The World Owes Haiti an Apology: The Perils of US Intervention

Via Picryl

The United States is a country that wears its values on its sleeve and thus takes it upon itself to carry the weight of the world on its shoulders. Upon its very birth, it stood upon a foundation of freedom, justice, democracy, fairness, and opportunity, principles that it proudly emblazoned on its seminal Constitution and that it immortalizes in its physical monuments. These are the traits that define the outlook of America’s history; these traits make up the hallowed, almost deified American Dream; these are the traits that Americans seek to embody at home and abroad. It is what distinguished early America from the antiquated and repressive monarchies that it sought to free itself from. Yet, travel to Haiti, a nation scarred by American intervention, and these traits will seem like a myth when ascribed to the U.S. Travel to Haiti, and it will seem like freedom and justice are in short supply.

Seemingly from its inception, the Caribbean country that makes up around one-third of the island of Hispaniola has been mired in a stubborn, unrelenting downward spiral of abject poverty, political instability, and despair. The reputation of being “the poorest country in the Western hemisphere” has clung to its national character for over a generation and supersedes any further conversation about Haiti. The irony is, Haiti was once the wealthiest colony in the entire Western Hemisphere. The juxtaposition between its former abundance and its current suffering can be explained by the legacy of colonialism and occupation, originally occurring under the Spanish, and later the French and American imperial projects. 

The story of Haiti’s contact with the West unfolds in a familiar way to its peers in the Western Hemisphere. Initial Spanish contact brought disease, which ravaged the indigenous populations, as the Spanish crown enacted the racial and economic hierarchy that facilitated its rule. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were trafficked onto the island via the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Amid weakening Spanish power, France laid claim to the Western part of Hispaniola, transforming the colony into an economic powerhouse fueled by cash crops like timber, sugar, and coffee. But in 1791, Haiti was struck by an intriguing turn of events: a massive slave revolt, led by the revolutionary and ideologue Toussaint L’Overture, proved an existential threat to French colonial rule. After thirteen years of brutal war, the former Haitian slaves successfully declared independence, in a land free from the tyranny, exploitation, and humiliation of slavery. This constituted the world’s first ever successful slave revolt to gain independence, and mirrored the effect of the “shot heard ‘round the world” so embodied in American ideals.

Yet, even from the outset of Haiti’s existence, America’s presence could be felt. Though early in the United States’s lifespan, the young nation had already demonstrated an interest in its peers in the Western hemisphere, in a foreign policy approach that would eventually culminate in the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. supported the global isolation of Haiti during the Jefferson administration, maintaining its alliance with France and the global balance of power. However, the U.S. had its own vested interest in preventing the success of the Haitian Revolution: the Jefferson administration did not want the country’s own slaves to revolt following inspiration from their Haitian comrades, especially given its already tense racial politics. Of course, Thomas Jefferson and his peers would never admit that their approach directly contradicted the premise of universal rights and economic freedom, upon which they had fought a war with the British less than thirty years earlier. But from its very birth, Haiti was defined by the interests and potential aggression from foreign powers, a trend that would only continue. 

Shortly after Haitian independence, the French levied enormous debts upon Haiti, which it was forced to pay under threat of force, to make up for the lost wealth of French slave owners and landowners. This was a threat made to Haiti, which was already outgunned and underdeveloped due to the existential war it had just fought. Haiti was forced to take out loans from French banks to pay this debt, and then accrue additional debt from French banks to cover its original debt. So while France continued to profit from its former colony long after its occupation, Haiti was deprived of the essential income needed to develop infrastructure, education, and other systems needed for a stable government. Its rural farmland continued to supply cash crops, as its infrastructure and farming methods grew increasingly antiquated, and as its people languished for generations. Around World War I, the United States re-entered the picture. 

In 1915, the Wilson administration occupied Haiti, under the pretense of establishing stability (eventually a common refrain in U.S. foreign policy) after the assassination of their president. The Americans also wanted to curb growing French and German influence (owing to their debt policies and economic interests toward the nation, respectively) and prevent their intervention during this time of chaos. But instead of ensuring stability and lasting peace, American intervention was brutal, corrupt, and altogether scarring to the Haitian people. The U.S. seized Haitian economic assets and land, enriching American banks and government coffers while damning the Haitians to debilitating yet familiar exploitation. Yet more damning, perhaps, is how U.S. Marines killed 15,000 Haitians who rebelled against American rule, and made chilling examples of opposition leaders. 

Make no mistake: U.S. intervention was not welcomed by the Haitian people, and this pattern of U.S. occupation and profiteering in the name of democracy or stability can be found across the Western Hemisphere. Around the same time, the U.S. effectively forced the creation of, and profited greatly from, the Panama Canal; it replicated a similar model of Haitian occupation in Cuba following the Spanish-American War; a few years before its actions in Haiti, the U.S. had ended a bloody, years-long war for control of the Philippines. While the Americans would often establish infrastructure in the countries they intervened in, these institutions were often not accessible to much of the country’s poor majority. But more importantly, even if this infrastructure (roads, ports, the Panama Canal itself) immediately or eventually created value or otherwise brought economic or social success to a community, I would assert that that value is incredibly dwarfed by the value of a people’s self-determination, self-governance, and control over its resources. I would surmise that the Founding Fathers would be inclined to agree with that statement. For the United States, freedom, justice, stability, and prosperity were the shades under which it imposed its will and hegemony onto others, relegating smaller countries to the very fate that it had escaped from itself at birth, and leaving death and destruction in its wake. 

While formal U.S. occupation ended in 1934, its influence over Haiti continued to loom large–most notably in its control over Haitian finances lasting until 1947. As Haiti weathered the brutal dictatorships of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier during the 20th century, the United States propped up their regime in the interest of Cold War hegemony, especially after the Duvalier regime made concessions to Washington, including tax breaks for foreign companies and anti-communist alignment. Haitians continued to suffer violence, imprisonment, repression, and poverty on the part of the state; the cascading disasters of Haiti’s history had left the country’s systems in disrepair. All the while, a deep well of corruption continued to replenish the country’s elite, a chasm of inequality separating rich and poor. Haiti’s ongoing crisis only deepened after a devastating earthquake in 2010, a 7.0 magnitude wave of destruction that killed an estimated 300,000 people and displaced another million. This brings us to Haiti’s current conditions: after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the nation has been overrun by gangs, who contend for control in the capital, Port-au-Prince. The actual government has lost much of its legitimacy following the aforementioned political turmoil, and the Haitian people are caught in the middle. A UN-backed intervention force, this time led by Kenyan police, has been dispatched, to minimal success.

What can we take from this? Again and again, even after Western colonialism and the Cold War, the United States’s intervention has damned Haiti to a fate it did not choose and did not deserve. American intervention was done in the interest of profit and hegemony, instead of the freedom and democracy that the country prides itself on. The common notion that Haiti’s current condition is the result of the failure of its people and the deep corruption of the country is, at best, reductive. Persistent foreign occupation and violence severely hindered the nation from creating strong institutions and infrastructure. Moreover, the support for illicit regimes (like the Duvalier dynasty) and the constant misappropriation of funds reinforce the vast inequality that Haiti experiences while preventing the socioeconomic mobility of the Haitian people, even given the country’s abundance. Indeed, many of the skilled and professional among Haiti’s population have migrated outward, many of them to the United States, where they are often the victims of xenophobic rhetoric. 

This fashion of American intervention was not just practiced in Haiti, though. It is a trend across recent American history, done in the interest of preventing communism or maintaining stability, but often ignoring the will and perpetuating the suffering of the people within. During the Arab Spring in 2011, as Egyptians rallied in the streets demanding freedom and self-determination, the United States continued to support the authoritarian Mubarak regime in the interest of regional political and economic stability until the final hour, once its collapse was all but inevitable. Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was, in large part, a failure: Iraq today maintains an unstable democracy, and the U.S.’s actions created a power vacuum that left an easy entrance for the Islamic State, one of the most destructive terrorist groups of the 20th century. There are also examples where the U.S. didn’t intervene, but should have: the United States, “leader of the free world,” sat idly by as the Rwandan genocide saw the senseless deaths of hundreds of thousands. President Bill Clinton himself publicly recognized this mistake during a visit to Rwanda after the genocide. Time and time again, the United States did not stick up for its values. However, there is precedent for positive examples of U.S. intervention and peacemaking when there is political will. American involvement in Somalia in the 1990s, while originally invoking the infamous “Black Hawk Down” debacle, eventually pioneered a positive model of diplomacy. The peace process was aided by the measured stability induced by foreign involvement, remained in the country until the peace process was fully complete, and made use of local power brokers to bring agreements that were effective–all lessons that can be applied to the current situation in Haiti. 

The Haitian people have suffered for generations. The United States and the world owe Haiti an apology. But an apology is not enough. The United Nations, with the backing of the United States and other important countries, must make a concerted effort to re-establish stability and the basic functioning of the Haitian state. While this is a form of intervention, it is a necessary one to prevent Haiti’s continued misery. From there, these organizations must work with Haitians to create Haitian-led institutions; there is precedent for state-building like this within Haiti (with the Aristide regime) and outside of it (the re-establishment of the democratic Sierra Leonean government by UN and UK forces after the rebel takeover in 1996). But one thing must remain true: the next chapter of Haiti’s future must be written by the Haitian people.

Schrodinger’s Breakaway Region: Russia and the Issue of Transnistria

euronews.com

Since February 2022, the existence of “breakaway” or separatist regions in Eastern Europe have skyrocketed into mainstream news and political analysis. A full year into the Russian-Ukrainian war has heightened the discussion of what could come post-war for separatist regions and the consequences of those outcomes. This also has implications for the separatist region of Transnistria, located in Ukraine’s neighboring country of Moldova. While recognized only by Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Republic of Artsakh, Transnistria, or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, has operated as a quasi-state since the government of Moldova designated it as an autonomous territorial unit in 2005. It is crucial to remember that the day when the existence of Transnistria is questioned is imminent. It is not whether this question will be raised, but more so when Transnistria’s existence will be questioned, how it will be questioned, and whether there is an answer to the “problem of Transnistria.” 

Before delving into these questions, it must be explained why Transnistria is a “problem.” From a Western perspective, Transnistria is occupied territory. With the war in Ukraine raging, more conversations are being had about the status of separatist regions with a Russian military presence. Increasingly, these areas are being looked at as regions that must be liberated from Russian militarization. In the words of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “we believe that the territory of Transnistria is the territory of the independent state of Moldova, and they [Russians] are constantly making provocations.” The outcome of the war in Ukraine will have ripple effects globally. As such, from a western democratic perspective, the existence of Transnistria is a problem that will eventually need to be resolved. 

In early 2023, it seemed the day of reckoning for Transnistria was on the horizon. On February 9th, President Zelenskyy announced that Ukrainian intelligence had discovered a Russian plot to “destroy” Moldova. Moldova, like Ukraine, has continued to drift further away from Moscow’s sphere of influence after the election of President Maia Sandu in 2020. Since her election, Sandu has been vocal in her belief that Russia should withdraw its military personnel from Transnistria. Early in her presidency, Sandu stated that it was her opinion that there was foreign interference during the dissolution of the Soviet Union which created the Transnistrian conflict to hinder Moldova’s strides towards independence. There has been a Russian military presence in Transnistria since 1992, when the cease-fire agreement between Moldova and Transnistria established the presence of troops as “peacekeepers.” As of today, Transnistria houses approximately 1,500 Russian armed forces personnel, seven Mi-24 attack helicopters, and around 100 armored vehicles. While these numbers may not call for immediate alarm, the presence of Russian military, and the memory of the Transnistrian war in the early 90’s, has been a looming presence since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelenskyy’s announcement of Russia’s plans for Moldova stoked pre-existing concerns over whether Moldova is the next country to be invaded.  

As one of the Eastern Bloc’s “frozen” conflicts, Transnistria has remained in stasis since the end of the Transnistrian War in 1992. The region itself is often referred to as a relic of the Soviet Union, complete with a statue of Lenin in front of its parliament building. As a result, Transnistria can be viewed as one of the few remaining areas that is deeply entrenched in the Soviet sphere of influence. Over the years, as tensions and annexations in Eastern Europe have ebbed and flowed, so have concerns over conflict flaring in Transnistria. None of these concerns have resulted in tangible conflicts, but with the war in Ukraine seriously upending the status-quo, there seems a real possibility that Russia may jolt Transnistria out of its liminal state and into conflict.  

Skeptics of this argument would claim that Russia will not want to risk angering the West further by instigating violence in a second country. However, one must look back to February 2022 and realize that Russia fully intended to drag Moldova into its invasion of Ukraine. In late January of 2022, it was reported that Russia intended to pursue a false-flag operation in Eastern Ukraine, supposedly to justify what was at the time, a hypothetical invasion. If this plan had worked, it is not unfounded to say that Russian troops could have moved into Ukraine through Transnistria. American officials even went so far as to say that this operation could occur in Transnistria as well as in place of Eastern Ukraine. In March 2022, a photo showed Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko in front of a war map wherein there appeared to be Russian troop movement into Transnistria from Odessa. So far, none of these scares have resulted in troop movement or violence in Transnistria- potentially because Russia has yet to formulate a feasible excuse to do so. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is in flagrant violation of international law; Russia has stuck with its claims of “denazifying Ukraine” and “protecting the Russian minority” in Ukraine while also preventing Western encroachment via NATO expansion.   

In early 2023, news coming from Russia and Moldova told a story of a frozen conflict thawing out at a concerning rate. After President Zelenskyy’s announcement on February 9th, Russia moved quickly to deny these claims. However, these claims were soon corroborated by President Sandu who announced that Russia’s plans were to use foreign saboteurs to attack government buildings in Chisinau with the goal of creating violence and havoc in the city. Externally, Russia has started to increase the severity of the narrative involving Transnistria. On February 23rd, Russia stated that Ukraine intended to launch an invasion into Transnistria as retaliation for an “alleged” offensive by Russian troops from the territory of Transnistria.” The Russian Defense Ministry alleged that Ukraine was “amassing troops” along Ukraine’s border with Moldova and that this provocation posed a “direct threat to the Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” which Russia would protect if necessary. 

This builds to answer the question of how the existence of Transnistria may be reckoned with. Despite Russia’s leaked plans and thinly veiled threats, as of April 2023, it seems unlikely that Russia has the military capacity or wherewithal to successfully invade Transnistria and/or Moldova. As reported by The Economist in March 2023, Russia has had an estimated 60,000-70,000 fatalities in Ukraine since the start of the invasion in February 2022. Adding the additional soldiers who were wounded or missing brings the total losses to an estimated 200,000-250,000. For perspective, in the early days of the war, it was estimated that approximately 150,000 Russian troops had entered Ukraine. This would mean that approximately a year after the initial invasion, Russia has lost 100% of its initial troops plus anywhere from 50,000-100,000 more. The rate at which Russia is losing troops is also incredibly high; American General Mark Milley said in an interview, that an estimated 1,200 Russian soldiers were killed in a single day around the area of Bakhmut. Russia has also suffered heavy artillery losses, having lost 1,000 tanks with another 544 tanks captured by Ukrainian forces. These losses have accumulated to roughly 30% of Russia’s tank force. Oryx, an open-source monitoring website, calculates total Russian equipment losses at 9,100, while Ukraine’s total losses are estimated to be 2,934.  

It could be argued that Moldova does not have the military strength to fend off a potential Russian invasion regardless of Russia’s troop losses. Moldovan Armed Forces only consists of approximately 6,500 personnel with an additional 2,000 yearly conscripts. They also face a modernization issue. In October 2022, Moldovan Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii said that roughly 90% of Moldova’s military equipment is of Soviet origin, ranging as far back as the 1960’s. However, it would be counter-productive for Russia to send forces to Transnistria when they are facing such significant troop and artillery loss in Ukraine.  Doing so would only further strain Russia’s army, diverting it away from Ukraine, and further Western involvement in the conflict.  

Now, why must the issue of Transnistria be dealt with? Most simply put- Moldova’s current westward trajectory is fundamentally incompatible with the existence of a Russian-occupied Soviet state.  

From the Russian perspective, there is Russia’s russkiy mir and sphere of influence ambitions. Russkiy mir or translated “Russian world” refers to a policy and cultural belief that all Russian speakers globally are part of Russian civilization and therefore must be protected against “persecution.” Unlike Ukraine, which has contended with conflicting claims over Kyivan Rus, Moldova has almost always been considerably distinct from Russia. The Principality of Moldavia was formed in 1346 and existed until 1859 when it formed with Wallachia, the geographical area of modern Romania. Today, the western section of Moldavia is part of Romania, and a portion of the eastern section is now Moldova. The Russian Empire did hold Bessarabia, a section of Moldavian territory in 1812, however it was ceded back in 1856. The native population spoke Romanian, although it was banned in 1836 as part of forced Russification. Stalin also mandated Moldovans to write Romanian in Cyrillic, a process which continued to drive a wedge between Moldova and its cultural ties to its western neighbor. As per the Moldovan 2014 census, (excluding Transnistria,) 4.1% of the population identified as Russian. In Transnistria, 29.1% identified as Russian. In the same census, 90.1% of Moldovans who reported to be religious self-identified as Eastern Orthodox; another key component of russkiy mir. With a respectable Russian minority and a majority Orthodox faith, Moldova, and more specifically Transnistria, have all the makings of a state to be incorporated into the “Russian World” that Putin so desires.  

With NATO expansion also being a key player in the Russo-Ukrainian conversation, it can argued that Russia is looking to prevent NATO expansion, and Western influence further eastward. As of 2022, Russia is surrounded by NATO on its western side. Despite Moldova being considerably smaller than Belarus or Ukraine, the “loss” of it to either NATO or the European Union would be antithetical to Russia’s desire to maintain and even expand its sphere of influence. Russkiy mir is even enshrined in Russia’s national security policies. The National Security Strategy outlines the perceived threat to russkiy mir as “the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the weakening of the unity of the Russian Federation’s multinational people by means of external cultural and information expansion (including the spread of poor-quality mass cultural products), propaganda of permissiveness and violence.”  Although the population of Transnistria is only 475, 373, it remains of symbolic importance to the Kremlin’s ideas of preserving Russian culture and influence.  

From the Moldovan perspective, the shift westward has already begun. The beginning of this change could be felt when Maia Sandu was first elected in 2020. Running on a pro-Western campaign, she won with 57.7% of the vote against Igor Dodon, who was backed by Russia. This was further reinforced with parliamentary election results in 2021. Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won 63 of 101 seats in Parliament with 58% of the vote. The Party of Action and Solidarity is pro-European, and prior to the invasion of Ukraine had the long-term goal of Moldova’s accession to the European Union. The success of the PAS in the parliamentary elections was broadly considered to be detrimental to Russia’s influence in Moldova.  

The invasion of Ukraine has expedited Moldova’s political movement westward. In March, the Moldovan Parliament passed a bill which formally restored Moldova’s national language to Romanian. Although 80% of Moldovans speak Romanian as their native tongue, the official language of Moldova was legally “Moldovan” which remained until March 2023 as a cultural relic of Stalinism. While the linguistic differences between Romanian and Moldovan are negligible, the change in policy represents a substantial distancing of Moldova and its ties to Russia. Other significant policy maneuvers include submitting Moldova’s official application for European Union candidacy in the early days of the Russo-Ukrainian war. As of April, the European Union agreed to accelerate European Union-Moldovan entrance negotiations to take place before the end of 2023. 

While Sandu is facing falling approval rates because of high inflation and multiple energy crises; general approval of Moldova joining the European Union remains steady among the Moldovan population. The International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research reported that in November of 2022, 36% of Moldovans were reported to “strongly support” Moldova joining the European Union, and 27% “somewhat supported” this motion. In the municipality of Chisinau, 42% of respondents strongly supported accession, and 37% somewhat supported it. The study also showed that Moldovans believe the European Union is Moldova’s strongest political partner, with Romania placing second and Russia third. In 2019, The European Union and Russia were tied in the IRI’s data on top political partner to Moldova. In 2018, Russia placed higher than the European Union. While Russia remains of political importance in the eyes of Moldova, it clearly has been losing primacy to Moldova’s Western neighbors.  

However, the question of whether or not the issue of Transnistria can actually be solved remains.  

In October 2017 (the last year that the IRI asked about Transnistria in annual polling,) 70% of Moldovan respondents said that Transnistria should be a regular region in Moldova, without autonomous designation. This is the largest percentage since 2010, with numbers dipping as low as 48% in March 2016. This would indicate that Moldova would like to see Transnistria be reintegrated into Moldova. But what about Transnistria? Unsurprisingly, Transnistria has remained politically inclined towards Russia since its inception. Russia originally backed Transnistria during the civil war and has continuously provided economic support, despite not formally recognizing Transnistria’s statehood. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Transnistrian officials appealed to the Duma to consider accepting Transnistria into the Russian Federation. Political scientist Antoly Durin, who himself is from Transnistria, said of public opinion, “people here feel Russian. Not just as a nationality, but as a people who love Russia and want to be part of a Russian civilization.”  So, while Moldova, (as an entity separate from Transnistria,) does not wish to be part of the Russian world/russkiy mir, Transnistria regards itself as intrinsically Russian.  

This creates a scenario wherein the existence of Transnistria diametrically opposes Moldova. This opposition, combined with the economic and militaristic realities of Moldova, Transnistria and Russia means that despite all the posturing and polling numbers, Transnistria may very well remain frozen for the foreseeable future. There are multiple hypotheticals about what could happen, all under different sets of circumstances.  

The scenario wherein Transnistria agrees in diplomatic negotiations to be reabsorbed into Moldova is currently too unlikely to be discussed here.  

A second possibility is another civil war. Moldova could attempt to use military might to forcibly reunite Transnistria with Moldova. This scenario also seems unlikely. Any military action taken by Moldova that is “unprovoked” would greatly jeopardize Moldova’s foray into the Western European community. There has also been no rhetoric from the Moldovan government that would indicate a desire to utilize military action. In fact, the rhetoric has been the opposite, with Maia Sandu reaffirming her commitment to diplomatic resolution throughout her presidency. With Moldova facing a cost-of-living crisis, and increasing concerns over inflation, avoidable conflict would be highly unpopular. Additionally, Neither Moldova nor Transnistria have the military capacity to engage in unnecessary conflict. If there was conflict between them, Russia would likely get involved to support Transnistria. However, Russian involvement in a conflict would divert resources and attention away from Ukraine, which is of higher importance to Russia.  

The third scenario is that an economic collapse in Russia and/or Transnistria would force the dissolution or reintegration of Transnistria and Moldova. Transnistria has a semi-independent economy; however, it remains reliant on Russian support. As with other quasi-states, Russia acts as a “patron” of Transnistria and subsidizes a large portion of the Transnistrian economy. This allows Transnistria’s continued existence despite their lack of international recognition. In February of 2023, a leaked contract between Russian company Gazprom and Moldovan company Moldovagaz unveiled that Transnistria owes roughly 7 billion dollars in gas bills. Russia has continued to supply Transnistria with gas, even though (as of 2019,) Transnistria had not paid for gas since 2009. In Moldova, it costs approximately $1,000 per thousand cubic meters of gas. In Transnistria, the same amount of gas is estimated to cost around $168. Russia also provides millions annually to Transnistria in humanitarian support, which keeps the economy afloat. In the event of a Russian economic collapse, the Transnistrian economy theoretically could collapse as well. If Russia forces Transnistria to repay their gas debt, or can no longer subsidize the Transnistrian economy, the Transnistrian economy could give way. An economic collapse could force Transnistria to reintegrate into Moldova.  

