Judge Bars Abrupt Deportation of Guatemalan Children
The Globe and Mail - Moises Castillo/The Associated Press
On August 31st, District Court Judge Sparkle Sooknanan issued a temporary restraining order blocking the deportation of 10 Guatemalan migrant children back to their country of origin. The National Immigration Law Center filed the case L.G.M.L. v. Noem, arguing that the deportation of the children, all of whom are between the ages of 10 and 17, violates protections under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and the right to due process. The center issued a statement explaining that the case does not fall under the “limited circumstances” for expedited removal. The case brings a delicate issue forward that involves migration law and concerns for children’s mental and emotional well-being.
Sooknanan’s decision extends to around 600 other Guatemalan children who are detained and have been identified for deportation. Becky Wolozin, senior attorney at the National Center for Youth Law (NCYL), explained that there was little to no “advance notice that this was happening,” and that the children were deported without their cases being heard in court, in violation of the proper procedure for deporting minors.
Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo and lawyers from the U.S. Justice Department claimed that the children were being sent to reunite with their families. Concerned families waited at a reception centre for returned migrants, only to be told that the children would not be coming home as planned. The children are currently being held in the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s (ORR) custody. The ORR is responsible for holding and caring for minors apprehended by agencies like ICE.
The experience of relocating to a different country and then suddenly being removed could have a significant psychological and material impact on the children involved in the case, especially given their age group. The children who arrived in the US alone experienced the emotional strain of being separated from their families and being under federal care in a foreign country. Research shows that sudden separation from family increases the risk of developing chronic mental health conditions and negatively impacts overall development. Being sheltered by the ORR may already be overwhelming for the children to acclimate to in a different country. The additional stress of experiencing sudden deportation, without warning or preparation, would inflict lasting trauma on children of a young age.
Furthermore, the lawsuit claims that if returned to Guatemala, the children would “face abuse, neglect, persecution, or torture.” The children represented by the National Immigration Law Center expressed that they wish to stay in the United States, due to unsafe conditions in Guatemala and neglectful and abusive treatment from their families. According to the lawsuit's argument, the children would be at risk of serious human rights abuses. The NILC also states that the children’s deportation would violate the government’s legal responsibility to protect minors from mistreatment or trafficking and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Senior NCYL attorney Wolozin goes on to say that, "The government is trying to spin this as child protection, but it's not, it's child abuse. It wasn't orderly; it skipped all of the procedural protections." On the other hand, the Trump Administration still holds firm to its claim that deportation is important for family reunification. As White House Deputy Chief of Staff and advisor on immigration, Stephen Miller stated, “a Democrat judge is refusing to let them reunify with their parents.”
The arguments for L.G.M.L. v. Noem reflect conflict between the prioritization of family reunification for the Guatemalan children and providing legal protections and due process in immigration cases. The developments following the temporary ban on their deportation may have consequences for future immigration cases that have to do with legal protections for minors.
The ICC Makes its First Conviction in the Sudan Case
Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (aka Ali Kushayb), October 19, 2023 during the opening of the defense statements at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands (ICC-CPI via Courthouse News)
At 14:00 local time on October 6th, the International Criminal Court (ICC) delivered a verdict against Sudanese militia leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman. Abd-Al-Rahman, commonly called Ali Kushayb, was a commander of the Janjaweed, a nomadic militia operating in the Sahel region.
This verdict is the first the ICC has issued regarding the violence in Sudan. Abd-Al-Rahman stood trial for a series of crimes that are representative of this violence. With this verdict, the ICC sets the tone for how the court will treat further trials of Sudanese fighters.
The ICC issued the warrant for Abd-Al-Rahman’s arrest in February 2007. After a brief arrest and release in 2008, Abd-Al-Rahman turned himself in for arrest in June of 2020 after Sudan’s government said it would cooperate with the ICC, causing him to fear that the authorities would kill him. Abd-Al-Rahman stood accused of thirty-one counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity for atrocities committed in Sudan between 2003 and 2004. The ICC verdict found Abd-Al-Rahman guilty on twenty-seven of the thirty-one counts. Abd-Al-Rahman was not found guilty only of crimes related to inhumane treatment during attacks on the villages of Mukjar and Deleig.
Abd-Al-Rahman’s crimes were committed over two decades before the trial, but the violence he participated in killed and displaced hundreds of thousands. Between 2003 and 2004, Abd-Al-Rahman orchestrated 504 murders, 20 rapes, and the forced displacement of 41,000 people. This violence not only harmed the victims back in 2003 and 2004, but continues to ripple through Sudan today.
As the verdict was announced, conflict continued to rage in Sudan. In 2023, tensions between Sudan’s military and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted. These parties were meant to oversee a democratic transition after a 2019 conflict. The RSF was born out of the Janjaweed militia, and Janjaweed groups still provide aid and assistance to the RSF.
The Janjaweed have been accused of committing genocide against non-Arab Sudanese communities from 2003 to 2008. Since the resurgence of violence in Sudan in 2023, the RSF has faced similar accusations of genocide against non-Arab Sudanese people. The conflict in Sudan is currently one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Since 2023, the fighting has killed at least 40,000 people and displaced 12 million others. In addition to the physical violence, famine is raging through Sudan. According to the World Food Programme, over 24 million people are facing severe food insecurity.
Notably, Abd-Al-Rahman was found guilty of multiple crimes of rape as a war crime and as a weapon of war. The ICC has found defendants guilty of sex crimes before, but it has faced difficulty in prosecuting and convicting defendants for the crimes of sexual violence and rape. Sex crimes are notoriously difficult to investigate, and the ICC has had a number of sex crime charges dismissed for lack of evidence or non-applicability. In the first fifteen years of the ICC, the court only prosecuted eight sex-crime cases, and only two achieved convictions. The court even overturned its first-ever conviction of sex crimes only two years after the decision was given. With Abd-Al-Rahman’s conviction for rape as a war crime and crime against humanity, the ICC is taking another important step towards successfully prosecuting conflict-related sexual violence, both in Sudan and other cases around the world.
The conviction is a landmark for the ICC. Abd-Al-Rahman's conviction affirms the UN Security Council’s condemnation of the Darfur war as a genocide. With this conviction, the court has set a precedent for recognising the crimes committed in Sudan as war crimes and crimes against humanity. This legal precedent will set the tone for future ICC trials regarding the conflicts in Sudan. This case also reaffirms that it is possible for the ICC to overcome the hurdles unique to sexual violence and successfully prosecute sex crimes as crimes against humanity. By finding Abd-Al-Rahman guilty, the ICC has created a precedent in the international community for recognising the crisis in Sudan as a conflict with elements of genocide and ethnic cleansing, which can guide further international actions in regards to Sudan.
As the RSF continues to commit atrocities and the conflict in Sudan creates new victims twenty years after Abd-Al-Rahman’s crimes, the ICC verdict should spur other governments and international bodies to take action to further justice in Sudan.
ICE Raids Spark Debate on Profiling & Constitutional Rights
On July 2, the ACLU and other civil rights groups filed a class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security and Secretary Kristi Noem, representing individuals, organizations, and a legal service provider affected by the ICE raids in Southern California. On July 11th, U.S. District Court Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong for the Central District of California issued an injunction barring federal agents from stopping individuals solely based on their race, ethnicity, or spoken language. The civil rights groups who filed the case argued that ICE is unconstitutionally using its authority to detain individuals based on those characteristics.
The case was taken up to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 28th, where the court ruled in favor of the civil rights groups, affirming that the basis of the ICE detainments in question is unconstitutional. In her ruling, she argued that the “reasonable suspicion” standard, which is used by law enforcement to justify detaining undocumented individuals, cannot be based on a person’s “apparent race or ethnicity,” accent when speaking English, profession, or presence at locations where undocumented immigrants may be expected to gather.
Judge Frimpong’s injunction was stayed by the Supreme Court decision in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo. Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion argued that the legal reasoning for the Supreme Court’s ruling lies in the idea that judges “may have views on which policy approach is better or fairer. But judges are not appointed to make those policy calls.” He went further, arguing that given the context of the population in LA, it is lawful for ICE to exercise its power by considering ethnicity alongside other factors as part of the “totality of the circumstances.”
As this case exemplifies, the pattern of partisan rulings persists. In this case, the majority of the justices who declared that ICE should be able to use a more general investigation approach are all Republican appointees. In comparison, the Democratic appointees on the Court—Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson—ruled that ICE’s actions in this case were unconstitutional.
In a twenty-one-page dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, argued that ICE’s interpretation of “reasonable suspicion” violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” In direct opposition to Justice Kavanaugh’s argument, Justice Sotomayor expressed that using contextual evidence, such as one's accent to detain individuals, leaves all Latinos at risk of being “fair game to be seized at any time.”
Outrage from local LA communities ensued. In response to the increase in ICE raids, immigrant rights activists have held “know your rights” workshops and had volunteers post about raids and detainments on social media. The efforts of immigrant rights activists to coordinate expressions of protest against ICE highlight the role that social media has played in the anti-ICE movement. “Know Your Rights” posts have become a widespread form of protest against ICE activity and advocacy for immigrant rights.
ICE released a statement heralding the ruling as “a win for the safety of Californians and the rule of law.” The legalization of racial profiling creates the possibility of future chaos in marginalized communities, under issues other than migration. The split in the justices’ opinions on the Court’s past decisions reflects the current state of political polarization, and concerns about how partisanship may influence the interpretation of the law. Public approval of the court has decreased from 70% in August 2020 to 48% as of this September. Statistics show that about 47% of Americans view the Court as conservative. Comparing favorability and political statistics suggests a correlation that indicates the low level of trust the public currently has in the Court. The Court’s decision in the case of Noem v. Perdomo presents the persistent question of who the law is protecting, and the cost to those under the mercy of those who wield it.
