is the fact that Sinn Féin’s president Gerry Adams stood down in late 2017; this, combined with the death of McGuinness, has left the government in a tricky situation, enough to where the assembly stopped meeting, an overhaul of the region’s health system was postponed, and any and all long-term decision-making processes were ended. The lack of a functioning government has forced the state to run off of the work of civil servants with very limited funds and resources.

Efforts to reinstate a functioning government were attempted in January 2018 with the election of Karen Bradley as Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State. Bradley ultimately got the two political parties to talk and draft a deal that satisfied both sides, however, at the last minute the deal fell through. While the precise reasons are unknown, circulating rumors claim that the deal included the foundations for an Irish Language Act, which would give the Irish language the same power and prestige as English. This is an act that the DUP is in complete opposition to, as it means equalizing the two communities in a way that elevated Irish culture and diminished British identity. As a result, there continues to be no active government in the region to this day.

Brexit Uncertainty

Moreover, Northern Ireland’s persistent challenges are not limited to domestic causes, but they also stem from international disputes, including the uncertainty surrounding “Brexit”, or the UK’s potential departure from the European Union (EU), and the possible political and economic ramifications associated with that decision. Brexit, a contentious issue that continues to plague European citizens, could destroy the little peace that has been achieved in Northern Ireland, as it brings into question the status of the country as a member of the UK. The political ramifications of Brexit are often discussed in relation to the “Irish backstop”, another way to refer to a guarantee that a “hard” Irish border will not be reinstated between the north and south if the UK splits from the EU. During The Troubles, the hard border that existed was known to be especially sensitive to violence, as the soldiers who patrolled it were seen as easy targets and enforcers of British occupation. Complete demilitarization of the border was a key condition of the 1998 peace agreement, but full or even partial reconciliation seems further and further out of reach as the uncertainty of Brexit, paired with the lack of a functioning government, threatens to reestablish the border, leading to immense social and economic consequences.

However, the border is currently viewed as a “tripwire” of sorts, where any slight miscalculation or aggressive action on behalf of either side threatens to open old wounds and reignite the bloody conflict. One of the most recent incidents occurred in January 2019 when a car bomb exploded outside of a courthouse on an empty street in Derry, NI. This violence was seen again in April 2019 when Lyra McKee, a reporter who specialized in The Troubles, was shot and killed during riots in Derry/Londonderry. These types of acts were all too common during the conflict, and demonstrate that violence still persists even to this day and could very easily occur on or near the border if it is recreated.

In terms of its economic impact, Brexit could do a large amount of damage to the British and Irish economies. In an interview in February 2019, Irish Deputy Prime Minister Simon Coveney stated that there are around 40,000 Irish companies that trade with Britain, amounting to almost a 75-billion euro trade relationship. The reestablishment of a hard border could have detrimental effects on that trade relationship, making it more difficult for the two countries to give and receive goods. Furthermore, the European Single Market that was created in 1993 allows for the easy passage of goods between members of the EU, while the EU Customs Union is a club of countries where customs (or tariffs) have been removed from goods. If the UK leaves the EU, then they leave the single market and the customs union. Thus, they run the risk of having NI and the Republic follow two different rules; as a result, all goods would need to be verified when moving between the two countries, requiring border checkpoints, which many see as a potential source of future violence. To mitigate these potential impacts, the EU and the UK created the “Irish backstop” deal as a sort of last resort policy so that there will be no hard border again, allowing for the easy movement of citizens within the island of Ireland.

Issue Recommendations

Building off of the fragile peace that exists requires a three-pronged approach that addresses the social, political, and economic issues that continue to persist in Northern Ireland. This comprehensive approach entails the gradual removal of the ‘Peace walls’ that exist primarily in Belfast, increasing the number of integrated schools across Northern Ireland, reestablishing a functioning government in Stormont with the help of the UK, and preventing the return of a hard border by monitoring the developments regarding Brexit.

The gradual destruction of the walls that divide Protestant and Catholic communities in many cities across Northern Ireland is the first step towards reconciliation. While many view the walls as dividers that actually aid in the peace process because they limit group interaction and therefore minimize violence, the mere existence of the walls promotes segregation. Many of the walls are located in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, especially in Belfast, and this has caused a lot of disagreement that goes back to the issue of Catholic rates of unemployment and housing shortages in comparison to Protestants. However, demolishing the walls would be the practical first step, but the reality of the situation is much more complex. While the violence may have decreased substantially since the signing of the peace agreement, the walls represent more of a psychological than a physical barrier that provides a sense of stability and protection from the other side. Nonetheless, while not much progress has been made since the goal of tearing down all 48 of Northern Ireland’s peace walls by 2023 was declared, local artists have used the walls as blank canvases to display peaceful images rather than the harsh, sectarian pieces that adorn some sections of the walls. Until more walls come down, artists should be encouraged to spread and promote peace through the use of imagery; for example, the Arts Council of Northern Ireland has formed the Re-Imaging Communities project that gives local community members grant money to create new art pieces that help tackle sectarianism. These “post-para” murals commemorate general “cultural treasures”, such as C.S. Lewis, who was born in East Belfast and is famous for his novel The Lion, The Witch, and the Wardrobe, or George Best, the boy who popularized soccer in the 1960s.

British and Irish cultural differences have also had effects on the education sector; to bridge this division, there should be a focus in Northern Ireland to create more integrated schools that host both Catholic and Protestant students in a comfortable and inclusive setting. At present, there are around 62 grant-aided integrated schools throughout NI, and results from a 2013 public opinion survey revealed that 66% of parents wish to increase the number of integrated places in Belfast from 4% to 33%, and 83% believe that integrated education is a vital part in moving forward in the peace process. New-Bridge Integrated College, an integrated school in Loughbrickland, Northern Ireland, focuses on this narrative of peacebuilding through social cohesion by stressing respect and tolerance for everyone, no matter their background. While these schools face challenges of addressing student questions of culture and identity, the needs of young people for reconciliation and inclusivity in NI should take precedence over parents’ desires for continued segregation. The overall goal should be to combat these negative social norms and attitudes that encourage divisiveness rather than unification.

With over two years since it last had a government, it is pertinent that Northern Ireland returns to having a functioning political system; one of the ways in which this could happen is if Westminster, the UK government that resides in London, steps in and controls NI from afar. While the UK is not quite keen on this idea, continuing without any government only further damages the country and puts a halt on the peace process. Currently, few decisions have been made and little action is being taken to address any issues that plague NI as a direct result of the limited resources and lack of working ministers. Reestablishing a functioning government would essentially help mitigate some of the economic and social issues that citizens face, as well as provide Northern Ireland with more of a voice in the Brexit debate. Ever since Stormont collapsed, concerns over health care in specific have grown, with the Department of Health finding increased wait lists up to 52 days for an initial consultation, staff shortages, and stalled hospital reform to be major sources of concern for individuals who need assistance as soon as possible. With the aid of Westminster, both the DUP and Sinn Féin representatives at Stormont could work together to at least satisfy the basic needs of their citizens and later use Westminster as a sort of third-party mediator to help facilitate dialogue and overcome their differences.

Lastly, in terms of solutions for the politically-fuelled border debate, all efforts should be taken to prevent the re-implementation of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The border was the site for lots of conflict, and to add patrolmen and physical infrastructure such as cameras, sensors, and drones to monitor movement between the two states is to create easy targets for sectarian violence. The results of a shocking survey, however, found that approximately 60% of the business community in NI were in support of a soft Brexit, including both nationalists and unionists. A soft Brexit means that the UK stays either within the European Single Market by becoming a member of the European Economic Area, the EU Customs Union, or both. The impact of a soft Brexit would, given the limited options, not be a terrible choice, as it would satisfy the interests of all sides by avoiding the reestablishment of a hard border. Nonetheless, as the various governments continue to issue statements regarding the progress of Brexit, and therefore the Irish involvement in that process, the hard border continues to be brought up. To make one single recommendation that would prevent the re-establishment of a hard border is difficult given the complexities of the issue among the parties involved.

The entirety of The Troubles was characterized by sectarian violence, clashes between the police and citizens, and general disagreements over culture and identity that led to the death of some 3,600 people, all of which are common markers of intrastate conflict or a civil war. While the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement formally ended the conflict, it failed to provide any practical recommendations or solutions on how to maintain peace while reconciling the past. Northern Ireland is still fraught with social, political, and economic issues today, making it difficult to work on the peace process whilst also addressing old wounds. The paramilitary violence of The Troubles may have stopped for the time being, but the underlying sectarian and nationalistic views that ignited the conflict continue to persist.

Economic Integration vs Economic Nationalism: The Deutsche Bank Merger

Introduction

The European Central Bank (ECB), founded in 1998, established  monetary policies after the creation and implementation of the euro as a transnational currency in the Eurozone. The Euro currency, used by the majority of members in the European Union, helps create a single market, which is essentially one large region which allows for trade to be done between European countries without any form of regulations or tariffs. The Euro system promotes more than economic cooperation; it promotes integration and merging of different European banks to further promote the financial cooperation the ECB strives towards. While strides have been made in order to further integrate European banks, there has been push back from European nations such as Germany to have a  “national champion”  in the financial system in order to support national companies. German believes this national champion is Deutsche Bank, one of the oldest banks in Germany whose foundation was based upon supporting German exports.

However, this once powerful bank is currently on the verge of collapse. Beginning from the financial crisis in 2008, Deutsche Bank is at the center of financial scandals, low profits,and other issues which will be discussed later. Members of the management board of Deutsche Bank and German politicians believe the solution to saving Deutsche Bank is by merging with competitor Commerzbank, another old failing bank who focuses more on domestic companies. While German politicians are hopeful that the merger with Commerzbank will help solve many problems surrounding the German banking system, it does not eliminate the underlying desire for a German bank to aid German companies. Germany’s agenda to have a national bank support national companies goes against the ECB's long-term plan to establish a Pan-European banking system between different European banks.

Deutsche in Danger

Without any form of reformation, Deutsche Bank is heading down the path to be Germany’s equivalent to the fall of Lehman Brothers. The global financial crisis of 2008 was the beginning of the decline for the German bank, which only deepened as scandals and conflicts internally within the bank as well as with outside actors continuously arose one right after the other. For example, in 2018, Deutsche Bank released its net profits on the company website for the first time since 2014. The numbers show an underperformance in comparison to the targeted reports. In 2018, Deutsche Bank only made a net profit of $390 million, which is lower than the Reuters projected target at $517 million. Another issue, which only makes matters worse, is their dependency on foreign companies. In a market where competitors are banks such as J.P. Chase Morgan and Citi Bank group, whom dominate market in and outside of the United States, Deutsche Bank relatively is small compared to its competitors. This, among other financial issues, declining revenues, and adverse market conditions have laid out the foundation to the pending doom of Deutsche Bank. These issues do not fully address different external scandals Deutsche Bank has fallen under for the past several years with outside actors.

These external scandals only make Deutsche’s road to recovery even harder. For example, Deutsche Bank recently came to a settlement with the US Department of Justice for $7.2 billion for misleading investors in the purchases of residential mortgage-backed securities. Other scandals, such as the one in which Deutsche Bank lost about $1.6 billion worth of bonds bought in 2007, and a tax evasion scandal that led to Deutsche Bank to pay $94 million, spill over a large amount of money the German bank owes to different countries, specifically the United States. While such scandals are not necessarily rare in the banking world, their accumulation and the long period it is taking for the German bank to pay back the settlements only make Deutsche’s situation worse.