However, a Russian economic collapse does not seem to be predicted any time soon. When Russia initially invaded Ukraine, it was predicted that the economy would contract by 10%. A contraction of 10% would have effectively crippled the Russian economy and potentially had rebound effects on the Transnistrian economy. However, heavy western sanctions have only been marginally successful in stifling the Russian economy. In the first 2023 fiscal quarter, the Russian economy contracted by 2.2%. Organizations like the International Monetary Fund are projecting that the Russian economy will recover in the coming year as a result of military production and mass amounts of state spending.  

So, what does all of this theorizing accumulate to?  

For better or worse, it seems that the situation is too tumultuous to make a long-term prediction. What can be said is that given the paradoxical nature of its existence, Transnistria will be stuck in its interjacent state until it is galvanized by external circumstances. As a quasi-state, it has not made any recent moves to change its status. Despite saying that they wish to join the Russian Federation, Transnistria has not properly attempted to join, nor provided military support to Russia.

In all, the answers to the question of Transnistria can only be found in due time. There is not a singular clear path for the future of Russia, Moldova, or Transnistria. Time will tell how the domino effect of events in Ukraine will play a role in the future of its neighbors. What can be said is that the global community must continue to monitor the situation in Transnistria. One day Transnistria will be called out of its intangible state, and when it is we must all watch with a critical eye. 

The United States and China: A Cyclical Relationship, Both Backwards and Beyond

nytimes.com

The relationship between China and the United States is akin to a circle. Tensions rise, are broken, and rise again. It is a pattern that has continued for decades; the divide between the countries is palpable. But the United States and China are more alike than reported. The countries are fundamentally similar in economic and military policies; China’s problems are ours. Examining U.S.-China relationship history and investigating and addressing these issues is the key to mending the U.S.-China relationship and fixing cardinal issues in the modern United States.

When asked about China, Americans report undoubtedly strong opinions. A poll concerning the global superpower found that 67% of Americans have negative opinions of China. Even more striking, 89% of Americans now classify China as a competitor or an enemy. When asked, “What’s the first thing you think about when you think of China?”, responses overwhelmingly leaned towards human rights and the economy (each issue making up 20% and 19% of responses, respectively). With only 15% of U.S. citizens viewing it favorably, it is time to re-examine U.S.-China tensions to repair future relations.

These numbers do not manifest from thin air. They are a cumulation of decades of nervous tension between the United States and China, leading to prominent unease among U.S. citizens. The two countries have endured a rocky relationship since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Soon after, hostility rose during North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea, when U.S. troops aiding South Korea approached the Chinese border. Although the United Nations, China, and North Korea signed an armistice agreement in 1953, this strain initiated a long pattern of U.S.-China tension. 

By 1964, the stress went nuclear. In October of that year, China conducted its first atomic bomb test. The test exacerbated the already tense U.S.-Sino relationship amid conflict in Vietnam. Relationships improved after China and Russia’s Sino-Soviet split, with Beijing mending connections and cordiality with the United States. President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, signing the Shanghai Communiqué, a document representing the first official diplomatic communications between the countries. Presidents Carter and Reagan continued the pattern of diplomacy through the 1980’s, maintaining a cooperative relationship with China. For almost twenty years, the U.S.-China relationship thrived. 

Unfortunately, peace was not enduring. In 1989, after military troops killed hundreds of student protestors during Beijing’s Tiananmen Square Massacre, the United States immediately froze relations with China, suspending the only recently approved sale of U.S. military equipment to Beijing. It was not until 1993, when President Bill Clinton propelled a policy of “constructive engagement” with China, that unease began to lift. By 1996, the capitals agreed to exchange diplomatic officials again, and in 2001, President Clinton signed the U.S.-China Relations Act that gave Beijing permanent trade relations with the United States. Once again, peace fractured in 2005. An American reconnaissance plane made an emergency landing on Chinese territory after colliding with a Chinese fighter. The U.S. crew members were detained on Hainan Island for twelve days. Only after a tense standoff did Chinese authorities release the American detainees. China experienced a significant leadership turnover in 2012, with approximately 70% of leadership body members replaced after the new election. It was also the year Xi Jinping assumed power as President, delivering speeches promising a “rejuvenation” of China. This turnover was shortly followed by President Obama’s 2013 effort to ease U.S.-China relations. He hosted President Xi for a California summit where the executives established a “new model” of relations. This presidential friendliness stuck around after the 2016 election. In 2017, President Trump hosted President Xi for a meeting to build relations and promised “tremendous progress.” Progress, however, did not last.

Throughout 2018 and 2019, tariffs on Chinese imports enforced by the Trump administration hit China hard. The Chinese government fights back with tariffs of its own, fanning the flames of a U.S.-China trade war. Although tensions eased after President Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He signed the “Phase One” trade deal in January 2020, they quickly seized again several months later during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both administrations blamed the other for their mishandling of the disaster. For the remainder of the Trump administration, this anger remains. Shortly after he took office, President Biden stressed the need for U.S. infrastructure to compete with China, maintaining Trump-era ideologies. After Russian-related disagreements sparked further tension, Presidents Biden and Xi eventually sought relationship repair in November of 2022. Speaking at the Bali G20 summit, the leaders expressed their wishes to alleviate hostility.

When this history is analyzed, a pattern emerges: China and the United States butt heads over an infraction on the part of the other. A new U.S. President is elected, who tries to ease tensions and foster a healthy diplomatic relationship with China. An inciting incident (i.e., the expulsion of American journalists or the spotting of a potential spy balloon) severs that friendliness, and tensions rise again. Each country demonstrates power and influence by implementing trade tariffs and making threats. And the cycle repeats itself. 

Documenting a clear pattern of behavior allows everyday citizens and politicians alike to analyze relations and make predictions accordingly. However, it makes for an easy trap to fall into, time and time again. If conflict is viewed as inevitable, that defeatist attitude will permeate international relations and allow tension to be viewed as the natural outcome. In recent headlines, an alleged “spy balloon” originating from China was shot down in U.S. airspace in February of 2023. It contained what U.S. officials defined as intel-gathering equipment, which the Chinese government vehemently denied, describing as a civilian meteorological airship. Regardless of the specifics, this incident indicates newfound strain, with more to come. Once again, we see the pattern emerge. In order for the pattern to be broken, the cycle needs to be stopped in its tracks. 

The key to stopping the cycle is analyzing the United States and China differently. We must ditch the old analysis model and replace it with a novel system: parallels. Instead of focusing on the rise and fall of strained relations, key similarities must be examined. Unsurprisingly, U.S.-China differences are highlighted more predominantly than their likenesses. After almost eight decades of frosty relations, the United States and China seem like separate entities. But maintaining that distinction only worsens the long-standing tension. Simultaneously, it will only exacerbate problems within the United States in the long run. Relationship difficulties should not be an “us vs. them” approach. It hasn’t worked in all these decades; there’s no reason to believe it will work in the future. The focus needs to be on collaboration after matching problems are identified.

 In 2007, China announced a military budget increase of 18%, continuing China’s increasing military expenditures and bringing their total spending allowance to 62.14 billion USD. This aligned with the United State’s budget increase at the time. By 2007, the U.S.’s military budget had expanded to 589.59 billion dollars, a 269.5 billion increase from 2000. In 2023, the United States' military budget sits at 800.67 billion USD, while China boasts one the largest military budgets worldwide at 224 billion USD. In addition to military spending, the economies of the United States and China share a prominent global role. As of 2023, they hold the top two spots by gross domestic product (GDP). These economies, primarily centered around military spending, hold significant weight worldwide. China and the United States are uniquely positioned in that they hold major international influence. They reflect each other’s values, but this reflective relationship is not represented in United States media despite these crucial similarities. Additionally, on September 28th, 2023, The Seattle Times posted an article detailing China’s recent property crisis. It outlines how developers are hurting as apartment sales dwindle. Real estate stocks are plummeting, and house hunting is difficult. Conditions are similar in the United States. Real estate prices are skyrocketing, and becoming a homeowner is less feasible than ever. These economic problems in each country mirror each other. Acknowledging similarities such as these breaks the cycle that builds and protracts the us-them mentality. When the problems are examined, it becomes a matter of “us vs. them” problems.

There is a fear, however, surrounding that acknowledgment. A fear of the countries being “alike.” This fear is built off of the “us vs. them” mentality that, to this day, dominates United States coverage of China. Decades of U.S. communism placed into historical context explain this. Communism is a hot-button topic in the United States. Post World War 2, a “Red Scare,” or fear of a communist threat, plagued the United States, aligning with the ongoing Cold War with the then Soviet Union. As hysteria over a USSR takeover grew, communism became synonymous with “un-American.” Communist fear has been hammered into U.S. culture for over a century. Now consider the fact that the People’s Republic of China has been a communist regime since its founding in 1949. It makes sense that to Americans, acknowledging that the United States and China share fundamental problems is akin to anti-patriotism. To admit the countries share those issues is to admit they are fundamentally similar. And when China is identified with communism, that threatens the American paradigm. 

This fear exacerbates the cyclical relationship and will kill any hope for future long-term civility. Right now, relations between the United States and China seem uncertain. On October 10th, Newsweek reported that Chinese vessels entered territorial waters surrounding Japanese-controlled islands. Any attack on these islands (or any Japanese government assets) would require the United States to respond and aid Japan, launching troops against China. Where is there to go from here? Perhaps the cycle of tear and repair will continue. But perhaps not. It is up to everyone, from politicians to the layman alike, to make this change. Acknowledging the similar plights the countries face is the key to creating a long-term, sustainable relationship that works for all parties. But that is, ultimately, up to each country’s leadership. Let’s hope they make the right choice.

The United States is Failing Yemen

Earlier this year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced $585 million in humanitarian assistance for the war-torn nation of Yemen. The US was quick to celebrate its own generosity, asserting that it remains “one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance to Yemen” in the world. US leaders also called on other nations to contribute more to the chronically underfunded international response. However, while America takes its victory lap, the people of Yemen will still have to shelter from barrages of US-provided missiles. The US government has quietly facilitated the Yemeni Civil War through “incoherent” policy that the US media and public have largely failed to notice. Meanwhile, the struggles of the Yemeni people caught in the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis” are lost in the background. This article will examine the origins of Yemen’s current conflict, its impacts on civilians, and the many ways in which the United States is failing the desperate nation.

Origins of the Yemeni Civil War

The conflict in Yemen began in 2014 when Houthi rebels seized control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The Houthis are Shiites who have long been at odds with their nation’s Sunni government. Contrary to popular belief, however, the Yemeni Civil War was not caused by Sunni-Shiite antagonisms alone. Fuel price hikes and corruption in former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government also caused tensions to rise throughout the early 2000s and 2010s. Massive protests erupted from these tensions when the Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011. President Saleh was eventually ousted in 2012 and succeeded by his vice president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s tumultuous presidency came to a brief pause in January 2015 when he resigned as president after rebels took Sana’a. The Houthis took advantage of his absence and seized control of the Yemeni government. However, while Hadi fled his palace and sought exile in Saudi Arabia, he rescinded his resignation a month later, declaring himself the rightful leader of Yemen.

Hadi has since been embroiled in various clashes with the Houthis. However, these two parties are not the only ones involved in the conflict. Saudi Arabia and a cohort of other Gulf nations sided with Hadi’s government and launched a campaign against the Houthi insurgents, with arms and logistical support from the United States. Iran, Saudi Arabia’s bitter enemy, has supplied the Houthis with weapons, deepening the divides between the two nations. Although separate from the civil war, there are also ongoing military operations in Yemen that target Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 

Despite the occasional ceasefire, the conflict and chaos in Yemen only seem to be escalating, and innocent civilians are undoubtedly suffering the most. According to UNICEF, hunger and starvation are widespread, with 17.4 million people in need of food assistance—over half of Yemen’s population. This number is expected to balloon to 19 million by 2022. Further, nearly six million people have been displaced from their homes, most of them internally displaced in Yemen. Access to healthcare, clean drinking water, and sanitation services is scant at best. There are few areas of Yemen that are untouched by poverty and adversity.

Meanwhile, the Russo-Ukrainian War has compounded the suffering of the Yemeni people. “It’s another blow to Yemen, driving food and fuel prices further up,” said Abeer Etefa, a senior spokeswoman at the UN World Food Programme. Exports continue to fall as Ukraine grapples with its own conflict, sending shockwaves through the global food supply chain. The Middle East, Asia, and Africa have been hit the hardest, and the burden is the greatest in conflict-stricken nations. “Yemen depends entirely on food imports, with 31% of its wheat coming from Ukraine over the past three months.” Wheat has disappeared from Yemeni food markets, making it extremely difficult for families to meet their basic needs. At the same time, humanitarian donors are feeling the financial strain of providing aid to both nations, and given that the conflict in Yemen has stretched on for eight years, its assistance is dwindling rapidly.

The Yemeni people are clearly in dire need of help from the international community, and the responsibility for their situation lies with those who created it in the first place. As a contributor to the conflict and subsequent humanitarian crisis, the United States must do more to provide meaningful help to Yemen.

Policy Problems 

The United States has allocated $4.5 billion to humanitarian assistance for Yemen since the conflict began. However, it has also sold more than $355 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia—one of the main instigators of the Yemen conflict—and has signed off on $4.5 billion more in future sales. It appears that America wants the world to think that they care about Yemen while they quietly pour money into the war. Not only does this render the $4.5 billion in humanitarian aid a very poor investment, but it is endlessly destructive to the Yemeni people. The Biden administration made moves to rescind support for Saudi Arabia and prioritize peace, but foreign policy experts agree that these are now nothing more than “broken promises.” US policymakers have also consistently blamed the Houthi rebels for the Yemen conflict and crisis. While the Houthis undoubtedly have a large role, breaking the war down into this “false binary” fails to account for the massive role that Saudi Arabia plays in Yemen. The United States must sever its ties with Saudi Arabia and put down its arms if it truly wants to end the conflict.

Experts also point out numerous issues with the peace process that has been led by the United States for the last several years. Katie Kizer of Foreign Policy writes: “The peace process led by the United States and United Nations has remained where it has for years: pursuing a top-down ceasefire between the men with guns—a strategy that has already failed multiple times—instead of engaging Yemen’s vibrant civil society which is interested in peace.” This assertion is true, as the UN brokered a six-month truce in early 2022 that temporarily reduced hostilities, but negotiators were unable to renew it. It expired on October 2nd, leaving civilians uncertain about their future. The US should be focusing its efforts on the resilient Yemeni people and rebuilding the local and state institutions that have collapsed since the start of the war. However, the US government currently faces little pressure to change its ways, so the gaping holes in its foreign policy will persist until the rest of the world takes notice.

Media Mistakes

America has clung to stories about conflict in the Middle East for the last several decades. The public hung onto journalists’ every word about the invasion of Afghanistan throughout the 2000s and the conflict in Syria for the last decade. Both of these wars have one thing in common: one big, scary enemy. It seems clear to Americans that Al-Qaeda was the enemy in Afghanistan and ISIS was the enemy in Syria. This makes both wars classic cases of good vs. evil (as it is painted by US media, at least) and portrays the United States as the hero of the Middle East. The conflict in Yemen, on the other hand, is complicated. It is difficult to sort through the complex politics and culture of the region and find the heroes and villains. Since it does not make Americans feel like they are on the right side of history, it is not worth covering for many news organizations.

As easy as it may be to point the finger solely at the media, its audience is also partly to blame. The conflict in Yemen is largely contained to the Middle East, meaning spillover onto US soil is unlikely. Since the conflict has no tangible effects on American citizens, many are content to live in their blissful ignorance. Journalists will understandably not go out of their way to cover an event that their audience will not read about, so the lack of public interest perpetuates negligent reporting. However, in the interest of fairness to US media, it is important to note that the sheer complexity of Yemen’s situation can make reporting particularly difficult. “You don’t see photos of Yemeni refugees anywhere because a lot of them are actually inside of [Yemen],” says activist Sama’a Al-Hamdani. Most Yemeni refugees are internally displaced, meaning they are trapped in dangerous areas and unable to speak to journalists. Despite this, it should also be remembered that journalists were willing to fly into war zones with troops to cover Afghanistan, but they do not seem to display the same drive to cover the situation in Yemen. Once again, this is due to the lack of public concern.

The Lost Generation

Why should the United States care about Yemen? In the middle of all the bad arms deals, failed attempts at peace, and the massive humanitarian crisis are the Yemeni people. They are just as entitled to security and peace as the citizens of every other nation involved in the Yemen conflict. But the United States' contributions to the conflict that surrounds them are part of the reason that they now face the loss of an entire generation of children. If Yemeni children make it through the conflict and into their adult lives, they will be forever hindered by illiteracy and lack of education. Two years ago, then UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen Lisa Grande said, “If the war doesn’t end now, we are nearing an irreversible situation and risk losing an entire generation of Yemen’s young children.” The war still rages two years later. The lack of tangible impacts on US soil does not merit citizens’ ignorance of this conflict, and the US government certainly cannot continue to fund it. The US owes the suffering Yemeni population so much more.

Written in the Stars: Examining the Complexities and Dilemmas of Foreign Policy in Space

Space is increasingly becoming the next global arena. Growing international attention toward space as a political terrain has made countries, including the US, need to focus on implementing policies that combat straining competition and the difficulties of space traffic and debris. Not only is space becoming an important topic in international relations, but each state is also responding differently to how they wish to exert their presence in this unique field. The US, through NASA, has installed its preeminence in space through early projects like the launch of Skylab, the first U.S. space station, and the Space Shuttle. Yet, NASA has its own set of challenges and the space landscape is growing more competitive with the rise of other countries like China, Russia, and India pushing for their own undertakings. From historical significance to modern-day implications, understanding how countries respond to this modern arena is essential to predicting outcomes and looming variables when it comes to foreign policy and national security. As modernization moves forward, the Earth is no longer the only political landscape for policymakers to analyze. 

Space has long been a motivator for innovation and competition. In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite named Sputnik. This caused a powerful reaction, as the US in a matter of months prompted measures to build and compete with Russia’s space program. With the creation of a civilian space exploration agency dubbed NASA, the international system became even more extensive and vast, calling for long-term missions in places humans have never been before. On September 12th, 1962, President John F. Kennedy addressed Rice University in his powerful speech that committed the United States to a moon landing stating, “Many years ago the great British explorer George Mallory, who was to die on Mount Everest, was asked why he wanted to climb it.” He said, "Because it is there. Well, space is there, and we're going to climb it, and the moon and the planets are there, and new hopes for knowledge and peace are there. And, therefore, as we set sail we ask God's blessing on the most hazardous and dangerous and greatest adventure on which man has ever embarked.” Without fully grasping the significance of this major event, the moon landing kick-started the national intrigue in space. The world was watching as spectators as it marveled at the sheer amount of willpower and aptitude required to complete this dangerous mission. The adventure didn’t end at the moon landing and certainly hasn’t ended today.

After six successful lunar missions, NASA’s robotic programs followed with Voyager and Viking and sent astronauts into low Earth orbit with the 1973 launch of Skylab, the first U.S. space station, and the Space Shuttle. These projects not only set the US on the map for space invention, but they also showed how the global system was changing and evolving. Each U.S administration made progress in its respective areas, as different presidents sought to make their own intentions when it came to space. The George W. Bush administration pushed for a return to the moon and a trip to Mars, while President Barack Obama pushed for an asteroid mission and made a subsequent project to orbit Mars by the mid-2030s. President Donald J. Trump’s administration urged a return to the moon and directed the Department of Defense to create a branch of the military under the Air Force that would concentrate completely on threats from space. In February 2020, President Joe Biden’s administration announced its support of a space force. Interestingly, President Biden’s defense budget shows that the Space Force, the smallest brand of the armed forces, accounts for about 2.5% of total Defense Department spending. There was a $2.2 billion increase in 2022, a considerable gain that shows the elevated prominence and focuses on space for the U.S government. Concerning the president’s plans, the Pentagon released documents on May 28, 2021, responding stating the budget “funds capabilities for the contested domain of space” adding that “Competitors like China and Russia are challenging America’s advantage in space by aggressively developing offensive weapons to deny or destroy U.S. space capabilities in conflict.” Each administration, regardless of the distinct goals or plans, understands the critical role space has in security and international relations. The competitive agenda is evident in how space is becoming an embedded factor in policy, economic, and national plans. It is no longer about shooting for just the moon anymore, countries now have their eyes on the stars. 

There is still much to look forward to in the next few years as these programs continue to capture and captivate audiences. NASA’s efforts continually inspire and drive a new generation of scientists and innovators, pushing humans far from just the bounds of Earth. NASA is collaborating with the private sector for its new Artemis program, which aims to put astronauts, including the first woman, on the moon by 2024. These new and exciting projects are not the only benefit of space exploration. After more than fifty years of human activity in space, the societal benefits and the improvement of the quality of life on Earth are seen all over. In a 2009 survey, it was found that fifty percent of the internationally renowned scientists who published in the prestigious publication Nature for three years had been inspired by the mission of Apollo to become scientists. Even more so, an astounding total of 89 percent of the respondents also agreed that human spaceflight inspires younger generations to study science. These statistics give a very clear picture of what space exploration can do for the US, the world, and humankind. Not only does pursuing space exploration help accumulate valuable knowledge, but the progression also enables an improvement in technology, and the job market, and provides an opportunity for scientific discovery. 

Unfortunately, this exploration can come at a cost like the growing multinational competition among states. Although the United States has had a considerable range in space, experts say U.S. dominance in space could be contested by a range of nations. For starters, China became the third nation to independently launch a human into orbit in 2003 and its capabilities have since expanded exponentially. On January 28, 2022, China released a white paper outlining its plans and priorities for the next five years of spaceflight and exploration that gave considerable ambitious and impressive reach. The document states, "In the next five years, China will continue to improve the capacity and performance of its space transport system and move faster to upgrade launch vehicles. It will further expand the launch vehicle family, send into space new-generation manned carrier rockets and high-thrust solid-fuel carrier rockets, and speed up the R&D [research and development] of heavy-lift launch vehicles.” This plan not only demonstrates the extensive international stage but also illuminates the comprehensive census to pursue space. It isn’t just China that contests and strains this competitive nature either. During the December 6th, 2021 summit, Russia and India agreed to joint activities in a human spaceflight program and satellite navigation. These two countries promised to seek “mutually beneficial” cooperation by creating launch vehicles and developing the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, including planetary exploration. These examples show the efforts and strategies of various countries to also seek space development. Through the employment of foreign policy, countries are also establishing key relationships and collaboration models that are perpetuating change and assembling a new global network. 

Simple competition and cooperation isn’t the only factor that U.S policymakers have to pay attention to. The UN’s 2021 Outer Space Security Conference in Geneva, Switzerland held talks about the potential of an arms race and the emergence of how space will be a new harmful battleground in the future, illuminating the recent emergence of counter-space technologies. China and Russia are developing offensive capabilities, including jammers, lasers, and cyberweapons that could damage satellite operations. Benjamin Silverstein, a research analyst for the space project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, shared this concern noting,  “I contend that we are watching an arms race unfold. We’re probably past the point at which it’s prudent to focus our main efforts on preventing that arms race.” Many scholars and policymakers like Silverstein are urging countries to update diplomatic resources and establish relationships between rival actors. In an effort to contend with this tribulation, the UN panel voted 163-8 on November 1st, 2021 to create an open-ended working group aimed at preventing an arms race in space. This working group will consider threats to space systems and recommend rules for military activities in outer space, meeting in Geneva for two sessions of five days each in both 2022 and 2023 and reporting to the General Assembly in the fall of 2023. Stressing international collaboration and peaceful talks, the UN, analysts, and scholars are working together to prevent tragedies that would devastate the planet. There seems to be a thread of anxiety that is interwoven in the international community as space diplomacy becomes more and more important if not crucial in preventing war. 