Russia’s Expanding Drone and Airspace Violations Across NATO
By Dpsu.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0
As of October 6, 2025, the airspace over Europe has become increasingly contested. What began on September 10 as an incursion of at least 19 Russian kamikaze drones into Polish territory has evolved into a broader and persistent pattern of airspace violations across NATO’s eastern flank. The incursion of Russian drones up to 300 kilometers into Polish airspace prompted a massive NATO response. Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, and Italian AWACS aircraft worked alongside NATO refueling tankers in one of the largest coordinated air operations since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Airports in Warsaw, Rzeszów, and Lublin were temporarily closed, and debris from intercepted drones fell near residential areas, but no injuries were reported.
Since then, similar incidents have spread westward. Estonia confirmed that three Russian MiG-31s briefly entered its airspace on September 19. Romania reported a drone crash along the Danube just days later. Germany has investigated a “drone swarm” over Schleswig-Holstein, believed to be surveilling critical infrastructure, and several other European nations have been forced to temporarily shut a number of airports in late September after repeated unidentified flights over a series of Danish and German regions.
The rise in Russian flyovers and drone incursions into NATO airspace reflects a shift toward aerial harassment designed to exploit the grey zone between peace and open war. By testing NATO’s air defenses and resolve, Moscow seeks to undermine deterrence without provoking a direct military clash. Each overflight increases the risk of miscalculation, where one mistaken interception could trigger a crisis.
The incidents have accelerated European defense integration. Poland and the Baltic states are expanding air surveillance networks, Germany and Denmark have tightened coordination with NATO command, and the EU is fast-tracking procurement for anti-drone systems. Western leaders, including Joe Biden, Emmanuel Macron, and Keir Starmer, have condemned the drone incursions as deliberate provocations meant to unsettle the continent.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the September drone incursion “the most serious violation of sovereignty since World War II.” NATO invoked Article 4 and began Operation Eastern Sentry, an integrated air defense mission to protect the eastern flank. Later that week, at an EU summit in Copenhagen, defense ministers proposed and began to discuss plans for an “Eastern Flank Drone Wall.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy added to the proposal by recommending that frozen Russian assets be used to fund a joint European air defense system.
Europe’s airspace is becoming an increasingly contested zone, with drone and aircraft incursions now a regular occurrence. The incidents have hardened NATO’s stance, reinforced defense spending commitments, and stressed the need for shared air surveillance. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s comments on October 6, calling the drone disruptions “a useful reminder of the dangers of war,” underscore the Kremlin’s intent to use intimidation as a strategic tool.
These repeated provocations mark a new phase in European security: one defined by invisible confrontations above the clouds, where vigilance replaces rest and every radar blip could carry diplomatic consequences. The safety of Europe now relies as much on coordination and composure as on the weapons that guard its skies.
Burkina Faso Abolishes Visa Requirements for African Citizens
As of September 2025, Burkina Faso has abolished all visa requirements for travelers who hold African citizenship. While travelers will have to fill out an online visa application, they no longer need to pay visa fees or go through the standard procedure. This follows a trend of other African countries, including Ghana, Rwanda, and Kenya, some of the most visible and prominent countries in their respective regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. Policies like this facilitate increased commerce and trade within the continent, allowing it to become more interconnected and promoting more intra-continent cooperation and cohesion.
This is an especially important moment for Sub-Saharan Africa, both politically and economically: it has some of the world’s youngest populations, while much of the Global North faces fertility challenges, and houses many of the material resources crucial to the development of technology, like AI and electric vehicles. Africa’s young population provides it with a major source of labor and burgeoning expertise that is vital as it urbanizes and develops its domestic and continental economies. Its resources likewise enable the growth of homegrown companies in the automotive, industrial, and technology industries while attracting foreign investment. Countries like Rwanda and Botswana seek to attract international attention and investment through rapid modernization and political and economic leadership among African states. The extensive cobalt veins in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the large amounts of bauxite (aluminum) in Guinea are essential to the continuing tech boom in the Global North. Africa was instrumental in the initial emergence of the Global North and industrialization, and is instrumental today in a new epoch of technological advancement, but many on the continent today aim to do so on their own terms, shaking off the rust of colonialism and neocolonialism. It is this mindset that envelops and motivates African leaders today, born after colonialism yet raised in its dark shadows.
This new policy emerges amid the Pan-Africanist orientation of Burkina Faso’s new government, led by military captain and iconoclast Ibrahim Traore, following a military coup in 2022. As a leader, Traore has ignited a radical turn away from the West and Western-backed institutions. Thus far, he has ejected French forces fighting Islamist terrorist groups in the Sahel, nationalized foreign-owned industries like the gold industry, and pulled out of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) alongside the similarly junta-led Mali and Niger to form the Sahel Confederacy. Further exacerbating relations with the West, Traore has chosen to ally with Russia, which has supplied him with military and material support but has drawn ire from international observers. Allying with Russia thereby forgoes previous relationships with the United States and France, Burkina Faso’s former colonial ruler. His stringent anti-Western policies and public image have gained him significant popularity on the continent, partially fueled by extensive and largely positive, if often dubious, social media coverage. In social media and his speeches, his goal has been to pioneer a modern form of Pan-Africanism in order to combat and ultimately “win the war against terrorism and imperialism,” issues which have rocked the Sahel in recent years.
Ultimately, Traore’s actions reflect his efforts to use this modern Pan-Africanism to foster greater African self-reliance and cooperation. More implicitly, this is a way for Traore to bring more economic activity to the struggling nation, as it attempts to grow its mining industry, invest in domestic automotive companies, and harness the labor and economic potential of its young population. All the while, Traore is increasing his prominence on the continent as a paragon of Pan-African strength, independence, and agency in the face of competing global interests in Africa. In many ways, Traore is intentionally harnessing and reinforcing the legacy of Pan-African leaders past, including Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Burkina Faso’s very own Thomas Sankara, who implemented similar socialist policies and enjoyed incredible popularity before his assassination. These iterations of Pan-Africanism were intended as a radical push towards African independence in the immediate aftermath of decolonization. The other Sahel countries (Mali and Niger), similarly ruled by military juntas, are working to emulate the Pan-African approach and have worked closely with Burkina Faso. Looking to the future, Traore’s policies could see a greater emphasis on cooperation among other African nations and regional intergovernmental organizations, possibly building up to the goal of fashioning the African Union (AU) on the European Union’s shared currency, freedom of movement, and joint policies.
Discord Elections and Youth Revolutions: Nepal’s Gen-Z protests
The youth-led protests that erupted in Nepal on September 9 have led to a new dawn with the appointment of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as the country’s Interim Prime Minister on September 12th. The sun set on Prime Minister Sharma Oli’s administration after the anti-corruption protests forced him to step down. In a uniquely Gen Z election, Karki was chosen via an election on Discord, a social media platform, due to protesters’ support of her previous stands against corruption.
The “Gen-Z” protests were in reaction to the rising corruption and authoritarian actions by the Nepali government. Viral videos of the luxurious lives of politicians’ children, also known as “Nepo Kids,” further exacerbated frustrations amongst Nepalis. Protestors were frustrated by the government’s recent ban on major social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, and X. Protestors thus took to the streets, fighting for a government that could better manage the faltering economy and the mounting unemployment rate. The protests grew violent, leading to the deaths of at least 72 people, according to official accounts. Among the injured was the wife of former prime minister of Nepal, Jhala Nath Khanal, who sustained serious burn injuries as their home was set on fire.
Hami Nepal, the group that organized these protests, notably used social media to coordinate its cause. Discord, a messaging platform often used by online gamers, served as the stage for debates regarding the appointment of the interim prime minister. Hami Nepal created a channel on the platform titled “Youth Against Corruption,” where more than 10,000 people participated in discussions. Ultimately, former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, known for taking a stand against corruption during her time on the Supreme Court, was chosen. She was sworn in on September 12th with the help of the military and the president. Elections for Nepal’s post-interim elections are set to be held on March 5th.
As Nepal looks toward its future, its history brings up key questions for nations worldwide. Nepal’s protests connect to a broader global phenomenon of rising frustration with corrupt and increasingly authoritarian governments. With TikTok bans being considered in the United States during the Biden administration, as well as various social media platforms being banned in other nations, the straw that broke Nepal’s back may soon occur elsewhere.
There are many possible implications of the presumed success of these protests. Hami Nepal’s uniquely social media-oriented organization presents new possibilities for protests and revolutions in the 21st century. This form of virtual polls on Discord was considered by supporters to be more egalitarian, accessible, and transparent to the general public, especially in comparison to the backdoor actions of Nepali politicians in the past. At the same time, possible issues include misinformation or misuse of accounts on social media. With youth voter turnout lower in rural US states, these Discord polls can present a unique opportunity. Furthermore, social media users from around the world have taken inspiration from the Gen-Z style revolution put together by the Nepali youth, and are highlighting similar frustrations with their governments, with the desire to replicate the revolution. For other countries, particularly in the region, these protests could inspire similar outcries from their own young adults. The question thus arises: Could more countries see Discord elections in their future?
The Caribbean Gang Problem
LinkedIn: Addressing Gang Violence in the Antigua and Barbuda: A Blueprint for the Caribbean
When most people think of the Caribbean, they often picture luxurious beaches and scenic mountains, perfect for a family vacation. However, underneath what appears to be islands full of rich ecosystems and culture, lies a deeper problem in the rapid spread of gangs across the region. Violence has skyrocketed as of 2025, with Haiti having a 78.9 crime index, followed by Trinidad at 70.9 and Jamaica at 67.4 (measured on a scale of 0-100). Gangs fight to control huge swaths of territory, and innocent civilians are caught in the crossfire as governments fail to protect them properly. Gangs are an issue of governance, and in order to protect their citizens, North American nations must form a united plan to implement effective governmental policies.
Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moise in 2021, Haiti and its government have collapsed. An attempt to establish a nine-member council to provide stability until the next election failed on account of multiple charges of corruption. Without any clear power structure present, gangs were able to roam freely, competing with each other to secure as much influence as possible. By 2023, gangs had taken huge swaths of the capital of Port Au Prince. Since then, these gangs have induced mass killings that have significantly affected the community, claiming around 1,000 lives since October 2024 and a record displacement of 1.3 million Haitians. Those who remain in Haiti are subject to brutal cruelty such as rape, stabbing, and kidnappings, to name a few. Now the violence has begun to spread outside of the capital, destroying vital infrastructures such as hospitals, apartments, and schools. Haiti’s gang problem shows no signs of ending, and it is rapidly becoming one of the biggest humanitarian crises faced.
While Haiti has been the most notable example of the rise in gang violence, other Caribbean islands have been subjected to similar fates. In Trinidad, gang-related violence comprised 40% of total murders within the region in 2024, leading to heavy criticism of the government, which has failed to act effectively. States of emergencies were also implemented in Trinidad as well as Jamaica within the last year due to persistent gang violence, in which police were granted the right to search and seize assets to aid in the peace-keeping process. Jamaica, specifically, has one of the highest levels of gang fragmentation, creating more volatile factions that rival those seen in Haiti. Police often engage in brutal conflicts with gangs, creating immense pressure. Puerto Rico has also been notorious for their gang presence, with clashes between gangs rising substantially to exceed last year's levels due to the rivalry between Los Viraos and El Burro. These gangs have even been labeled as transnational criminal groups by the Jamaican prime minister, Andrew Holness, who publicly stated that Trinidad gangs may have links to Jamaican ones. This ongoing transnational gang violence threatens the lives of innocent citizens, as one in ten children experience sexual abuse in Trinidad, and women continue to be subjected to domestic violence. With so many nations already being affected by the brutality of gangs, it is important to mitigate the issues as soon as possible, or fear other nations such as Grenada or Barbados becoming absorbed with gang violence.
When examining these Caribbean islands and their high rate of gang violence, there are a few common trends. Many of these nations, such as Trinidad and Haiti, have governments that suffer from a weak executive branch due to significant corruption and inefficiency. A weak central government results in weak institutions that fail to enforce the law, allowing gangs to roam around freely with very little resistance. When conflict arises, gangs are often more coordinated than official government responses because of a greater sense of unity. These Caribbean islands also heavily suffer from poverty and inequality, compounded by the ineffectiveness of the government in remedying these issues. Gangs take advantage of the socioeconomic gap, providing relief to those subjected to poverty in the form of food, water, clothes, and money. The result is people residing in those towns pledging loyalty to respective gangs because they have improved their lives, legitimizing themselves over the government. Finally, all these Caribbean nations are geographically trapped between the U.S. and Latin American illegal drug trafficking routes. Gangs smuggle drugs illegally into these Caribbean islands, selling to the U.S. in exchange for firearms. In nations such as Trinidad and Haiti, the illegal U.S. firearm market has yielded significant money for these gangs to help claim territory, leading to high murder rates that directly correlate with gun trafficking.
To help mitigate the violence of gangs, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) should coordinate a united policy with the U.S. This idea has already been presented at the Caricom Summit in July, with the St Kitts and Nevis prime minister, Terrance Drew, stressing the necessity of “the coordination of all of the member states.” The first act of Caricom should be to work with the US to negotiate for better security over gun trafficking, with the U.S. imposing much stricter policies and control when it comes to illegal drug and firearm trade, considering most of it goes to Caribbean gangs. Secondly, Caricom should look to break up the international connectivity of these gangs. This could be done through establishing a border task force, negotiating agreements on persecuting criminals if they flee to another island, and increasing funding for information centers. Thirdly, Caricom and the U.S. should provide some funding to Caribbean nations such as Trinidad and Haiti, which have severe issues of poverty. Providing some relief for these vulnerable communities decreases the likelihood that citizens will rely on gangs for survival.
Gang violence can be solved, as seen recently, where Jamaica, despite having high crime rates, decreased its murder rate by 40% for the first 5 months of 2025 by integrating new technology into law enforcement operations. Therefore, to ensure stability in the Caribbean, the issue of gang violence must be solved sooner rather than later.
Narco-Feminism Is a Lie: The Myth of Empowered Women in Cartels
Introduction: The Illusion of Power
In cartel culture, women hold guns, manage drug operations, and appear to wield influence. Social media, pop culture, and even certain feminist narratives frame them as powerful figures breaking into a male-dominated underworld. The rise of the buchona aesthetic—a hyper-glamorous, luxury-driven style associated with cartel wives and girlfriends—further fuels this perception. But does their presence in organized crime signify genuine empowerment, or is it simply another manifestation of patriarchy?
Choice feminism suggests that any decision a woman makes is inherently empowering. This logic extends to women who enter cartel life, assuming that if they choose to launder money, traffic drugs, or command sicarios (assassins), they are asserting autonomy. In reality, cartel culture does not liberate women—it subjugates them to a hyper-violent system designed to use and discard them. Radical feminism makes this clear: participation in oppression does not equate to freedom, as choices made within oppressive structures are often shaped by those structures. Cartel women may appear powerful, but their influence is conditional, and their survival often hinges on their relationships with men in power.
Women in the Cartel World: Authority or Survival?
While a handful of women have reached leadership roles in cartels, their ascent is almost always tied to male figures. For example, Enedina Arellano Félix of the Tijuana Cartel took control only after her brothers were arrested or killed, managing finances rather than commanding troops. Similarly, Rosalinda González Valencia, associated with the CJNG (Jalisco New Generation Cartel), handled financial operations but was ultimately arrested while her husband, a major cartel leader, remained at large. Sandra Ávila Beltrán, the so-called "Queen of the Pacific," leveraged her family’s cartel ties but ended up imprisoned, like so many others before her. These women may have wielded influence, but they were never at the top of the power structure. They occupied a position of authority because the men around them were temporarily absent and unable to do so.
Beyond leadership, women serve other roles in cartel operations, yet none offer true security. The buchona aesthetic is often presented as a symbol of cartel women’s financial independence because, on the surface, it visually signals access to wealth, luxury, and power. Women who embody this look typically display markers of high status—designer clothing, luxury handbags, dramatic makeup, and surgically enhanced bodies—which are conventionally associated with success and autonomy in capitalist, image-driven societies. It is, however, actually a reflection of control. Cartel-affiliated men dictate the physical appearance of their wives and girlfriends, funding plastic surgeries and designer wardrobes to fit a beauty standard designed to flaunt their wealth, even if it kills them. These women, though seemingly elevated by their proximity to power, remain vulnerable. If they lose their usefulness—whether through age, disloyalty, or legal troubles—they are easily replaced.
Others are thrust into direct criminal activity. Women are frequently recruited as drug mules because they attract less suspicion at border crossings. Some, like La Catrina, a high-profile cartel assassin, become sicarias themselves. However, many are coerced into these roles and given no real alternative. La Catrina, who became notorious for her involvement in cartel violence as a member of the Jalisco New Generation cartel, was dead by twenty-one, killed in a police raid. Her notoriety did not protect her, nor did it grant her the longevity or security enjoyed by her male counterparts. The promise of power in the cartel world is often a short-lived illusion.
Why Choice Feminism Fails
Choice feminism insists that women exercising agency—even within oppressive systems—are inherently empowered. This framework, however, collapses when applied to cartel women. While they may choose to enter the drug trade, that choice is rarely made in a vacuum. Many come from environments where cartel involvement is one of the few economic options available. Others are drawn in through coercion, manipulation, or familial ties. The argument that their participation is an act of empowerment ignores the structural conditions that drive them into organized crime in the first place.
Even for those who voluntarily enter cartel life, power remains tenuous. A woman’s influence within a cartel is almost always tied to a man—her father, brother, husband, or lover. Unlike their male counterparts, whose authority is recognized through force or reputation, women in cartels gain status relationally. The moment their connection to a male figure weakens, their protection disappears. They are not dismantling patriarchal structures, but operating within them, often at great personal risk. The notion that women gain equality by playing the same violent game as men disregards the reality that cartel structures were never designed for female autonomy.
Social Media and the Glorification of Cartel Culture
The romanticization of cartel life extends beyond the criminal world into mainstream culture, particularly through social media. Platforms like TikTok and Instagram promote an idealized version of the buchona lifestyle, showcasing extravagant wealth, designer clothing, and luxury cars under hashtags like #NarcoQueen and #CartelWife. These curated images create a false narrative that cartel-affiliated women live glamorous, consequence-free lives. Missing from these portrayals are the violence, domestic abuse, and lack of agency that many of these women face.
This glorification extends to music as well. Narcocorridos, or drug ballads, often depict women in cartel culture as either deadly and seductive or beautiful and submissive, reinforcing the idea that their worth is tied to their desirability or usefulness to men. Young women consuming this media may not recognize the disparity between the image and the reality. Instead, they see a path to financial security and status without realizing the inherent dangers of cartel life. The aesthetics of power should not be mistaken for actual power, and yet, social media blurs this distinction.
Conclusion: Narco-Feminism is a Façade
Women in cartels are not revolutionaries; they are participants in a system that was never built to protect them. The idea that their involvement represents a form of feminism ignores the realities of how power functions within organized crime. Holding a gun or managing cartel finances does not free women from patriarchy. Running a criminal operation does not shield them from the violence, exploitation, and disposability that define cartel life.
Choice feminism argues that because these women have chosen their roles, they are empowered. Radical feminism exposes this fallacy. True empowerment does not come from maneuvering within an oppressive system—it comes from dismantling it. If narco-feminism were real, women would not have to navigate cartel culture by the rules men established; they would be rewriting them entirely. But they aren’t. They are surviving, and survival is not the same as liberation. There is no feminism in a system built to destroy women. The only way forward is to reject the structures that keep them bound.