A Complicated Merger

If the merger happens, Deutsche Bank will reap more benefits than Commerzbank. It will cause  cost cuts will need to be done in order for the newly merged bank to soundly operate. One way this could be executed is through cutting employees. While a measure such as this is normal to any bank merger or acquisition, the reductions required from Deutsche Bank would be substantially less than if the bank restructured itself.  While the alliance allows both banks to expand their markets domestically and internationally, Deutsche Bank’s expansion into the domestic market will diminish its dependency on any international trade operations or need to lend to international companies.

Due to the fact that Commerzbank’s main clientele are small-medium enterprises in Germany, the merger of these two banks would create  the largest lender in Germany. The concept of having one large bank financing various companies in Germany follows an agenda of many German politicians, which is a large German bank supporting German companies. This concept of a megabank promotes the idea of a  national champion, which the German government favors. By having Deutsche Bank as the country’s primary bank to finance majority of Germany companies, politicians hope this will decrease the global footprint of foreign banks such as J.P Chase. Although the merger is a protectionist-like measure to limit external interference, it does not fix the flaws in the German banking system. The merge might even make the banking system of Germany more complicated.

The country’s banking is currently suffering from overcrowding. Overall, there are three pillars in which all German banks fall. The three pillars are; private banks, which are banks that deal with the financing of specific individuals; public banks, which normally pertains to commercial companies and co-op banks which is a combination of both private and public banks. With the amount of banks in each pillar ranging  from as small as 385 banks to as many as 1000 banks, this results in a system that is weak and underperforms. Although banks, including s Commerzbank, have attempted to salvage the situation through consolidations and merging with smaller banks, it did not prove to be helpful in reducing the number of players in the system since it did not erase the fact that there are too many banks in Germany.

This merger, if it occurs, will result in this new bank being the third largest bank in the Eurozone. While Germany is overall in favor of this merger, it still needs the ultimate approval of the European Central Bank in order for it to fully take place.

The European Central Bank has given a set of criteria which must be met by both banks for the merger to be approved. Nevertheless, the merger goes against the broader plan of the European Central Bank to have a Pan-European banking system where banks within the Eurozone will merge with other banks in the regions as well as finance companies beyond their national border. In 2018, the ECB created the Target Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS), which allowed transactions between European banks to be processed instantaneously, regardless of where the primary base of a bank is. Although only a few European countries use the TIPS, the hope is that all member-states will use the system to make financial transactions more timely and efficient. The Deutsche-Commerzbank merger will not wholly dissolve this program, but it will weaken the goal of having financial integration among member states. If the European Central Bank is promoting the idea of European banks merging and financing companies outside of their national borders, the idea of German companies only being supported by German banks goes against the agenda of the European Central Bank.

Recommendations

German politicians should focus their efforts on reforming their entire banking system instead of focusing  on saving Germany’s oldest, and not most efficient, banks. While it may be in Germany’s best interest to have German banks  support domestic companies, it is more important to reform the banking system. Through this, Germany will hopefully create a more financial market which will enhance the performance of banks within the financial system as well as reducing the risk in banks collapsing. The reforming of Germany’s banking system can also ease any worry of the European Central Bank system about Germany’s protectionist path. Although board members of the ECB have not released any form of hard push back against the merger, they have listed different demands or criterias which need to be met in order to gain the full approval for the merger to occur.  One of these criterias given by the ECB is for Deutsche Bank to increase their fresh funds, which is the amount of funds that are neither withdrawn or newly deposited funds into a bank. Criteria such as increasing the amount of fresh funds is just one way for Deutsche bank to create a safety net in case the merger is not successful.

All in all, the merger reflects many things internally in Germany as well as the Eurozone. Internally in Germany, the ongoing negotiations to save one of the oldest banks in Germany is a reflection to preserve their pride of national banks financing national companies. Even in an overcrowded banking system, politicians hope the new merged will be the answer to their prayers. Externally, through the lens of the European Central Bank, the possibility of the third largest bank in all of Europe who wants to have a global footprint as large as American banks and finance all German companies is an ambitious dream for Germany to have their cake and eat it too.

No Warm Welcome: Siberian Animosity towards Chinese Economic Activity

As a nation of 1.4 billion people, it is not hard to decipher why China’s ambitions and potential influence in neighboring Siberia, an area home to a shrinking population of about 25 million, has long been a cause of concern for Russians. This imbalance is expected to increase with time, as China’s quickly expanding economic and political clout continues to eclipse a Russia suffering from economic and demographic stagnation. Despite this, there is no end in sight to increasing ties between Beijing and Moscow, leaving many local Siberian anxieties unconsoled. For policy makers in both capitals, it should be obvious that failure to address these concerns is politically dangerous and economically unsustainable.

The most vocal resistance to Chinese ventures in Siberia manifests in the area surrounding Lake Baikal, the largest freshwater lake in the world by volume, which garnered Chinese interest due to an appetite for water across the border. This demand prompted Russia’s agriculture minister, Aleksandr Tkachev, to propose diverting some of the region’s river water to China in 2016, which has more recently taken the form of either bottling the water or developing a pipeline to pump it into the province of Xinjiang. As the lake occupies a special place in the minds of many Russian people, and serves as an important part of their national patrimony, it was no surprise that the proposals motivated around a million people to sign a petition against the plans and sparked protest against them this past month. These actions were eventually successful in deterring the project from being carried out, although there is reason to believe that backtracking on the part of the Kremlin may have damaged prospects for Chinese foreign direct investment to Russia overall. It is important to note that a great deal of recent Sino-Russian economic cooperation is due to Western sanctions placed on Russia since 2014, after which the nation turned eastwards to mitigate its losses. Failure to elicit confidence in the face of its smaller pool of international investors, and the Chinese in particular, will certainly pose issues for the nation’s economy.

With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that this is just one of a multitude of Chinese-involved economic projects in the region. It is also not the only one that has drawn local tension, as anxiety over Chinese forestry projects and real estate consumption have also become quite pronounced. Due to the close proximity and vastness of Siberia’s forests, Russia is China’s premium supplier of timber, and the Chinese forestry business’ presence in the area has only grown over time. In an effort to mitigate Russian tariffs put in place in 2007, much of the industry decided to migrate to Russia itself and establish sawmills there. In 2008 there were 152 Chinese forestry companies located across Russia, but by 2018 this number jumped to 564. While this has lead to the conception that China is destroying the Siberian environment in a manner similar to what they have done domestically, the fact that significant numbers of Chinese migrant workers have also accompanied the industry’s trek, and only Chinese equipment is used in the work, has not helped with local perceptions.

There has also been serious resentment towards wealthier Chinese purchasing property on the banks of Lake Baikal, and some constructing hotels and resorts there. This has similarly lead to petitions for government action against what locals have called an “invasion” or a Chinese “yoke” (a reference to medieval Mongolian invasions), specifically with the intent to ban the sale of real estate to Chinese citizens in certain parts of the region. This frustration comes, in part, due to the fact that the constructions are often illegal, and that the Chinese often act with seeming impunity.

Frustration towards these kinds of practices are something that can lead to backlash, negating potential benefits for both Beijing, Moscow, and Siberian residents. That being said, it would be wise of China to actually deal with these concerns. This means employing more local workers rather than relying on Chinese labor, as well as bolstering the local economy in general by using Russian equipment and facilities. Strict adherence to local laws, especially environmental regulations, is vital, especially in culturally important landmarks such as Lake Baikal. This also includes replanting trees in accordance with logging agreements, and ceasing to log in protected forests. Although perhaps good for domestic advertisement, local Siberian anxieties would be largely calmed if Chinese tourist agencies refrained from exhibiting Lake Baikal as a former Chinese territory, and if they made a greater commitment to reducing pollution and utilizing Russian-owned resorts and services.

The Russian government must also take serious steps to alleviate these grievances, as many across Siberia blame the Kremlin and business-oriented oligarchs for being permissive of China’s actions. While Russia’s current geopolitical difficulties have limited its bargaining power, it should remain keenly aware of its own interests and sovereignty. Moscow should never hesitate to enforce its own laws when it comes to illegal logging and construction, as public backlash has also shown that a failure to do so can damage long-term economic potential. This comes as failure to address fears over immigration recently prompted the entire Siberian Sakha Republic to ban migrants from 33 fields of work. Considering the ethnic animosity that has already begun to simmer towards the Chinese due to temporary migrant workers, it is not unreasonable to consider that similar decisions could be made elsewhere in the region if this continues.

Russia’s east has always been in need of economic development, and in many ways the rise of China could prove a blessing for the people who inhabit Siberia. However, one-sided resource extraction and disregard for cultural concerns is certainly not a viable way to undertake this task. If this continues, trust in the Russian government will continue to plummet, regionalism will likely experience an ascension, and long-term prospects to use China as an economic substitute for the West in the face of sanctions will suffer. A positive path forward can be determined by choices made in Moscow and Beijing, but it would be wise to remember that the people of Siberia do have a say in the region’s future.

The Two Poles: The ‘Rise’ of China and U.S.-China Trade Relations

The U.S.-China trade war reads like a poorly written political script: leaders spew vigorous polemics at each other, denounce policies made by the other while adopting those same policies, and take flawed actions that actually only hurt their own citizens. What the script reveals at the end, however, is not a scene where the protagonist flies off happily ever after in a grand resolution. Instead, the story continues indefinitely, causes a global downturn, alienates allies, and establishes a dangerous precedent of divorcing sound trade policy from foreign policy.

With the recent round of trade talks aimed at resolving the trade dispute between the United States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of China (China) coming to an end, both sides have expressed that “new progress” was made and the talks were “constructive.” However, what these conciliatory comments ignore is the fact that the crisis was first brought about as a result of misunderstanding economic concepts and neglecting international dynamics. While the U.S. is home to the largest economy in the world, its growth is marred by superficial and unsustainable policies—such as the recent levying of tariffs—that will likely prove to be long-term detriments to the U.S. economy. This trend is best captured in U.S.-China trade relations, recently stained by hostile trade policies that assumes a U.S.-China trading partnership made decades ago while ignoring sound economic and foreign policy.

A Primer on the U.S. Trade Deficit

On the trade balance, Adam Smith once wrote that “[it’s] unnecessary to lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous. Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of trade.” Trade deficits occur when a country imports more than it exports. In macroeconomic terms, a country’s exports minus its imports is equal to savings minus investment. In the wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and tariffs levied against products such as steel, aluminum, and other Chinese goods, the U.S. trade balance has reached unprecedented levels, widening to $891.3 billion. Trade imbalances with China account for almost half of that number, rising to $419.16 billion for 2018. But analyzing these numbers in a vacuum as some are apt to do risks adopting the same flawed reasoning that has led to U.S.-China tensions.

Multiple elements can influence the trade deficit, such as more government spending, the exchange rate of the dollar, and a growing economy. In the U.S. context, the stability and size of its economy encourages increased purchases of American assets, appreciating the dollar. As the dollar strengthens, foreign goods become cheaper to purchase and American consumers buy more and save less. In the shadow of weakening global growth, financial and trade conditions internationally have contracted while the consumer-driven U.S. economy continues to expand, contributing to the deficit. Additionally, increased government spending over the past several years has also widened the deficit.

As economist Martin Feldstein notes, it often becomes politically expedient to blame the trade deficit on unfair practices adopted by foreign governments. While it may be correct to assert that governments such as China do engage in improper economic activities, constraining those countries’ access to U.S. products or markets will not drastically change the trade balance. This may be considered a legitimate negotiating strategy, but a belligerent trade policy that adopts this fallacious attitude damages important country relations and harms domestic consumers, making the costs greater than the benefits.