The crisis in space concerning accommodating the new technology and traffic is also a concern for Earth. A growing number of private corporations, including SpaceX Amazon, OneWeb, and China’s iSpace are creating constellations of hundreds or even thousands of orbiting satellites, to provide global wireless internet coverage and other outputs. Their advent raises questions about regulation and how to include a limited resource like a satellite. Many satellites pose risks for managing space traffic and the accumulation of debris. In the MIT Technology Review by Mark Harris, currently planned mega-constellations “could generate over 67,000 ‘collision alerts’ annually, forcing operators to choose between precautionary evasive maneuvers and assuming the small risk of collision.” This could end in disaster for Earth, as orbit could become unusable because of debris. Space is becoming more and more congested, and any future treaties and global agreements must take into account these new rights and obligations of non-state actors and be proactive in these constant changes in technology. 

The employment of multilateral cooperation demands greater awareness of space foreign policy. A larger asteroid or space debris striking an urban area could kill millions, making a disaster waiting to happen. U.S. officials have pressed countries to adopt a basic set of norms and rules for operating in space. For instance, Defense Secretary Lloyd had a talk on Washington Post Live on April 30, 2021, expressing this push, “The other thing I would encourage is norms of behavior, and they talk a little bit about responsible behavior in space. Right now, it is the wild wild west. Short of you can't put weapons of mass destruction in space, or you can't build a military base on a celestial body.” A couple of months later, in July, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III signed a memo pledging the Pentagon to follow five “tenets of responsible behavior in space” operating in space with “due regard” for others and in a professional manner, limiting the creation of space junk, avoiding harmful interference, maintaining separation and safe trajectories, and communicating to enhance safety and stability. This effort needs to be collective, as competition continues to rise and technology gets developed. Innovation, although a pivotal tool for curiosity and captivation, has its setbacks. Although world leaders are reaching for the stars, there needs to be a further job on Earth to keep catastrophes like congestion and warfare at bay. Never has there been a more exciting time in space exploration, yet the shadow of potential conflict looms overhead. Nations need to continue to work together as the Earth becomes not the only arena in which conflict can emerge. There is a prevailing question that can’t help but arise after this ceaseless stress in competition and innovation continues to plague the international community: When does reaching for the stars go too far?

Burkina Faso and the Resurgence of Coups in West Africa

nytimes.com

Towards the end of January, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR) announced that the government and national assembly had been dissolved, and they had removed democratically-elected Roch Marc Kaboré from his position as president of Burkina Faso. Kaboré was detained and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, an overnight curfew was implemented, land and air borders were closed, and the constitution was suspended for one week. A coup d’état had struck.

While this is the most recent one, a trend has emerged in the past year and a half as Mali, Guinea, and Chad have faced military takeovers. There is a resurgence of coups in West Africa, and the contributing factors are not adequately being mitigated. With the presence of everything from violent extremism to poverty, democratic institutions are struggling to stay alive in the region, and there has been controversy regarding international response. Moreover, discussion of this subject has been full of generalizations and blanket policy suggestions. Examining the coup in Burkina Faso can provide a deeper understanding of the circumstances in West Africa and why it is important to acknowledge each country’s distinct identity, advancing the global conversation surrounding intervention and aid.

Growing Violence in West Africa

The buildup to the coup in Burkina Faso was multifaceted, but a major reason for the overthrow was the rising threat from violent extremists. As with the 2020 coup in Mali—the one often seen as the trigger for the other military takeovers—many civilians thought that their government had failed to protect them. Since 2016, over 230 terrorist attacks have taken place in Burkina Faso. Last November, 53 people were killed after a gendarmerie post was attacked, which was “the worst strike on Burkinabe security forces in years.” Just one month later, a civilian militia trained by the government to contain insurgents was ambushed, and at least 41 members were killed. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “violent events linked to militant Islamist groups” increased by 70 percent between 2020 and 2021 in the Sahel region, and the United Nations reported that almost 12,000 people were displaced within two weeks in December. There were at least 2,354 fatalities from the violence in 2021. 

Many believed that the government response was not enough, and the people of Burkina Faso made that clear. As gunfire erupted at Kaboré's residence and several of the country’s military barracks on the day of the coup, protests raged in the capital. The headquarters of Kaboré’s party was looted and set on fire, and people were tear gassed by police as hundreds marched through Ouagadougou. The events of this day showed what Damiba explicitly said in his first speech since taking power: the takeover was due to their former leader’s failure to stop attacks across the country. 

Repercussions Regarding Sanctions and Aid

A major player in how the world has responded to the coups is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After the coups in Mali and Guinea, ECOWAS responded by closing member states’ borders and imposing economic sanctions. However, these sanctions were highly controversial, in part because the affected economies were already poor. If the goal of these sanctions is to promote stability in the region, the long-term consequences may backfire. As explained by the International Peace Institute, the sanctions may be “necessary” but “counterproductive,” and the people whose lives could be altered the most would be marginalized groups in rural areas, those displaced from the violence, and unemployed youth. A large portion of the protestors on the day of the coup in Burkina Faso were showing up in solidarity with the affected population in Mali. 

While the possibility of sanctions remains and ECOWAS has warned of them, Burkina Faso has only been removed from the bloc thus far, and the African Union (AU) also suspended the country pending the reinstatement of the constitution. Additionally, while sanctions have not been imposed, the United States has paused $450 million in aid to Burkina Faso. The United States has been the largest international donor to the country, but U.S. law requires the suspension of non-humanitarian aid to countries where a democratically-elected government has been taken over unconstitutionally, and there is still much uncertainty regarding Burkina Faso’s path forward. Although the constitution has been restored now and MPSR ensured “the continuity of the state pending the establishment of transitional bodies,” those transitional bodies are yet to be established. 

In a more recent development, Burkina Faso may see a steep decline in aid due to the invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council spokesperson in West and Central Africa said, “Some donors have already indicated that they would proceed to a 70% cut of our funding to support operations in Ukraine…” Additionally, a regional advocate from Refugees International said that “Russia is one of the leading grain exporters in the world,” and more people in sub-Saharan Africa will be in need of emergency food assistance as the international community cuts ties with Russia. Finally, certain impacts of foreign aid on political stability as a whole are still debated, but time will tell whether the military government is able to successfully carry out their plans. 

However, a timeline has been given for the transition of power in Burkina Faso, and it was announced a week after the invasion of Ukraine. Damiba was officially inaugurated as president back in February and a team of 25 ministers stood by his side, but it took until March for other plans to be released. On March 3, an economist and professor named Albert Ouedraogo was announced to be the interim prime minister, and the plan as communicated by the military government is for Damiba and Ouedraogo to work towards political stability for the next three years before hosting elections. 

International Response to the Coup

Countries in other parts of the world have also reacted to the coup, including France. Although France has been less involved in Burkina Faso than it has in some neighboring countries, Burkina Faso is a former French colony, and France has about 5,000 soldiers in the region. For years, France has been trying to halt militant attacks from extremists by sending in troops and working with the groups in power, but after the events of January, the country is in a tough place. After the takeover of Burkina Faso, President Emmanuel Macron said, "I would remind you that our priority in the region is to fight against Islamist terrorism,” but it should be noted that Macron has an upcoming election to think about. While he has already been reducing the number of troops in the area, if France takes any drastic measures, those actions would reflect on him.

Russia is also worth discussing, for reasons beyond the invasion of Ukraine. In Mali, the junta has relied on security from the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization backed by the Russian government, and this group has been deployed in Libya and the Central African Republic as well. Reportedly, the leader of the coup in Burkina Faso was regularly in communication with the military leaders of Mali and Guinea, and twice, Damiba tried to convince Kaboré to use Russian paramilitaries. Kaboré refused, but with Damiba in power, the situation has shifted. 

Examining France and Russia’s current role in the region, counterterrorism and tension between the West and Russia were at the forefront of the conversation—but there is more at play. Some have said that “core political problems” are being ignored while foreign powers use West Africa to compete among themselves. In terms of Burkina Faso, the International Crisis Group surfaced the importance of addressing the social crisis in the north and the development deficit, as well as the pre-existing spread of corruption in the administration judicial system. Not every coup in the region can be solely blamed on violent extremism (although it is certainly a large factor in this situation) because the acceptance of democracy underlies the pattern.

The Need for Nuance

The chairman of ECOWAS and president of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, called the coup in Mali “contagious” during the summit following Burkina Faso’s takeover. This implies that the coups are having a domino effect, or that they are modeled after each other. Notably, however, not every coup in West Africa stemmed from the violent extremists, but rather the interruption or prevention of democratic trajectories. Some, including Vice President of the US Institute of Peace’s Africa Center Joseph Sany, believe that conveying the idea of a coup contagion is problematic because it “absolves the world community” from assisting West African countries in creating democratic institutions. Fully attributing these coups to violent extremism could greatly affect the viability of international response.

On the other hand, Akufo-Addo did address the observed controversy over democracy, and he called for a collective response to the trend of coups in the region. Perhaps “contagious” is a fitting way to describe the pattern in West Africa, not because extremism is the overarching factor, but rather concerns about democracy. Panic generated from violence inevitably leads to critique of the present format and exploration of government systems, but while root causes are important to address, there does seem to be a connecting factor beyond violent extremism. 

Moving forward, those discussing coups in the West African region should be conscious of nuance while noting that there are major similarities. Talking as though each country is struggling for the same reason and attributing all of this to religious extremism interrupts how the international community responds to military takeovers in West Africa, and that way of thinking draws attention away from social issues, government/judicial corruption, poverty, and more. Particularly in terms of strategizing foreign aid, countries need to pay attention to both the situations of individual countries and the region as a whole.

The AUKUS Deal, China, and Nuclear Non-proliferation

The AUKUS deal is a security partnership involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was announced in September, and its first project will be to provide Australia with a nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Although diesel-fueled submarines are useful, nuclear submarines can “remain submerged almost indefinitely” without a snorkel, and many suspect that one of the main purposes of this partnership is to offset the power of the Indo-Pacific region. However, while trying to get the upper hand, Australia would “have to become the first non-nuclear-weapon state to exercise a loophole that allows it to remove nuclear material from the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” China’s perspective is that this will negatively interfere with the arms race, and other influential people involved in non-proliferation efforts worldwide have denounced the agreement. However, 60 percent of US residents do support the AUKUS deal due to national security, and the deed is done. The pact has been made, and Australia’s previous partnership with France for diesel-fueled submarines has ended. The only remaining steps are to prepare for the implications of actually delivering the fleet and be mindful about how other agreements may be compromised by this action.

Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region and Conflict with China

The European Union has strategized over the Indo-Pacific region for a long time. After the United Kingdom left the European Union, however, the U.K. reportedly did not consult with the EU about the AUKUS deal, and foreign policy has become alarmingly less unified. At the same time, it is obvious that the EU would oppose it with the U.K. having left because the agreement caused Australia to cancel a $40 billion submarine deal with France—the country that actually initiated European engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Regardless of opinion on the efficacy of the deal, however, this development also shows the increasing lack of coordination among the European Union, the United States, and allies. Gone are the days of a united front, despite there being an overall goal of non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, it has been four years since Australia’s then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull declared they would “stand up” to China, the country that actually remains to this day their biggest trading partner. The relationship between China and Australia has also worsened since then, particularly due to the fact that the latter called for a global inquiry surrounding the initial outbreak of COVID-19 and China’s handling of the situation. While their trade relationship is still well, China has responded to Australia’s declarations with bans and restrictions on its goods. In the context of these tense relations, it only makes sense for Australia to be bracing itself in regard to China. 

In reviewing this analysis, it makes sense that the components of the AUKUS deal would be a priority for all parties. Yet, China has argued that those involved in the AUKUS agreement have a “Cold War mentality.” While the White House has disputed the idea that the AUKUS deal has anything to do with the Indo-Pacific region, China’s claims are not entirely unfounded, and there is no denying the substantial difficulties between countries—particularly in the aftermath of the Trump administration. Additionally, many have noted that specifically in regard to China, deterrence has worked relatively well with nuclear activity, and hanging onto mediocre agreements could be the best move as of current.

A Double Standard in United States Nuclear Foreign Policy

To zoom in on the United States, the country has a clear double standard in terms of nuclear technology and foreign policy. For a quick reality check, the U.S. has more nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines than China, and in terms of submarines as a whole, the United States has 68 while China has 12. In fact, the total number of submarines belonging to the United States is more than that of China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and India combined. To top it off, in terms of use, “the United States and Russia each have deployed five times more nuclear warheads than Beijing possesses”—and it is known that the threat of China is one of the main reasons for this deal. Although power cannot be boiled down to submarines or even military resources in general, the importance of focusing on gaining an upper hand with nuclear technology versus focusing on non-proliferation is debatable, particularly in the following context. While boasting a strong fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, the United States has emphasized non-proliferation efforts yet also come into conflict with countries not considered to be allies over their refusal to cooperate with the United States’ wishes. 

Critics have been pointing out Washington’s hypocrisy over nuclear weapons for years. In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Seoul and said that “North Korea will not be accepted as a nuclear power.” President Barack Obama said the same year that Iran possessing a nuclear weapon at all is “a red line for us.” At the same time, the Obama administration was planning “to spend billions on upgrading nuclear bombs stored in Europe to make the weapons more reliable and accurate.” The United States has also tried to impose a number of sanctions on other countries for nuclear weapons over the years while it expands its own powers. Additionally, the Iran nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was made official in 2015, but in 2018, President Donald Trump left the deal, furthering United States hypocrisy surrounding nuclear weapons. 

However, it is important to note that while looking at current statistics about the U.S. military versus the militaries of other world powers, projections for the future are concerning. Reportedly, the nuclear arsenal of China could triple by the year 2030, meaning 1,000 nuclear warheads would be in its possession. Beyond that, the Pentagon is troubled by the prospect of new technology, specifically how nuclear strategists in China are approaching “nontraditional arms,” and the launch of a hypersonic missile in July showed a design that was meant to “evade the United States’ primary missile interceptors, which can operate only in outer space.” While there is a clear double standard in terms of United States nuclear foreign policy, that does not mean that the U.S. should ignore or underestimate the chance of greater threats to come.

Overall Implications of the AUKUS Deal

The AUKUS deal is arguably counterintuitive to rhetoric flowing from the United States about non-proliferation. While the U.S. has sanctioned other countries, particularly ones in the Middle East, for working with nuclear materials, this new agreement will actively help close allies gain nuclear technology. Other countries may perceive the U.S. as hypocritical when observing through that lens. Additionally, although maintaining a strong military is critical in the context of current concerns, including China, a glimpse at U.S. resources indicates that pursuing more may be excessive. Moreover, focusing on the military when it comes to China may actually threaten the security of the United States. Defense analyst William Hartung who focuses on the economics of Pentagon spending argued, “Focusing on China is a good way to pump up the Pentagon’s already bloated budget—which is currently higher than the peaks of the Korean or Vietnam wars or the Reagan buildup of the 1980s—but it will not make us safer.” Consistently bolstering the resources of the United States military is not the way to deal with the flawed U.S.-China relationship. Putting such an emphasis on war can fuel the flames of a conflict.

Furthermore, the whole idea of the AUKUS agreement is debatable, but the most imminent worrisome situation is how the new Australian fleet will set a precedent. If Australia does end up with the nuclear fleet, it will end up becoming the first country without nuclear weapons to utilize a loophole allowing for them to take nuclear material from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection system. As stated by James Acton from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “In the future, would-be proliferators could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons—with the reasonable expectation that, because of the Australia precedent, they would not face intolerable costs for doing so.” Since a major part of nuclear non-proliferation efforts is about enforcement decisions, as in, many policies currently in place are subjective to an extent, this sets a dangerous example for the future. 

Moving Forward With Strategic Stability Talks

While the AUKUS agreement is a questionable move, it is important to acknowledge that President Joe Biden has recently indicated after the virtual summit that the White House would like to hold “strategic stability talks,” and China’s President Xi Jinping expressed a willingness to participate in these talks. Concededly, the relationship between countries may not be strong enough to profit from formal negotiations, but alternative options have been explored; for example, the meeting of nongovernmental experts from each country has been put on the table. Although the particular method of discussion has not yet been clarified, the recent summit has opened the door to security measures that do not fully revolve around the military. The AUKUS deal may have thrown a wrench in non-proliferation progress by setting a dangerous precedent for nuclear possession, but the heightened tensions exacerbated by the agreement have been met with a response of cooperation.

An Alliance of Asterisks? The Significance of the U.S.-India Relationship

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to Texas in September 2019, he was greeted by over 50,000 people — and introduced by none other than then-American President Donald Trump. The Texan-style cries of “Howdy, Modi!” lifted through the air at one of the largest mass rallies for a foreign leader in United States history. “I’m so thrilled to be here in Texas with one of America’s greatest, most devoted, and most loyal friends,” exclaimed Trump, part of a series of affectionate remarks between the two leaders. In turn, Modi introduced his “family,” a jubilant nod to the many Indian-Americans in the crowd, to Trump. The years-long, sometimes-called “bromance” between Modi and Trump was on full display.

Despite grandiose moments like this, U.S. ties with India remain far less discussed than those with competitors like Russia or China, or allies like Japan or Germany. Though these relationships are not uniform and simple, they are far easier to classify as cool or warm. In contrast, New Delhi’s posture toward Washington and vice versa is more complicated, with areas of agreement and others of divergence. However, the U.S.-India alliance will likely grow with time. Undoubtedly the rapid growth of India’s population and economy plays a role. It is also worth noting a growing community of Indian-Americans and Kamala Harris’s recent election as America’s first Vice President of Indian ancestry, in addition to being the first woman and person of color to hold the post. Her triumph was celebrated by some in India and highlighted by Modi when congratulating her and President Joe Biden on their victory.

Though Modi will find a very different counterpart in Biden, and may adopt a different strategy toward the relationship as a result, the U.S.-India alliance will nevertheless continue to grow in importance. While the latter half of the 20th century saw some estrangement between the two countries, U.S. administrations since President Bill Clinton’s have developed an ever closer rapport with their Indian counterparts. However, as currents bolster this partnership, several issues will soon become key, some of which will draw the two countries closer, like wariness of China. Others, like the global retreat of democracy and human rights, may make this still-burgeoning relationship more awkward. Furthermore, these themes raise and reflect key debates in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. This juncture thus affords an opportunity to investigate these deepening bilateral ties’ implications moving forward.

America and India: An Evolving Relationship

India’s first post-independence prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru famously trumpeted his country’s stance of nonalignment in the Cold War, signaling that New Delhi would adopt a track of neutrality in global geopolitical disputes. This irked Washington, especially as this opened the door to some Indian ties with the Soviet Union. In much of the 20th century’s latter half, India had its fair share of conflicts with Pakistan and China, many of them over border disputes, leading New Delhi to race toward nuclear proliferation. To make matters worse, clashes between India and Pakistan sometimes brought the U.S. to support the latter, such as in 1971. While communication between India and the U.S. continued, the relationship was not close. As C. Raja Mohan writes for Foreign Policy, India in this time “became a champion” for the global south, took a sharp leftward turn economically, and even voted more frequently against the U.S. than the Soviets at the United Nations.

This trajectory began to reverse with Clinton’s 2000 visit to India. During his successor President George W. Bush’s administration, relations continued to strengthen. In a rejection of India’s previous skepticism of military cooperation with America, closer defense ties were reached, and agreements over nuclear proliferation and trade resulted. In the War on Terror era, India’s own concerns with terrorism also rendered the U.S. a logical ally. President Barack Obama’s administration increasingly — and rightly — recognized India’s growing power. While Modi’s election in 2014 presented reasons for strain, not least because of Modi’s nationalist outlook, the Obama administration chose instead to welcome him for a visit to the U.S.

The Trump years were truly strange for many American alliances. India, however, seemed impervious to many of these tensions. Modi was quite capable in appealing to Trump’s fondness for close personal bonds with foreign leaders, especially when greeting the American president with a bear hug at one of their first meetings. As Institute of South Asian Studies researcher Amitendu Palit tells the Financial Times, “India was one of the few countries that got used to working with Trump.” This could have to do with similarities between the two leaders. Scholars Duncan McDonnell and Luis Cabrera argue that Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) shares several similarities with the European right-wing populist party grouping to which Trump’s politics have often been compared. While there is a tendency to refer to comparable leaders as simply permutations of Trump in foreign countries, this urge often obscures concrete differences and dynamics. However, Modi’s BJP has been characterized as Hindu nationalist, protectionist, and anti-elitist, trafficking in discourse not altogether different from that of Trump’s, albeit adapted to a different societal context.

This is not to say there have not been areas of discord between the two leaders. Trade is one. Trump went as far as to end India’s special trade status with the U.S., citing India’s market as unfair for American companies, prompting Modi to unleash tariffs on some American goods. Even through spats like this, however, the two remained cordial. Despite rough patches, Modi avoided the mercurial jabs Trump launched at other world leaders who once fêted him, like French President Emmanuel Macron. 

Today, Modi realizes well that Biden is quite different from Trump. But this does not mean the two leaders’ contrasts will necessarily derail warming ties. After the events of January 6, 2021 in the U.S. Capitol, Modi joined a chorus of foreign leaders condemning efforts to delay the transfer of power between administrations. Since his victory, Biden has been embraced by Modi, particularly during recent talks on China. Biden will likely continue this convergence, as areas for partnership with New Delhi abound. 

The Indo-Pacific and Beyond: Areas of Agreement

This March, Biden was joined by his Indian, Japanese, and Australian counterparts for a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, nicknamed the Quad, an informal strategic grouping revived during the Trump administration focusing on Indo-Pacific affairs. Central to its current agenda is the distribution of vaccines in the region and combating further responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. But the Quad certainly has additional motives in a region fraught with danger. Through this venue, the U.S. and India may find themselves working together more frequently.

The largest task of the Quad moving forward was not lost on observers: an increasingly strong and assertive China. Tensions between Washington and Beijing have been building for years over a vast array of issues, but the recent U.S.-China summit in Alaska was perhaps the most blatant show of discontent yet between the two sides. Dignitaries swapped their usual pleasantries for harsh critiques, with Chinese officials condemning American police brutality and American officials condemning China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, among other complaints. The areas of competition between China and the U.S. continue to grow over technology, trade relations, stewardship of the international order, the internment of Uighurs, and military relations in East Asia, to name a few.

India and China have long been adversaries, but enmity between them has also been on display in recent years. Their infamous border disputes have flared up again multiple times, sometimes leading to casualties, usually patrolling soldiers. But the tension has even deeper roots. As Vijay Gokhale argues for Carnegie India, a general divergence between the two countries’ geopolitical goals — and their perceptions of one another — have fueled distaste between them, including the feeling in New Delhi that Beijing sees it necessary to box out India to lock in control of the Indo-Pacific. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, bringing it closer to nations like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and especially Pakistan, has certainly not helped to turn down the temperature. This tension was reflected in a recent poll: a staggering 83% of Indians view China as a security threat, yet 63% still hope for better relations.  However, the same poll found that a larger 75% of Indians want relations with the U.S. to strengthen. Washington’s growing coziness with New Delhi is without doubt partially about combating Beijing, especially as India has increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Other matters of global significance are also factors. For one, India is a significant partner on climate change, as underscored by a trip from U.S. climate envoy John Kerry. With its large border with Myanmar and rapport with its armed forces, India could use some leverage to help improve a rapidly deteriorating situation following recent violence and coups. India’s growing economy and population also make it a logical ally for the U.S. Yet even as many issues offer opportunity for agreement, room for separation still exists.

Of Media and Missiles: Areas of Divergence

Biden, against the backdrop of eroding norms at home, has made democracy a pillar of his foreign policy. Especially after the events of January 6, a desire to restore confidence in democracy at home and abroad is welcome. Though little has manifested yet, his administration floated a Democracy Summit of sorts, aiming to bring fellow democracies to the table in the face of autocratic trajectories abroad. India would ordinarily be guaranteed an invite. However, Modi’s governance has alarmed observers concerned about a retreat of democratic norms. Freedom House has downgraded India from “free” to “partly free,” and Varieties of Democracy, an index tracking the integrity of democracy worldwide, recently made the momentous decision to classify India as an “electoral autocracy.” These rankings were promptly lambasted by Modi’s government. 