The EU Struck a Deal for Detention Centers and Desert Dumps: A Crisis for African Migrants
In 2024, the European Union (EU) signed bilateral agreements and memorandums with several Muslim-majority nations, including Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, that contained financial agreements to curb migrant flow through border control and closure or violent action towards migrants if necessary. These agreements come as a result of a well-documented rise in anti-immigrant sentiment across Europe as thousands of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa have fled conflict and persecution in their homelands to establish a better life on the other side of the Mediterranean. Migrants, particularly those from Libya and Syria, are fleeing the violence of the ongoing war and factional power struggle, where they are vulnerable to extortion, violence, and other abuses by the government and armed groups. One individual interviewed had fled military service in Syria under al-Assad’s regime due to conflict with his oath as a medical professional–he, along with 125 other refugees, fled Syria to Europe for freedom from violent conflict since 2009, 4.48 million Syrian refugees have sought asylum in Europe.
With the increasing immigrant population, especially from Muslim countries, many white Europeans fear that low fertility rates among “European natives” will create a self-effacing Europe devoid of Western identity. Xenophobic political sentiment has begun to influence the EU and its agreements with North African countries, regions that groups such as Liberian migrants must traverse before attempting to cross the Mediterranean. These agreements have already dropped irregular border crossings by an overall 38%—the lowest level since 2021 (due to COVID-19)—though the West African route saw an 18% increase, the highest since data collection began in 2009. This means that while efforts have been made to close off points of crossing, immigrants are finding alternative routes and bypassing blocked routes.
In response to the increased migration across the Mediterranean, Tunisia and Italy have developed a coordinating strategy that integrates migration control with national identity and economic policies. Tunisia stated that the reason for their aggressive migration crackdown and policy development is a defense against migrants who threaten to transform the state into an “African” country rather than an “Arab-Muslim” one. EU nations such as Italy have pitched migration policy as a facet of plans to boost the economies of African countries directly involved with migrant flow into the EU. Last year, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen both presented plans with economic benefits in tandem with stricter migration policy. Leyen’s partnership package plan held over 1.08 billion dollars in assistance, with approximately 164.5 million dollars targeted towards border management.
This is not the first time agreements have been used to curb migration into the EU. In 2017, an EU summit in Malta saw the promise of greater funding for migrant containment and the closing of the Liberian and Tunisian Central Mediterranean migrant routes. This is the same route that experienced a 59% drop in crossings in 2024, according to Frontex. The EU’s concerted response differs greatly from those in 2015, alongside the growth of xenophobia and the election of far-right politicians. There is a fear that Europe is losing its Western identity, particularly from invading Arab populations who, from their perspective, terrorize the white European population. Germany had committed 6.6 billion dollars to support 800,000 migrants entering the country and take in 500,000 migrants a year, with Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly stating that the EU cannot fail on the matter of supporting refugees if they wished to remain “the Europe [they] wished for.”
These recent agreements have increased the expulsion of migrants in North Africa who sought to cross the Mediterranean, some even using brutal tactics, including documented human rights violations and imprisonment. As a result, migrants face threats of torture, sexual violence, starvation, serious injury, and death. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has now been denied access and obstructed from providing treatment to those individuals inside two of Libya’s major detention facilities after more than seven years of access, from 2016 to 2023. At one detention center, Abu Salim, women reported to MSF workers that they were told they could be released in exchange for sexual favors, and that they experienced sexual abuse at the hands of armed guards and men brought from outside the facility. Prisoners described being routinely denied life-saving medical treatment. In response to the exposed abuse, MSF has called for a stop to detention practices and the release of all those held, and for refugees to be provided with safe and legal pathways out of Libya.
Other countries, such as Tunisia, have begun a process known as “desert dumping,” abandoning migrants into the no-man’s land along their border in the Sahara Desert, providing them with no food or water and adequate medical care. Funded with more than 400 million euros by the EU Trust Fund under the pretense of migrant management, these operations use the funds to operate vehicles and commute out to remote regions of the Sahara to abandon migrants, according to a year-long investigation from Lighthouse Reports. Many who are left in the desert face threats of kidnapping, extortion, torture, violence, and death; others are sold and held for ransom. Vehicles used to round up migrants during raids and transport them to desert regions have been matched to vehicles donated to Tunisia by Italy and Germany. Some people, like African-American citizen Timothy Hucks, have been wrongfully arrested and subsequently abandoned in the desert following a police interrogation.
Of the 613 men arrested and sent back to Niger in December 2024, a majority reported mistreatment by authorities during their time in detention centers and while being transported. Few, including a 25-year-old from Guinea, are detained despite holding UNHCR refugee status papers. Those detained also include pregnant women and children; one group interviewed reported suffering hallucinations and heel infections. Many were dehydrated, injured, and abused by organized crime and trafficking rings that operate in the dumping zones. One group reportedly had been photographed by Spanish officers before knowingly being abandoned in an al-Qaeda-linked active war zone in the Malian desert.
Damaging migration policies from the EU and partnering African nations have resulted in the forceful return of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers to Libya and neighboring regions, where they face horrific and abusive conditions in detention centers and abandonment in the Sahara Desert. When groups are finally able to reach nearby cities, often the same from which they were rounded up, many risk being detained and dumped again, creating a cycle of violence and abuse. Using violent and abusive detainment as a solution to reduce migration will not reduce the influx of migrants and refugees into Europe, but rather force those desperate enough to create newer and potentially more dangerous routes to the EU and their assumed freedom from violent conflict. Scholars have long since connected this crisis to the colonial historical legacy left by many nations that participate in the prevention of African and Muslim migration into the EU. If the European Union is desperate to contain and prevent migrants at the cost of billion-dollar economic deals, it would be a greater use of funds to build instead grassroots support for democracy and peace-building efforts in regions of conflict.
Yemenis Face Death As Trump Administration Blocks Aid
On March 15, drones and fighter jets from the USS Harry S. Truman conducted the first in a series of “relentless” bombings across Yemen. These attacks lasted for a little over seven weeks before a ceasefire was achieved. US President Donald Trump and his administration have stated that the targets of those attacks were members of the Houthi militant group, however, many of the people killed or injured in the strikes were civilians not affiliated with the terrorist organisation.
While the March 15 strikes were the first U.S. actions that actively harmed Yemeni civilians since Trump’s reelection, many of the cuts and changes made by his administration to U.S. policy may have ripple effects that could place more innocent Yemenis at risk.
One Trump-era policy change with such side effects was the administration's re-designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO), a move that came after former President Joe Biden reversed a last-minute policy made by the first Trump administration when he took office in 2021.
On February 5, 2021, only seventeen days after the Trump administration designated the Houthis as an FTO, former President Biden removed the designation. In a now-deleted White House webpage, the Biden administration said that it was lifting the FTO designation in order to help mitigate the humanitarian crisis that has been plaguing Yemen for years.
The FTO designation makes it illegal for any United States entity—private or public—to provide “support or resources” to an FTO. Since the Houthis control over seventy percent of Yemen, this prohibition greatly hinders any aid initiatives, as U.S. entities must ensure that no aid reaches a Houthi member or civilian with ties to the Houthis.
Critically for Yemen, “support or resources” includes food aid. Yemen relies on imports for up to ninety percent of its food, fuel, and medicine, and while it is legal to provide medical supplies to FTO-controlled areas, U.S. entities cannot legally provide food and fuel to FTOs or any civilians related to FTOs. Currently, 17.4 million people in Yemen are food insecure, 15 million of whom are women and children. The FTO designation risks devastating the Yemeni economy and could potentially send parts of Yemen into a famine.
In 2024, after a series of Houthi attacks on U.S. naval vessels, the Biden administration re-designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organisation, a less severe category that would block entities associated with the de facto Houthi government from conducting financial transactions or owning property inside the United States. Importantly, an SDGT designation does not prohibit the distribution of American humanitarian aid abroad. Despite this new designation, and against the warnings of humanitarian aid organisations, the Trump administration redesignated the Houthis as an FTO on March 4.
On top of placing restrictions on U.S.-based entities and NGOs providing humanitarian aid in Yemen, the Trump administration has drastically reduced the amount of American government aid being provided to Yemeni citizens. On his first day in office, Trump signed an executive order “reevaluating” the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This reevaluation came along with a severe reduction in USAID programmes in every region of the world and by March 11, over 80 percent of the agency's programmes had been terminated.
The Trump administration has also been see-sawing on many decisions regarding some of the most important USAID programmes. Among these programmes is the USAID Urgent Food Aid programme—one of the most critical USAID programmes in Yemen. On April 8, the administration cancelled the programme. However, less than 24 hours later, aid was restored for all countries except Afghanistan and Yemen. This cancellation included food already at distribution centres in Yemen, ending lifesaving aid to at least 2.4 million people.
The Trump administration said it was cutting USAID programmes in Yemen because it claimed the Houthis were stealing aid. This statement is likely accurate as the Houthis have been accused of aid theft by multiple different sources. In 2019, the Houthis reportedly stole around 1 percent of the food aid that entered Yemen. This number is significant, but it does not outweigh the potential famine that will come about as a consequence of the FTO designation and the loss of USAID Urgent Food Aid.
The FTO designation will not only starve many innocent Yemenis, but it could even push some into extremism. When people are facing food insecurity and are unable to properly feed themselves and their families they become vulnerable to extremist groups. These individuals often do not want to join the Houthis, but as they begin to starve, joining becomes one of the only options available to them. The Houthis either keep the excess food for the members of their organisation or they resell the food for an extortionate amount. As aid dries up, the people of Yemen will have to face a choice: spend money they do not have to buy food from the Houthis, join the Houthis in order to eat, or die.
Since Donald Trump took office in January, his administration has enacted policies that have put the health and safety of 17.4 million Yemenis at immediate risk. Despite the ceasefire, these innocent Yemenis are still in danger. Not only has it become significantly more difficult for private entities in America to provide humanitarian aid, but U.S. government aid to the people of Yemen has been reduced to next to nothing. If they are unable to access aid, millions of people in Yemen face starvation, thousands of whom will likely die.
Marine Le Pen Barred From Running in 2027 French Elections
On March 31st, French courts found the leader of the far-right Rassemblement National (National Rally) party, Marine Le Pen, guilty of embezzling millions of euros of European Union funds. This decision shook national politics, making Le Pen ineligible for the 2027 presidential election in France.