Trade deficits are not inherently bad nor are they good. It’s important to note that sustained imbalances can harm the economy, such as contributing to slow growth and destabilizing financial bubbles. A larger trade deficit provides a challenge in increasing employment and sustaining economic growth. However, the U.S. has experienced remarkably low unemployment rates and consistent economic growth.

In a two-country scenario, large trade deficits can lead to irreversible damage to the U.S. economy. However, despite what some may believe, no country exists in this bilateral sphere. To identify trade imbalances--such as the one between the U.S. and China--as the greatest economic issue is to incorrectly identify the appropriate factors influencing the economy and country relations.

Historically, due to its size and influence, the U.S. may have operated in a global environment closer to the zero-sum world that the Trump administration has painted a picture of. However, the international terrain has shifted, with China possessing more market power and global impact.

The ‘Rise’ of China: What’s the Alternative?

Over the course of 2018, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on at least $200 billion of U.S. imports, with tariff rates ranging from 10 percent to 25 percent. Targeting strategically significant industries, such as steel and goods important to China’s “Made in China 2025” program, this marks the first U.S. trade war seen since the 1930s. President Trump cited unfair terms of trade, the large trade deficit, and discriminatory trade practices by China as the primary reasons behind the recent trade policies. In response to this, several countries, notably China, have levied retaliatory tariffs on at least $121 billion of U.S. exports.

Written in the shadow of these recent tariffs, several studies assert that U.S. consumers are hit hardest by trade tariffs. Economist David Weinstein found that, in the wake of the trade tariffs recently implemented, the full incidence of those tariffs has been passed through to domestic consumers. In an effort to mitigate this, the Trump administration has encouraged Americans to switch to alternative suppliers, believing that if Americans do this, the burden of $200 billion of tariffs against Chinese goods will be paid only by foreign firms. However, if this was possible, it would have happened already. In the short-term, Americans cannot find viable alternatives to the competitive goods that China producers offer.

This suggests that over the past decade, a shift in the global economy has occurred, affording more market power to Chinese firms. As International Monetary Fund data indicates, China currently makes up 19.18 percent of the world’s GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity) in comparison to the U.S.’s 15.01 percent. Additional Chinese geopolitical strategies through the use of markets, infrastructure, and foreign aid continue to strengthen the country’s position in the global community. These actions are what has led some to comment that China is on the ‘rise.’ To use this fearful expression is a misnomer that ignores the fact that China and its influence has always been present on the global stage. However, similar to what President Trump is espousing now, China has historically looked inwards instead of outwards. The change in China’s current international strategy and their increasing presence has prompted a reactionary and protectionist response from the U.S., perpetuating an already weakening U.S. presence.

Driven by substantial economic growth over the past several decades, Chinese producers have become key contributors in the global supply chain created by globalization, further solidifying their position in the global economy. As the investment bank Morgan Stanley comments, “the integration of supply chains both domestically and globally has meant that any trade measures implemented on a single country or sector will likely ripple outward to other regions and sectors.” Action taken in one corner of the world affects the entire world. This economic and political shift in China’s market power and its trade partner ‘elasticity’—meaning that there is increasing market power for Chinese producers and a growing array of markets able to substitute for the U.S.—allows producers to avoid importation prices and instead push a majority of the burden towards U.S. producers and consumers. The U.S. remains the largest economy in the world but stands a close second in production. Poor trade, economic, and foreign policies have allowed other countries, such as China, to inch closer to surpassing the U.S. in influencing the complex web of global supply chains.

Hostile trade and economic policies implemented by the U.S. risk alienating trading partners significant to the U.S.’s economic and international presence. Economic structures and relations form the body that social and political institutions dress. While the validity of those economic structures is a topic that deserves its own lengthy discussion, the reality is that the emergence of economic substitutes to the U.S. weakens its already lackluster presence in the international community. Similar to what countries in the past have done, China is simply capitalizing on the U.S.’s weakening international presence and is pushing towards a softer expression of power to increase its influence. The trade war instigated by the U.S. against China and other countries risks solidifying this.

Divorcing Trade Policy and Foreign Policy  

In the report “Beyond the Water’s Edge” by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, researchers found that many U.S. Congressional members appeared to “view trade issues as distinct from foreign policy.” While it appears to be a concession to the conflict between domestic and international policies, the Trump administration has adopted this perspective, furthering global tensions and diminishing the U.S.’s influence.

Even though the Trump administration asserts that the U.S. economy has been running at a deficit for far too long, the U.S. has underpinned multilateral global policy cooperation efforts since World War II as a result of that deficit. A tightening of trading policy harms not only the global economy but the U.S.’s international status.

The U.S. economy currently provides a majority of liquidity to the world economy while simultaneously driving demand. This has contributed to the large trade deficit as discussed in the previous primer on the trade deficit. Ruchir Sharma, head of emerging markets and chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, argues that by maintaining the deficit and consequently its position as the de facto reserve currency, U.S. international borrowing costs are lowered and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is heightened. The dollar has served as the most popular global reserve currency and, as Council on Foreign Relations’ James McBride and Andrew Chatzky contend, as the “primary tool for global transactions.” Because it is the de facto reserve currency, other countries use the dollar as the primary currency in their foreign exchange reserves and some even peg their own currencies to the dollar. These reserves are used in the global economy during transactions and investments. Because of these reserves, U.S. influence in the global economy and greater international stage remains profound.  

By pretending that trade policy and foreign policy doesn’t exist in conjunction with each other, the U.S. risks placing itself in the economic and political vacuum it’s created. This directly stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of economic dynamics and how it relates to international relations.

Looking Forward

It’s been said before: the ‘rise’ of China is threatening the current global order. In the wake of increasing tensions between previously friendly countries, China is becoming a more legitimate alternative to an often hostile and unpredictable U.S. administration. Instead of lashing out with poor policies that perpetuates this--such as levying harsh tariffs, backing out of the now defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and swelling the budget deficit--the U.S. should focus on reaffirming economic relationships with those they have marginalized. While there are trade-offs inherent in every economic action taken, multilateral trade deals such as the TPP can be used to counter China’s growing influence without estranging countries who have depended on the U.S. in the past. But while these approaches are legitimate in their prescription, such suggestions imply that a rising China is dangerous to the U.S.

Somewhere far back in the annals of history, someone once convinced us that a unipolar world was the only viable goal for countries. However, the U.S. should reject the notion that the international stage is a pragmatic game of chess with antagonists standing at opposite sides of a board. Most—though they may not admit it—are tired of this narrative or, rather, they should be tired of it. The U.S. should engage with China, join its international initiatives, and continue to establish itself as a leader standing among leaders. If the U.S. is attempting to influence China and its policies, working alongside China instead of against it is the best approach the U.S. can take. Hostile trade and diplomatic policies only succeed in alienating those closest to us and entrenching stereotypical narratives about those who are not. Beyond a ‘rising’ China, the most effective foreign policy that the U.S. can adopt is to engage in multilateral endeavors and strengthen its relationship with other countries through positive economic and international agreements.

Separating trade policies and international relations is a fallacy that disrupts the global economy. Trade policies should affirm relationships with other countries, forcing those countries and individuals to work together for mutual goals. Failing to acknowledge this--or ignoring this--isolates the U.S. and strains global dynamics. The U.S. is still the largest economy in the world and wields immense power in the international community. To implement policies that act as if this isn’t true lacks a depth of understanding and causes the U.S. to become smaller on an already crowded global stage.

An administration that clings to the tattered sleeve of a vacuous economic practice devoid of international context runs the risk of further weakening its position in the world. The Trump administration has made reducing the U.S. trade deficit a key policy position, looking at the global economy through two-dimensional lenses. However, hostile policies ignore the multidimensional nature of foreign policy as facilitated through economics. Instead of implementing policies that could better global relations, the administration has established itself among elitist economists and politicians who are either ignorant or feign ignorance in order to achieve ideological goals. And yet, somehow, the U.S. still hasn’t managed to lessen its trade deficit.

Note

Because there are topics mentioned deserving of their own discussion, this article only seeks to understand and explain the misconstruction of economic elements and the failure to incorporate those elements holistically into international relations. It’s important to acknowledge those subjects that have not been elucidated upon in order to continue having conversations about these issues. There have been several subjects that have been offered in the context of the discussion that have not been appropriately expanded upon:

This article does not seek to specifically only comment on the veracity of trade policies such as tariffs, but instead examines the economic dimensions in which these policies exist and the theoretical failures that have followed. For example, the usage of the dollar as a de facto global reserve currency supports U.S. influence in the international community. However, the article did not ask whether or not that influence has been correctly wielded.

The article does not comment on the geopolitical strategies adopted by China. While often accused of using ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ to gain power, some would assert that these policies offer alternatives to monopolistic initiatives that are arguably an extension of neocolonial practices.  

Finally, the article does not comprehensively comment on the impact of a large trade deficit and liberal trading policies. These policies and practices create positive benefits for consumers, such as contributing to lower product prices, higher overall standards of living, and so on. However, these same policies have arguably led to the consolidation of capitalism and the crystallization of inequality, environmental degradation, etc.

Demystifying International Courts: The True Challenges to Justice

After two world wars, peoples from around the world have come together to ensure that civilians are no longer be at the mercy of the whims of states. However, there remain major challenges to peace to this day. The modern concern comes, not from a lack of capacity for international cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution, but rather from an inability to get great powers to comply with international regulations and a lack of understanding among states that the goals of international courts are in establishing a fair, judicial system worldwide.

The two world wars changed perspectives on interstate warfare. The lack of regulations for maintaining at least some regulation of conflict led to enough casualties to make all the great leaders sit down and make an entire separate organization committed to maintaining peace. First came the League of Nations, and then, after its obvious lack of success, the United Nations. The presence of these international institutions was revolutionary and continues to remedy otherwise devastating conflicts. Yet even that is not enough. While countries, through the UN, agree to maintain peace and universal respect for human life, they all keep their respective sovereignty and the UN can under no conditions interfere with internal affairs. While the UN is a perfect place to gather and resolve international conflicts before escalation, civil wars and aggression by non-state actors remain highly plausible and a major security risk in the post-WWII era.

Major failures of the UN’s conflict prevention rhetoric are evident in genocides which occurred even after WWII, notably in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. This prompted international community to see an urgent need for action. The International Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia were created to ensure the victims received some peace of mind knowing that the perpetrators were punished. Though the idea of war crimes were first established and agreed upon multilaterally at the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, agreeing to these labels and determining what is and is not a crime may be more challenging. Each country aims to protect its citizens, which prompts it to reject outside judgement for its past crimes, for the sake of protecting its sovereignty. Yet recent history shows persistent attempts to regulate warfare and punish tragic practices. American President Abraham Lincoln established the Lieber Code during the American Civil War, a set of rules to attempt to regulate warfare through protecting civilians, property, condemning the practice of taking prisoners of war, engaging in prisoner exchange among others. The 1847 Brussels Declaration borrowed heavily from the Lieber Code, but was never adopted by major nations. The Hague Conventions saw some progress, though a coalition of countries led by Germany ensured that none of the protocols were binding. The Geneva Protocol followed WWI and added prohibitions regarding the use of mustard gas and other chemical weapons. However, making all these rules and definitions universally accepted and fully binding was virtually impossible. After the Nuremberg Trials, however, everyone, even non-signatories to previous conventions, agreed to commonly accepted rules of warfare, including the protection of civilians and attacks only with a prior warning. Obviously, as mentioned earlier, none of this was enough to prevent future genocides. After the International Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia showed success in gathering evidence, apprehending suspects, and even sentencing at least major government and military officials, there was hope for an apprehensive, mutually agreed upon and, most importantly, enforceable international legal system. This led to the Rome Statute of 1998, a more formal recognition of war crimes, which also took into account the events of Rwanda and Yugoslavia which served to create the International Criminal Court (ICC), a legal body with jurisdiction over certain international crimes. For international law, this is revolutionary as rules of warfare are finally enforced. Conflicts can be regulated, and even prevented, and no civilian would unjustly die or suffer the effects of mindless bloodshed.