Worrying developments include immigration policy. Critics point to BJP-crafted laws and rules changes, like that in Assam, which discriminate against Muslims and erode India’s religious tolerance tradition, including by offering a path to citizenship for migrants of many faiths except Islam. Indeed, mobs and violence have threatened Indian Muslims before. When demonstrations arise in response to these changes and others, Modi has relied on a favorite tool to quell unrest: restricting Internet access and the press. He blacked out phone and Internet services recently after massive farmer protests formed to protest his economic policies. These same tactics were deployed in Jammu and Kashmir after he repealed the disputed state’s special status in Indian law. Most recently, India’s government has threatened to arrest Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter employees if the sites do not agree to regulate content related to the farmers. The world has watched uneasily as the leader of the most populous democracy has leaned on increasingly authoritarian tactics. Even if this summit idea ultimately does not materialize, a U.S.-stressing democracy abroad might find cozier ties with India awkward. As Tanvi Madan assesses for Brookings, the Biden administration will still see in India a strategic partner, but the relationship will not deepen as fast or as much as it otherwise could due to these concerns. 

Geopolitical thorns exist as well. Though Modi may feel comfortable aligning India closer to the U.S., he does not see India working solely with America. Just as New Delhi’s nonalignment and subsequent relations with Moscow bothered Washington in the Cold War, Modi’s relations with Russia today leave the U.S. unsettled. Though Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin have not been particularly close, except for an invitation to host Putin after COVID-19 subsides, India’s purchase of the S-400 Russian missile system ruffles American feathers. (Turkey’s purchase of the same system has similarly sparked controversy on Capitol Hill.) Indian officials defend buying the system as necessary for defense against neighbors like China and Pakistan. But as the U.S. State Department warns, India could be subject to U.S. sanctions as a result. Though these measures against India may still be unlikely, the transaction remains a sticking point between the countries. The U.S. may still struggle to trust an ally which hopes to retain a more nonaligned stance between Moscow and Washington.

Conclusion: An Alliance of Asterisks

Evidently, the U.S.-India partnership will elevate in importance as years pass. However, existing concerns lead the two countries to remain more estranged than they otherwise might be. Though these bilateral ties are unique, the dynamics at play reflect larger pressing questions in U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. today finds itself in odd positions with many of its allies. Some, like the Philippines and Brazil, have far-right leaders whose disregard for the rule of law and liberal international order complicate ties with America. Turkey, despite its NATO membership, worries the U.S. due to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s closer relations with Putin, authoritarian populist worldview, and general revanchism. Other high profile examples include Saudi Arabia, whose Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has attracted notoriety over the bloody war in Yemen and the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Biden has had to — and will continue to — balance a foreign policy advocating simultaneously for specific values and also American alliances with some partners who violate these standards, while also withdrawing support from such transgressions.
In the case of India, the U.S. should not reject an expanding alliance. It should realize India’s foreign policy goals and aspirations are not as dichotomous as America’s and will not always align, yet a mutually beneficial partnership can flourish in some areas. Geopolitical disagreements like the S-400 missile purchase alone should not fragment U.S.-India ties. Where possible, the two countries should cooperate. Biden’s ability to aid India in its current battle against the raging coronavirus is one such area. Even so, the U.S. should not stay silent with India on troubling topics, particularly human rights. Badly-needed moves to strengthen America’s own democracy and immigration system would also be a boon to Biden’s foreign policy, to make it one of mutual appreciation for reinforcing democratic norms in the face of malaise. If done right, both countries could enjoy a mutually beneficial partnership, even if the days of “bromance” have passed.

China’s COVID Vaccine Diplomacy

Ever since January 2020 when the first cases of COVID were discovered in Hubei Province, China has had a significant role to play in the development and distribution of COVID vaccine doses. The public-private partnerships which joined the resources of the Chinese government with the manufacturing capabilities of the country’s pharmaceutical companies have allowed them to make speedy progress, and that has opened opportunities for providing global assistance during the pandemic. Indeed, China has made offers to a number of countries in a move that could be seen as a public service, a strategic play, or a combination of the two. The Chinese government has pushed one narrative, of course, but there is no denying that China has extensive room for growth in terms of soft power. China’s capabilities have increased its competitiveness with the West and opened doors to its expansion on the national market. Though, much of China’s COVID vaccine operations remain ambiguous. Firstly, there is uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of the country’s three vaccines. There is also confusion and a lack of transparency surrounding the vaccine research. There is skepticism about China’s follow through and what they may ask for in return. There are also the Chinese people who need to be cared for. China is acting on the center stage during this COVID pandemic, and there is no unified expectation from its spectators.

Global Assistance from China

Last May, Chinese President Xi Jinping allocated large sums of money to about 17 vaccine projects and gathered 22 firms and research institutes to get to work. With this devotion to overcoming the pandemic that killed so many and initially tarnished China’s reputation, China has committed to delivering about half a billion doses of vaccine to over 45 countries. These countries are low and middle income, and they are struggling to meet their demand due to the costs and requirements of Pfizer, Moderna, and the like. One difference between these Western vaccines and China’s, for example, is that the latter do not require ultracold storage; standard refrigerators are sufficient. This alleviates the problem of transporting mass amounts of vaccines to areas without substantive infrastructure. Many low and middle income countries see China’s offer as more cost-effective and distributable than the other vaccines. 

Although the Chinese government rejects the phrase due to its negative connotations, this global assistance has been called “vaccine diplomacy.” Many suspect that China’s actions are less of a public service than they are a political move, and the Associated Press relayed “concerns about what China might want in return for deliveries.” It is not yet clear what China expects from the countries they have pledged to help, but no matter the intention, China has a lot to gain from this circumstance. 

China’s Competition with the West

China’s primary gains from assisting low and middle income countries are in regard to competing with the West. Assisting Serbia and Hungary, for example, is a “geopolitical victory in Central Europe and the Balkans.” This will give China greater economic influence in the region. This diplomacy is also about showing China’s advancements and proving that they can keep up with the United States. Foreign Affairs quoted a Chinese virologist who said that China is “not lagging behind the United States as far as the technology is concerned,” and the research is being conducted in public-private partnerships. President Emmanuel Macron of France said that China’s vaccine diplomacy was “a little bit humiliating” for the West, and to top it all off, the Chinese government is pushing rhetoric and theories about how COVID did not originate in the country and American vaccines are unsafe. China is attempting to establish itself as the world leader in COVID response.

Additionally, China’s involvement in COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) compels the World Health Organization (WHO)to approve vaccines that were developed in China. This is because China has committed to buying a certain amount of vaccines, and they have the option to choose Chinese brands. If the WHO permits the use of China’s COVID vaccines, COVAX may order these vaccines for developing countries, therefore expanding China’s market share. Some estimates predict that COVID vaccines may bring more than 10 billion dollars in sales. COVID vaccine diplomacy is a way for China’s pharmaceutical companies to broaden their scope. 

Joining COVAX is also a way that China is leading in comparison to the United States because former President Donald Trump chose to give up the opportunity for soft power that China has been pursuing. He refused to join COVAX, and he refused to offer vaccine aid to any country — including allies of the U.S. Foreign Affairs viewed the United States’s action — or inaction — as a nationalist path, yet they also pointed out that this play only bolstered China’s benefits from vaccine diplomacy. While the Biden administration has since joined COVAX, China has already been able to make major strides in distribution pledges and gain influence. If former President Trump had just joined COVAX from the beginning, it is possible that the low and middle income countries that China has been collaborating with would have had a more difficult decision. Instead, the concerns about the safety and efficacy of China’s COVID vaccines have been overlooked by these countries due to their major lack of options.

The Safety and Efficacy of China’s COVID Vaccines

China has developed several vaccines, but there are concerns about how safe and effective they are. One of the vaccines, Sinopharm, is reportedly 79 percent effective. CanSino is reportedly 65 percent effective. There is a significant amount of variation in research about the Sinovac vaccine, and it could be anywhere from 50 percent to 91 percent effective. Although the Sinopharm, CanSino, and Sinovac vaccines seem to have their benefits, this should be put in perspective. Although the three vaccines developed by the Chinese seem to have their benefits, these efficacy rates are significantly lower than the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines that are 95 percent and 94.1 percent effective, respectively. To be fair, while Dr. Anthony Fauci said that he would like a vaccine to be at minimum 75 percent effective, the minimum requirement for a vaccine to be approved by the Federal Drug Administration is only 50 percent. The main issue here is about whether or not these percentages are even on the nose. 

This issue has arisen because information about the Chinese vaccine studies is difficult to come by. None of the three Chinese companies have released their late-stage clinical trial data to the public, and multiple requests to interview have been declined by the vaccine companies. If China cannot deliver, Beijing will not gain much from the pledges it has made. As stated by the Associated Press: “China’s vaccine diplomacy will be only as good as the vaccines it is offering, and it still faces hurdles.” 

Honoring Promises and China’s Own Population

Western vaccine makers are not alone in their struggle to meet production goals; there is widespread concern that China may not be able to follow through with the commitments they have made in a timely manner. As aforementioned, Chinese vaccine makers have not been the most transparent, and the public only knows a bit about how production levels are thus far — but what is known does not paint a good outlook. For example, Sinovac production levels reached only half of its intended manufacturing capacity in January.

It is unclear if China will be able to deliver on its promises, and shipments have already been delayed and fallen short repeatedly. In Southeast Asia, the region which has been promised the most vaccine doses, it is predicted that mass immunization will take until at least 2024. Revealingly, China has promised many countries in Southeast Asia priority access to the Chinese vaccines. Moreover, there is uncertainty about how the Chinese government will proceed with juggling their vaccine diplomacy on top of taking care of their own people. There are 1.4 billion people in China, and its COVID vaccine makers have been consistently coming up short. China has a goal to vaccinate only 40 percent of its population by the end of July, and at the beginning of March, “China had committed more than ten times as many doses overseas as it had administered in China,” according to Foreign Affairs. 

China has been a prevalent actor in the development and distribution of COVID vaccine doses. Although the Chinese government has denied that they are participating in “vaccine diplomacy,” they have made moves to help them restore their reputation, pull ahead of Western competition, and expand China’s share in the international vaccine market. However, while the public-private partnerships in the creation and manufacturing of Chinese vaccines jump-started the country’s scientific and diplomatic successes, their gains have been threatened by their shortfalls on pledges made to low and middle income countries in need of vaccine doses, and there remains uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of each Chinese vaccine. On top of that, China has not yet delivered much for its own citizens. There is significant uncertainty surrounding China’s vaccine diplomacy that will unfold in the coming months.

Nayib Bukele: Central America’s First Hipster Despot

Nayib Bukele’s election as president of El Salvador in 2019 sent shockwaves that have reverberated throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. At just 37 years of age on election day, he was but a ten year old boy when the Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed, ending his country’s protracted and bloody civil war. A right-wing populist and the former mayor of the capital San Salvador, Bukele campaigned on anti-corruption and a tough approach to crime, all in blue jeans and a leather jacket. His campaign was also unique in that it was so reliant on social media that he did not even bother to participate in a formal debate (a decision that may have helped him in the polls, distinguishing him from the establishment candidates). 

Bukele’s election was unique in that it proved a repudiation of the establishment and the status quo in El Salvador, much like the election of Donald Trump in the U.S. and the rise of right-wing illiberal populists around the world. As a member of Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (or the Grand Alliance for National Unity), he became El Salvador’s first president elected from outside of the two-party system since his fellow former San Salvador mayor Jose Napoleon Duarte left the presidency in 1989. Contemporary Salvadoran politics has traditionally been dominated by the conservative Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) and the left-wing Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) FMLN and ARENA also represent the two main parties of the civil war. 

This rupture of the two-party system in El Salvador is emblematic of a broader regional movement away from stable two-party systems, which have recently fallen in Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Honduras,. While some of these countries have been able to support multi-party democracies, others have descended into authoritarian states. In his two years as president, Bukele is quickly leaving no doubt that he intends for El Salvador to be in the second category for the foreseeable future.

The U.S. Role in El Salvador and Why It Matters

In its history, El Salvador has long grappled with severe economic inequality, like many countries in the region. The smallest of the Central American republics (in fact, only about the size of Massachusetts), the country (like its neighbors) profited immensely when coffee became a major global cash crop, at one point responsible for up to 95 percent of the country’s income. Just two percent of the country, led by the country’s oligarchic richest 14 families, owned more than 75 percent of the nation’s arable land and more than 70 percent of its wealth during the 20th century. While these families were each worth tens to hundreds of millions of dollars, the Great Depression left millions of peasants with nothing, and in 1932, the peasants led an uprising in the western part of the country that was met with brutality from the military government.

Then, in 1969, the Football War between El Salvador and Honduras strengthened the power of the corrupt military government, which began to expand its arms imports, purchasing weapons from Israel, Brazil, West Germany, and the United States. The 1972 elections were rigged in favor of the military government, and left-wing groups like the FMLN began to become more militant, leading President Arturo Armando Molina to embrace modest land reforms that were ultimately defeated by the Salvadoran elite. Civil war ensued and did not relent until the 1990s.

The Salvadoran Civil War was one of the bloodier conflicts of the Cold War, with war crimes committed by both parties. However, the right-wing military government was the more brutal party, with the United Nations (UN)-supported truth commission finding it guilty of 85 percent of the war’s human rights abuses, compared to just 5 percent for the guerillas. Raymond Bonner of The Atlantic, who covered the war for The New York Times, described the war as “a civil war of the 1980s, one that pitted leftist revolutionaries against the alliance of countries, oligarchs, and generals that had ruled the country for decades—with U.S. support—keeping peasants illiterate and impoverished...Peasants were shot en masse, often while trying to flee. Student and union leaders had their thumbs tied behind their backs before being shot in the head, their bodies left on roadsides as a warning to others.”

American nuns were assassinated on the orders of the military. So were Salvadoran priests who advocated for peace and spoke out against the military’s human rights abuses despite the Catholic Church’s long-standing, close ties with the military government. And on December 11, 1981, the government carried out its worst massacre, one of the most genocidal actions of the entire Cold War: the El Mozote Massacre. At El Mozote, the Salvadoran army and air force, alongside death squads trained by the United States, tortured and subsequently murdered the village’s men, raped the village’s women and girls — some of them as young as ten years old — and murdered them with machine guns. Children were killed, with their throats slit or by being hung from trees. Months later, the Salvadoran military would collect the skulls of the children they murdered to keep as good luck charms. After virtually the entire population of El Mozote had been killed, the soldiers marched to nearby Los Toriles, took its people from their homes, robbed them, shot them dead, and then set their homes on fire. It took the Salvadoran government two decades to apologize for the massacre, and litigation ensues to this very day to ensure its victims can be heard.

And where was the United States during this conflict? Unapologetically behind the military government. With the exception of a brief interlude when Jimmy Carter temporarily suspended aid to El Salvador (before ultimately increasing it on his way out the door), the United States ignored or even praised the repression of the anti-communist government. During the Reagan Administration, only Egypt and Israel received more American military and economic aid than El Salvador, and its embassy staff size rivaled that of the American embassy in India. 

With that aid came next to zero accountability. After the massacre of the American nuns, the Reagan Administration ordered Ambassador Robert White to cover up the Salvadoran government’s culpability. When he refused, he was fired and expelled from the Foreign Service entirely. After El Mozote, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (and later Trump’s envoys to Iran and Venezuela) Elliott Abrams smeared Bonner and the reporters on the ground in El Salvador as activists exaggerating both the death toll and the government’s culpability. He also extolled the Salvadoran government’s human rights record before the Senate. The State Department inflated claims of left-wing violence and downplayed their own links to the death squads to persuade the American public that backing a right-wing dictatorship was worth it in the end because nobody’s hands were clean. As Joan Didion wrote in her seminal account of the conflict, Salvador, “If it is taken for granted in Salvador that the government kills, it is also taken for granted that the other side kills; that everyone has killed, everyone kills now, and if the history of the place suggests any pattern, everyone will continue to kill.” This amoral, cynical Cold War policy contributed to the subsequent development of El Salvador immensely.

Bukele, El Mozote, and the Legacy of the War

Though the war ended in 1992 with the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, its legacy continues to haunt El Salvador. In a narrow sense, the Chapultepec Accords have been a success, with its prescribed ceasefire holding to this very day and the UN applauding the compliance of the parties in the immediate aftermath. The grave inequality that was long characteristic of El Salvador has been partially rectified with the FMLN’s integration into the political system and its reforms under President Mauricio Funes. But while the country continues to be a fragile democracy, its representatives have often failed to deliver on institutional reforms. 

El Salvador ranks fifth in the world in its annual number of instances of gender-based violence. Inequality, although reduced, remains in place and threatens to persist thanks to the neoliberal project of ARENA that preserved wealth and political power in the hands of a small class of elites through intense privatization and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (with the support of the U.S.). The FMLN made some changes to the arrangement, but did not radically transform Salvadoran political economy, as it acted much less radically than its other left-wing equivalents in the region.  Almost 1.5 million (or about 1/5 of the Salvadoran population) has been forced to migrate north to the United States due to the threat of domestic violence, economic depression, or the war as refugees. Once again, U.S. policy was at the center of the issue: during the Trump Administration, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions instructed immigration courts not to grant asylum to victims of gender-based violence and gang violence, even if they had a credible fear of returning to their home country, a decision that severely and adversely impacted Salvadoran migrant women and their children.

Given these failings of the political establishment and the political fragmentation of the country, it was perhaps not surprising that Bukele was able to gain election as an outsider running on a nationalistic platform. But rather than the post-war candidate he ran as, he is increasingly resembling the brutal right-wing dictatorship responsible for the vast majority of its casualties. 

At every turn, Bukele has responded to a myriad of political issues with intense repression. In early February 2020, Bukele countered parliamentary opposition to his proposal to increase funding for the police and armed forces to combat crime by asking his supporters to rally, and he ultimately had the armed forces occupy the Legislative Assembly. When the coronavirus pandemic reached El Salvador, Bukele used it as a pretext to ask the police to crack down on gang members, arbitrarily detaining citizens and holding them in unsanitary conditions. Some died after not receiving adequate medical care even as the country has universal health care for all citizens while others were assaulted by police for violating quarantine protocols. The crackdown was denounced by human rights organizations and the Democratic majority on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Despite nominally running an anti-corruption campaign, Bukele’s government has been under scrutiny for breaches of the public trust. While he fulfilled a campaign promise in 2019 to create a new anti-corruption commission modeled after the largely successful but now defunct UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) in Guatemala, journalists and prosecutors have uncovered sizable evidence of financial improprieties, misallocated funds, and corruption in government contracting since the advent of the pandemic. El Salvador was also singled out by anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International for its irregularities and corruption cases relating to pandemic-related procurement and “alarming concentration of power” in its executive branch. Furthermore, as these scandals have emerged, Bukele has moved away from his anti-corruption rhetoric, instead cracking down on independent media outlets that expose evidence of government wrongdoing. Investigative outlet El Faro is currently under an ongoing money laundering investigation after publishing a report claiming Bukele negotiated with gang leaders to secure a reduction in violence in exchange for political support. El Faro denies any malfeasance and asserts that the investigation is political retaliation. 

Finally, the “post-war” president has exploited, not healed the wounds of El Mozote in particular. While he ran on declassifying military archives “from A to Z” that would allow inspectors to investigate the massacre in accordance with a court order, in June 2020 he reversed his position, claiming that national security would be endangered if he opened the archives. When the judge, Jorge Guzman, who issued the order scheduled the inspections anyway and showed up to the sites, he was denied access by a group of soldiers. Bukele had deployed troops and police officers to many one time FMLN strongholds using the cover of the pandemic to intimidate residents and inspectors. In a subsequent address, he bashed the courts, Salvadoran human rights organizations, and the bipartisan group of American legislators who sent him a letter expressing their concern over his lack of respect for the rule of law. He singled out Guzman as a saboteur of the government and military’s image motivated by FMLN sympathies. 

Bukele’s disinterest in the rule of law poses a grave threat to El Salvador’s fragile democracy and the project of national reconciliation. His autocratic ambitions have disillusioned those who believed in transformative, structural change and should have eroded unconditional American support for his every action.

And yet Bukele was embraced wholeheartedly by the Trump Administration. Former Ambassador to El Salvador Ronald Johnson commended Bukele for his handling of the pandemic, arguing that the violent abuses and arbitrary detentions carried out by his police forces were merely consensual arrangements between the government and people to give up some freedoms for security in a crisis. Bukele was also a convenient ally for the Trump Administration on immigration and agreed to several accords to reduce protections for asylum seekers from El Salvador.

However, with a Democrat in the White House, it is possible that fortunes may change for Bukele’s critics. President Joe Biden has already suspended Trump’s anti-asylum immigration accords with El Salvador. In an attempt to curry favor with Biden, Bukele has invested in D.C. lobbyists and requested a private meeting with President Biden. However, the White House rebuffed his offer, citing concerns about Bukele’s lack of commitment to the rule of law and democratic rule. Biden’s National Security Council’s senior director for Latin America Juan Gonzalez also took an implicit recent shot at Bukele, asserting that no leader in the region unwilling to tackle corruption would be considered a U.S. ally. And the outlet that interviewed Gonzalez? El Faro, the very one subject to the retaliatory investigation.

Congressional criticism of Bukele is mounting as well. Rep. Norma Torres (D-CA) and Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ, and chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Latin America) sent a letter to Bukele urging him to refrain from stoking divisions and violence ahead of the country’s February legislative elections. And at the end of the Trump Administration, legislation supported by Democrats barring El Salvador from accessing a State Department program that finances the purchase of American weapons was adopted into law. The same bill authorizes targeted sanctions on government officials in Central America’s Northern Triangle — which includes El Salvador — who have undermined democratic institutions. What is clear is this: Congress and the White House are distancing themselves from Bukele’s El Salvador, and quickly.

With Donald Trump in the White House, aspiring autocrats like Bukele, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Bolivia’s former president Jeanine Áñez thrived free from American concerns about the rule of law and democracy. Without a course correction that prioritizes human rights and withdraws unconditional support for Bukele, democracy in El Salvador may be lost for good.

One Face, One World: The Life and Legacy of Sultan Qaboos bin Said

As the world reels from the gravity of the COVID-19 pandemic, unmanageable civil unrest, and widespread political upheaval, it is easy to lose sight of seemingly smaller events. For many living in the United States and the Western world, the passing of Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said on January 10th, 2020 was little more than a passing headline. But for the people of Oman, the death of their reigning monarch represented the end of an era. Bereavement did not fail to extend outside of the country however, as family and officials in Muscat received condolences from leaders worldwide. From Kenya to Pakistan and across the Middle East, Omanis everywhere shouldered their grief with the plethora of kings, presidents, and prime ministers who had the distinct honor of meeting the Sultan. It is hard to fathom the impact of such a man upon Oman and the region. Why did the death of one man elicit such an outpouring of sympathy from leaders across the world? How is it that this natural cycle of a noble’s ascension, rule, death, and succession to the next ruler would cause tens of thousands to gather in Muscat for his funeral? 