This court decision has massive implications. Before the verdict, Le Pen was the frontrunner in national polling ahead of the 2027 French election. Projected to win 32.0 percent of the vote, with the runner-up only receiving 23.5 percent, Le Pen was the clear national favorite. After running three times before, the next election would have been Le Pen’s best chance at winning the French presidency.
There are still chances Le Pen could run for president. She is determined not to back down, stating that “I’m a fighter and I’m not going to be eliminated.” Part of her strategy to undermine court supremacy has been attacking the legitimacy of the institution, calling the court’s decision a “‘nuclear bomb detonated by a corrupt system.” Moreover, Le Pen has received support in her fight against the judiciary, as some supporters have sent death threats to the judges who issued her conviction. A French court of appeals also said it would expedite her case, allowing for her trial to take place before next summer. This would allow her to run a successful presidential campaign for the following election.
What’s next for the Rassemblement National?
In light of this crisis, the Rassemblement National must decide its next move. Although Le Pen is a cornerstone of the party, which was founded by her father Jean-Marie in 1972, the wisest decision could be to look towards another candidate. Even if her appeal is heard in 2026, there is a chance the current sentence will be upheld, shortening the time another candidate might need to prepare for the presidential election.
Within the Rassemblement National, the clear choice for successor is Jordan Bardella. Le Pen’s charismatic 29-year-old prodigé has taken over the party since her conviction. But, this does not mean the Rassemblement National is prepared to support him in a presidential race. Le Pen stated that Bardella is “a tremendous asset for the movement. … I hope we don’t have to use that asset any sooner than we have to.” Bardella is remaining committed to Le Pen, affirming that he will “continue to fight with her to the end, hand in hand. I am totally loyal to her.”
All in all, Rassemblement National members are likely to stand by Le Pen’s side, with Politico stating that she is “almost universally worshipped within her party. None of her allies appear ready to tell her that endorsing Bardella now, rather than waiting for the courts to rule on her case, is the safest way to protect her movement.” Even at the risk of an underdeveloped presidential election, her allies are unwilling to jump-ship to Bardella.
If Le Pen refuses to offer her support, this could cause a rift not only in their party but in far-right French politics at large. It seems unlikely, but depending on the outcome of the appeal case and the level of support garnered by Bardella before the 2027 presidential campaign, it is possible that he could step out from behind her shadow.
Even if Le Pen and the Rassemblement National choose to endorse Bardella, this is not universally viewed as the best option. “Bardella is still quite a young politician. It would be a big step for him to be the presidential candidate in two years’ time” states Nicholas Starin, associate professor at John Cabot University in Rome.
Beyond that, Le Pen’s conviction could have devastating consequences for her and the Rassemblement National. While some believe her protégé Jordan Bardella could take the presidential ticket if she is prevented from running, others think rival right-wing parties will benefit most from the situation. As France demonstrates increasingly conservative tendencies, far-right politicians such as Éric Zemmour, Gérald Darmanin, or Bruno Retailleau could seize the opportunity and gain votes with Le Pen out of the picture.
Le Pen and Trump
After a life spent in right-wing politics, Le Pen has recently focused her attention on demonstrating that she will put national interests first, building the narrative that she is the best candidate for France. By not praising President Donald Trump’s electoral victory and not attending his inauguration, Le Pen may be acknowledging that many French citizens view Trump as a threat to Europe, even if they agree with his far-right stances, prioritizing her people above pleasing the American president.
For his part, despite a cold relation with Le Pen in the past, Trump has expressed his support for her after the indictment. Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform that the “Witch Hunt against Marine Le Pen is another example of European Leftists using Lawfare to silence Free Speech, and censor their Political Opponent.” His comparison reflects the image of martyrdom he has used to rally support behind himself in previous presidential elections.
Many have drawn parallels between Le Pen’s sentencing and the multiple cases called against Trump, namely “for covering up a hush money payment to a porn star, for attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election that he lost, and for retaining classified documents after his first term ended.” In the United States, as Trump regained control of the White House, it seems his charges had little impact on the political landscape, potentially demonstrating that some Americans do not take powerful criminals seriously: if one has enough influence, they may be able to get away with illegal activity. If anything, Trump’s anti-establishment rhetoric capitalizes on his convictions, using them to portray the idea that judicial institutions target far-right leaders who challenge the “corrupt” system, giving him a clear motivation to support Le Pen in her appeals process.
Yet, unlike Trump’s charges, France will feel the consequences of a prominent politician’s indictment. Le Pen’s four-year prison sentence was reduced to two under house arrest, and her 100,000€ fine should not cause too much trouble, but the five-year ban on running for office could have severe consequences. Despite his wrongdoings, Trump’s criminal and civil charges resulted in few consequences, as he has run for president twice since the original charges were pressed. On the other hand, French judges are not willing to let Le Pen go free for her crimes, even though she was predicted to win the next presidential election.
Could Marine Le Pen’s sentencing set an international, or at least European or French, precedent of prosecuting high-level politicians when they commit crimes? What this means for far-right French politics is yet to be seen as Le Pen’s appeal is processed and the 2027 election approaches.
Incumbent Ecuadorian president reelected for another term
In a rematch between Ecuador’s two 2023 presidential candidates, Ecuadorian president Daniel Noboa won the country’s runoff elections held on April 13th, defeating Luisa González with a 10-point lead. The elections came after neither candidate won a majority in a snap election held on February 9th. While the conservative, banana-billionaire incumbent was quick to announce that he had secured another four-year term, his opponent, left-leaning lawyer González, demanded a recount of the votes that she claimed were the result of “grotesque electoral fraud.”
Previously, Noboa, at age thirty-five, became Ecuador’s youngest elected head of state in November 2023 after winning another snap election held following President Guillermo Lasso’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly to avoid an impeachment vote. After only serving a year and a half, elections were set to be held again on February 9th for the next presidency, which resulted in a “technical tie.” Noboa won 44.17% of the votes and González 44% (the third candidate Leonidas Iza had 5.25%). Voter turnout for round 1 of the elections was 82%, increasing to 84% in round 2 of the elections following a heated presidential debate.
While President Noboa expressed skepticism following the first round of votes, he has failed to provide any definitive evidence of election fraud or malfeasance, instead asserting that the “irregularities” were being reviewed in areas where the counts “did not add up.” However, in observations independent from the elections, both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the EU Election Observation Mission denied Noboa’s allegations of fraud.
Historically, an incumbent being successfully reelected in Ecuador is rare, yet, ultimately, issues with rampant crime and gang violence tipped the voters over the edge. With rampant crime stemming from cocaine production and narco-trafficking from neighboring countries Colombia and Peru, Ecuadorian citizens have fallen victim to violence across the country. While Noboa put this topic at the forefront of his campaign, González stressed different goals of increasing social spending to boost the economy and cut fuel prices—a message that ultimately didn’t resonate enough with voters.
Despite making modest progress in reducing crime rates and drug gang presence, Noboa’s past actions in implementing emergency military measures to curb crime and successfully reducing homicide rates, from 46.18 per 100,000 people to 38.76, swayed citizens into giving him another chance to produce more tangible results. González, on the other hand, garnered little attention in her various government positions over the years, until being selected by the RC (Citizens Revolution) as its presidential candidate in the snap election in 2023.
As a whole, the candidates shared some similar goals and policies, including endorsing continued oil drilling in the Amazon and weakening Indigenous governance rights. Third-party candidate and self-identified Marxist-Leninist Leonidas Iza, however, directly opposed these policies in his campaign, advocating for Ecuador’s Indigenous communities and powerful grassroots communities, the End Amazon Crude Movement, and the introduction of a new era of climate justice. While the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) strongly aligned with Iza, with around 5% of overall national votes, much of the community was divided over which candidate would best advocate for their interests. The organization’s failure to fully assemble around one candidate called into question the organization’s ability to unify its members.
In recent years, President Noboa has aligned himself with other conservative presidents, including Argentina’s President Javier Milei, El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, and the U.S.’s President Donald Trump, even going further to align with Trump’s anti-immigration policies and declare a willingness to accept deportees. Ecuadorian citizens have shown disappointment in this alignment, believing that a relationship with President Trump should have already excluded the country from the 10% tariffs outlined for Trump’s “Liberation Day.” González even mocked Noboa when these tariffs were implemented following his informal visit to Mar-a-lago. Now, Ecuadorian citizens hope the new president takes the same strong stance against drug and crime rates, following through on his vows to fix the detrimental effects it has had on the country.
Ukrainian and Russian War Negotiations: The Role of US Intervention
President Trump and President Putin meeting in Helsinki, Finland 2018. Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the conflict has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians and displaced millions more. Despite previously attempting several rounds of peaceful negotiations between Russia and Ukraine alone, all have failed. Now, three years into the war, negotiations to facilitate the end of the conflict seem to be bearing fruit. Much of the recent swift negotiations are being attributed to the re-election of U.S. President Donald Trump, who has been pushing for an end to the war since he first began campaigning. Yet, the format of these negotiations has drawn international criticism for their exclusion of Ukraine, one of the two parties embroiled in the conflict. Talks between the United States and Russia began in Saudi Arabia, yet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukrainian diplomats had not received an invitation to war negotiations.
As a whole, Trump’s coziness with Russian President Vladimir Putin has worried many U.S. allies. Not only has Trump failed to denounce Russia for their invasion of Ukraine, but he has also refused to sign a formal statement attributing Russia as the cause of the war, instead stating that the focus should be on ending the war rather than its causes. This set the stage for the meeting of President Trump and President Zelensky on February 28th to discuss mineral rights in Ukraine, which quickly turned into a highly contentious, tense discussion. Among the key moments of the meeting were Trump calling President Zelensky a “dictator,” blaming him for starting the war, and criticizing him for not thanking the United States for the foreign aid that Ukraine has been given, all of which led to President Zelensky walking out of the meeting without signing any agreement.
Following this meeting, President Zelensky sent a letter to the Oval Office stating that Kyiv was ready for negotiations and peace. Since then, President Trump spoke with President Putin on March 18th, and a 30-day partial ceasefire against attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure has been reached. Yet, President Putin still has not agreed to a complete ceasefire, stating that there were still issues that needed to be “ironed out.” The direction of further negotiations remains uncertain.