However, as states can always claim their sovereignty and lean on exceptionalism, the Rome Statute saw no ratification in either Russia or the United States, and the ICC has no support from the United States, China, or Russia. The ICC saw some success in its operation and is to this day engaging in resolving the Ugandan conflict of early 2000s, and has settled to address four major breaches of war code: crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and most recently added (in 2018) the crime of aggression. Even with an organized structure, transparency (trials can be viewed online), and support from most states, none of the world’s major militaries are official parties to the court. This creates limitations. First, the ICC, the only body capable of punishing war criminals worldwide, can do virtually nothing to punish incidents of violent crimes executed by these states as all of them are on the UN Security Council and any investigation into a non-party to the ICC must be referred to by the Security Council. This renders it impossible to punish either U.S., Russian, or Chinese officials as they would, being members of the Security Council, have to agree to the investigation into their internal affairs. On top of this, the absence of these major powers means that the credibility of the court is in danger and it is only a matter of time before other states party to the court begin feeling manipulated by international bodies. Especially in the eyes of the nationalists, this can be seen as a way to keep the smaller states in check and ensure they remain powerless and at whim of bigger states who, free from any pressure of the ICC, can use this rhetoric to diminish the court’s credibility.

Backlash against international institutions is on the rise. One can only imagine what impact dissolving the ICC would have on the balance of nations and retaining at least some sense of civility and international emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution. Even the country of origin of the Lieber Code, the US, is very closed off to the idea of greater involvement. The fact that the crime of aggression, which outlaws invasions and war in general (aside from some conditions of course), was added to the already short list of crimes, did not make the situation any better since major powers such as the US, Russia, and China find comfort in having and using their military capacities. On the other hand, smaller countries, especially the ones who, unlike major states, have agreed to let go of some of their sovereignty and allowed international institutions in, became more viable to rise of nationalism and exceptionalism of their own and giving up on the international courts.

One clear example is the concern voiced by many African countries that the cases brought to the ICC are exclusively focused on the African continent and are thus only another example of neocolonial tendencies of the developed world. Given that every single one of the cases currently in the ICC are pertaining to African nationals, their concerns are very much confirmed in reality. Of course, the goal of the ICC is not to punish countries, but rather to aid the national court systems in prosecuting their wartime governments, so the argument that the western governments are focused on improvement of the domestic African justice has some merit to it. This does not mean that the African countries have no reason to be upset and Reuters, among others, explains that the Kenyan government has in fact announced the desire of the African Union members to withdraw from the ICC due to the concern that the court is deliberately targeting African leaders.

Increasingly nationalist, ethnocentric European countries are also likely to show a more formal rejection of the court. While the EU is supportive of the ICC, there are increasing levels of suspicion against both the EU and the ICC, showing another fundamental threat to this court’s existence. Unlike the US, the EU fully supports the ICC, but this question remains highly sensitive to the desires of dominant national parties. With people such as questionably acquitted Vojislav Šešelj, Serbian ultranationalist, having been released from the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and having openly insulted and made fun of the international court that inspired the ICC, as reported by Balkan Insight, there are even more threats to destabilization of domestic and international politics, as well as discreditation of the ICC.

It is obvious that this highly valuable international institution is facing threats. Some ways to mitigate this threat and improve its credibility, thus providing for a more stable, just international community, would be a wider acceptance of the ICC in the entirety of the UN Security Council to ensure that the court really does have universal jurisdiction, as Russia, US, and China are currently neither signatories nor ratifiers. On top of this, educational programs are lacking-countries that do experience “intrusion” by the ICC should also be provided technical support to provide necessary education and media coverage that explains the value  of the sacrifice of sovereignty for the sake of this higher purpose, which would reduce the risk of a nationalist backlash and make the court stronger and better understood.

Addressing Gun Violence in the Wake of the Christchurch Shootings Implications for New Zealand and the United States

On March 15, in Christchurch, New Zealand, a gunman killed fifty people in two mosque attacks. After the shootings it was revealed that the perpetrator bought his weapons in accordance with New Zealand law. It was clear that New Zealand’s gun policies were not enough, leading Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to announce changes just days after the shootings. In response, many people celebrated Ardern and encouraged the United States to follow New Zealand’s lead.

Currently, New Zealand’s gun laws require a background check and a minimum age of only 16, or 18 to purchase semi-automatic weapons. The process for earning a firearms license includes a background check, a gun safety lecture, and a thirty-question test. In addition, “Two referees, including one spouse or parent, must be able to attest to an applicant's suitability to carry a gun in an interview with police. An arms officer from New Zealand Police will also pay a visit to their home to inspect security of the guns.” Despite these requirements, a report in 2017 showed that “43,509 people applied for firearms licences, and 43,321 were granted” during that year. For reference, that means 99.5% of applications were successful. Furthermore, “Among developed nations it stands alone with the United States as the only two countries without universal gun registration,” and a person is allowed to purchase any number of guns after receiving their license.

After the attacks, Prime Minister Ardern took little time to declare that the laws would be changed. All five of the weapons used by the Christchurch attacker were bought legally — two of which were semi-automatic. Prime Minister Ardern announced that access to these military-style weapons will require a police permit, which will be extremely difficult to attain. She continued, “We will also ban all assault rifles. We will ban all high-capacity magazines. We will ban all parts with the ability to convert semi-automatic or any other type of firearm into a military-style semi-automatic weapon.” Further efforts include implementing a buyback program in which the acquired weapons will be destroyed. Although some people may view the changes as drastic, Prime Minister Ardern claimed that the cabinet is “absolutely unified.”

In light of these announcements, the conversation stretched from New Zealand to across the globe. Although there was some backlash, the overwhelming majority praised Prime Minister Ardern. New Zealand journalist Eric Young commented, “@jacindaardern has done an extraordinary job representing our nation, our pain and our resolve.” New York Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez also praised Arden’s actions, “Christchurch happened, and within days New Zealand acted to get weapons of war out of the consumer market. This is what leadership looks like.” On the other hand, NRA spokeswoman Dana Loesch argued that New Zealand is “an entirely different country that doesn’t have the right to bear arms as a cornerstone of its constitution, in addition to numerous state laws.” While the second amendment gives people living in the United States the right to bear arms, there is debate over whether that includes military-style weapons.

In the United States, “Federal law does not require background checks for private sales. It would not require background checks for transfers between family members or for temporary use of a gun.” In February 2019, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would require background checks on all firearm sales. The bill is unlikely to reach the Senate floor, but if it if it is passed President Donald Trump said that he would veto it. In addition, a federal ban on bump stocks went into effect in March of 2019. Bump stocks allow semi-automatic weapons to function as a fully-automatic weapon and they have been used in a number of attacks, such as the 2017 Las Vegas shooting. Although the bump stock ban is progress, it should be noted that it is one of the only effective pieces of federal legislation regarding gun control that was passed in the last several years.

Meanwhile, gun deaths in the United States have reached a record high. Vox reported that more people died from gun violence than car crashes in 2017. However, those in favor of gun control have been faced with extreme pushback. For example, Florida Senator Marco Rubio claimed that many “view banning guns as an infringement on the Second Amendment rights of law abiding citizens that ultimately will not prevent these tragedies.” The National Rifle Association (NRA) is also a big contributing factor as to why the United States does not have satisfactory gun control. According to Cameron Kasky, a March For Our Lives co-founder, “the second we want to put common-sense resolutions on these assault weapons, the NRA will say they are trying to steal every single one of your guns, and people believe them.” New Zealand also has a National Rifle Association, but they are considering a name change to avoid association with the United States organization.

New Zealand’s current situation shows that compromises can be made in order to keep people safe. As Prime Minister Ardern stated, their country’s reforms are not being made to infringe on anyone’s freedoms. Instead, they “are directed at making sure this never happens again.” She also emphasized her belief that most gun owners will agree that change is necessary. In other countries, gun control has proven to save lives. For instance, after a mass shooting in Australia, a ban on semi-automatic weapons was implemented. Since 1996, they have had no mass gun deaths and “Researchers concluded gun control laws theoretically prevented 16 mass shootings in Australia.” In addition, the United Kingdom’s buyback program and strict gun control laws may explain why it has one of the lowest levels of gun deaths among industrialized nations. Statistics show that gun control laws generally lower the gun-related death toll.

In 2016, deaths related to gun violence were at “a rate of 1.87 per million people” in New Zealand as opposed to “106 deaths per million” in the United States. While New Zealand’s leadership announced significant changes only six days after Christchurch, the United States has yet to properly respond to Parkland, Las Vegas, Orlando, and the alarming amounts of daily gun-related deaths. It is estimated that each day in the United States, 318 people are shot and 96 of those people die. Clearly, something needs to change in order to end this epidemic.

How Should the U.S. React to the South China Sea Dispute?

What is the South China Sea Dispute?

The South China Sea dispute is one of the most significant and intense territorial disputes in the world today. It first emerged after World War II when China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia seeked to occupy islands in the South China Sea. As decades passed, the dispute became increasingly complicated as more nations, including the U.S., and various complicated factors came into play.

There are two forms of disputes occurring in the South China Sea. The first dispute is over territory. Nations including China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have territorial claims over various islands, rocks, and reefs around the South China Sea. The second dispute involves maritime boundaries. This dispute includes all territorial actors and Indonesia. The argument between these actors pertains to how to divide the sea itself. Each nation has different claims over different areas, and the major issue of the dispute is that these claims largely overlap with each other.

The South China Sea is seen as a valuable provider of a variety of resources. In 2015, the South China Sea has been accounted for 12% of the global fish catch, and home to more than half of the world's fishing vessels. These fisheries officially employ about 3.7 million people and many more unofficially. The South China Sea is estimated to be rich in oil and gas deposits as well, though there is no clear data on the matter. The area beneath the sea is potentially valuable, as it is an important energy supply corridor.

There are numerous territorial claims in the South China Sea. China and Vietnam have previously made and continue to make claims over the islands (including Scarborough, Paracels, and Spratly Islands) within the South China Sea, while Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei have claims over the water surrounding the islands. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not abide by claims that violate the limits of a state's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ states that 200 nautical miles from the shoreline is exclusive area for a country's economic utilization. Countries in their exclusive economic zones have "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources." Vietnam claims it has actively ruled over the Paracels and  Spratly Islands since the 17th Century. The Philippines claim sovereignty in the Scarborough Shoal (or Huangyan Island in China), which is located 100 miles from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei claim territory that falls within their EEZs, as defined by UNCLOS. Malaysia additionally claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys.