In order to understand this subject, I paid a visit to the Omani Embassy in Washington, DC to interview Marwan al-Balushi, the Information Attaché. Meeting Mr. Al-Balushi for the first time, I am kindly greeted and welcomed into his office with a firm handshake before he instructs me to take a seat as he quickly darts out of the room. His office is tidied and neat, and as I adjust myself on the couch he has pointed me toward, I notice Sultan Qaboos’ royal portrait hung adjacent to that of his successor: Sultan Haitham bin Tariq. The gazes of both are intense but temperate, exuding a wisened calm into the room which is only added onto by the traditional Arabic music coming from Mr. Al-Balushi’s computer. Moments later when my interviewee returns, he carefully hands me a piping hot jigger of rich coffee, which he tells me is a classic Omani brew. Little bigger than a shot glass, it only takes a few sips of the uniquely spiced coffee before I’m jolted awake. After sharing some pleasantries and outlining the purpose of my presence at the embassy that day, Mr. Al-Balushi excitedly reaffirms his commitment to aiding in my understanding, and we begin the interview.

Where It All Began

I first ask for him to offer me an understanding of Sultan Qaboos’ accomplishments and policies, but before doing so, Mr. Al-Balushi insists that “a history of Oman is required” to put everything into perspective. “The time before Sultan Qaboos unmet the aspirations of its people,” he begins. “Oman was isolated, cut off from the world, and largely underdeveloped—there were only three schools in the entirety of the country.” In spite of its rich, triumphant history, it is true that the decades preceding Sultan Qaboos were a low point for the great nation. For instance, as can be seen from this biography of the time prior to Sultan Qaboos’ tenure, Taimur bin Feisal (Qaboos’ grandfather), was so disinterested in running his own country that he exiled himself to India to separate himself from the responsibility of managing Oman. Marked by a power feud between the imamate and sultanate—or the religious and political heads of state—then-Sultan Said bin Taimur significantly isolated the country and stagnated its industries. By the late-1960s, as the Sultan waged war with the Marxist guerilla group the Dhofar Liberation Front, the British had decided that Said bin Taimur had become too much trouble. Realizing his rule could not be legitimized through conquest alone, in July of 1970, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office aided in the coup d’état which placed bin Taimur’s son, Qaboos bin Said, upon the throne. As a July 27th, 1970 article from the New York Times writes, the Sultan expressed “I have watched with growing dismay and increasing anger the inability of my father to use the new‐found wealth of this country for the needs of its people. That is why I have taken control.”

Of course, it begs the question: Why was Britain so intent on managing Oman? Furthermore, where was this organized socialist opposition in the form of the DLF coming from? To the first point, Britain’s focus on Omani stability stemmed from the profound connection that Britain has possessed in relation to Oman since the late 1920s. At that time, Oman was technically two loosely-connected states comprising of Muscat (the coast) and Oman (the interior). These two states were essential in the consolidation of the London-based Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). This monopolization of the Omani oil industry by the British contributed to the disunity of Oman and their further desire to stabilize it under Sultan Qaboos. As for the Dhofar Rebellion, much of this disturbance may be traced to the geographical vicinity of the Dhofar Governate in Oman to Yemen, which at the time was the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Fundamentally dedicated to spreading Marxism across the Arabian Peninsula, the DLF was a conglomeration of transnational irregular fighters which waged an almost 10-year war on the sultanate. With Qaboos’ successful stabilization efforts as well as armed support from the British and Imperial Persia, the Dhofar Rebellion finally ceased to be a significant entity by 1976.

A Step in the Right Direction

Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman redefined the responsibility of the government to its people, and substantially improved human rights and quality of life nationwide. Rather than hoarding the wealth to his own private treasury, Qaboos used the renter income from Oman’s petroleum industry to finance infrastructure projects, healthcare, education, and agriculture improvements. From 1960 to 2000, Oman’s infant mortality rate fell dramatically, from 169 for every 1,000 to just 18 for every 1,000.  “Improving the lives of workers was a big task for the Sultan,” Al-Balushi tells me, “and there are plenty of stories of the Sultan himself travelling the country, hearing out the personal stories of his countrymen and recommending them to the government for federal work. Occasionally, he even used his private wealth to pay outstanding family debts.” In some ways, Oman remained authoritarian and restricted. While Sultan Qaboos granted universal suffrage to all those over 21 in 1996 under Oman’s first constitution, “unauthorized public gatherings remained prohibited.” Compared to the state of Oman prior to 1970, however, the living standards for the average citizen dramatically increased with the ascension of Sultan Qaboos.

Oman additionally experienced a revolution to its very political system. “The old government style was referred to as barza,” Al-Balushi explains, “a decentralized form more akin to tribal rule than centralized power.” He goes on to explain how Sultan Qaboos introduced a bicameral system consisting of the houses of shura and dawla (equivalent to the American House of Representatives and Senate respectively). While the dawla is made up of appointed officials, the introduction of a democratically-elected shura was an incredible step in allowing for formal representation in the Omani political process. Unlike his father, Qaboos additionally introduced a system of “10-year advisors”, meant to legitimize a formerly informal system of consultants to the sultan as it had existed for centuries prior. This interest in a parliamentary system is unsurprising of course, given Qaboos’ education at Oxford and Britain’s Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst. But it was because of his broadening of political communications—for instance, joining the UN and Arab League in 1971—that allowed Oman to place the foundation for its foreign policy later.

Sultan Qaboos’ Foreign Policy

This brought us to the question of how the late sultan conducted his foreign policy. Al-Balushi explained that “the Sultan lived by, I would say, three core tenants: respect your neighbor, no intervention, and no agenda in other countries.” These pillars of Qaboos’ philosophy in relation to foreign nations is what has allowed Oman to remain on such stable terms with its neighbors and across the waters over the decades. Joseph Kechichian of the RAND Corporation expressed this in his piece covering Omani diplomacy. For Kechichian and other scholars, it was Qaboos’ “balancing [of] interests, tolerance toward differences, and a determined search for mutual benefits” that managed to skyrocket Oman’s prevalence on the world stage as a mediator during conflict. Al-Balushi chuckles lightly before stating “There’s a funny story, actually. During the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, Oman was involved with the US-led coalition, and it formally condemned Sadam’s invasion. But when all other countries cut ties with Iraq, Oman was the only one to maintain its embassies in both Kuwait and Iraq.” This is confirmed by Kechichian in his article, and is frequently told to embody the spirit of Omani foreign policy. For Sultan Qaboos, there was no such thing as stepping away from the negotiating table.

Oman’s foreign policy has not gone without scrutiny however, and its involvement with some countries like Yemen has remained split to this day. On one hand, as Al-Balushi details, “following Oman’s war with Yemen early in Sultan Qaboos’ reign, he tried everything to connect with Yemen and ease tensions.” Indeed, Oman had previously opened its first consulates with Yemen under Sultan Qaboos, and had been involved in an attempt to jumpstart the Yemeni oil industry. But with the collapse of the Yemeni political system and the civil war there, Oman has come into shaky conflict with its fellow neighbors. For instance, in 2016 Oman was accused of smuggling arms to the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, against the wishes of the Saudi-backed Gulf Cooperation Council. Oman similarly came into conflict with the rest of the Arab World following Egypt’s recognition of Israel in 1979. Oman stood with only Sudan and Somalia in maintaining relations with Anwar Sadat for what was considered an ultimately controversial decision. These examples serve as instances where Omani neutrality has served as a technicality for Middle Eastern countries to condemn it for its contradictory policies or inaction.

But this is where the uniqueness of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy comes into play. “He wanted one face and one world,” Mr. Al-Balushi continues. “Oman was about respect for human rights—even when it came to Israel and Palestine, Sultan Qaboos stood firm that any decision should be made in the respect of the rights of both parties to their sovereign determination. It is why Oman supports the legitimate and just demands of the Palestinian people of an independent Palestine with a capital in East Jerusalem, while simultaneously upholding the Arab Peace Initiative and a two-state solution.” Like with his general rule of non-interventionism, Sultan Qaboos was an advocate for universal equality and outcomes that benefited both parties. The reason why the story of Oman’s response to the Gulf War is so notable is because it shows a line of consistency. Just as in the recognition of Israel in 1979, Oman remained steadfast in supporting its ally in Egypt and not caving to the pressure of denouncing Sadat’s action so harshly. Meanwhile, not only are the claims of Houthi rebels being aided in the Yemeni conflict unreliable given Oman’s mediation of both sides, but Oman has remained steadfast in its conviction to holding no favorites. 

Remembering Sultan Qaboos bin Said

Recalling his experience with the phenomenon of Sultan Qaboos’ public image and how it has changed over time carefully, Mr. Al-Balushi illustrates how differences have been settled by telling me of how different the Arab Spring was for Oman. “Where other countries had protestors calling for the heads of state to be removed, the people of Oman said no. ‘We love you Sultan Qaboos, just not the ministers.’” This trend continued throughout the 2011 protests in Oman, as Omani civilians expressed “We love His Majesty, but there are problems we need to fix.” Al-Balushi continues, “Even then, you know what happened? Sultan Qaboos listened to his people.” Sure enough, Sultan Qaboos responded by firing a third of his cabinet in addition to helping the people directly by promising 50,000 government jobs and the opening of a second public university. Ultimately, the people of Oman were happy with the outcome of their protests, and praised the Sultan for his handling of the unrest.

As I am about to finish the interview, I ask Mr. Al-Balushi to try summarizing how Sultan Qaboos’ legacy will live on. Looking out the window as if in deep thought, Marwan’s eyes lightly water as he recalls “There are only two times in my life that I have cried. One of those times was upon the death of Sultan Qaboos.” Pausing to collect himself, he continues: “Sultan Qaboos crafted a new Oman and a new country from nothing, and he has crafted a foundation for everyone after him. I mean no disrespect, but Americans don’t understand. In the United States, in the West, politicians are temporary figures meant to serve three or four years. Their title and their position are their job and they are looked at like a worker. In Oman, Sultan Qaboos was more than that. He was not only a king; he was a father to everyone. He respected his country, and so his country respected him.”

A cynic will look at Oman and see an absolutist monarchy with little in the way of oversight as in the Western democracies. But this is not an endorsement of every policy and procedure under Sultan Qaboos. It is that there is a trust in the system, unique to Oman, which has allowed the country to thrive in the years following Sultan Qaboos’ ascension to the throne. It largely works because of the “kind of people the Omani people are" as Mr. Al-Balushi describes it. “We are a tolerant and an open-minded people. You want to go to a mosque, you go to a mosque, or you want to go to an opera, you go to an opera. You will find some Omani women with head scarves, and others without. That is what the Omani people are about.”

There is no way to completely predict what is in store for Oman or its people in the years to come. But if one thing is for certain, it is that Sultan Haitham bin Tariq has some big shoes to fill with the passing of Sultan Qaboos bin Said only a short while ago. If Oman is to survive as a unified people, they must continue to uphold the values of their beloved sultan: tolerance, rule of law, mutual respect, and spiritual passion. One can only hope that these principles are adopted by others around the world, and that a more stable Middle East and international order may be crafted from them.

Comparing Trump and Biden's Foreign Policy

It’s a new day in Washington D.C.. With the swearing in of Joseph R. Biden over, and the confirmation of his cabinet members well underway, the Biden administration has commenced overturning several key policy themes of the previous administration, from climate change to civil rights. One contentious area where drastic changes have yet to occur, however, is foreign policy. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has quickly set about contacting his counterparts across the globe, and the Paris Climate Agreement has been rejoined - but on many pressing issues, the tone is all that has changed. 

With the presidential campaign heating up amidst a global pandemic killing hundreds, if not thousands of Americans daily, deteriorating race relations reaching a breaking point after the murders of George Floyd, Ahmad Arbury, and Breonna Taylor, and the largest economic downturn on record since the Great Depression, it is perhaps unsurprising that foreign relations were low on the list of priorities in debates, speeches, or press releases. Russia, one area that was always a little bit too relevant for the Trump administration, did arise on the campaign trail, with President Biden lambasting Trump for his lack of action against Russian President Vladimir Putin, in wake of the startling news that Putin was paying bounties to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan. While the Trump administration has been characterized by its lenience in the face of election interference and bounties on American troops alike, they have not been quite so steadfast in China-US relations, where they swung wildly between hosting Chinese President Xi Jinping for a summit and getting into a trade war that, at least according to Vice President Kamala Harris, the US has lost. Biden has advocated for, firstly, taking a harder stance on human rights from Hong Kong to the Uyghur genocide, and secondly, applying pressure on China’s trade practices. Biden’s advisers have touted some aspects of Trump’s China policy as worth continuing, such as the economic and diplomatic pressure placed on Beijing over things such as trade practices and technology theft. These advisers have held more fault with Trump’s erratic, brash statements than the policy itself. There is a similar disconnect between policy and rhetoric in the Middle East; while Trump and Biden had a shared goal of withdrawing troops, Trump insisted, publicly and often, that troops would be pulled out on a strict timeline that never materialized. On the other hand, President Biden struck a more cautious tone, saying withdrawal was contingent on the meeting of benchmarks that have yet to be determined. 

Much of Biden’s foreign policy appears to be a return to the Obama years, a strategy that fits neatly into his overall message about a return to normalcy. Included in this return to normalcy is reaffirming our commitment to NATO and the Iran nuclear deal which Trump pulled out of directly, imposing sanctions that hurt Iran's economy and resulted in an increase in nuclear activity. While some leftists have criticized Biden for failing to promise more progressive foreign policy, many have argued that Trump damaged both relations with allies and the very institution of American diplomacy to the point that it needs to be walked back to a baseline and stabilized before any more action is taken. One area that illustrates this is Afghanistan - Trump campaigned on pulling troops out, and the administration brokered a deal with the Taliban calling for US troops to leave by mid-2021. Biden has refused to commit to a definitive end date, insisting that conditions on the ground must be monitored closely. This is not to say Biden is taking no action on foreign policy at all - beyond rejoining supranational institutions such as the Paris Climate Agreement, World Health Organization, NATO, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, he has also swiftly reversed some actions of the Trump administration, such as the “Muslim ban, a travel ban that restricted citizens of primarily Muslim countries from immigrating to the United States. Continuing in this vein, President Biden has pledged to take a stance on refugees that is more humanitarian than isolationist, in a sharp turnaround from the Trump administration’s cap of 15,000 annually. Indeed, Biden is even surpassing the Obama administration’s cap of 85,000, to admit 125,000 refugees annually. 

While on the campaign trail, almost exactly a year ago, President Biden laid out his foreign policy proposal, full of idealism and promises for direct action, in Foreign Affairs magazine. Included in this were a laundry list of changes, a “day-one down payment on our commitment to living up to democratic values at home.” Among these were the reversal of the Trump administration’s highly controversial family separation policy, reaffirming the ban on torture, more transparency in US military operations, and restoring a government-wide focus on lifting up women and girls around the world. Later, he would propose a “global Summit for Democracy,” calling democratic leaders and civil society organizations around the world to America to “put strengthening democracy back on the global agenda”. 

While the Summit for Democracy seems to have been put on the back burner, global leaders seem unequivocally relieved to have someone with foreign policy experience and diplomatic chops in the White House again. Biden is uniquely suited to repair America’s image abroad, having served twice as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and having met with close to 150 foreign leaders from nearly 60 countries. Anne Hidalgo, the mayor of Paris, provided perhaps the best endorsement of Biden’s positive image abroad, tweeting “Welcome back America” shortly after the election.

In his first hundred days, beyond the myriad domestic crises occurring, Biden has been left with a series of increasingly alarming international crises, the Trump administration’s parting gift. In his lame duck days, Trump set about damaging the last reachable parts of Obama’s foreign policy legacy that Biden came in hoping to rebuild. As Raffaello Pantucci, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore put it, “The Trump administration is locking in place a series of conflicts that change the starting point for Biden walking into office on the world stage.” In his last days in office, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo oversaw legislation and statements that named Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism, planned to designate the Houthi rebels in Yemen as a foreign terrorist organization, and lifted restrictions on contact between American officials and Taiwanese officials. This last shift in policy is particularly dangerous, diplomatically speaking, as it threatens to wreak havoc on a fragile peace struck by decades of building US-China relations. Since the US established formal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China in 1979, it has refrained from having official diplomatic relations with China - until now. 

All in all, it is easy to believe that there will not be a seismic shift in foreign policy with the transition of power, but rather in rhetoric. Restoring moral leadership and soft power as cornerstones of American foreign policy are priorities of the Biden administration - the Summit for Democracy is simply the manifestation of a desire to showcase the commitment to returning strengthening global democracy to a priority. While Biden may be focusing on rebuilding the moral aspects of US foreign policy, Trump focused mainly on economic and security ideas - translating, policy-wise, to a priority on peace and international cooperation for the former, and prosperity and safety for the latter.

In the foreign policy proposal published in March 2020, just as the COVID-19 pandemic was gathering strength, Biden pledged, “As president, I will take immediate steps to renew U.S. democracy and alliances… This is not a moment for fear. This is the time to tap the strength and audacity that took us to victory in two world wars and brought down the Iron Curtain.” It is almost ironic, Biden calling for Americans to not be afraid, directly before one of the most tumultuous years in American history, before a year that would see hundreds of thousands dead from the pandemic, millions unemployed, widespread civil unrest, and an insurrection that killed five and very nearly resulted in the assassination of multiple members of Congress. If we tapped into our reserves of strength and audacity to lead us to victory in two world wars and brought down the Iron Curtain abroad, America will need to dig deeper than ever before to heal our own divisions before we attempt to lead the world again. It remains to be seen whether the actions taken thus far are just the first step in Biden’s self described “return to soft power,” or yet another area where the American people will have to say, as Greta Thunberg put it, “while we do appreciate beautiful speeches and promises - we prefer action”.

Trump’s Legacies in China: Lessons Biden Can Learn

Introduction

President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from international institutions, and subsequently the international arena, has left rising powers such as China to undermine the liberal world order. The US has classified China as a revisionist power on the basis that China is exploiting global rules and norms in favor of its own interests over the interests of others. Yet, President Trump’s approach towards China does not prevent China from taking advantage of the US and will have long lasting implications for the future of US-China relations. Before President Trump, disagreements between China and the United States over trade, human rights, and cybersecurity already existed. President Trump’s strategy towards China did not resolve these issues but exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems. President Trump’s attempt at holding China accountable for taking advantage of the US economy, intellectual property, and institutions have pushed the two countries to the brink of war. With Joseph Biden winning the 2020 US Presidential election, American allies, scholars on US-China relations, and citizens of both countries are paying close attention to what President-elect Biden’s approach to China will look like. Based on the current tensions between the US and China, it is likely that the confrontational approach of President Trump will continue under Biden. The enduring implications of President Trump’s foreign policy towards China has lessons in which President-elect Biden can learn and develop a more effective way of dealing with the superpower.

Lessons Biden Can Learn From 

Lesson #1: Trade disputes can be resolved by economic tools other than tariffs, and trade agreements should address structural issues.

President Trump has regularly prided himself on the fact that he is a businessman and believes his skills will help the US gain a competitive advantage over China in trade. In the summer of 2018, Trump began his lengthy trade war with China by imposing tariffs on thousands of Chinese manufactured products. Before the trade war, the Chinese economy was already showing signs of slowing economic growth. Therefore, the trade war further impacted China’s economy. The tariffs that Trump imposed significantly impacted Chinese manufacturers who saw a decline in exports to the US by more than 12%. The trade war exacerbated China’s existing sluggish economic growth and forced smaller businesses to exit the market. 

Despite the negative impact of the tariffs on China’s economy, the real evaluation of the trade deal Trump negotiated with Beijing is whether it benefits the American people. Trump’s trade war has received much criticism from economists and scholars who argue that the cost outweighs the benefits. US consumers who have to pay higher prices for imported goods are taking the brunt of the high tariffs. A study conducted by Moody’s Analytics estimates that the trade deal has caused the US to lose more than 300,000 jobs and reduced US GDP by 0.3% in just one year into the trade deal. The US is not a price setting country which means that the tariffs did not lower the world market price of imports. In other words, the impact of higher tariffs is fully passed on to US consumers and businesses. Tariffs are not the best economic tool in dealing with China. For instance, Tom Giovanetti, president of Institute for Policy Innovation, argues that a more effective way of dealing with trade disputes with China is to use the World Trade Organization and other international economic institutions to pressure them. President Trump either did not get consider or understand the impact of tariffs on American people and firms before he enacted the tariffs. Another downside to tariffs in the trade war with China is that it does not address the structural issues that are behind the origin of China’s economic expansion. For example, Ana Swanson and Alan Rappeport explain how cybersecurity issues such as hacking are linked to trade and remain unsolved in Trump’s trade deal with China. Another issue Swanson and Rappeport bring up is the failure of Trump to address China’s currency manipulation and subsidization of goods by the Chinese government which allows the “cheap goods to flood the United States.” Without addressing the structural issues linked to trade, the US cannot stop China from taking advantage of the global economy. Therefore, the lesson that Biden should take away from Trump’s trade negotiations with China is that a successful trade deal should consist of effective methods that do not involve tariffs and address structural problems associated with China’s unjust economic practices.

Lesson #2: Multilateralism is one of America’s best tools for addressing transnational issues.

US democracy and the US-led liberal order is under threat due to the Trump administration. During Trump’s presidency, he withdrew the US out of several international institutions thus abandoning multilateralism and the spread of US democracy. Some of the international organizations Trump has pulled out of include the Paris Agreement, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The most important implication of Trump’s unilateral “America first” approach is allowing revisionist powers such as China to shape the international rules and institutions that the US once founded. 

As seen in China’s creation of the Belt and Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, China’s goal is not simply to surpass the US in the global economy, but to replace the US-led liberal world order. Therefore, the more crucial conflict between the US and China is over ideology. The ideological nature of the conflict makes it more important to emphasize multilateralism as a way to counteract China’s threat to the liberal world order. William Moreland, a research analyst at the Brookings Institution, explains that the three main dimensions to multilateralism are “measured collaboration on shared challenges, revitalize to provide for deconfliction and crisis off-ramps, and compete selectively both with existing institutions and via new ones to better defend democratic values against authoritarian rivals.” In other words, multilateralism creates a support system of similar ideologically based countries. Although Trump rejected multilateralism on issues such as the environment and economy, in the past year, he has started to restore friendly relations with allies in Europe to address cybersecurity challenges Western countries face from Chinese tech companies such as Huawei. Some cybersecurity challenges that China poses include state-sponsored espionage, threatening and monitoring dissenters abroad, and intellectual property theft. President Trump’s efforts in persuading European countries to divest from China’s 5G network and technology companies have been successful so far. For example, Britain, Germany, and Sweden are countries who have most recently succumbed to President Trump’s pressure to not use Chinese technology. As more countries join the US-Europe front to halt Chinese tech, China will eventually run out of markets to sustain Chinese tech companies and be forced to play by global rules and norms. In the aspect of cybersecurity, President Trump has started an effective multilateralism campaign to address challenges with Chinese tech. However, President Trump’s multilateralism ignores a core aspect of US values which is human rights. President Trump has ignored China’s human rights violations against the Xinjiang Uyghur population, due to a “fear of jeopardizing trade talks with Beijing.” By upholding one aspect of the liberal world order at the expense of human rights is contradictory and can undermine the coherence of the ideologies that created multilateralism in the first place. During President-elect Biden’s campaign for the presidency, he made remarks vowing to “renew trust in American international engagement and leadership” which will restore disbanded international agreements and strengthen existing multilateralism with US allies. Biden’s track record on emphasizing American leadership in the international system and continued cooperation with US allies will help the US restore core democratic principles that were undermined during the Trump administration. 

Lesson #3: Rash decisions lead to misperceptions about the opponents actions and escalate tensions between the two countries. 

China is the world’s second largest economy next to the US and is projected to surpass US GDP in around a decade. There exists a debate within the field of international economics about whether China will actually surpass the US since there are signs that its economy is slowing down. Despite the debate between scholars on whether China will be able to sustain its rise, however, facts show that China is projecting its influence and coercing regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In other words, the US is no longer in an asymmetrical power relationship with China. 