In the midst of this crisis, many European nations have been expressing concerns about the Trump administration’s new foreign relations policies, especially with the knowledge that Ukrainian aid is conditional pending. French President Emmanuel Macron is one of these leaders, and in response has hosted several European-specific meetings over the past couple of weeks that excluded the United States from discussions on potential aid solutions for Ukraine. As a result, tensions have continued to increase between Europe and the U.S., with many allies continuing to look for alternative routes of aid without involvement from the U.S. This shift toward isolationist policy marks a stark shift in U.S. foreign policy and international diplomacy, with European allies learning they will need to rely less and less on the U.S. for support.
Women and the Struggle for Power in Post-Assad Syria
In Syria, women rallied with YPJ flags to demand that Damascus respect women’s rights. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December marked a turning point in the governance of Syria. In its place, a new interim government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, is leading efforts to rebuild state institutions and restore basic services. Al-Sharaa was the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni rebel group who maintained extensive military and political power and coordinated the offensive that pushed Assad to flee the state. Al-Sharaa announced the new cabinet Saturday, March 29, promising greater diversity and inclusion in decision-making positions in this “strong” post-Assad era.
On paper, Syria’s authorities have made commitments to gender equality. A newly ratified constitutional declaration was created to facilitate a five-year transitional period that included language guaranteeing women the right to education, work, and political participation. Al-Sharaa called this declaration the beginning of “a new history.” But for many Syrian women who are hesitant to both Assad and HTS, these changes raise more questions than answers. Can Syria’s next political chapter be stable without prioritizing the full inclusion of women in its political and social reconstruction?
A critical examination of the transition reveals troubling early signs. While the constitutional declaration outlines "social, political and economic rights" for women, the sincerity of the commitment to these rights has been perceived by some as dismissive of the demands of Syrian women. For example, the initial appointment of Aisha al-Dibs to lead the Women’s Affairs Office was hailed as progress–until she framed the role of women in society strictly within Islam and the family unit. This narrow vision for female empowerment contradicts the broader equal rights promised in the transitional constitution by institutionalizing and reinforcing this restrictive narrative. This disconnect raises concerns that these reforms are largely symbolic, signaling a shift toward an ideologically-driven government that may limit genuine progress for women’s rights.
Critics from the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava, have outright rejected the new constitutional declaration, calling it unrepresentative of women’s rights and their political participation. In Rojava, women have been at the forefront of both military resistance and civil governance for years, chanting “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” (Women, Life, Freedom) as part of their women-centered society. The Kurdish feminist philosophy “jineology” emphasizes women’s liberation as central to democracy. While the national transitional government has taken steps to include women in leadership positions and legal codes within the constitution, its approach is still rooted in conservative interpretations of gender roles. In contrast to this, Rojava’s institutions prioritize co-leadership in politics and hold women’s councils as integral parts of community decision-making. It places women’s liberation at the heart of social transformation, arguing that no society can be truly free without the freedom of women. Sharia courts have been disbanded in Rojava following their revolution, demonstrating a practical commitment to women’s empowerment.
This localized model presents a challenge to the transitional government in Damascus. If the central state fails to incorporate women into political processes–or worse, reverts to conservative rhetoric and ideology–it risks alienating a generation of women who have already experienced autonomy but have also borne witness to gender-based violence. Suppressing these hard-fought gains could incite widespread civil unrest, especially in regions like Rojava where women played key roles in military operations, post-conflict recovery, and everyday governance. As al-Sharaa’s government seeks to prove itself to Syrian minorities and the international community, a wave of civil unrest led by women as a result of these restrictions could threaten its already fragile standing. This could especially endanger their support amongst ethnic minority groups like the Druze and Yezidis, as newly-appointed cabinet members from these communities are trusted as representatives to the state. A perceived failure to address their concerns could weaken their trust, in addition to the weakened trust among women.
In fact, Syria may already be primed for its own version of the 2022 Mahsa Amini movement. Mahsa Amini– a young Kurdish woman– died in police custody for allegedly violating Islamic hijab laws. What began as a Kurdish expression of grievance, “Women, Life, Freedom” soon became a chant for a global women’s movement. Much like Iran, Syria is witnessing the consolidation of a government that claims social and political progress while actively reproducing conservative narratives on women’s societal roles. If the new Syrian government continues to marginalize women, especially those who played major roles in the revolution and in rebuilding their communities, it risks igniting a similar response—a feminist-led call for dignity and justice that shakes Syria’s efforts for stability. Reversing the political gains of women in regions like Rojava could evolve into a regional, minority-led uprising demanding women’s freedom and structural reform.
Unlike Iran, Syria has not yet institutionalized Sharia law, but if the new government takes this step, it would shake Rojava’s “Women, Life, Freedom” philosophy to its core, threatening to erase an existing system where women’s autonomy has been realized. The lessons of the Mahsa Amini movement remain clear: when states fail to include their most vulnerable and politically active populations, both regime and constituent stability is at stake.
International actors involved in Syria’s reconstruction should also take note. Foreign aid and diplomatic recognition must be tied to concrete commitments to human rights– this includes gender equity. Support for grassroots women’s organizations will be essential in sustaining momentum toward genuine reform. For Syrians and the government alike, the stakes are existential. As Syria now faces the challenge of rebuilding, the future of its legitimacy and peace hinges on whether it chooses to uphold the rights of women in every governing institution, street, and home. In this way, jineology is now a warning. A Syria that sidelines women is not a Syria at peace.
The AfD and New German Parliament
Kay Nietfeld/Pool Image via Getty Images
In February, Germany held a snap national election to determine a new Bundestag, their national parliament. While its winners, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU), were unsurprising to many observers, the real story lies in the breakthrough of the far-right political party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Coming up with 20.8% of the vote, this doubles their share of votes and seats from the last election in 2021.
Who are the AfD? Now led by Alice Weidel, the political party was formed as a Eurosceptic party in 2013 and has since grown in popularity for its anti-establishment attitude. Frequently, they endorse policies that are less mainstream across the continent, including opposing military aid to Ukraine. Moreover, the party has capitalized on the promotion of harsh anti-immigration policies, a stance that has grown increasingly popular in Germany and Europe writ large.
While the AfD supports populist far-right beliefs that are rising in popularity around the world (including anti-“woke,” pro-fossil-fuel, and secure border protections), it had been kept on the fringe in post-World War II Germany. As Germany carries the weight of its Nazi past, international and domestic leaders have discouraged the extreme right from holding power in Europe’s largest economy. Marine Le Pen, France’s far-right opposition leader before being disqualified from running for office on embezzlement charges, has publicly distanced herself from the AfD, describing them as the “radical fringe.”
Moreover, they are closely associated with their antisemitic and Islamophobic statements. They have a pattern of trivializing the Holocaust through the adoption of Nazi slogans (including Alles für Deutschland or “Everything for Germany”) and the promotion of the belief that anyone with migrant heritage is not “properly German.” Beyond that, they’ve focused their anti-immigration efforts on restricting the entry of Muslims into the country. Making matters worse, they are currently under investigation for purported extremism and anti-democratic practices. A German court in Münster ruled that there was reason to believe that they intended to promote a system of illegal discrimination towards those who have immigrated to the state. It is for these reasons that the political party’s rise to power is so monumental. Although they did not win a majority of seats, (an unlikely feat that has only happened once, in the parliamentary term 1957–1961, by the CDU) the systemic features of the German government still give them substantial power, the most that any far-right party has had since the Nazis.
Understanding the Bundestag
The Bundestag is made up of 630 seats, with the number of seats a party has depending on its share of the national vote. This means that because the AfD won 20.8% of the vote, they are allotted 152 seats. Following a federal election, the Bundestag votes to decide who will serve as Chancellor. To win, the candidate must form a coalition to achieve a parliamentary majority. This process is currently underway with CDU/CSU leader Friedrich Merz, and he hopes to have this secured by mid-April.
With the AfD winning over 20% of the election, Merz must meet their demands if he wishes to secure their support. In the process of negotiations, he has promised to take steps to limit immigration and agreed to refuse all undocumented migrants (regardless of if they are asylum seekers) at the borders. As he works to form a coalition, he must balance the policy priorities of both the Social Democrats (SDP) and his partners, the Christian Social Union (CSU), to secure a majority without working with the AfD.
Additionally, the new government plans to increase defense spending at a level of ambition not seen since the Second World War. The spending boost reflects the broader sentiment held by European leaders and their plan for increasing EU strategic autonomy. Instead of relying on other countries in important policy areas like defense and the economy, leaders in the EU are looking to increase state capacity to act independently. As the Trump administration continues to insult European leaders and has shown that an American defense is undependable, many leaders are turning to secure their own defense funds.
Making sense of this election
To understand how the AfD rose to a position of power, we can analyze both international and domestic points. Internationally, the party received support from SpaceX and Tesla CEO Elon Musk, who used his platform to amplify their message. In endorsing them on X, he has said that the AfD is the only party that can “save Germany.” With his support, they have been able to move their messaging from more obscure social media platforms, such as Gettr, Telegram, and VKontakte, to mainstream platforms like X. This mobility helped normalize and legitimize the AfD and its hard-right stances, no matter how extreme they may be.
Writ large, the rise of the AfD and the outcome of the elections reflect the growing sense of domestic political, economic, and societal turmoil. First, the state’s deep political fractures have only worsened in the past few years. In November 2024, the three-party governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SDP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz collapsed due to disagreements over economic policy, plunging the already struggling German economy into further political chaos.
Adding to this, Germany is in a period of serious economic recession and is facing the longest spell of economic stagnation since the end of the Second World War. While the coronavirus pandemic significantly diminished foreign trade and tourism, their industrial and manufacturing sectors were hit the hardest. This was especially significant because roughly a quarter of Germany’s GDP lies in industry. What was created was a vicious cycle in industrial production where decreases in production would decrease consumption, which, in turn, would further decrease production. The direct consequence is record-breaking unemployment, reaching its highest level in 10 years. This further exacerbates individuals’ economic anxieties and their fears towards immigration.