One of the most important things to keep in mind about the South China Sea dispute is that much of the argument is over rocks and reefs rather than legally defined islands under international law. If a rock or reef legally becomes an island, it means that it would have its own EEZ. In order for a rock to be classified as an island, it must be able to sustain human life on it to engage in economic activity. A reef does not belong to anyone because it belongs to the sea bed. However, if a state has rights to a seabed, it is able to manipulate the reefs. Since 2015, China has been dumping sand and cement on numerous reefs to create man-made military bases on islands, in order to expand their sovereignty further into the South China Sea. China uses the "cabbage" strategy to layer on "civilian, paramilitary, and military protection" amongst the islands. The "salami-slicing" tactic additionally pertains to China slowly gaining control over land, sea, and air space in the East and South China Seas.

In the past, there have been many incidents where fishing boats and ships of opposing nations have sunk each other. Most recently, a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in March 2019. The fishing boat was sailing near the Paracel islands, which China has most control over, before the Chinese vessel pursued the fishing boat and shot at it with a water cannon. The fishing boat hit a rock and sank but the five fishermen were rescued by another Vietnamese fishing boat. The area in which the fishing boat sank is currently being disputed between China, Vietnam, and Taiwan, with each claiming that their sovereignty over the islands were violated by this incident. The cause of the incident is still not clear, with Vietnam claiming that the Chinese vessel rammed the boat.  

China Perspective

China's claims in the South China Sea are largely historical. China has created the nine dash line, which was taken from a 1947 map. The nine dash line represents what China believes should be the boundary of its territory, which essentially encompasses most of the South China Sea. The nine dash line largely overlaps with the claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. China's reasoning for the nine-dash line is that Chinese fishermen have been active in that area for centuries. China believes that its historical claim over the islands and sea was established before the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), despite having ratified it. Therefore, China has been exerting "constant diplomatic pressure to either revise international law or gain a special exception to it, where China's ancestral claims would be recognized by all."

The Century of Humiliation, lasting from 1842 to 1949, was a time in China's history when the country was exploited and overpowered by western nations. The strive to overcome a period of history that, to China, symbolizes their weakness, has made the nation more assertive in the South China Sea. This includes expanding naval capabilities and using the man-made islands to build military bases on as an strategic advantage.

China's narratives say that the US is seeking to contain China as a rising power. It opposes the U.S.'s naval presence in the area, one of the reasons being that it is encouraging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to stand its ground on their claims and their opposition of China. China firmly believes that third parties, including the U.S., should not be involved in the dispute because it does not directly concern them.

U.S. Perspective

The Obama Administration has previously stated that the U.S. has interest in the South China Sea and that nations should make claims on it as long as they abide by UNCLOS standards. The Obama Administration additionally made a commitment to "pivot" to Asia and strengthen allyship and security ties with ASEAN. It is an important "test of American leadership" to try to defend allies in the region amongst the growing aggression of China. The U.S. has stated that it will defend the Philippines in a potential clash against China; however, at the same time, the Philippines does not want to get dragged into a potential war between the U.S. and China. The U.S. rejects China's nine-dash line and its claims over the island, but because it does not have any interest in the islands, rocks, and reefs in the area, the U.S has verbally stood in a neutral position over the dispute. Currently, the Trump Administration doesn't seem to have a long-term strategy for the issue like Beijing does. Recent policies have tended to contradict each other, turning to isolationism because being the "policeman" of the world is too costly while simultaneously wanting a stronger military presence in the sea. As of now, there is no sense of direction due to conflicting statements.

On the other hand, the U.S. still seeks to patrol the sea because of its commitment to defending international law and the rights to sail freely within international waters. The South China Sea is also an important commercial trading route for the U.S. One of the US's strategies has been to promote Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP's) to reiterate the international law of the sea. This strategy, however, has been ineffective because it has intensely harshened China's salami-slicing or cabbage strategies instead of reducing them. The U.S. is in a tight spot because it doesn't want to further provoke China but at the same time does not want China to bully its allies. Because of this, the U.S. continues to patrol in the area.

What Should the U.S. Do?

The U.S. needs to act with a clear strategy in mind, because the South China Sea dispute will only evolve as time goes on. If the cards aren't played right, this dispute has the potential to turn into a full-fledged war. The U.S. needs to keep in mind that if it doesn't have a military presence in the South China Sea, then China will take advantage of it. If the U.S. shows that it is okay for China to make claims in an aggressive manner, China could be more likely to be aggressive in other territorial disputes such as Tibet.

On the other hand, how can the U.S's military presence in the region truly be justified? The U.S is not a direct player in the game, so increased patrolling of the sea (such as FONOPs) can make them look like an aggressor and will only allow for China to legitimize its militarization in the islands. The main mission of a FONOP is for the US to assert its power when it believes that other nations are restricting freedom of navigation and dismissing international law and norms. FONOPs are questionable because they have no real, detailed justification and sometimes are conducted by U.S. warships and bombers, which can make the operation look aggressive. There are also economic risks to consider, being that China is a significant trade partner to the U.S and the two states are currently engaged in a trade war. The U.S. can hold Beijing accountable by placing economic sanctions on trade and creating tighter restrictions on business between the two states, but this could also further provoke China.

In my opinion, it is in the best interest of the United States to keep its commitment to its partners and allies, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The U.S. must build up its maritime capacity building by providing equipment and support in sea surveillance and infrastructure support to coast guards. Additionally, the US should continue selling more military weapons to Taiwan or increase defense cooperation with India as an indirect way of helping. Helping allies in the region benefits nations to defend themselves against China's aggressiveness and helps balance the power rivalry. It is essential that the U.S. commits to multilateral institutions like ASEAN in the region to prevent a potential war with China. Whichever way the U.S. reacts, the aim should be to maintain peace within the region and promote negotiation, communication, and cooperation without interfering in a way that demonstrates aggression and western dominance.

Fake News in North Korea: Censorship, Propaganda, and the Rewriting of History

In the era of the Trump administration, ‘fake news’ has arisen as a significant concern. What is true? What is fake? These are questions that many Americans now ask of their government and media platforms. In the first amendment of the Constitution, free speech is guaranteed for all Americans. That right is expertly exercised by American citizens and often taken for granted.

On the other side of the matter lies North Korea, where free speech is outlawed and the state tightly controls all forms of media. Citizens of North Korea have virtually no freedom of speech: internet is only accessible by a select number of powerful individuals in Pyongyang, television and radios can only access North Korean-operated stations, and accessing foreign media is illegal and punishable by death or by imprisonment in political prison camps.

Beyond harsh media censorship, North Korea also engages in a constant rewriting of history, dictated by the Kim family and executed by government officials. The foundation for extreme censorship lies in the core North Korean ideology of Juche (“self-reliance”). Juche encourages complete national independence from the outside world, which includes the disregard of foreign media and the creation of a uniquely North Korean history. Ultimately, the intense censorship serves as a protection for the Kim family and their continued survival as dictators.

Article 3 of the North Korean Constitution defines Juche and the purpose it serves:

“The DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people.”

To achieve said independence of the masses, censorship and propaganda begin at a young age. North Korean children learn the history of the three Kim leaders - Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un - starting in preschool. Songs and theater performances tell the stories of the Kim family’s brilliance and  describe the Kims as higher beings who have devoted their lives to serving their country.

In Jang Jin Sung’s memoir of his defection from North Korea, Jang tells a well-known North Korean fable of a man whose house was burning down. This man had just enough time to save either his children or the portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. He saved the portraits and was regarded a hero.

Censorship and propaganda continues into adult life with the monitoring by neighborhood supervisors. The Inminban are networks of North Korean women who patrol their neighborhoods for criminal activity, which includes any questioning and disparaging of the Kims or of the North Korean state. While cellphones are allowed, they are heavily surveilled by the state.

Within North Korea, there are two main news sources: the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and Rodong Sinmun. Since these news sources exist online, they are difficult to access for the North Korean people. These newspapers primarily are written for foreign onlookers and detail the daily activities of the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. Articles contain heavy propaganda and report a “straightforward reflection of Pyongyang’s policy stance”, leaving no room for personal opinions.

Censorship, state-run media, propaganda in schools and in the arts, and surveillance all serve the purpose of controlling the North Korean people, to achieve the desired ‘independence of the masses’ from outside influences. The most startling effort; however, is the rewriting of history.

Historical reshaping became a talking point of international media in the early 2010s, following the release of the memoir Dear Leader by Jang Jin-Sung. Jang worked in Pyongyang as a propaganda poet and assisted with the rewriting of Kim Jong Il’s biography.

Reshaping began after the Korean War in the 1950s when North Korea was established as its own state. Kim Il Sung, the first leader of North Korea, had his biography rewritten by state officials. Kim Il Sung’s birth conveniently fell on April 15, 1912, the same day the Titanic sunk. His biography opens with the telling of how the world began to change from the moment he was born, starting with Titanic’s demise. The biography served to “solidify a narrative of his [KIS] own unblemished record” from the Korean War and into his time as Great Leader of North Korea.

Following in his father’s footsteps, Kim Jong Il had his past similarly rewritten once he took over as Dear Leader of North Korea in 1994. This process began with the location of his birth. Despite reports that he was born in the Soviet Union, the North Korean state claims that Kim Jong Il was born in a military camp in on Mount Paektu. Given the claims that all three North Korean leaders were born on this mountain, they are referred to as the “Mount Paektu Bloodline”.

Despite being merely a child during the Korean War, his biography tells the story of a young boy at the front lines of battle, learning to conduct military operations with his father. After the fall of the Soviet Union, stories about North Korea’s relationship with the Soviet Union were modified to give the impression that North Korea had been skeptical about the survival of the Soviet state since the very beginning. Along with the rewriting process, Kim Jong Il ordered a “massive purge of libraries” to destroy any unflattering stories of North Korea’s past.

After Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011, Kim Jong Un began his reign as Supreme Leader with a purge of over 400 high-level government officials. Unlike his father, who had years of experience in the government before assuming the role of head of state, Kim Jong Il’s death took North Korea by surprise. This forced Kim Jong Un to step up as Supreme Leader having had little experience dealing with his father’s officials. His purging of most of his father’s government was with the intention of proving himself as a strong and legitimate leader.

The most well-known executed official was Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un’s uncle. Jang and Kim worked together for two years without much issue until late 2013. After constantly disagreeing with the Supreme Leader, Kim decided he had enough. Jang was arrested at a meeting, stood for trial a few days later, and was executed. Rumors said he was “stripped naked and fed to 120 dogs”; however there is no factual basis for this claim. In media coverage of the event, Jang was referred to as “despicable human scum” and after the execution, Rodong Sinmun erased tens of thousands of articles referring to Jang from their online databases, as if he had never existed.

The intense controls on the North Korean media lead one to ask whether North Koreans are convinced of their altered history and of the propaganda. Coverage of North Korea in popular media sources presents the people as being brainwashed by Kim Jong Un. For example, the film The Interview perpetuates some stereotypes of the North Korean people, despite being written as a comedy. The following quote is Jang Jin Sung’s take on this issue:

“North Koreans are people, and they aren’t stupid. In the North Korean system, you have to praise Kim and sing hymns about him and take it seriously, even if you think it’s only a shit narrative. That’s the block, you see? It’s not that people are brainwashed and think he’s god. These are the things that people know, but they don’t dare to challenge.”

There are likely people who believe in the North Korean state and trust the stories they are told. However, there are also likely people who have zero faith in the state. With the rising number of defectors each year, it is clear that more and more North Koreans are aware of the situation they are in and are actively trying to escape.

The severe punishment waiting for North Koreans who attempt escaping is enough to scare someone into staying put. After three failed escape attempts, the defector will be executed along with three generations of their family. The state does not stop with one execution, but they continue to execute the entire close bloodline. This way the state can deter any future attempts by this family to escape from North Korea.