As the power dynamic between the US and China shifts from an asymmetrical relationship to a symmetrical relationship, there needs to be a change in the US approach towards China. The US is no longer in a more powerful position to make China subordinate to the US. China has responded to the US’s attempts to avert China by mimicking US actions against China. This places the US and China in a tit-for-tat strategy. An example of the tit-for-tat strategy playing out in US-China relations recently is President Trump’s order that restricted Chinese graduate students and researchers from attending American universities this past summer. Beijing responded to President Trump’s order by similarly, restricting and detaining US academic scholars and journalists in China. The initial provocation started by President Trump led to an escalation of US-China relations into a “hostage diplomacy” scenario. President Trump’s decision to detain and exclude Chinese graduate students and researchers sends a message to Americans to view “Chinese students as perpetrators of espionage and intellectual property theft.” President Trump’s action merely shifts the blame on Chinese academic scholars which for the most part is not involved in problems involving China’s economy, human rights, cybersecurity, etc. President Trump’s short-sighted decision to block students fuels xenophobia and does not answer the underlying issues of intellectual property theft by China. China responded to President Trump’s order to restrict Chinese students and researchers by initiating similar threats against US researchers and journalists which instantly escalate the existing conflict between the two countries. Therefore, as China’s power becomes just as compelling as the US, the Biden administration’s foreign policy towards China needs to emphasize decisions that can help achieve long-term goals as opposed to short-term reactionary decisions. Long-term preventive measures also have the benefits of being able to negotiate with China beforehand to prevent retribution of an action on the US. 

Adapting to Change in the New Era of US-China Relations 

By the time President Trump leaves the Oval Office, US-China relations will not be where it was previously. The change in US-China relations is not only due to decisions President Trump made during his presidency, but also the evolving nature of China and its relationship with other countries. The confrontational foreign policy approach President Trump has employed on dealing with China helped make clear China’s intentions and the problems the incoming administration needs to address. However, President Trump’s way of dealing with China has also led to a decline in US engagement in international agreements and organizations. Therefore, there needs to be a better strategy to address China’s unjust practices. Decisions based on short term reactionary impulses will not solve the underlying issues China presents because it undermines certain pillars of US foreign policy (i.e., human rights) for economic or political advantages and lacks long term preventive measures. 

The incoming Biden administration needs to be aware of the evolving nature of China and other countries. The actions that were taken during the President Trump administration or previous administrations are not going to be effective in dealing with China in a new international environment. An adaptive strategy that acknowledges China’s rise, but also addresses the violations and challenges China poses for the US in terms of sustaining its international competitive edge and democratic values is necessary to effectively deal with China. During Trump’s presidency there was an attempt to establish superiority and contain China which has colonialist overtones and can exacerbate the existing tensions between the two countries. The new administration’s goals with China should not be one that emphasizes dominating China, instead it should be one that focuses on establishing preventive measures and addressing China’s existing misconduct and foster a more cooperative relationship based on common goals. The US and China are the two largest countries in terms of GDP and representatives of the two opposing ideologies in contemporary times which makes it more important for a new strategy that is focused on long-term preventive measures and foster a favorable atmosphere for cooperation.

Worlds Collide: The Significance of the Abraham Accord and the Future of the Middle East

Introduction

On September 9th, Christian Tybring-Gjedde—member of the Norwegian parliament and populist Progress Party—nominated US president Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Tybring-Gjedde was shortly followed by Swedish MP Magnus Jacobsson, and most recently four Australian law professors led by Dr. David Flint. All of these come ahead of the recent peace deals between Israel and the Persian Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. These three parties have issued their support for Trump on grounds of their personal appreciation for his sentiments regarding the corruption of Western governments and unfettered immigration. This is not even the first time Tybring-Gjedde has espoused his support for Donald Trump, with the MP formally nominating Trump in 2018. The peace deal in the Middle East instead serves to underline how these individuals have interpreted the success of Donald Trump’s administration at home and abroad. Understandably, a fair deal of press has begun to circulate over this issue. Not only has partisan debate arisen concerning the nature of the deals themselves, but additionally over whether the President is deserving of these nominations. 

In regards to the Abraham Accord (the Israeli-Emirati treaty), the Director for the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated: “This will radically change the way Arab states will deal with each other and their problems.” Not only is this a win for Israel and its people, it is telling of a marketed shift away from the hegemonic control of Saudi Arabia and more autonomy in how the Gulf States—and the Arab World as a whole—deal with interstate issues. However, other commentators are less impressed. In mid-August, Steven A. Cook of the Center on Foreign Relations (CFR) correctly predicted Bahrain’s deal, but noted silence from Saudi Arabia and opposition from Qatar, Turkey, and most notably Iran. 

Similarly, Trump’s nomination has received an apparent partisan reaction. For Republicans, these peace deals have provided an easy point of praise for the Trump administration in the foreign policy realm. Jared Kushner—who was heavily involved with the deal—took the opportunity to praise Donald Trump for his “historic peace effort”. Alabama 2nd District candidate Barry Moore similarly expressed that the UAE-Bahrain-Israel peace deal was “truly a historic moment”. Opponents to Trump have conversely flipped his praise to contrast it with his failings in the foreign policy arena. Some have claimed that Trump has destroyed the US reputation for foreign policy entirely, and that this is only a drop in the bucket in a history of failures. This is the same debate which has prompted whether the successful Middle East summit is truly a landmark win.

Aside from partisan divides in Congress, negative reactions to the Abraham Accord have gained traction mostly out of their comparative analyses. Though some journalists praise the work of Trump’s Emirati-Bahraini delegation in securing the treaty, they report that this success follows a similar trend of foreign policy in the Trump Administration. Rather than nurturing friendships and maintaining alliances, critics of the “Trump Doctrine” laude it for comprising of diplomatic stunts; policies made to impress and awe rather than inspire change. For instance, Trump’s talks with North Korea are lauded as an act of grand-standing. They do more to inflate the ego of the administration than do anything productive.

Still, supporters and opponents alike argue the possible historic weight of these talks. Rather than looking to the past to influence policy in the Middle East, the Abraham Accords have attempted to “look forward”. Where treaties with other countries have been mostly done out of a means to discontinue armed conflict and align interests with the US, the Abraham Accords have been signed purely out of the interest of opening new roads for discussion with Israel and paving the road to increased measures of diplomacy in the region. The ramifications of the Abraham Accords are far-reaching, and it’s necessary to grasp them fully before judging the weight of them completely.

Before the Abraham Accord

It is no secret that Middle Eastern politics are complicated, but they become near unnavigable when the debate over Israel is thrown into the mix. The origin of this issue has to do with the creation of Israel post-World War II to give a homeland for displaced Jews. This decision fell in line with proposals from Zionists since the dawn of the 20th century, who were eager to escape persecution in the West by having their own ethnic homeland. Unfortunately, regardless of historical claims to the region, over the millennia, the region had become home to a significant Muslim Arab population. In a textbook example of decolonization, the British Mandate of Palestine was partitioned to arbitrarily grant land to the new Jewish population. As history suggests, the outcome of this plan led to a bloody civil war. Although this civil war is long over, its outcome has culminated in a micro-level cold war between Israel and Palestine. 

The Arab World has had mixed approaches to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Historically, Arab leaders of Sunni and Shi’ite stripes opposed the state’s very creation, and went out of their way to avoid interaction with it. While more moderate clerics and liberal politicians have been open to acknowledging Israel’s existence and opening talks, few countries have been willing to open diplomatic relations. Prior to the Abraham Accord, the only Arab nations to have recognized Israel were Turkey (1949), Egypt (1979), and Jordan (1994). In spite of their recognition of Israel, there remain complications to their relationships.

Turkey’s recognition of the state of Israel was certainly important for the era, yet primarily derived from Western influence on Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. Egypt’s relations similarly came out of the involvement of the United States with the Camp David Accords. Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt, was seeking a closer alliance with the US and thus acted to service the broader interests of his own country. The treaty between Jordan and Israel was most deliberately influenced by the Westwith US president Bill Clinton politically pressuring and promising to forgive Jordanian debts for a peace deal with Israel after years of conflict. None of the countries who signed peace deals possess a significant amount of kindness toward Israel in their populace. According to an opinion poll from Vox, as of 2013, Turkey and Egypt held a favorability rating of Israel amounting to 8% and 1% respectively. Much of Jordan’s population is descendent from Palestinian refugees, who near-universally view Israel and its Jewish population with animosity.

The source of this animosity between Arabs and Israelis is at once simple and complicated. According to the Anti-Defamation League, well over 74% of the Middle East harbors anti-semitic views. For everyday Arabs in the Middle East—specifically those of the Muslim faith—Israel is an extension of Western imperialism and Jewish conspiracy. Thus, Zionism (the ideology advocating for the establishment of a Jewish state, specifically in the historic area of Palestine), its advocates, and Israel itself must be eradicated. Although more liberal elements of the Middle East have tried to claim that they are simple anti-Israel rather than anti-Jewish, it is clear that this is merely a dog-whistle to justify anti-semitic policies in the Middle East.

However, the more complex part of this equation is that there are social and political barriers to peace between Israel and Arab states as well. While individuals in the region value their religion greatly—the very name of the Abraham Accord is an eponymous reference to Jews and Muslims being children of Abraham—support of Palestine remains a key issue for Arab officials. Bolder countries like Qatar have directly supported Palestinian paramilitary groups, but for a majority of the Middle East, the question of supporting Israel cannot even be approached because it effectively abandons their support for Palestine. Thus, not only are Israelis left with little hope due to cultural divides, but for political and social obstacles as well.

On a geopolitical scale, the Middle East’s concentration of power has gravitated toward Saudi Arabia in recent years, primarily in response to the growing threat of an Iranian superpower. The reasons for this are varied. There is certainly something to be found in the rivalry toward Sunni and Shi’a sects of Islam for which the Saudi and Iranian governments serve to respectively represent. In the absence of a modern caliph, modern Sunnis have the House of Saud to look to in the containment of the Shi’ite threat of the Ayatollah Khamenei. For modern Shi’a Muslims, the revolutionary theocracy of the Ayatollah is a necessity to spread a Pan-Islamic revolution outside of the bounds of Iran.

It is because of this divide between Muslims then that Middle Eastern states act mostly in allegiance to Saudi Arabia. For instance, it is the means for the Saudis (and to an extent the Qataris) to justify their intervention in the Yemeni Civil War in providing arms to fight against perceived Iranian influence and the growth of Shi’ite Islam. Thus, the common foe of Iran has served to unite the Gulf and Levant states around Saudi Arabia, just as the problem of Israel has served to divide them.

Impact of the Abraham Accord

Through the Abraham Accord, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have broken away from the common consensus among the Saudi-led coalition that Israel should be disavowed and Palestine should be supported. While the duo are far from the first countries in the Middle East to normalize relations with Israel, they do follow a common trend in the quest for closer relations with the United States by extension. These treaties represent more of a political move by the elite than a rising consensus among the populace. Whether the rest of the Arab World is to follow remains unclear, and highlights a discrepancy in the allegiance of these ambitious Gulf States to their counterparts as well as their hegemon: Saudi Arabia. 

To understand why the UAE and Bahrain agreed to normalize relations, a quick recap of recent events between the US and these countries is needed. The Abraham Accords point out that its signatories are “Recalling the reception held on January 28, 2020, at which President Trump presented his Vision for Peace.” The direct reference of this quote comes from the ambitions of the Trump administration to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. Critics of the plan—while noting its complexity and adherence to a two-state solution—have lambasted it for being too one-sided and giving preference to Israel over Palestine.

However, whether the Vision for Peace is possible is a digression. The point is that the involvement of the United States in this agreement is salient even in the wording. Mention of the United States are only made three times, but it is where they count: in outlining the US’ future involvement in a “Strategic Agenda for the Middle East” and in “Expressing deep appreciation to the United States for its profound contribution to this historic achievement”. Just as with the Camp David Accords, there is a reason that Donald Trump is an official signatory of this treaty: because it is part of a larger goal to divert states in the Middle East toward recognizing and opening ties with Israel.

Interestingly, just as with Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, neither the UAE nor Bahrain have particularly favorable views of Israel or its people. In the former, the lead-up to the Abraham Accord was one of skepticism and outrage toward the government. The phrase “Normalisation is Treason” trended among Emirati citizens, though particularly among ethnic Saudi youth. A petition—the Palestine Charter—opposing normalization reached more than one million signers from the Emirates. Only because of fear of government crackdown and the desire for a closer relationship with the US did Bahraini citizens quiet their dissent against the treaty. While the elites of these countries have signed the deal, its people are not so sure.

In addition, there are definitely ramifications for the greater Muslim World at stake, especially in the Gulf. Although Oman—and, surprisingly, Sudan—have agreed to seek relations with Israel, other states like Kuwait have condemned the treaty and Saudi Arabia has specifically demanded the condition of Palestine incorporating the Israeli-controlled Jerusalem as its capital for peace. Iran more ardently opposed the treaty alongside Turkey and the people of Palestine. These actors claimed that the peace deal of the UAE and Bahrain with Palestine was not only wrong, but a violation of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative which had been reaffirmed by both signing parties in 2017.

The future of the Middle East is an uncertainty. It is clear now that we will not be seeing a universal recognition in the Middle East of Israel any time soon—there is simply far too much ground to cover. But there is more to this peace deal than the outcome of Israeli sovereignty. For one: the Abraham Accord denotes a marked shift in the power dynamics of the Middle East. Where the UAE and Bahrain might have gone along with the indifference of the Saudis toward Israel—perhaps even outwardly supporting Palestinian revolutionaries—just a few years ago, this move has revealed a weak link in the armor of the Saudi coalition. Not only are the two Gulf states now more isolated from their Sunni brethren, but the alliance itself is now more unstable than it was previously.
Ultimately, what will be the final result of the Abraham Accord is hard to say. Brzezinski of the CSIS who I referenced earlier acknowledges: “The biggest losers are probably the Palestinians.” The heaviest role of the Middle East in refusing to acknowledge Israel was a sense of pan-Arab solidarity. Sans the influence of outliers, it was part and parcel of Middle Eastern policy since the Bush administration that Israel was in an underdog battle with the US in its ring against the rest of the Arab World. Now, it has put that dynamic into flux. While we will have to wait and see what the future holds, one can only hope that the redefinition of Middle Eastern policy will follow a more peaceful, more cooperative path in the wake of the Abraham Accord.

U.S. Policy Towards Saudi Arabia: The Up's and Down's

The United States’ (U.S.) policy towards Saudi Arabia restrains numerous determinants and interests. The U.S. considers the global market for oil, counterterrorism efforts, containing Iran, trade, and human rights when conducting policy towards the kingdom. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is significantly progressing as both countries share a number of interests in the Middle East. 

The U.S. trade in goods with Saudi Arabia has been steady since 1990. At that point in time, U.S. exports were $4 billion and imports were $10 billion, while in 2010, exports were $11.5 billion and imports were $31.4 billion. In 2019, exports so far have amounted to $8.9 billion and imports to $9.8 billion. Over the years there has been a pattern established where the total value of imports exceeds that of exports. The U.S. imports hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia, which is a crucial component of petroleum and natural gas, making it essential for U.S. energy needs. The U.S. then exports weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. 

Historically, the U.S. was dependent on oil from Saudi Arabia. However, the U.S supply of oil has changed. As of now, the U.S. is the top oil producer and the largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia in the production of crude oil. The U.S. has numerous reserves with various natural resources, including crude oil. As a result of technological advancement in oil extraction, U.S. oil production is expected to increase even more in the future. Though the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) continues to be the largest oil producer, non-OPEC countries such as the U.S. and Canada will contribute significantly to the growth of world oil supply. Despite this, Saudi Arabia is still an important player in the world market for oil.  As a key member of OPEC, Saudi Arabia is able to coordinate with other OPEC members in order to control oil prices through the manipulation of the oil supply. As a "swing producer," Saudi Arabia is able to influence the world market quickly and independently with its spare oil capacity.

Saudi Arabia is more important to U.S. interests because of its capacity to change the world price of oil than as an oil exporter. Even though the U.S. is a top exporter of oil, it is still dependent on the world price of oil as part of the global market. If Saudi Arabia increases its supply, the world price of oil would fall, which would harm U.S. oil producers. For example, if the U.S. imposed restrictions on imports of Saudi oil, U.S. oil refineries would experience a shortage, as Saudi Arabia imports an estimated five million barrels a day to the U.S. While the five million barrels Saudi Arabia imports is significant, the U.S. is in a position to replace that with oil imports from Canada or domestically produced crude oil. However, the cost to U.S. oil producers from a Saudi-led price drop would be considerably more detrimental to U.S. economic interests. 

Because Saudi Arabia plays a major role in controlling the global oil market, U.S.-Saudi policy should be governed by collaborating on the world price of oil rather than focusing on imports and exports. As top exporters, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia could collaborate to meet increasing oil demands from emerging economies. According to the World Bank, as developing nations' economies grow, their demand for fuel and consumer goods that are dependent on crude oil will also increase. This allows the U.S. to prioritize energy independence without weakening relations with Saudi Arabia. In the long run, policy focused on cooperating with Saudi Arabia on regulating the global oil market would benefit U.S. economic interests. 

U.S. energy policy extends beyond oil to nuclear energy within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which represented their willingness to cooperate on nuclear activities in medicine, industry, and electricity production. In 2018, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources Khalid al Falih discussed the potential for civil nuclear engagement, including new technology sharing. In 2019, the Trump Administration stated that it would share its nuclear technology if Saudi Arabia agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The U.S. must be especially wary of Saudi attempts to develop nuclear weapons considering escalating tensions with Iran in the aftermath of the crumbling Iran Nuclear Deal. However, if the U.S. pushes too hard for the enrichment and reprocessing restrictions, several U.S. Administration officials and nuclear advocates have argued that Saudi Arabia would search for nuclear cooperation with Russia or China. Therefore, the U.S. is constrained in its ability to push for IAEA inspections, which puts them in a difficult position since inspections are essential for nuclear security. It is necessary for the Trump Administration to demand IAEA inspections, as a nuclear conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran would be incredibly detrimental to U.S. national security. 

There have been a number of security-related events that have positively and negatively affected the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Shortly after the Cold War, the Gulf War that lasted from 1990 to 1991 strengthened U.S.-Saudi cooperation after half a million U.S. troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia in order to push back Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, Salafi jihadism was spreading in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. For political reasons, Saudi Arabia suppressed the internal Salafi opposition but did not react to transnational Salafi jihadism. Saudi Arabia did not want to have a conversation about Salafism domestically seeing as it was ideologically similar to jihad and Wahhabism, an ideology central to Saudi government institutions. U.S.-Saudi relations then worsened after Al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and conducted the September 2001 (9/11) attacks. Saudi Arabia denied any connection to Osama Bin Laden including financial connections to Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia additionally viewed the U.S. negatively after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Despite these events negatively affecting the U.S.-Saudi relationship, they have partnered together in counterterrorism efforts. For example, Al-Qaeda campaigned against the Saudi Arabian regime and conducted terrorist attacks there in 2003. After Saudi Arabia condemned Al-Qaeda following the 2003 terrorist attack, the U.S. cooperated with the kingdom in intelligence sharing and eliminating financial sources to jihadist groups. Like the U.S., Saudi Arabia views Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda's affiliates, ISIS, and Salafist-jihadist groups as a threat to Saudi national security. The U.S. believes that Saudi Arabia has improved its counterterrorism efforts since the 9/11 attacks, and it has been more involved in cooperative initiatives. For example, Saudi Arabia co-chairs the Counter-ISIL Finance Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, and since 2014, Saudi Arabia has prevented Saudis to travel abroad to support terrorist groups. In 2017, Saudi officials stated that they plan to contribute to stabilization efforts in Syria and get involved with Iraqi leaders. U.S.-Saudi relations also continued to cooperate because they have a shared interest in containing Iran, as it remains both a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East and a rival power of Saudi Arabia. 

It is necessary to examine the policies that continue the counterterrorism alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. because they face similar threats from common enemies. The U.S. benefits from having a counterterrorism partner in the Middle East, especially from a wealthy nation that has significant political influence over Arab states. The U.S. should ally with Saudi Arabia to contain Iran, especially because of the current high tensions between the three actors. U.S. and Iran tensions have recently escalated after potential military attacks and an Iranian shootdown of a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. If the U.S. were to get into a military confrontation with Iran, it is in U.S. national interest to cooperate with Saudi Arabia, where it could access Saudi air space and bases for troops. Thomas Lippman, Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, claims that Saudi Arabia is not crucial for U.S. security interests because its military capabilities are limited. The U.S. holds naval headquarters in Bahrain, maintains a large airbase in Qatar, and has troops in Kuwait and Djibouti, among many other areas. He claims that the U.S. should go by an "issue-by-issue basis" with Saudi Arabia, rather than maintaining a close partnership. I disagree with this point; even though the U.S. has strategic military bases in numerous areas in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is still an important asset for intelligence sharing, and using it for additional military space would be an added benefit of partnering with them.

Though Saudi Arabia has limited military capacity, the U.S. conducts arms sales and training and service support to strengthen the Saudi military. For example, there is the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG), which supervises U.S. defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia. In May 2017, President Trump indicated that the U.S. would continue strengthening bilateral defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia through arms sales. In 2019, Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale went to Saudi Arabia to meet with the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir. Secretary Hale emphasized the strong U.S.-Saudi partnership and shared interests in working with other regional partners to contain Iran's influence over the Middle East, as well as promote security and stability.

Encouraging dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is also in the U.S.’s security interests. Saudi Arabia has had a rocky relationship with Qatar for over twenty years as they have been concerned over Qatar's ties with Iran, in which Qatar provides natural gas reserves. In 2017, Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic relations with Qatar, closed its land borders, air space, and waters to Qatari vessels, and disallowed Saudi nationals from visiting Qatar, as well as demanded Qatari nationals to leave Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had claimed that Qatar supported terrorism, interfered with the domestic affairs of other Arab countries, and supported Iran's push to destabilize Saudi Arabia.

This is of significant concern to U.S. security interests in the Middle East. The U.S. has close defense cooperation, including in arms sales, with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Because the U.S. has major facilities in Qatar, it is in the national interest to attempt to fix Saudi Arabia's relationship with Qatar, as this broken relationship is unsuitable for U.S. security interests. If the two states went into military conflict, the U.S. would be in a difficult situation because it has defense cooperation with both countries. Picking sides would further the conflict and severe one or the other relationship.

Another current event pertaining to U.S. security and human rights interests in Saudi Arabia is the Yemen Civil War. The Trump and Obama Administrations have diplomatically supported Saudi Arabia's attempts to reintegrate the Hadi government, and have also provided logistical and intelligence support to their military operations. The Saudi-led coalition has contributed to Yemen civilian casualties, a humanitarian disaster, a blockage on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid to Yemen, the empowerment of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and Iranian support for the Houthis. Following a Saudi airstrike that killed numerous children in 2018, Lieutenant General Michael Garrett went to Saudi Arabia to pressure the government to investigate this accident. The Saudi-led coalition found that the accident violated the coalition's rules and recommended that it comes with punishment. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo additionally stated to Congress that authorities from both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are taking action in preventing the danger imposed on Yemeni civilians and infrastructure. 

U.S. arms sales and military support to the Saudi-led coalition have sparked debate within U.S. Congress. Proposed foreign military and commercial arms sales aligning with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) have been criticized by several Congress Members because Saudi Arabia has been using them for airstrikes in Yemen, which violates international humanitarian law. Congress has also attempted to investigate an instance where an exception was made under the AECA, allowing the Trump administration to continue selling weapons to Saudi Arabia without a required congressional review period. Those critical of the arms sales argue that the U.S. should instead share more advanced U.S. technology and increase training and intelligence support to the Saudi air force. Other members offered for the implementation of conditions for the Department of Defense activities and U.S. support for the coalition. Another proposed solution is for President Trump to withdraw U.S. military forces from Yemen missions. Numerous members proposed to require more oversight reporting on U.S. activities, disallow deployment of U.S. military personnel or U.S. funds to be used for specific goals in Yemen, and prohibit sales of a specific type of weapon to Saudi Arabia. On the other end of the debate, several members argue that U.S. support lessens Yemen civilian casualties by encouraging more human rights.