Finally, deep societal divisions persist even a generation after Germany’s reunification. The East-West divide continues to define local and national politics and shape policy preferences to this day. Despite the attempts of the German government to integrate East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, more and more it seems to create its own parallel political reality. Political leaders from East-Germany who were previously defined by intense far-left stances, like Sahra Wagenknecht, have forged new anti-establishment policy preferences that veer so far left they have become far-right. This ideology was coined by Wagenknecht as “left conservative,” deeming those on the left as the threat to democracy. She views the move towards clean energy as responsible for deindustrialization, advocates hard-right migration policies, and seeks close relations with Vladimir Putin to secure Russian natural gas. The former East Germany is a fertile ground for this ideology with historically high unemployment and slow economic growth in comparison to West Germany. Overcoming this polarization will require the government to address lingering systemic inequalities.
Ultimately, the recent elections and the rise of the AfD mark a turning point in Germany’s postwar political development. The shift from traditional parties to support for anti-establishment far-right parties reflects the deep-seated frustrations toward domestic concerns and trends in the international order. Despite not being included within Merz’s coalition, Weidel and the AfD will continue to hold power and maintain influence over the Bundestag as the largest leading opposition force.
Rodrigo Duterte Arrested Under ICC Warrant
Omar Havana / AP Photo
On March 11, former President of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte was arrested on an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for crimes against humanity. Duterte was taken into custody by Philippine authorities at the Manila Airport upon returning from a trip to Hong Kong. Following his arrest, the former President was flown to the ICC’s headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands and appeared for his first hearing on March 14.
The case against Duterte was filed to the ICC in 2018 for the killings that occurred from November 1, 2011 to March 16, 2019, under his anti-drug and crime campaigns as Mayor of Davao City and as President of the Philippines. The Philippine National Police recorded the deaths of over 6,000 Filipinos while human rights groups estimate up to 30,000 were killed. Investigations conducted by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I found evidence suggesting Duterte “jointly with and through other persons, agreed to kill individuals they identified as suspected criminals or persons having criminal propensities.” The extrajudicial killings, Duterte maintained, were part of a larger scheme to rid the nation of illegal drugs, dubbed the “War on Drugs.” In a video posted to Facebook after his arrest, Duterte declared “I am the one who led our law enforcement and military. I said that I will protect you and I will be responsible for all of this.”
While in office, Duterte issued the withdrawal of the Philippines from the ICC’s Rome Statute on March 17, 2018, arguing that the ICC case infringed upon principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. One year later, the withdrawal became official, making the Philippines the second to rescind membership after Burundi.
The ICC began its formal investigation in 2021. In an attempt to suspend it, the Duterte administration claimed the Philippine government was actively investigating the accusations, rendering the ICC’s jurisdiction as a “court of last resort” – invoked in the case that a country is unable or unwilling to investigate international crimes – null and void. The international court temporarily suspended their investigation based on the administration’s claim, but later resumed in 2023. A warrant of arrest was then issued on March 7, 2025.
Without a police force, the ICC relies on states to carry out warrants of arrest, conduct transportation operations, and enforce sentences. INTERPOL Manila was given a copy of the ICC warrant, encouraging Philippine authorities to carry out the arrest. Despite previously refusing to aid the ICC case, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. complied. Avoiding mention of cooperation with the ICC, Marcos framed the arrest as a matter between the state and INTERPOL: “Mr. Duterte was arrested in compliance with our commitments to INTERPOL.”
Marcos’s reconsideration comes amid bubbling tensions between the President and Vice President Sara Duterte, daughter of the former President. Following their win as the “UniTeam” in the 2022 elections, divisions began to stem from disagreements over drug enforcement policy and relations with the U.S. and China. Disputes escalated as accusations of alleged corruption and a comment from VP Duterte threatening the assassination of the President sparked a case for her impeachment in the House of Representatives. Inflaming tensions heightened weeks prior by the House vote favoring impeachment, the arrest placed further strain on the relationship between Marcos and Duterte. Vehemently opposing her father’s arrest, the Vice President has questioned the court’s jurisdiction and condemned the administration’s response.
Duterte’s legal defense and supporters insist that the ICC lacks the jurisdiction to issue an arrest, given that the Philippines is no longer a member. Others, including the judges responsible for issuing the warrant, maintain that the ICC’s jurisdiction is valid, given that the crimes he is accused of transpired prior to the 2019 withdrawal. Awaiting hearings and possible trial, Duterte could apply for a provisional release from the detention center. If the accusations are confirmed, the trial may proceed several months or years later.
For the Philippines, the arrest has deepened the rift between dominant dynasties and rekindled debates over Philippine sovereignty, contributing to the growing political turbulence of the period leading up to the May midterm elections. With 12 of the 24 seats up for re-election, the Senate recently announced its decision to investigate Duterte’s arrest. Leader of the probe and sister of the President, Senator Imee Marcos explains, “It is imperative to establish whether due process was followed and to ensure that his legal rights were not just upheld but protected.” The investigation, given the politicization of the arrest, holds the potential to sway support for Senators, such as Imee Marcos, who face re-election in the upcoming midterms.
The case, situated amid a divisive political feud and the last leg of campaigning before midterms, demonstrates the way in which international justice can hinge on political context. While this context is not to be underestimated, it is worthwhile to recognize the stride this case makes towards accountability. The arrest, as UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Volker Türk maintains, “is a very important step towards seeking accountability for the thousands of victims of killings and other abuses, as well as their families who have courageously pursued justice.”
Macron’s Meeting With Trump
Despite myriad disagreements between U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron over the years, the two politicians put their differences aside at a recent White House meeting in February–an encounter which France24 called a “bromance.”
While Trump is a far-right populist and Macron is more center-left, the two might not have much to agree on. Yet over their respective two presidential terms, Trump and Macron have mastered this form of friendly diplomacy, getting along well while also remaining firm in their beliefs and agendas.
For instance, rather than getting upset at Macron for speaking in French at the White House– as happened previously at the Eiffel Tower– Trump cut him off with a compliment and a firm pat on the thigh, stating: “That is the most beautiful language.”
Piers Morgan, a British broadcaster and longtime friend of Trump, insists Macron is skilled at dealing with Trump. “No world leader handles Trump as well as Macron. Friendly but firm, respectful but not afraid to stand up to him when he thinks he’s wrong. And Trump respects him for it.”
During their meeting Trump and Macron agreed on a few important points, with Trump even stating that Putin would support European peacekeeping forces entering Ukraine once the war is over–a claim that the Kremlin has since denied. Anticipating pushback, Macron prefaced that these forces “would not be along the frontlines. They would not be part of any conflict. They would be there to ensure that the peace is respected.”
Although Trump’s talk with Macron went well, there was no such “bromance” between Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy when the two met on February 28. Trump said one thing with Macron and another with Zelenskyy, demonstrating his lack of commitment to diplomacy and how easily he can be swayed by politicians he gets along with. After being berated by Trump and vice president JD Vance, Zelenskyy walked out of the meeting leaving the US-Ukraine minerals deal unsigned.
Was the groundwork Macron laid regarding Ukraine all in vain? Trump may have ruined his chances with Ukraine by disrespecting Zelenskyy and not taking the suffering and demands of his people seriously.
Given Trump’s unreliable diplomacy, even his relationship with Macron is not always smooth. This is clearly illustrated in Macron’s exclusion from Trump’s inauguration. Instead, fringe far-right French politician Éric Zemmour attended, and not even Marine Le Pen– the more established right-wing politician who finished in second place in the 2022 French presidential election– was invited.
While Trump has recognized that the conflict must end before it escalates into a Third World War, he felt that a possible solution could include Ukraine surrendering territory to Russia. However, Macron stressed the need for a strong peace agreement and underlined that a good solution would not include the capitulation of Ukraine.
With the United States announcing on March 3 that it will suspend military aid to Ukraine, only time will tell whether Macron’s strategy with Trump worked. Those on the left are horrified at the consequences this change of policy may have. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee insisted that in “freezing military aid to Ukraine, President Trump has kicked the door wide open for Putin to escalate his violent aggression against innocent Ukraine.”
Much of Europe shares this anxiety, including Macron’s close ally François Bayrou, France’s prime minister since December who stated “If Russia stops fighting, the war stops. If Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine disappears.”
While Bayrou has been clear of his disdain for Trump and his politics with Ukraine, Macron took a more restrained response to American military aid suspension: “The United States, our ally, has changed its position on this war, is less supportive of Ukraine and is casting doubt on what will happen next… I want to believe that the United States will remain by our side, but we need to be ready if that were not the case.”
While the relationship might not be strong enough to be labeled a “bromance,” Macron has affirmed his commitment to supporting the American president and his dedication to Franco-American relations.
However, as the situation in Ukraine unfolds–especially after the halting of American military aid–the world will watch for the fate of the Ukrainian people and the response of Europe’s leaders in light of the president’s withdrawal.
Failure After Failure: Let’s Ditch Small Modular Reactors.
REUTERS/Stephane Mahe
Imagine a revolutionary new coffee machine – one that can get twice as much coffee from the same amount of beans. This machine would make coffee cheaper to make at home and buy at shops like Dunkin’ and Starbucks. This coffee machine starts to get buy-in from major companies in the coffee business, like Keurig and Nespresso, and is projected to be launched in Summer 2025. Halfway through the spring, it’s announced that, due to delays, it will now be launched in Winter 2027. After another delay, it’s announced that the project is now expected by 2030. Keurig and Nespresso, in response, withdraw from the project, further delaying it until 2035. After 10 years of delays, would you still invest in this machine? Probably not, so why are we investing in an energy technology that’s built on the same promises?