Unfortunately, there is not much that can be done about this issue. North Korea has no incentive to stop their censorship, propaganda, or rewriting of history. It is in their best interest to continue these practices to maintain the intense cult of personality surrounding the Kim family.

Given the outcome of the recent Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States, the US is in no position to interfere in Kim’s affairs. Relations between North Korea and the US have returned to being hostile and do not show any signs of improving. International actors, like the United Nations, have also used up all their cards in recent attempts to shame North Korea into addressing human rights violations.

The state with the most leverage regarding North Korea is South Korea. President Moon Jae-In ran for president on the platform of reunification as his primary goal. He is positioned well to work bilaterally with North Korea, especially since their recent summit at Panmunjom in April of 2018 was successful. It is up to President Moon to determine the future of inter-peninsula relations. Ultimately, South Korea is the sole government that could potentially improve the freedom of speech in North Korea. However, change is not likely. North Korea has no incentive to loosen their censorship. It will take expert level negotiations and agreements in order for Kim Jong Un to relinquish some control. It is likely that fake news will continue to prevail in North Korea for some time to come.

In looking ahead to a future where the United States, South Korea, and North Korea are working together, the most practical way to go about remedying this situation would be a gradual rollback of censorship. North Koreans have been raised to believe that Americans are their ultimate enemy and that South Koreans are poorer than they are. If either the US or South Korea enter North Korea and immediately expose citizens to the whole truth, North Koreans would not be likely to believe them. Incremental exposure to their true history and contemporary affairs would be the best method of reintegration into an uncensored state.

Artificial Intelligence and Ethics: An Exploration of Machine Morality

Since the Industrial Revolution, nations across the globe have brought on waves of technological innovation that have drastically altered the global economic landscape. From the steam engine to the telephone to the widespread use of electricity, technology has served a pivotal role throughout history in advancing the capabilities of the human race. Today, the world faces its next great hurdle along the path of technological progress, possibly its largest one yet; artificial intelligence. Our current socio-economic systems trend towards increased automation; by the early 2030s, roughly 38% of US jobs are expected to be at risk of automation, with more than 85% of customer interactions projected to be managed without a human. Although integration of machines into the global economy is no new concept, the notion of machine learning and consciousness presents policymakers with a host of new social, political, and ethical concerns. To better explore and address these concerns, one must first ask; what exactly is artificial intelligence, and what steps should we take to control it? This article will argue in favor of programming AI with normative philosophy in order to benefit the future of the human race, focusing on German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s theory as a starting point for AI ethics.

We have seen the use of touch-screen soda dispensers and ATMs for years, but the more modern term, “AI”, describes the study and design of intelligent agents, which is a “system that perceives its environment and takes actions which maximize its chances of success”. Otherwise referred to as computational intelligence or rationality, put simply, AI is a blanket term used to describe any form of intelligence demonstrated by a machine. The majority of existing AI technology takes the form of simple AI, or machines that rely on decision trees, or a predetermined set of rules and algorithms for success. Machine Learning, however, is distinct in that it allows machines to learn without being explicitly programmed. This type of technology allows for machines to improve their decision-making process by incorporating and analyzing swaths of data pertaining to a particular task and the success rate of certain actions. Often referred to as complex AI, deep learning machines work by picking out recognizable patterns and making decisions based on them. Thus, the more data you feed it, the smarter it becomes, and the better it works. In today’s society, we can already see the positive benefits of machine learning in many of our most innovative technologies, such as the predictive analytic machines that generate shopping recommendations or the AI used in security and antivirus applications worldwide. The drawbacks, however, are far less evident.

Despite Terminator-esque representations of a war-torn future dominated by robots, the potential dangers of the advancing field of AI research lie in the fundamental lack of control at the heart of the development of autonomous machines. For many experts in the field, the question of whether or not AI will yield beneficial or harmful results for the human race is simply the wrong one; instead, the focus falls on determining the degree of control with which we execute this line of progress. Most notably, Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk remains outspoken in his belief that AI’s development will outpace our ability to manage it in a safe way. Musk even went as far as to claim that AI development poses a greater threat to humanity than the advent of nuclear weapons, citing the machine intelligence that defeated the world champion in the ancient Chinese strategy game, “Go”. Although much of the AI that is used in the status quo has yet to cross this intelligence threshold, the increasing development of neural networks for complex AI has opened the door for an exponential uptick in the rate of machine learning. Once the cat is out of the bag, warns Musk, the intelligence in question will be unstoppable, and has the potential to wreak havoc on all of society. Autonomous drone strikes. Release of deadly chemical weapons. Violent revolution fueled by mass media propaganda campaigns. When one considers the degree to which we rely on machines for public health, global military operations, and political communications, the necessity for control over the activity of AI becomes abundantly clear. Therefore, the solution to the dangers of AI development lie in our ability as humans to control its behavior past a certain threshold of growth, through whatever means necessary.

As outlined above, policymakers have a clear incentive to avoid a scenario in which the rate of AI learning exceeds our ability to control it. However, as can be seen in the status quo, leading governments have failed to adequately regulate their respective tech industries, causing them to be caught in a game of catch-up with AI developers. As evidenced by the 2018 Congressional hearing questioning Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, the government has allowed the tech industry to exceed its reach, with no major value shift or policy agenda in sight. The question now becomes, what should policymakers do to maximize the chance that an AI outbreak would yield positive consequences for society? The answer lies in the study of philosophy, or ethics. At its most basic level, philosophy, or the debate over morality, is a question of what an agent ought to do. This question is especially relevant when applied to AI; after all, an AI with an intelligence level greater than that of humans would be able to rewrite its own code, effectively making itself anything it wants to be. Yet, there is much uncertainty as to whether an AI would want to rewrite itself in a hostile form, or a peaceful one. This is where ethics comes in. If AI developers could program machines with ethics that morally prohibited them from harming humans, then the scenario in which they utilize their neural capabilities for harm becomes much less probable. In this sense, ethics comes into view as the primary method of control, potentially the last one, that humans could bear over their creations.

Next, we are tasked with determining which system of ethics would yield the best outcome for humanity in the event that AI exceeds our ability to regulate it. Before making this determination, it is important to understand some core distinctions between various branches of philosophical thought. Normative philosophy is divided into two major categories: consequentialism and deontology. Consequentialism dictates that the morality of an action be determined by looking purely to the consequences of said action, and that an ethical agent ought to seek to achieve the maximal state of affairs. Deontology, on the other hand, is a system of ethics that uses universal rules to distinguish right from wrong. A deontologist would not be concerned with the consequences of an immoral action, even if the consequences were positive, since the action is deemed immoral by its very nature. Similarly, a consequentialist would not care if an action is intrinsically immoral or violates certain rights, insofar as the action produces good consequences down the road. Put simply, consequentialists are concerned with ends, and deontologists are concerned with means. In the context of AI decision-making, this distinction could make all the difference; for example, a consequentialist AI might decide that killing one particularly evil human would amount to thousands of lives saved down the road, thus justifying the practice of murder on the part of AI for the greater societal good, despite the intrinsic wrongness of such an act. Conversely, a deontological AI would disregard the future benefit of killing the evil individual for the sake of avoiding committing a violation of that individual’s fundamental rights. A third, less prominent branch of normative philosophy, known as virtue ethics, offers an alternative to the more rule-based approaches listed above. Conceived by Aristotle, virtue ethics is an approach to normative ethics that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character of an agent, rather than the duties and consequences involved in an agent’s action. Under this theory, an AI would be considered “ethical” if it took actions that were reflective of intuitively desirable character traits, such as honesty, courage, or wisdom.

Insofar as the goal of programming AI with a system of ethics is to preserve the future wellbeing of the human race, then any attempt at formulating a normative theory upon which to program AI must center around the value of humans as moral agents. Otherwise, we run the risk of becoming an obstacle in the way of the machine’s progress. Created by enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant, “Kantianism” is used to refer to the deontological theory derived from universal principles of human worth. This section will lay out the primary arguments for adopting a Kantian system of normative ethics for AI, by explaining the theory’s applicability to AI and various advantages this approach holds over alternatives.

First and foremost, Artificial Intelligence must be programmed with a rule-based (deontological) system of ethics, instead of the more calculative and character-based approaches of consequentialism and virtue ethics. Robotics expert Matthias Scheutz argues that the need for a “computationally explicit trackable means of decision making” requires that ethics be grounded in deontology. Since AI have the potential to make incredibly complex moral decisions, it is important that humans are able to identify the logic used in a given decision in a transparent way, so as to accurately determine the morality of the action in question. This necessitates deontology, as theories that rely on valuation of consequences or judgements of character are far more subjective and difficult to track in an ordered manner.

Furthermore, Kantianism is uniquely suitable to AI programming because of its prioritization of the self-determination and rational capacities of other moral agents. While attempting to formulate a moral theory, Kant began his inquiry by drawing a distinction between the moral status of rational agents, and non-agents. According to Kant, humans are morally distinct from other beings in their ability to use their rational capacities to set and pursue certain ends. This status would also apply to AI. Dr. Ozlem Ulgen, member of the UN group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, claims that technology may be deemed to have rational thinking capacity if it engages in a pattern of logical thinking from which it rationalizes and takes action. Although Kant’s concept is reserved for humans, the capacity aspect may be fulfilled by AI’s potential for rational thinking. Not only does this prove the suitability of Kantian ethics to AI, but it also provides built-in advantages when it comes to protecting human interests. As Kant identifies the source of moral value as individual reason, the rules that follow accordingly seek to protect that same capacity. For example, Kantian ethics prohibits harming others, as doing so would fundamentally contradict the capacity for reason within other moral agents. In this sense, a Kantian AI would be far less likely to do harm unto humans, as the core tenet of their philosophy would be tied to our shared rational capabilities. Thus, Kantian ethics provides a human-centric approach to formulating moral rules.

Lastly, the subjectivity at the heart of consequentialist and virtue ethical approaches to morality provide a comparative advantage to Kantian ethics. Consequentialist theories, on one hand, mandate that we maximize the probability of good consequences, but don’t inform us of what those consequences are. Thus, consequentialist theories are incomplete in that they leave it up to the agent in question to determine what they consider to be a “moral good”. This poses potential problems when applied to AI, as they could very well decide that the extermination of the human race is a good consequence, and thus act to achieve it. Similarly, virtue ethics relies on the notion of “good character”, or the idea that we ought to inculcate certain character traits within society. This commits the same error as consequentialists often do, as it fails to provide a comprehensive account of the “good person”, leaving room for AI to drum up their own conceptions of virtuous character in order to suit their own needs. Kantianism, however, avoids this pitfall, as it sources “the good” within the agent itself. To a Kantian, actions are good insofar as they respect the right of other moral agents to set and pursue ends, thus further helping to create a human-centric system of ethics.

In answering the question of which system of ethics would be most suitable for programming AI, a variety of other questions arose, all of which demand further investigation. Evidently, reaching a definitive conclusion on the issue of AI ethics is no easy task; after all, humans have been debating back and forth between different philosophies and modes of thought for hundreds of years, and the conversation doesn’t seem to be ending any time soon. The one thing we, as a society, can agree on despite differences in perspective is the idea that morality is fundamentally subjective. If history is any example, it is clear that the ethical systems by which people choose (or attempt) to live their lives is heavily contingent on their individual point of view. As such, the mission of determining how to program an ethical AI is problematized by the reality that we, as humans, do not operate under a perfect ethical framework to begin with. According to virtual reality developer and CEO Ambarish Mitra, this concern is easily surmountable, as he argues that AI could help us create one.  Referred to as “super morality”, many in the field of AI development believe that the potential for AI to reach a level of consciousness “beyond” that of humans gives them the potential to reach the sort of higher ethical truth for which we have been searching for so long. If moral truth is to be discovered through reflection and deliberation, machines with higher rates of learning and cognition than that of humans would have a better shot at discovering that truth than we ever will.