The U.S. is in a difficult position in the Yemen conflict. On one hand, both U.S. officials and Saudi Arabia have concerns about the Houthi movement due to its ties with Iran. Houthi forces additionally operate cross-border attacks to Saudi Arabia, which also threatens American citizens there. Both countries are concerned about armed threats from Al-Qaeda and Islamic State supporters in Yemen. Despite these concerns, there have been civilian casualties, mass displacement, and infrastructure damage caused by Saudi intervention using U.S. weapons. 

There should be a sense of compromise to this debate. The U.S. should not discontinue arms sales to Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia does not purchase U.S. arms, it will seek out other partners such as Russia and China. Russia and China would be less likely to have human rights concerns in Yemen and would not make any effort to hold the Saudi-led coalition accountable for its actions. However, the U.S. could terminate the sale of a specific type of weapon used in Saudi airstrikes. That way, it is a stronger signal to the Saudis that they should be careful of where they target. It is additionally important to not single out Saudi Arabia and claim that they are committing all of the humanitarian violations in the conflict. The Houthis and Iran are equally responsible. Therefore, it would not be tangible to simply discontinue arms sales to Saudi Arabia, because it would imply that Saudi Arabia is not there to bring a political solution to the issue. On the diplomatic side, the U.S. should continue encouraging a United Nations negotiated resolution that incorporates the GCC transition document which was signed and agreed to in 2011. 

Aside from Yemen, Saudi Arabia has a low record of domestic human rights as well. The Kingdom is run by Islamic sharia law, which does not allow freedom of expression, press, religion, or association, and political parties are prohibited as they are seen as going against the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia gives death sentences to crimes committed by minors and uses torture to interrogate alleged criminals and force confessions out of them. The government also unlawfully interferes with the privacy of families and homes. The government decides which media content can be public in order to maintain internal security and prevent chaos or division. Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist who lived abroad in "self-exile," was murdered by government agents in Istanbul, Turkey. In 2016, Saudi authorities banned Khashoggi from writing, appearing on television, and going to conferences because he had made critical statements about Saudi government officials. Per the U.S. State Department's 2018 report on human rights in Saudi Arabia, human rights activists were detained and later released but warned not to use social media for their activism or reach out to foreign diplomats, international human rights organizations, and travel outside the country. The use of torture has also been employed against detained human rights activists, including women who fought for the right to drive.

Dana Stroul, a former senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, states that human rights in Saudi Arabia can progress with the U.S. simply encouraging change. While the U.S. does not have a say in how to run another government, their assistance can help promote long-term change. For example, the Two Holy Mosques Scholarship Program admits 50,000 Saudi students each year to attend U.S. universities, which provides them an American-style education. These students go back home with ideas they have learned through this education. Though this is a catalyst for long-term change, it is better than telling Saudi Arabia what it should and shouldn't do. If there were a situation that went against U.S. interests, U.S. policy should be direct and question Saudi Arabia's actions. For example, the U.S. should condemn and outright state that it believes that Saudi imprisoned civil-rights activists should be let out. Additionally, the U.S. must be more forward with holding Saudi Arabia accountable for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Overall, it is better to maintain positive relations with Saudi Arabia to encourage human rights, because if the U.S. severs its economic, military, and strategic relations, then Saudi Arabia would turn towards powers such as China and Russia, which would not have much interest in encouraging respect for human rights. 

After discussing U.S. policy and interests in Saudi Arabia, it is reasonable to argue that the U.S. should continue keeping Saudi Arabia as a close security partner in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has the potential of being an even stronger U.S. ally in counterterrorism efforts and containment of Iran because it is a wealthy and influential nation in the region. In regards to human rights, there is a more likely chance that Saudi Arabia would cooperate with the U.S. rather than other powers, which may not consider the issue. Lastly, it is important to maintain economic relations with Saudi Arabia for the world market for oil and to take advantage of emerging economies in the long run. Though there are disagreements and a difference in views between the two nations, there are more benefits than disadvantages in their relationship.

The Myth of the Mideast Ally: The Moral and Strategic Failure of American Foreign Policy Toward Saudi Arabia

As a student of Latin America, I am in no way blind to the historical moral shortcomings (to put it lightly) of American foreign policy. When I lived in Asunción, Paraguay, my school’s first field trip was to the Museo de las Memorias, a museum housed in a former detention and torture center used by the Alfredo Stroessner regime. Stroessner was a Cold War-era dictator responsible for the deaths of thousands of his own citizens, and like many of his regional contemporaries, he was supported by the United States solely because he opposed communism. (A recent World Mind article brilliantly questions the legacy of Henry Kissinger, the architect behind these alliances.)

One would hope that the American foreign policy establishment recognized the damage wrought by decades of autocratic rule, learned from its mistakes, and then ceased the practice of abetting dictators in exchange for money and influence. Unfortunately, this iniquitous style of transaction remains in the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, as evidenced by the current American partnership with Saudi Arabia. In spite of a laundry list of human rights abuses and an enduring legacy of violent extremism perpetrated or enabled by the regime, the Trump Administration has not shied away from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (known as MBS), the charismatic young heir to the throne. Since taking office, President Trump has expanded operational support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, significantly increased weapons sales, and refused to acknowledge the crown prince's involvement in the gruesome assassination of Washington Post columnist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi.

The Administration argues that in our alliance with Saudi Arabia, the benefits outweigh the costs. Popular talking points center on money and combatting extremism; according to the executive branch, increased defense sector employment, cheap oil, and counterterrorism cooperation are invaluable to U.S. interests.

However, upon closer examination, all of these arguments fail to justify the American alliance with the Saudi regime, especially when placed in the context of the Kingdom’s atrocious domestic and foreign policies. By analyzing these policies, it becomes clear that such an alliance is not only immoral to the liberal internationalist, but also counterproductive for the conservative realist. The U.S. stands to gain nothing – neither as devout moralists nor cutthroat strategists – from the robust commercial, political, and military partnership with the Kingdom that the current administration goes great lengths to maintain and defend.

Saudi Human Rights Abuses and the Global Perception of the U.S.

During the spring of 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman embarked on a three-week tour of the United States as part of an ambitious attempt to revamp Saudi Arabia’s global image. Eager for a piece of the royal family’s opulence and influence, American investors, politicians, and movie stars rolled out the red carpet. Harvard University and MIT both welcomed the young prince. He visited Wall Street, Washington, and the Silicon Valley. He sat down with Oprah and dined with Morgan Freeman and Dwayne Johnson.

Would these individuals still entertain the crown prince if they were provided a detailed report of the Kingdom’s human rights record? If they could see the contrast between MBS’ extravagance and the plights of Saudi Arabia’s tremendously disadvantaged citizens? If they understood the extent of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen sparked by the Saudis and exacerbated by U.S. arms sales?

Although MBS’ American tour came some 10 months before the highly publicized October 2nd assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s prior transgressions were already widely known. According to the 2018 edition of the Human Right Watch (HRW) World Report, the Kingdom “has committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law” in Yemen, including scores of “unlawful attacks… some of which may amount to war crimes.” The report notes that coalition airstrikes have repeatedly struck “homes, markets, hospitals, schools, and mosques.” To date, an estimated 10,852 civilians have been killed or injured by coalition airstrikes.

Domestically, Saudi activists and dissidents are silenced, and women are subject to some of the most archaic laws in the world. The same HRW report details the arrest of numerous peaceful, pro-reform activists, some of whom received multi-year prison sentences and travel-bans. The Kingdom is known for its use of the death penalty, performed inhumanely and often for non-violent offenders, as well as torture; as recently as March 31st of this year, The Guardian reported that leaked medical documents describe up to 60 political prisoners suffering from “malnutrition, cuts, bruises and burns.” While Saudi women were recently granted the right to drive, the most critical regulation barring gender equality in the Kingdom remains in place: according to the BBC, under the “guardianship law,” a woman’s male relatives “[have] the authority to make critical decisions on her behalf.” As long as such a law exists, any concessions the regime makes to Saudi women’s rights activists should be considered insincere.

What do the crimes committed by one distant nation have to do with the U.S.? 100 years ago, when even the world’s hegemons largely operated within their own geographic regions, human rights abuses in a nation as far away as Saudi Arabia might not have demanded the attention of U.S. policymakers, but today is a different story. As long as the U.S. supports Saudi Arabia, it cannot expect to have the respect or cooperation of fellow nations as it attempts to shape the world order. Any American policies put forth in the name of peace, freedom of speech, or women’s rights are liable to objection by even our closest allies; for example, suspension of aid toward a nation due to human rights violations could be easily deemed hypocritical given the overwhelming security assistance we provide the Saudi regime. In such a case, the effect of American aid suspension would have diminished impact, as the international community might not be compelled to join.

In short, a lack of global moral standing means a lack of global influence, too. Surely, arms deals that have limited impact on the American economy are not worth our ability to enact beneficial international policy.

Wahhabism and the Perpetual War on Terrorism

The instances of regime-led crackdowns on dissent outlined above are typical of a highly-centralized power structures terrified of losing control (think North Korea and Venezuela). In addition to brutality and oppression, however, the royal family employs another form of social control: ultra-conservative religious ideology.

The rise of the House of Saud, Saudi Arabia’s namesake and longtime ruling family, is indebted to the 18th century merging of politics and religion on the Arabian peninsula. In 1744, Muhammad ibn Saud, an influential tribal leader, and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, an iconoclastic Muslim scholar, swore an oath to form a state guided by Islamic principles. Al Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam was not widely shared –in fact, it condemned many Muslims then inhabiting the peninsula– but Saud was desperate for a “clearly defined religious authority” he could use to establish authority. This authority would stretch far into the coming centuries, as noted by a 2008 CRS report on what is now known as Wahhabism:

[After 1930,] Wahhabi clerics were integrated into the new kingdom’s religious and political establishment, and Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws adopted to govern social affairs in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism also shaped the kingdom’s judicial and educational policies. Saudi schoolbooks historically have denounced teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs…

Saudi-born professor Madawi al-Rashid of the London School of Economics echoed this analysis in a 2015 BBC article:

The Wahhabis were given full control of the religious, social and cultural life of the kingdom. As long as the Wahhabi preachers preached that Saudis should obey their rulers, the al-Saud family was happy. In the 1960s and 1970s the Arab world was full of revolutionary ideas. The Saudi government thought the Wahhabis were a good antidote, because they provide an alternative narrative about how to obey rulers and not interfere in politics.

By relinquishing significant societal control to Wahhabist clerics, the regime created a united and obedient populous over which it could rule. Additionally, it cultivated and promoted an intolerant and often violent ideology that would later form the basis for violent extremist groups.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and fearing the global spread of secularism, the Saudi regime weaponized Wahhabism, imploring its citizens to travel to fight the spread of communism. Terence Ward, in his book The Wahhabi Code, describes how the Kingdom funded Wahhabi schools in Pakistan to indoctrinate both Pakistani youth and Afghan refugees fleeing the Soviet invasion. These foreign fighters, inspired by the Wahhabist interpretation of holy war, are the first example of the exportation of Wahhabism and violence. Future examples include al-Qaeda, Daesh, and related fundamentalist groups operating in Syria.

The connection between Saudi-promoted Wahhabism and global terrorism is not a new revelation. For years, analysts have commented on the absurdity of our relationship with the country that produced 15 out of the 19 9/11 hijackers; one Brookings Institute scholar quipped that the Saudis are “both the arsonists and the firefighters”, and a 2015 New York Times op-ed refers to Saudi Arabia as “the ISIS that made it.”

In defending their sustained support of the Kingdom, the Administration again points to arms deals, in addition to joint counterterrorism efforts, as justification for our partnership with Saudi Arabia. My argument regarding U.S. arms sales to the Kingdom is simple –quick profits are not worth a long-term fight against extremism– but what about the Saudis’ counterterrorism operations?

A 2018 CRS Report identifies the Kingdom as a strong partner in the fight against extremism, claiming that the “U.S. government now credits its Saudi counterparts with taking terrorism threats seriously and praises Saudi cooperation in several cooperative initiatives.” There is little evidence to suggest otherwise; in 2014, the Kingdom’s leading Islamic authority denounced Daesh and al-Qaeda, and a 2017 State Department report detailed Saudi Arabia’s “strict supervision” of illicit funding of terrorist groups. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia itself is frequently the target of terrorist attacks perpetrated by extremists.

However, multiple reports suggest that Saudi Arabia’s promotion of Wahhabism and religious intolerance domestically carries global effects. A 2016 New York Times article details the role one Saudi-funded mosque in Kosovo played in sending 314 men, women, and children to join Daesh, and 2017 Voice of America article cited experts linking an uptick in terrorism in Africa to Saudi scholarships provided to regional youth. Another Times article cautions observers from heaping blame on solely on Saudi Arabia, as grievance-related factors also contribute to radicalization. Still, it notes that Daesh used official Saudi textbooks in its schools until it was able to publish its own, much to the embarrassment of the regime.

Thus, while Saudi Arabia deserves credit for its kinetic counterterrorism efforts, it is losing the long-term ideological war against extremism by funding and promoting religious intolerance. In partnering with the regime rather than pushing it to alter its policies, the U.S. is losing as well, effectively implementing a counterterrorism strategy that neglects the root of the problem and perpetuates terrorism. CNN’s Fareed Zakaria might have put it best: “The Saudi monarchy must reform itself and its export of ideology,” he wrote in 2016, “But the reality is, this is far more likely if Washington engages with Riyadh rather than distancing itself, leaving the kingdom to fester in isolation.”

Moving Forward: Talk to Saudi Arabia, But Don’t Reward Them

In Ben Rhodes’ memoir, The World as It Is, the former national security adviser and speechwriter recalls one particular instance of Barack Obama’s frustration on the 2008 campaign trail. Members of the foreign policy establishment had just ridiculed the young senator for suggesting he would engage in diplomacy with historically hostile nations, much to his bewilderment. “It. Is. Not. A. Reward. To. Talk. To. Folks,” the future president emphatically argues, pounding his palm on a table as he does. “How is that working out with Iran?”

Obama’s point was this: a U.S. presidential administration can engage with an undesirable foreign government without promoting its detrimental interests. His flagship piece of foreign policy, the Iran Deal, is a perfect example of this in that it edged Iran toward membership in the responsible international community without granting it nuclear weapons or excusing its autocratic domestic policies.

The U.S. should handle Saudi Arabia in a similar fashion. Cooperation can continue in the areas that it has worked well, such as counterterrorism, but U.S. officials should not hesitate to publicly criticize and seek to curb the regime’s oppressive domestic policies, illegal military strikes in Yemen, and exportation of intolerance. Thanks to the Texas shale revolution, an abysmal economic outlook in Saudi Arabia, and significant U.S. commercial investment in the Kingdom, the regime has little in its arsenal to counter hypothetical demands from American policymakers; the U.S. is insulated from OPEC’s whims, and sanctions leveled on U.S.-Saudi business interactions would seriously damage the Kingdom’s economy.

It’s clear that the Trump Administration has no interest in molding Saudi Arabia into a respectable ally, otherwise it would have already started down that path. Whether Mr. Trump’s eagerness to buddy-up to MBS is the result of greed, myopia, or personal affinity is anyone’s guess – presently, the most that Americans can do is hope that the next president, Republican or Democrat, does not perceive the Kingdom through the same ignorant lens. Such perception will only result in further human rights violations at the hands of the regime, the continued implementation of an ineffective counterterrorism policy, and lastly, almost irreparable damage to U.S. global standing. After all, as Asunción’s Museo de las Memorias demonstrates, history does not forget those who side with tyrants.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and America’s Response

In the last 30 years, China’s economy has developed at a record breaking pace. According to the CIA, in 2015 92 countries counted China as their largest trading partner compared to only 57 countries counting the United States at the same rank. China has gone from the world’s largest recipient of World Bank loans in the 1980s and the 1990s to, in recent years, loaning more to developing countries than the entirety of the World Bank. China’s economic rise has supplanted the nation as a pillar of leadership in a globalized world, and China has only accelerated its dramatic rise to superpower status with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative seeks to ambitiously launch long-term land and maritime transport links between China, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. With Italy becoming the latest and largest nation so far to join China’s BRI, the United States be cognizant about the BRI’s potential to elevate China’s economy to new heights and should strengthen economic alliances with nations that are increasingly looking to China as a major development partner.

Global Scope

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisions a set of maritime and land-based economic routes that links China to 71 countries in Central Asia, Europe, Africa and South Asia. Touted as “the most significant and far-reaching initiative China has ever put forward” by Wu Jianmin, member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the BRI includes infrastructure projects like the Yiwu-London railway and a bridge over Croatia’s Mali Ston Bay to strengthen economic and non-economic elements of China’s relationship with recipient countries.

The majority of the funding for the Global Belt and Road Initiative will come in the form of loans, meaning that if the recipient country cannot pay back its loans the Chinese government could own the infrastructure projects they are funding. While some posit the BRI as a challenge to the “liberal international order” the United States has pioneered over the last fifty years, China facilitating more trade, especially in developing nations, reduces the likelihood of interstate conflict and war. Even if war is less likely under a system where China is a leading partner with most of the important economies of the world, the United States realizes that it will be difficult to impose the will of the United States, like sanctions and counterterrorism measures, on countries that are now economically dependent on China. Chinese government sources maintain that the One Belt, One Road is compatible with the five principles of peaceful coexistence as laid out in the United Nations Charter: mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Xi Jinping stated that these connectivity networks across Africa, Asian, and European continents are likely to tap market potential, promote investment and consumption, create job opportunities, enhance cultural exchanges, and enable trust, harmony, peace, and prosperity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also believes that One Belt One Road will accelerate the development of western Chinese provinces that lag behind eastern China industrially and infrastructurally. The Chinese consensus rejects notions that China plans to take complete control of existing global financial institutions as the United States did with the Marshall Plan immediately following World War II; Chinese sources in the Global Times delineate between the Marshall Recovery Program that excluded pro-Soviet European countries and the Belt Road Initiative which welcomes all countries to join regardless of their allies, their doctrine, or their past relationship with China.

In the last decade, Chinese foreign policy began to utilize soft power as a method to obtain economic and political goals, and cooperation rather than coercion as a foreign policy tool by China should concern a United States that has traditionally been the world’s foremost hegemon. Soft power scholars believe that because China has such a drastically different government from most of the Western world and developed economies, it has difficulty shifting the international narrative away from its focus on issues of human rights and repressive political system. While previous attempts at Chinese soft power, like Confucius Institutes which have been accused of compromising academic integrity, and Chinese think tanks, that rarely endorse ideas differing from official Chinese Communist Party ideology, recipient countries typically embrace Chinese grant aid. The most effective manner in which China can spread soft power and spur other nations to work towards China’s goals is through what the BRI claims to do, addressing economic needs of developing countries. A Singaporean senior foreign policy official explained that China’s appeal to Southeastern Asian nations over the United States comes from gifts like multibillion-dollar investment aid packages.

American Concerns

The BRI drew disdain from the West due to Chinese willingness to pump money into dictator-run countries, like Zimbabwe, Niger, Angola, and Burma, that have poor human rights records without aid conditionality of changing authoritarian government practices.  Despite America’s enormous military strength and reputation as the pinnacle of innovation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) represents an concerning trend to Americans that the BRI follows. They are both noteworthy international financial structures that include many trusted American allies but exclude United States financial hegemony. The AIIB also supports the idea that American financial institutions are ill-equipped to adequately deal with the rapid rise of developing Asian economies. South Korea, a long-term ally of the United States, turned to China as its most important trade partner to rival Japan. The decision of President Trump to go behind South Korean leadership to meet with Kim Jong-Un and end large-scale joint military exercises with South Korea has also strained relations. As the United States finds themselves no longer alone as the sole superpower in the world, many American allies experience internal contradictions and friction within one another that complicates their relationship with the United States. Contrasting preemptive military interventions into Iraq and Afghanistan that have incensed regional conflicts and made American visions of “global peace, security, and stability” seem insincere, the official Chinese ideology behind the BRI is to sponsor peaceful infrastructure and economic development. China’s discourse of “peaceful development” may ultimately win the hearts of nations that grow wary of the Americanized doctrine of “security.” Herrero and Xu uncover that the Belt and Road Initiative would drastically reduce both railway and maritime costs for trade between European Union countries, especially landlocked countries, who are historically American allies.

The BRI is critical to transforming China’s self-identity from an East Asian country to a central country of Asia that includes the North, South, and the West; this reinvigorates China’s image into a world superpower that rivals the United States. What will drastically improve Chinese soft power is the feature of the BRI that allows for an open and inclusive commerce involving countries along the route that are not China, as introduced by Xi Jinping in the 2015 Boao Forum. The BRI fosters a new era of Chinese economics and foreign policy that encourages intensive cooperation and builds on win-win diplomacy endorsed by Deng Xiaoping throughout the 1980s and 1990s to ensure a peaceful environment where China could grow economically.

At best the BRI benefits every country that is willing to partake in a mutually beneficial trade arrangement and at worst the BRI is a nefarious, ideological plan to win over American allies and whose economic benefits are conditional on political requirements and military cooperation. Either scenario should be concerning towards the American policymakers who wish to solidify America as the world’s foremost economic hegemon. Western officials also worry that Chinese development money undermines governance standards of lending institutions like the World Bank, especially if that money goes towards China’s own companies or environmentally damaging projects. The argument that the Belt Road Initiative will better account for the experiences and interests of emerging economies than existing financial institutions like the World Bank does not necessarily need to be true to worry American policymakers either; the AIIB and BRI may bolster China’s global reach as a complement to existing financial mechanisms. Funneling money towards infrastructure, business, and educational opportunity throughout Western China can help assuage relations with China’s ethnic minorities, which takes away a key talking card by Western governments about China’s alleged human rights violations.

Effectiveness of American Countermeasures

In 2015, the BRI was expanded to encompass 70 percent of the global population and 55 percent of the world’s GDP. In 2015, China allocated a $40 billion fund solely dedicated towards funding almost 900 BRI projects, but recently China was estimated to increase total investment on BRI projects to $1.2-1.3 trillion by 2027.

American countermeasures emerged from China’s recent and rapid expansion of infrastructure. Rising anxiety in the American government about China’s assertive development abroad led to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo laying forth the “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” to combat China’s rise. Pompeo also elucidated President Trump’s Indo-Pacific counterstrategy with a trilateral investment agreement among the United States, Japan, and Australia. The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision will funnel money into Southeast Asia through the US International Development Finance Corporation, which doubles the global spending cap for loans private companies can use for development projects to 60 billion USD. Pompeo’s language was far less combative and aggressive than Vice-President Mike Pence’s language in 2018 at the Hudson Institute that stressed a Chinese campaign undermining support for “our nation’s most cherished ideals.” Pompeo even offered an avenue for collaboration for China when stating “our Indo-Pacific vision excludes no nation.” Brian Hook, Pompeo’s senior policy advisor, implied that American efforts to expand US technology exports to the region and store energy resources by developing infrastructure would ensure “that America’s model of economic engagement is the healthiest for nations in the region.” These American initiatives still do not even scratch the surface of the billions of dollars of investments China is transferring into Southeast Asia.