Small modular reactors (SMRs), unlike the coffee machine, are a real technology that promise to make nuclear energy cheaper and more accessible. In theory, their smaller size allows them to be deployed more quickly and in a variety of settings, an advantage over solar panels, wind turbines, and tidal energy, which have location restrictions. Some of these reactor designs can reprocess spent fuel (known as a “closed fuel cycle”) to extract more energy than traditional reactors can from the same amount of fuel. As such, many have hailed these nuclear reactors as the key to addressing the climate crisis, as they seem to resolve a lot of the current problems that have plagued nuclear power thus far.
On an international level, France and India have announced plans to begin constructing SMRs together, praising the energy source for its potential to enable the transition to a low-carbon future. India is also expected to work with U.S. firms to enhance investment in the technology. Similarly, Trump’s pick for energy secretary, Chris Wright, served on the board of Oklo Inc., a company that focuses on advanced nuclear technology, and is pushing for investments in nuclear energy (alongside fossil fuels). As the Trump administration ditches renewables for fossil fuels and nuclear energy, some, including Wright, have said that now is the time for the nuclear renaissance.
Unfortunately, however, it seems increasingly likely that these reactors will fail to live up to their promise. Talks of deploying small modular reactors have been ongoing for over a decade, and while around a hundred designs exist, only two reactors have been deployed–one in China and one in Russia. In the U.S., while private companies and the federal government have invested billions into their development, projects have faced delays and cancellations. Long construction times, issues with quality control, and disproportionately high energy costs (for producers and consumers alike) have led many to conclude that the energy source is a false promise. Recognizing this failure, many of the largest energy companies, such as Babcock & Wilcox and Westinghouse have withdrawn their investments, leaving many other investors hesitant to put any of their assets in the nuclear cause. While the potential of these models is exciting in theory, investors would much rather hedge their bets on just about anything else.
To make matters worse, small modular reactors come with an additional catch: they risk enabling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. SMRs are a dual-use technology; after reactors have extracted energy from the fuel rods (the real-life equivalent of the coffee beans from earlier), they’re left with weapons-grade plutonium in the nuclear waste that could be used to create a potent nuclear weapon. This risk is particularly acute for reactors that reprocess for more energy, as the leftover waste is more potent and more viable for a nuclear weapon. This presents a particular challenge, as in order for the touted benefits of SMRs to materialize, they need to distinguish themselves from the nuclear reactors we have now. As such, these new designs have to be more efficient and take advantage of their versatility, which means a lot of smaller reactors capable of reprocessing. More fissile material (in quantity and quality) coming out of more reactors makes it difficult to effectively monitor where all the waste goes. To complicate things, monitoring is already a problem, as it’s difficult to accurately measure nuclear material as it’s being transported from the facility to a waste disposal unit. The ease of diverting material could provide a pathway for states that have long had nuclear ambitions, such as Iran (who is also in a proxy war against a nuclear-armed adversary), or opportunistic non-state actors (such as domestic extremists or terrorist groups like ISIS) to finally get their hands on a nuclear weapon.
Unfortunately for proponents, it’s unlikely that the U.S. will be able to control or monitor the spread of this technology. The U.S. cannot set the standards for SMRs when it continues to lag behind Russia and China in production. Even then, why would countries already in China’s global infrastructure program, known as the Belt and Road Initiative, choose to get nuclear reactor designs from the U.S. further down the line when they can get nuclear reactors from China now? Chinese energy technology is likely more interoperable—able to work with pre-existing infrastructure—than U.S. designs, further restricting the U.S.’ potential market share. Even our closest allies wouldn’t want U.S. models, as some of them, including Germany and Japan, have given up on nuclear energy altogether. Given this hesitation and the long delays, SMRs would either fail to be deployed at a sufficient scale to resolve climate change, or would be completed hastily, which increases the risk of state or non-state actors acquiring a nuclear weapon.
While some may argue that any investment in renewable energy is a net positive in the fight against climate change, investing in nuclear energy hamstrings the response of future administrations. Investing in nuclear power creates a dangerous moral licensing, wherein future leaders may feel less incentivized to invest in other, effective renewable energy sources because they feel that they already have it covered with nuclear power. Historically, because of the way subsidies are distributed under the Clean Power Plan, nuclear energy actively stifles the development of other energies. In an effort to make nuclear power prices competitive, the U.S. government subsidizes it, which actively siphons those subsidies away from solar, wind, and tidal energy. As solar energy becomes the cheapest option available, subsidies to expand its gap or aid its clean partners could enhance renewable energy’s grip on the market. Absent these subsidies, however, fossil fuels may retain their foothold in the market for the foreseeable future. Given the existential threat at stake, the risk that this poses for the climate response cannot be overstated.
While advocates of SMRs are right that renewable energy needs to be adopted swiftly, trying to haphazardly rush out these reactors to deploy around the world risks trading one crisis for another, enabling a new era of nuclear proliferation. Similarly, if the Trump administration wants to keep its promise of low energy prices, their best bet is to stop investing in the nuclear power industry and let solar and wind energy take the reins. Like the hypothetical coffee machine, the benefits of SMRs will remain a nice thought, but nothing more than that. As climate change beckons at our doorstep, we can’t afford to invest in a false promise—it’s time to ditch SMRs.
NATO Confirms Assassination Plot on CEO of German Defence Firm Rheinmetall
Ina Fassbender/AFP via Getty Images
On January 28, 2025, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General James Appathurai confirmed that Russian operatives plotted to assassinate Armin Papperger, CEO of German defence firm Rheinmetall. This revelation was made during a European Parliament committee meeting on hybrid warfare, where Apparthurai detailed Moscow’s ongoing covert operations targeting Western defence infrastructure. The plot against Papperger was part of a broader campaign of sabotage and political destabilisation across NATO member states. Rheinmetall and Russia have declined to comment on the confirmation.
NATO officials have linked the assassination attempt to a series of recent Russian hybrid attacks, including arson, train derailments, and acts of political intimidation across Europe. Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest arms manufacturer, is a likely focus of Russian espionage and sabotage efforts against European defence, especially as the company announced plans to ramp up production by building a tank factory in Ukraine.
NATO’s confirmation of the assassination plot emphasises the escalating hybrid warfare tactics used by Russia, reflecting Moscow’s belief that they are at war with the entire West. Western intelligence agencies have expressed alarm over the increased danger of Russian activities. These “grey zone” attacks aim to spread chaos among Ukraine’s partners, disrupt military supplies to Kyiv, and widen societal divisions.
Ultimately, this development highlights the need for NATO and its allies to strengthen their defences against hybrid threats and other similar covert operations. Through its use of hybrid tactics, Russia is able to harm the alliance without triggering Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one state is an attack on all NATO states. In this case, Russia’s attack on important public figures illustrates that their efforts to destabilize NATO states aren’t limited to political attacks. As the United States and Russia discuss an end to the war in Ukraine, it remains to be seen how Russia interacts with their Western neighbors. Looking to the days ahead, the alliance is expected to agree on a strategy for tackling the hybrid threats by the summer, with the hopes of deterring further acts of sabotage and protecting key industry leaders essential to Europe’s security infrastructure. Given Trump’s shift away from the alliance, however, we could expect a sooner response, especially if Russia continues to escalate their attacks.
Filipina Vice President Sara Duterte Awaits Senate Trial Following House Impeachment
Vice President Sara Duterte speaking at a Manila press conference on February 7, 2025 Basilio Sepe, AP Photo
On February 5, the Philippine House of Representatives voted to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte. The vote was raised over complaints of alleged corruption involving the misuse of public funds and failure to declare wealth as required by law, alongside plotting the assassination of President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos. At a news conference on November 23, the Vice President claimed she contracted an assassin to kill Marcos, his wife, and the Speaker of the House Martin Romualdez. Later, she contended the comment was not a threat, instead an expression of worry for her own safety. Concerns regarding the VP’s lack of assertiveness towards China, citing her failure to denounce Xi Jinping’s behavior challenging Philippine presence in the South China Seas, added to those raised in the vote. Duterte has denied all accusations.
Exceeding the one-third minimum for an impeachment, with 215 of the 306 members in favor, the vote will proceed to the Senate. The impeachment claim is set to be addressed in June, when Congress resumes following the May midterm elections. Given that 12 of the 24 Senate seats are up for re-election, and 16 votes are needed to convict, the midterms are imperative in deciding the outcome of the impeachment trial.
If convicted, Duterte would be ousted from her current position and barred from future entry into public office, squandering tentative plans for presidential candidacy in the 2028 election. The impeachment, if passed, would mark the first of a Vice President in the Philippines. In this instance, Marcos would nominate a member of Congress as a successor. The newly-appointed senators are among the potential candidates.
The impeachment case is the latest manifestation of the feud between Marcos and Duterte. Since landslide victories in 2022, the “UniTeam” has experienced rifts over diverging anti-drug agendas and foreign policy. Duterte’s absence of defiance against China’s aggression in the SCS has created tension with Marcos’s continued efforts to strengthen U.S.-Philippine relations. With speculation swirling around the VP’s intentions to run for President following Marcos’s term, the impeachment trial holds the potential to not only shape the outcome of the 2028 presidential elections but the direction of the country’s relationships with the U.S. and China.
The House decision comes amid an ongoing International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into the mass extrajudicial killings that occurred under the “War on Drugs” launched in 2016 by the VP’s father and former President, Rodrigo Duterte. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that over 8,000 people have been killed under the banner of the campaign. On the claim that the case violates principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, Rodrigo Duterte issued the withdrawal of Philippine membership from the ICC’s Rome Statute. The Philippines officially withdrew in March 2019, making it the second to rescind membership following Burundi in 2017. Retaining the assertion that the case threatens sovereignty, Marcos stated that “the Philippine government will not lift a finger to help any investigation that the ICC conducts.” Given the lack of cooperation exhibited by the government and the court’s means of enforcement, the violence is likely to persist as the campaign, though toned down, carries on. Human rights groups are concerned that the VP may intensify the campaign, if given the opportunity. The impeachment trial, granting or denying Duterte’s ability to maintain and run for office, may be critical in determining how the crisis unfolds.