The Myth of the Mideast Ally: The Moral and Strategic Failure of American Foreign Policy Toward Saudi Arabia

As a student of Latin America, I am in no way blind to the historical moral shortcomings (to put it lightly) of American foreign policy. When I lived in Asunción, Paraguay, my school’s first field trip was to the Museo de las Memorias, a museum housed in a former detention and torture center used by the Alfredo Stroessner regime. Stroessner was a Cold War-era dictator responsible for the deaths of thousands of his own citizens, and like many of his regional contemporaries, he was supported by the United States solely because he opposed communism. (A recent World Mind article brilliantly questions the legacy of Henry Kissinger, the architect behind these alliances.)

One would hope that the American foreign policy establishment recognized the damage wrought by decades of autocratic rule, learned from its mistakes, and then ceased the practice of abetting dictators in exchange for money and influence. Unfortunately, this iniquitous style of transaction remains in the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, as evidenced by the current American partnership with Saudi Arabia. In spite of a laundry list of human rights abuses and an enduring legacy of violent extremism perpetrated or enabled by the regime, the Trump Administration has not shied away from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (known as MBS), the charismatic young heir to the throne. Since taking office, President Trump has expanded operational support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, significantly increased weapons sales, and refused to acknowledge the crown prince's involvement in the gruesome assassination of Washington Post columnist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi.

The Administration argues that in our alliance with Saudi Arabia, the benefits outweigh the costs. Popular talking points center on money and combatting extremism; according to the executive branch, increased defense sector employment, cheap oil, and counterterrorism cooperation are invaluable to U.S. interests.

However, upon closer examination, all of these arguments fail to justify the American alliance with the Saudi regime, especially when placed in the context of the Kingdom’s atrocious domestic and foreign policies. By analyzing these policies, it becomes clear that such an alliance is not only immoral to the liberal internationalist, but also counterproductive for the conservative realist. The U.S. stands to gain nothing – neither as devout moralists nor cutthroat strategists – from the robust commercial, political, and military partnership with the Kingdom that the current administration goes great lengths to maintain and defend.

Saudi Human Rights Abuses and the Global Perception of the U.S.

During the spring of 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman embarked on a three-week tour of the United States as part of an ambitious attempt to revamp Saudi Arabia’s global image. Eager for a piece of the royal family’s opulence and influence, American investors, politicians, and movie stars rolled out the red carpet. Harvard University and MIT both welcomed the young prince. He visited Wall Street, Washington, and the Silicon Valley. He sat down with Oprah and dined with Morgan Freeman and Dwayne Johnson.

Would these individuals still entertain the crown prince if they were provided a detailed report of the Kingdom’s human rights record? If they could see the contrast between MBS’ extravagance and the plights of Saudi Arabia’s tremendously disadvantaged citizens? If they understood the extent of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen sparked by the Saudis and exacerbated by U.S. arms sales?

Although MBS’ American tour came some 10 months before the highly publicized October 2nd assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s prior transgressions were already widely known. According to the 2018 edition of the Human Right Watch (HRW) World Report, the Kingdom “has committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law” in Yemen, including scores of “unlawful attacks… some of which may amount to war crimes.” The report notes that coalition airstrikes have repeatedly struck “homes, markets, hospitals, schools, and mosques.” To date, an estimated 10,852 civilians have been killed or injured by coalition airstrikes.

Domestically, Saudi activists and dissidents are silenced, and women are subject to some of the most archaic laws in the world. The same HRW report details the arrest of numerous peaceful, pro-reform activists, some of whom received multi-year prison sentences and travel-bans. The Kingdom is known for its use of the death penalty, performed inhumanely and often for non-violent offenders, as well as torture; as recently as March 31st of this year, The Guardian reported that leaked medical documents describe up to 60 political prisoners suffering from “malnutrition, cuts, bruises and burns.” While Saudi women were recently granted the right to drive, the most critical regulation barring gender equality in the Kingdom remains in place: according to the BBC, under the “guardianship law,” a woman’s male relatives “[have] the authority to make critical decisions on her behalf.” As long as such a law exists, any concessions the regime makes to Saudi women’s rights activists should be considered insincere.

What do the crimes committed by one distant nation have to do with the U.S.? 100 years ago, when even the world’s hegemons largely operated within their own geographic regions, human rights abuses in a nation as far away as Saudi Arabia might not have demanded the attention of U.S. policymakers, but today is a different story. As long as the U.S. supports Saudi Arabia, it cannot expect to have the respect or cooperation of fellow nations as it attempts to shape the world order. Any American policies put forth in the name of peace, freedom of speech, or women’s rights are liable to objection by even our closest allies; for example, suspension of aid toward a nation due to human rights violations could be easily deemed hypocritical given the overwhelming security assistance we provide the Saudi regime. In such a case, the effect of American aid suspension would have diminished impact, as the international community might not be compelled to join.

In short, a lack of global moral standing means a lack of global influence, too. Surely, arms deals that have limited impact on the American economy are not worth our ability to enact beneficial international policy.

Wahhabism and the Perpetual War on Terrorism

The instances of regime-led crackdowns on dissent outlined above are typical of a highly-centralized power structures terrified of losing control (think North Korea and Venezuela). In addition to brutality and oppression, however, the royal family employs another form of social control: ultra-conservative religious ideology.

The rise of the House of Saud, Saudi Arabia’s namesake and longtime ruling family, is indebted to the 18th century merging of politics and religion on the Arabian peninsula. In 1744, Muhammad ibn Saud, an influential tribal leader, and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, an iconoclastic Muslim scholar, swore an oath to form a state guided by Islamic principles. Al Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam was not widely shared –in fact, it condemned many Muslims then inhabiting the peninsula– but Saud was desperate for a “clearly defined religious authority” he could use to establish authority. This authority would stretch far into the coming centuries, as noted by a 2008 CRS report on what is now known as Wahhabism:

[After 1930,] Wahhabi clerics were integrated into the new kingdom’s religious and political establishment, and Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws adopted to govern social affairs in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism also shaped the kingdom’s judicial and educational policies. Saudi schoolbooks historically have denounced teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs…

Saudi-born professor Madawi al-Rashid of the London School of Economics echoed this analysis in a 2015 BBC article:

The Wahhabis were given full control of the religious, social and cultural life of the kingdom. As long as the Wahhabi preachers preached that Saudis should obey their rulers, the al-Saud family was happy. In the 1960s and 1970s the Arab world was full of revolutionary ideas. The Saudi government thought the Wahhabis were a good antidote, because they provide an alternative narrative about how to obey rulers and not interfere in politics.

By relinquishing significant societal control to Wahhabist clerics, the regime created a united and obedient populous over which it could rule. Additionally, it cultivated and promoted an intolerant and often violent ideology that would later form the basis for violent extremist groups.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and fearing the global spread of secularism, the Saudi regime weaponized Wahhabism, imploring its citizens to travel to fight the spread of communism. Terence Ward, in his book The Wahhabi Code, describes how the Kingdom funded Wahhabi schools in Pakistan to indoctrinate both Pakistani youth and Afghan refugees fleeing the Soviet invasion. These foreign fighters, inspired by the Wahhabist interpretation of holy war, are the first example of the exportation of Wahhabism and violence. Future examples include al-Qaeda, Daesh, and related fundamentalist groups operating in Syria.

The connection between Saudi-promoted Wahhabism and global terrorism is not a new revelation. For years, analysts have commented on the absurdity of our relationship with the country that produced 15 out of the 19 9/11 hijackers; one Brookings Institute scholar quipped that the Saudis are “both the arsonists and the firefighters”, and a 2015 New York Times op-ed refers to Saudi Arabia as “the ISIS that made it.”

In defending their sustained support of the Kingdom, the Administration again points to arms deals, in addition to joint counterterrorism efforts, as justification for our partnership with Saudi Arabia. My argument regarding U.S. arms sales to the Kingdom is simple –quick profits are not worth a long-term fight against extremism– but what about the Saudis’ counterterrorism operations?

A 2018 CRS Report identifies the Kingdom as a strong partner in the fight against extremism, claiming that the “U.S. government now credits its Saudi counterparts with taking terrorism threats seriously and praises Saudi cooperation in several cooperative initiatives.” There is little evidence to suggest otherwise; in 2014, the Kingdom’s leading Islamic authority denounced Daesh and al-Qaeda, and a 2017 State Department report detailed Saudi Arabia’s “strict supervision” of illicit funding of terrorist groups. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia itself is frequently the target of terrorist attacks perpetrated by extremists.

However, multiple reports suggest that Saudi Arabia’s promotion of Wahhabism and religious intolerance domestically carries global effects. A 2016 New York Times article details the role one Saudi-funded mosque in Kosovo played in sending 314 men, women, and children to join Daesh, and 2017 Voice of America article cited experts linking an uptick in terrorism in Africa to Saudi scholarships provided to regional youth. Another Times article cautions observers from heaping blame on solely on Saudi Arabia, as grievance-related factors also contribute to radicalization. Still, it notes that Daesh used official Saudi textbooks in its schools until it was able to publish its own, much to the embarrassment of the regime.

Thus, while Saudi Arabia deserves credit for its kinetic counterterrorism efforts, it is losing the long-term ideological war against extremism by funding and promoting religious intolerance. In partnering with the regime rather than pushing it to alter its policies, the U.S. is losing as well, effectively implementing a counterterrorism strategy that neglects the root of the problem and perpetuates terrorism. CNN’s Fareed Zakaria might have put it best: “The Saudi monarchy must reform itself and its export of ideology,” he wrote in 2016, “But the reality is, this is far more likely if Washington engages with Riyadh rather than distancing itself, leaving the kingdom to fester in isolation.”

Moving Forward: Talk to Saudi Arabia, But Don’t Reward Them

In Ben Rhodes’ memoir, The World as It Is, the former national security adviser and speechwriter recalls one particular instance of Barack Obama’s frustration on the 2008 campaign trail. Members of the foreign policy establishment had just ridiculed the young senator for suggesting he would engage in diplomacy with historically hostile nations, much to his bewilderment. “It. Is. Not. A. Reward. To. Talk. To. Folks,” the future president emphatically argues, pounding his palm on a table as he does. “How is that working out with Iran?”

Obama’s point was this: a U.S. presidential administration can engage with an undesirable foreign government without promoting its detrimental interests. His flagship piece of foreign policy, the Iran Deal, is a perfect example of this in that it edged Iran toward membership in the responsible international community without granting it nuclear weapons or excusing its autocratic domestic policies.

The U.S. should handle Saudi Arabia in a similar fashion. Cooperation can continue in the areas that it has worked well, such as counterterrorism, but U.S. officials should not hesitate to publicly criticize and seek to curb the regime’s oppressive domestic policies, illegal military strikes in Yemen, and exportation of intolerance. Thanks to the Texas shale revolution, an abysmal economic outlook in Saudi Arabia, and significant U.S. commercial investment in the Kingdom, the regime has little in its arsenal to counter hypothetical demands from American policymakers; the U.S. is insulated from OPEC’s whims, and sanctions leveled on U.S.-Saudi business interactions would seriously damage the Kingdom’s economy.

It’s clear that the Trump Administration has no interest in molding Saudi Arabia into a respectable ally, otherwise it would have already started down that path. Whether Mr. Trump’s eagerness to buddy-up to MBS is the result of greed, myopia, or personal affinity is anyone’s guess – presently, the most that Americans can do is hope that the next president, Republican or Democrat, does not perceive the Kingdom through the same ignorant lens. Such perception will only result in further human rights violations at the hands of the regime, the continued implementation of an ineffective counterterrorism policy, and lastly, almost irreparable damage to U.S. global standing. After all, as Asunción’s Museo de las Memorias demonstrates, history does not forget those who side with tyrants.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and America’s Response

In the last 30 years, China’s economy has developed at a record breaking pace. According to the CIA, in 2015 92 countries counted China as their largest trading partner compared to only 57 countries counting the United States at the same rank. China has gone from the world’s largest recipient of World Bank loans in the 1980s and the 1990s to, in recent years, loaning more to developing countries than the entirety of the World Bank. China’s economic rise has supplanted the nation as a pillar of leadership in a globalized world, and China has only accelerated its dramatic rise to superpower status with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative seeks to ambitiously launch long-term land and maritime transport links between China, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. With Italy becoming the latest and largest nation so far to join China’s BRI, the United States be cognizant about the BRI’s potential to elevate China’s economy to new heights and should strengthen economic alliances with nations that are increasingly looking to China as a major development partner.

Global Scope

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisions a set of maritime and land-based economic routes that links China to 71 countries in Central Asia, Europe, Africa and South Asia. Touted as “the most significant and far-reaching initiative China has ever put forward” by Wu Jianmin, member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the BRI includes infrastructure projects like the Yiwu-London railway and a bridge over Croatia’s Mali Ston Bay to strengthen economic and non-economic elements of China’s relationship with recipient countries.

The majority of the funding for the Global Belt and Road Initiative will come in the form of loans, meaning that if the recipient country cannot pay back its loans the Chinese government could own the infrastructure projects they are funding. While some posit the BRI as a challenge to the “liberal international order” the United States has pioneered over the last fifty years, China facilitating more trade, especially in developing nations, reduces the likelihood of interstate conflict and war. Even if war is less likely under a system where China is a leading partner with most of the important economies of the world, the United States realizes that it will be difficult to impose the will of the United States, like sanctions and counterterrorism measures, on countries that are now economically dependent on China. Chinese government sources maintain that the One Belt, One Road is compatible with the five principles of peaceful coexistence as laid out in the United Nations Charter: mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Xi Jinping stated that these connectivity networks across Africa, Asian, and European continents are likely to tap market potential, promote investment and consumption, create job opportunities, enhance cultural exchanges, and enable trust, harmony, peace, and prosperity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also believes that One Belt One Road will accelerate the development of western Chinese provinces that lag behind eastern China industrially and infrastructurally. The Chinese consensus rejects notions that China plans to take complete control of existing global financial institutions as the United States did with the Marshall Plan immediately following World War II; Chinese sources in the Global Times delineate between the Marshall Recovery Program that excluded pro-Soviet European countries and the Belt Road Initiative which welcomes all countries to join regardless of their allies, their doctrine, or their past relationship with China.

In the last decade, Chinese foreign policy began to utilize soft power as a method to obtain economic and political goals, and cooperation rather than coercion as a foreign policy tool by China should concern a United States that has traditionally been the world’s foremost hegemon. Soft power scholars believe that because China has such a drastically different government from most of the Western world and developed economies, it has difficulty shifting the international narrative away from its focus on issues of human rights and repressive political system. While previous attempts at Chinese soft power, like Confucius Institutes which have been accused of compromising academic integrity, and Chinese think tanks, that rarely endorse ideas differing from official Chinese Communist Party ideology, recipient countries typically embrace Chinese grant aid. The most effective manner in which China can spread soft power and spur other nations to work towards China’s goals is through what the BRI claims to do, addressing economic needs of developing countries. A Singaporean senior foreign policy official explained that China’s appeal to Southeastern Asian nations over the United States comes from gifts like multibillion-dollar investment aid packages.

American Concerns

The BRI drew disdain from the West due to Chinese willingness to pump money into dictator-run countries, like Zimbabwe, Niger, Angola, and Burma, that have poor human rights records without aid conditionality of changing authoritarian government practices.  Despite America’s enormous military strength and reputation as the pinnacle of innovation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) represents an concerning trend to Americans that the BRI follows. They are both noteworthy international financial structures that include many trusted American allies but exclude United States financial hegemony. The AIIB also supports the idea that American financial institutions are ill-equipped to adequately deal with the rapid rise of developing Asian economies. South Korea, a long-term ally of the United States, turned to China as its most important trade partner to rival Japan. The decision of President Trump to go behind South Korean leadership to meet with Kim Jong-Un and end large-scale joint military exercises with South Korea has also strained relations. As the United States finds themselves no longer alone as the sole superpower in the world, many American allies experience internal contradictions and friction within one another that complicates their relationship with the United States. Contrasting preemptive military interventions into Iraq and Afghanistan that have incensed regional conflicts and made American visions of “global peace, security, and stability” seem insincere, the official Chinese ideology behind the BRI is to sponsor peaceful infrastructure and economic development. China’s discourse of “peaceful development” may ultimately win the hearts of nations that grow wary of the Americanized doctrine of “security.” Herrero and Xu uncover that the Belt and Road Initiative would drastically reduce both railway and maritime costs for trade between European Union countries, especially landlocked countries, who are historically American allies.

The BRI is critical to transforming China’s self-identity from an East Asian country to a central country of Asia that includes the North, South, and the West; this reinvigorates China’s image into a world superpower that rivals the United States. What will drastically improve Chinese soft power is the feature of the BRI that allows for an open and inclusive commerce involving countries along the route that are not China, as introduced by Xi Jinping in the 2015 Boao Forum. The BRI fosters a new era of Chinese economics and foreign policy that encourages intensive cooperation and builds on win-win diplomacy endorsed by Deng Xiaoping throughout the 1980s and 1990s to ensure a peaceful environment where China could grow economically.

At best the BRI benefits every country that is willing to partake in a mutually beneficial trade arrangement and at worst the BRI is a nefarious, ideological plan to win over American allies and whose economic benefits are conditional on political requirements and military cooperation. Either scenario should be concerning towards the American policymakers who wish to solidify America as the world’s foremost economic hegemon. Western officials also worry that Chinese development money undermines governance standards of lending institutions like the World Bank, especially if that money goes towards China’s own companies or environmentally damaging projects. The argument that the Belt Road Initiative will better account for the experiences and interests of emerging economies than existing financial institutions like the World Bank does not necessarily need to be true to worry American policymakers either; the AIIB and BRI may bolster China’s global reach as a complement to existing financial mechanisms. Funneling money towards infrastructure, business, and educational opportunity throughout Western China can help assuage relations with China’s ethnic minorities, which takes away a key talking card by Western governments about China’s alleged human rights violations.

Effectiveness of American Countermeasures

In 2015, the BRI was expanded to encompass 70 percent of the global population and 55 percent of the world’s GDP. In 2015, China allocated a $40 billion fund solely dedicated towards funding almost 900 BRI projects, but recently China was estimated to increase total investment on BRI projects to $1.2-1.3 trillion by 2027.

American countermeasures emerged from China’s recent and rapid expansion of infrastructure. Rising anxiety in the American government about China’s assertive development abroad led to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo laying forth the “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” to combat China’s rise. Pompeo also elucidated President Trump’s Indo-Pacific counterstrategy with a trilateral investment agreement among the United States, Japan, and Australia. The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision will funnel money into Southeast Asia through the US International Development Finance Corporation, which doubles the global spending cap for loans private companies can use for development projects to 60 billion USD. Pompeo’s language was far less combative and aggressive than Vice-President Mike Pence’s language in 2018 at the Hudson Institute that stressed a Chinese campaign undermining support for “our nation’s most cherished ideals.” Pompeo even offered an avenue for collaboration for China when stating “our Indo-Pacific vision excludes no nation.” Brian Hook, Pompeo’s senior policy advisor, implied that American efforts to expand US technology exports to the region and store energy resources by developing infrastructure would ensure “that America’s model of economic engagement is the healthiest for nations in the region.” These American initiatives still do not even scratch the surface of the billions of dollars of investments China is transferring into Southeast Asia.

The American response to the Belt Road Initiative under the Trump administration has flirted with bolstering ties with relevant allies in the Asian-Pacific region and has taken issue with China’s economic interactions with other Asian countries. While there are little doubts in the international community about America’s ability to uphold military commitments, investment in Southeast Asian countries could strengthen America’s image as upholding economic and political alliances especially after trust among Southeast Asian countries dwindled after President Trump incurred a withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its trades relationships with relevant Southeast Asian countries in the pivot against China, and the AIIB represents China’s largely successful response to the TPP with major economies like Brazil, India, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom joining membership.  In July of 2018, the American government also streamlined funding to prevent the termination of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an agency that offers political risk insurance and financing towards American companies interested in international development projects. Representative Ed Royce (R-CA) labeled Chinese development assistance as “predatory development finance models” citing the specific example of China acquiring a major port in Sri Lanka due to Sri Lanka’s inability to pay back China’s loans. Royce’s quarrel with China has more merit than it used to; Chinese loans are nearing up to 5 percent when they used to only be 2.5 percent.

The Belt Road Initiative can also be seen as proof that China is deeply cognizant of America’s “pivot” to Asia, implying a stronger commitment US military, trade, and development assistance to American allies to counterbalance China’s rise. Major General Qiao Liang stated that the BRI is a “hedging strategy against the eastward move of the U.S. pivot to Asia.”

Conclusion

Despite Chinese sources proclaiming altruistic goals, the BRI is first and foremost a tool to promote Chinese economic development by heightening exports, enriching access to natural resources, and providing support to domestic industries that experience overcapacity within China’s economy. China also stands to benefit from strengthening ties with Central Asian autocratic governments that have an abundance of energy resources and to reduce tensions among China’s western ethnic regions. China would not undertake such a grandiose project if it did not have the potential to propel China into the world’s most important economic power.

It is hard to deny that the BRI does provide China a valuable avenue in shaping the preferences of other nations in a manner that benefits China. Chinese sources will under-exaggerate and Western sources will exaggerate the difficulty of the BRI’s profitability with many nations that have underdeveloped economies, high levels of corruption, and limited knowledge on the project. The United States should also feel more at ease at the fact that coercion of nations involved in the BRI would result in political counterculture that would denigrate China’s soft power and destroy Xi Jinping’s new ideal for China.

While the American military is by far the most formidable force in the world, American supremacy of the economic realm is more at question currently than it has since before the Bretton-Woods Institution. The Institute for China-America Studies, China’s only DC based think-tank, argues that the West’s best option regarding the BRI is simply to accept and attempt to shape the potential $1 trillion bestowed upon the geo-economic stage. Either option of joining the BRI as a partner and using America’s premier economic influence of the last 50 years to exert political ideologies or remaining outside the BRI but bolstering economic and political support to Asian Pacific allies in our pivot against China is preferable to questioning the value of our alliances. Any approach by the Trump administration that ignores trends of globalization and free trade, like abandoning multilateral trade deals or questioning burden-sharing in alliances, is doomed for failure.