The American response to the Belt Road Initiative under the Trump administration has flirted with bolstering ties with relevant allies in the Asian-Pacific region and has taken issue with China’s economic interactions with other Asian countries. While there are little doubts in the international community about America’s ability to uphold military commitments, investment in Southeast Asian countries could strengthen America’s image as upholding economic and political alliances especially after trust among Southeast Asian countries dwindled after President Trump incurred a withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its trades relationships with relevant Southeast Asian countries in the pivot against China, and the AIIB represents China’s largely successful response to the TPP with major economies like Brazil, India, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom joining membership.  In July of 2018, the American government also streamlined funding to prevent the termination of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an agency that offers political risk insurance and financing towards American companies interested in international development projects. Representative Ed Royce (R-CA) labeled Chinese development assistance as “predatory development finance models” citing the specific example of China acquiring a major port in Sri Lanka due to Sri Lanka’s inability to pay back China’s loans. Royce’s quarrel with China has more merit than it used to; Chinese loans are nearing up to 5 percent when they used to only be 2.5 percent.

The Belt Road Initiative can also be seen as proof that China is deeply cognizant of America’s “pivot” to Asia, implying a stronger commitment US military, trade, and development assistance to American allies to counterbalance China’s rise. Major General Qiao Liang stated that the BRI is a “hedging strategy against the eastward move of the U.S. pivot to Asia.”

Conclusion

Despite Chinese sources proclaiming altruistic goals, the BRI is first and foremost a tool to promote Chinese economic development by heightening exports, enriching access to natural resources, and providing support to domestic industries that experience overcapacity within China’s economy. China also stands to benefit from strengthening ties with Central Asian autocratic governments that have an abundance of energy resources and to reduce tensions among China’s western ethnic regions. China would not undertake such a grandiose project if it did not have the potential to propel China into the world’s most important economic power.

It is hard to deny that the BRI does provide China a valuable avenue in shaping the preferences of other nations in a manner that benefits China. Chinese sources will under-exaggerate and Western sources will exaggerate the difficulty of the BRI’s profitability with many nations that have underdeveloped economies, high levels of corruption, and limited knowledge on the project. The United States should also feel more at ease at the fact that coercion of nations involved in the BRI would result in political counterculture that would denigrate China’s soft power and destroy Xi Jinping’s new ideal for China.

While the American military is by far the most formidable force in the world, American supremacy of the economic realm is more at question currently than it has since before the Bretton-Woods Institution. The Institute for China-America Studies, China’s only DC based think-tank, argues that the West’s best option regarding the BRI is simply to accept and attempt to shape the potential $1 trillion bestowed upon the geo-economic stage. Either option of joining the BRI as a partner and using America’s premier economic influence of the last 50 years to exert political ideologies or remaining outside the BRI but bolstering economic and political support to Asian Pacific allies in our pivot against China is preferable to questioning the value of our alliances. Any approach by the Trump administration that ignores trends of globalization and free trade, like abandoning multilateral trade deals or questioning burden-sharing in alliances, is doomed for failure.

American Swords, Somali Shields

Part I: A Tragedy in Somalia

Around five in the morning of August 25th, 2017, gunfire broke out near the small town of Bariire in Southern Somalia. The Somali National Army, aided by United States (US) special forces, was sweeping through the area, conducting a counterterrorism raid against the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab. Yet when the smoke had cleared, it was not terrorists, but civilians who were left dead. The incident provoked a furious backlash in Somalia, as well as from the international community.

In the face of public scrutiny, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the military apparatus in charge of US operations in Somalia, was quick to release a statement saying American troops had only been present “in a supporting role.” Indeed, AFRICOM often claims that American soldiers do not take part in the conflicts they oversee, but rather follow behind local allies, providing advice during missions but never directly engaging the enemy. In the case of the Bariire raid, however, this claim was disputed, and an investigation by the Daily Beast found American bullet casings were present, in chilling quantity, at the scene. According to the same investigation, eyewitnesses further testified that American soldiers had lead the way, not followed.

The tragedy in Bariire exemplifies the confusing state of US counterterrorism strategy in Africa, where the line between combatant and advisor is often blurred, and information about military operations is withheld from the public wherever possible. This article will look at the reasons why US soldiers are playing a “supporting role” in the Somali bush, analyze the military footprint involved in such operations, and evaluate the risks and benefits of an “advise and assist” approach to the global War on Terror.

Part II - How US special forces ended up in Somalia

The doctrine that guides US military strategy in Africa is encapsulated in the phrase “by, with, through,” which refers to the relationship between US troops and their local counterparts, called partner forces. According to this doctrine, military operations should either be done by partner forces, with partner forces, or through partner forces. These options are preferred because they keep US soldiers out of harm’s way, leading to a policy known as indirect engagement. In theory, this “by, with, through” approach should mean providing training, equipment, military-to-military communication, and drone strikes. Yet US soldiers do not always watch from the sidelines, as was demonstrated in the Bariire raid.

When US troops join partner forces on the ground, the concept of “by, with, through” falls into question. AFRICOM calls these joint operations “advise and assist” missions, a mundane term for an important, and controversial, part of US counterterrorism policy. Soldiers on advise and assist missions are supposed to accompany and direct a partner force during an operation, while staying out of the line of fire and avoiding a direct engagement with the enemy. But if the enemy ambushes US soldiers, surprises them, or simply advances on their position, they are allowed to fight back. These exceptions create problems when it becomes unclear which side fired first, or whether American troops ever intended to stay on the back line. Adding to this confusion, advise and assist missions are extremely secretive because US soldiers are rarely injured or killedー which is often how the public learns of special forces operations. The result is cases like Bariire, where the exact role American soldiers played is uncertain, making it difficult to attribute blame when civilians are killed.

Part III -  Partner Forces

The forces that accompany US soldiers on advise and assist missions are deceptively called “partners,” despite the fact that they have often been organized, trained, and deployed by the US. In many cases, the loyalty of these forces to their own government is called into question. They are housed in secretive US bases, flown to operation sites by US helicopters, and accompanied by American special forces on their missions, which may have been ordered by the US without their own government’s approval. Hence, the idea of US soldiers serving as advisors to an independent ally is misleading, because the material, command, and logistic backbone of advise and assist missions is often the same as those led by US forces, but with partner forces providing the final manpower of the operations.

Yet while these partner forces may operate alongside, or at the direction of, the United States’ military, they are not subject to the same oversight as their American counterparts. Partner forces have been accused of torturing prisoners, including at bases where US special forces were present. Moreover, the US has trained partner forces in countries where the national army is subject to accusations of human rights abuse, such as in Cameroon, where Amnesty International alleges mass extrajudicial arrests, torture, and killings. Working by, with, or through partner forces linked to such abuse undermines America’s credibility in pushing for human rights in these countries, and risks souring relations with the population at large. Another concern with partner forces’ reliability is the risk of providing them weaponry they may not be able to secure. In Libya, the US military provided the country’s special forces with training and large amounts of equipment, only to see the special forces’ base overrun by militants, giving them possession of its arsenal.

Part IV - Evaluating “Advise and Assist”    

The argument in favor of advise and assist missions is a pragmatic one. First, they require a minimal US presence on the ground, because partner forces will augment even a small number of troops’ capabilities, and provide the manpower for dangerous operations. Second, advise and assist missions avoid putting American lives on the line as much as possible, reducing their human cost. Finally, while the “by, with, through” doctrine is limited in its goals when compared to direct military engagement, it can still enable progress in the fight against terrorism. As AFRICOM commander Thomas Waldhauser stated, “these strikes are not going to defeat al Shabaab, but they are going to provide the opportunity for the Federal Government and the Somali National Army to grow and assume the security of that country.”

Conversely, the argument against a “by, with, through” approach to counterterrorism in Africa centers on the role it plays in expanding America’s shadowy security apparatus, one that sent US special forces to 20 African countries in 2016. Advise and assist missions are approved liberally, on the grounds that deploying soldiers in a supporting role is a lesser commitment than sending them to engage the enemy directly. Yet this distinction is difficult to enforce in the field, where soldiers can set their own mandates in deciding whether to fight on the frontlines or remain behind their partners. These missions are also not without risk,  as sending US soldiers to the field is inherently dangerous, and examples such as the catastrophe in Niger show that the public may not be willing to expend American lives in foreign places. Moreover, US soldiers being killed creates the risk of escalation, potentially drawing Washington into unnecessary conflicts. Another source of uncertainty is the partner forces that are required for such operations work. These forces are not always reliable and may act in ways that run counter to US interests or values, or even cross the line into atrocities. Finally, advise and assist missions have allowed the military to expand without asking congress, or the public, for approval, and the true scope of these operations in Africa is unknown, creating a dangerous lack of accountability. In the end, while the “by, with, through” doctrine may be an effective, restrained approach to fighting the global War on Terror, it places control dangerously far from civilian oversight, and fails to guarantee that tragedies like those in Somalia and Niger will not happen again.

Kissing Kissinger: The American Love of Foreign Policy’s Most Dangerous Mind

It is negligent to engage in a discussion of contemporary foreign policy without mentioning former Secretary of State Henry M. Kissinger. Kissinger, a Jewish refugee, became a household name during the Cold War era when he served as President Nixon’s secretary of state. Kissinger is considered by many contemporary scholars and politicians to be a leading statesman and one of the most well-known faces in the sphere of foreign affairs. Indeed, Kissinger’s tenure as secretary of state had a global impact still visible in countless countries. However, while Kissinger was an influential thinker, it is critical not to overlook his policies in the global south and how quickly he condoned acts of violence within these regions.

Henry Kissinger first came to the United States as a Jewish refugee after escaping Nazi Germany with the rest of his family. From his humble immigrant roots, Kissinger quickly rose to the center of US politics, serving as secretary of state and national security advisor under the administrations of Nixon and Ford, respectively. In 1973, Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize for his involvement in negotiating the ceasefire to end the Vietnam War. However, Henry Kissinger is perhaps best known for his work in opening up relations with China, and establishing a friendly rapport with one of the world’s emerging powers. His’s legacy extends far beyond his career as secretary of state. Indeed, Kissinger established a formidable reputation as a dramatic diplomat, and influenced diplomats within the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. To this day, Kissinger is considered by many to be the leading voice in foreign policy analysis. While Kissinger’s influence has extended across continents and decades, not all of his actions resulted in the bettering of the world and the spread of so-called American ideals of freedom and justice. Although scholars excuse some of his more controversial policy decisions, saying that few policies stand the test of time, Kissinger’s policies and actions affected not just people in the past but also those very much in the present. To this end in addition to his impressive diplomatic career, Henry Kissinger also demonstrates how not to be a statesman.

Kissinger reached the height of his career during the Cold War - his reach far and widespread. In order to analyze the impact of his policies on a detailed level, it does not suffice to give a brief view of his involvement in different countries and regions. Rather, this analysis will focus on Kissinger’s impact within South America in order to give a more comprehensive explanation of who Kissinger and his beliefs really are. During the 1970s and 80s, fearing the spread of communism, the US government and the CIA helped back right-wing governments and organize military coups to oust leftist governments they felt posed a threat to U.S. interests.

In 1973, with funding and training from the CIA, Augusto Pinochet and Chilean military forces led a coup to overthrow the Salvador Allende, the first democratically-elected socialist leader. Throughout Pinochet’s bloody 17-year dictatorship, over 25,000 people were tortured and more than 3,000 were ‘forcibly disappeared.’ Kissinger, far from seeing Pinochet’s regime as a human rights concern, assured Pinochet that he “...did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende.” In order to address the communist wave that was threatening to flood Latin America, Kissinger played a key role in green-lighting Operation Condor - a joint military operation with far-right dictatorships aimed at capturing and torturing political dissidents. Henry Kissinger did not play a observatory role within the dictatorships in Latin America, rather he was an active accessory to regimes that were responsible for murder, torture, and forced disappearances. In a memo from 1976, Kissinger urged Argentina’s military junta to act faster to establish government authority, “before U.S. opposition to its human rights violations gained momentum.” As secretary of state, Kissinger not only had the authority to approve US involvement in these coups, but to also further aid and encourage the individuals committing mass human rights atrocities.

Kissinger’s Latin American policy establishes him as de facto co-conspirator in the numerous coups d’etats and military dictatorships that quickly took root in Latin America. Immediately after the Argentine coup, Kissinger recommended increased security assistance. As a result, the US Congress approved 50 million dollars in security assistance to the junta, with an additional 30 million granted at the end of the 1967. Decades later, Kissinger refuses to cede culpability for the ramifications of his actions within the region. In a recent interview, Kissinger stated that “...when the charge of war criminal becomes an accepted form of discourse, the prospects of national cohesion disintegrate. Diplomacy loses its flexibility and strategy its force.” It is not always simple to rationalize past policies but in this example, Kissinger demonstrates that ethics and morality are desirable only as long as they don’t become a nuisance.

Latin America still faces the consequences of their dictatorships, visible in everything from social institutions to public policy. In Chile and Argentina, families still seeking justice for their murdered loved ones have been calling for decades for the prosecution of those at the top who allowed these atrocities to occur.  Ali Beydoun, of the Washington College of Law, brought forth a lawsuit against Kissinger on behalf of Chilean victims seeking reparations for wrongful deaths. While many academics still study and promote Kissinger’s ideas, many members of the global community have become outspoken in their characterization of Kissinger as a war criminal. Most famously, Christopher Hitchens wrote a book and produced a documentary entitled “The Trial of Henry Kissinger” where he explained the case for Kissinger to be charged for international crimes, among which war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture. Hitchens also went as far as to argue that Kissinger himself was directly involved in the kidnapping and murder of Chilean general René Schneider, one of the actions leading up to the military coup. Schneider’s family also attempted to sue Kissinger for his murder, but were also unsuccessful.

The primary issue in any analysis of the legacy and global impact of Kissinger is howto weight the value of both the good and bad he his policies and advise contributed to across several presidential administrations. Many continue to praise the statesman for his “opening” of China to the West as well as his role in the end of the cold war. Meanwhile, Kissinger’s fingerprints are clearly imprinted on the landscapes of Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as in the shadows of the thousands of persons disappeared under the military dictatorships in South America. The evaluation of whether Kissinger is inherently good or evil lies involves asking some of the hardest questions in the heart of politics, ethics, and world affairs -  what actors matter, whose lives have more worth, and to what extent is the West willing to justify the death of innocents as a just tradeoff for the winning of wars, the spread of democracy, and US global hegemony.

Antarctic Cooperation: Challenges and Benefits to American Foreign Interests

Multinational cooperation plays an essential role in shaping the field of international relations. Throughout the years, countries have been trying to overcome and understand each other’s differences and create bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Nowadays, in Europe, Asia, North and South America, Africa, and Australia, nations have various sets of rules and regulations that all actors must abide by. Those commonly established principles make the cooperation within the continents safe and transparent, as those processes are usually overseen by the international organizations. Nevertheless, there is still one giant and geopolitically significant continent that is left out from the general attention: Antarctica. As the world’s coldest and hardest to reach continent, Antarctica has been attracting scientists and explorers from all around the planet for decades.

Countries, as a result of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, have been granted a right to share and use the continent for “peaceful purposes only.” This means that no nation is capable of owning the whole icy land, it is common by the rule of international law. The Antarctic Treaty requires nations to use the icy continent according to the following principles: “Freedom for scientific research,” “International scientific exchange shall be promoted,” and “Territorial claims shall be held in abeyance while the Treaty is in force.” The United States (US), as one of the most developed nations, has been studying Antarctica since December of 1955 when the first American base, McMurdo Station, was established on the continent.

As time went by, the US and other members of the Antarctic Treaty furthered their influence in Antarctica by increasing the number of research bases and advancing their own infrastructural features on the continent. Additionally, nations have been increasing their budgets, related to the South Pole research and exploration. The United States certainly has national ambitions and goals in Antarctica, benefits that America might not be willing to split with others. However, because of the extreme weather conditions, logistical hardships, and other shared problems, the US, together with other nations, will be better off cooperating with one another within Antarctica despite the political issues, mistrusts, and resource nationalism of the current global order.

Opportunities of Antarctica

The South Pole region is one of the most unexplored parts of our planet that possesses a great amount of material, scientific, and other types of opportunities yet to be utilized. Therefore, the United States together with other nations can get more out of the icy continent by making the Antarctic partnerships with each other. Nonetheless, while cooperating, nations in Antarctica may or may not still act with respect to their own interests and this commitment uncertainty could make the cooperation perspectives less likely. Hence, by being clear about the sharing process of goals and gains that arise from collaborations, countries will be able to have far more trust in one another and eventually achieve significantly more objectives.

The article “The Fight to Own Antarctica” that was written by Benedict Mander and Leslie Hook in the popular publication Financial Times informs the reader that Antarctica has a lot to offer and the issue of sharing the findings may bring up a number of possession related matters between the countries. The authors highlight that “At stake is the last pristine continent, one that contains the world’s largest store of freshwater, huge potential reserves of oil and gas and the key to understanding how quickly climate change will impact the world through rising sea levels.” This excerption has a relatively pessimistic and competition implying message, which is a relevant concern, based on the current global order and long-determined relationships between the world’s most powerful nations. Nevertheless, the same statement may be interpreted as evidence for a different viewpoint. Antarctica has so much to offer that nations will benefit from cooperating and can eventually advance their exploration and gains from the icy continent’s enormous potential. America is capable of leading the common work and cooperation, which eventually can contribute to strengthening the US hegemonic future.

Furthermore, by working together with other preoccupied nations, the United States will get more information and a broader picture of a highly contemporary problem as climate change. Thus, by having a superior comprehension of this issue, nations will be able to orient the essential solutions to the existing causes of the climate change and the primary matter of global warming.

Competitors on the Continent

Our planet has been a gigantic arena where nations compete for resources, power, control, and usually act in pursuit of their own interests rather than the common good; ergo, with its resources and overall potential, Antarctica may become a new battlefield for the world’s leading countries. Nowadays, there are a lot of skeptics of the Antarctic Treaty saying that the agreement needs to be modernized in order to meet the demands of current global order and implement additional regulations on the agreement signing countries.

The Financial Times authors in their Antarctica related article introduce the Royal Holloway, London University’s professor Klaus Dodds, who raises the principal question about the icy continent. The online publication provides an interview excerpt: “Resources have always been the big trigger,” says Professor Dodds. “Once you get more explicit about resource exploitation, then you raise the troubling issue of who owns Antarctica. That’s the issue that haunts the Antarctic Treaty, and the Treaty System more generally.” This concern is not random and has been one of the key talking points of the Antarctica conversations, debates, and international meetings. Professor Dodds does not mention any countries, however, it is clear that the race for resources and other Antarctic prospects might erupt between nations with the most influence in the region, which are the United States, Russia, and China. Therefore, even if America follows all the rules and favors the cooperative way of diplomacy in Antarctica, the US will not have any other option but to join the contest when Russia or China begin the resource race. In that case, we may see the Antarctic Treaty countries form clusters, bilateral groups, or act solely and eventually any likelihoods of multilateral cooperation in Antarctica would be extremely hard to work through.

It is vital to note that countries such as Great Britain, Australia, Norway, Argentina, Chile, France, and many others are also crucial actors in Antarctica with their research bases and various influence giving aspects. Moreover, since the Antarctic Treaty was signed, more and more nations have been developing their technological, logistical, and monetary capabilities and can now join the scene. Whether it will be a cooperative or competitive scene has to be decided by the nations themselves, though it is understandable that the Antarctic Treaty will need to be updated according to the current global standards and preoccupations.

Prospects of Collaboration

Cooperation in Antarctica will most likely benefit the countries with less industrial and technological capabilities on the continent, yet this partnership will also make the nations with significant powers in the region much better off. The United States, as one of the leading players in Antarctic explorations and studies, is and should strive for the cooperation with other countries, especially if such interaction can bring the American side certain optimistic outcomes. The academic article, published in the scholarly periodical The Polar Journal by Georgetown University professor Christopher C. Joyner, touches upon the significance of Antarctica for the United States in scientific, astronomical, and geopolitical ways. The author also mentions the importance for America of the science-related partnership. He argues that “The United States government strives to undertake opportunities for cooperative scientific research to understand Antarctica and other global physical and environmental systems.” Additionally, the writer calls the American efforts a “major national interest.” This statement clearly shows that the United States is open towards various research-related partnerships on the icy continent.

Moreover, the American authorities view the scientific investigations and potential knowledge, gained as a result of Antarctic research, as a vital matter for the whole country. Consequently, by collaborating with other nations in Antarctica, the United States and its researchers will be able to make new scientific advancements, and as Christopher C. Joyner suggests, acquire valuable information to understand the world we live in. The US supports the Antarctic cooperation in pursuit of the scientific discoveries and is willing to create bilateral or multilateral partnerships with other nations on the continent. However, competition between the partner countries is the obvious issue that arises and needs to be addressed, while talking about the prospects of Antarctic cooperation and potential steps that must be communicated along the way.

Real Obstacles

The process of Antarctic cooperation is not easy to commence and even more difficult to stick to; ergo, the matter of trust is vitally important with relation to the partnership formation activities on the continent. Like most situations, cooperation cannot exist without trust between the global actors. Nevertheless, it gets tricky when you have to rely on the collaborator who you have been competing with for a long time. In the article “The WikiLeaks Arctic Cables,” published in the Polar Record, Professor Klaus J. Dodds analyzes and publicizes the confidential American foreign relations records that were obtained and distributed by WikiLeaks. Those documents reveal a great number of conversations, assignments, and exchanges of advice between the State Department of the United States of America, diplomats, and embassies around the globe. The primary reference point of those records is the situation in the Arctic among the North Pole countries. This peer reviewed publication talks about the present issue, related to mistrust of the US and other NATO nations towards Russia, as one of the active leaders in the areas of Arctic research, territorial control, and resource extraction. As a result, such North Pole matter can be compared with the possible course of events in Antarctica.

The author also references the WikiLeaks website and writes, “Under the heading of ‘New WikiLeaks revelations shed light on Arctic oil “carve up”’ it rallied against the ‘new revelations’ by the whistle blowing website WikiLeaks that show how the scramble for resources in the Arctic is sparking military tension in the region, with NATO sources worried about the potential for armed conflict between the alliance and Russia… .’” The publicity of these revealed records did not benefit the United States or its allies. Moreover, American competitors, primarily Russia and to some extent China, among others, got valuable insight information that concerns the NATO countries’ activities, preoccupations, plans, and talks about the North Pole region. The WikiLeaks publication shows that in the Arctic, neither the US and its allies trust Russia or any other potential adversary, nor can the Russian Federation trust their counterparts. This conclusion can also be empirically devoted to other regions of the planet and Antarctica is one of them. Consequently, based on these materials, a reliance-building process between the three strongest Antarctic nations will demand a great amount of diplomatic work and time.

Coexisting in Peace

        It is hard to deny that the United States views other powerful countries, such as China and Russia, as evident rivals because of the decades long competition for global hegemony, resources, and political ideas. However, Antarctica is an immensely different kind of location, as it is impossible to be in power and thus, cooperation has a lot less obstacles. Taking the Antarctic Treaty into account and the possibility of gaining benefits through mutual assistance, the United States should not worry about the threat from other nations. The Global Politics report titled “The Option for U.S.–China Cooperation in Antarctica” by Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng, highlights that the Antarctic matter is not a zero-sum game and there can be multiple winners as a result of the cooperation on the icy continent. The report was published through The Heritage Foundation website and looks at the prospects and American interests from the United States-China cooperation in the Antarctic region. Cheng makes it clear that China is currently one of the biggest actors in Antarctica and will be advancing its influence in future. Beijing is spending more money in the field of South Pole research and Cheng emphasizes it by giving the information about the new Chinese base, which at the time of the report writing (2014) was close to be completed. The researcher affirms, “Once completed [the research station], it will give China one of the largest Antarctic presences. With its Antarctic budget growing from $20 million to $55 million, China clearly has the wherewithal to expand its presence even further.” By increasing the Antarctic exploration spending, China confirms its plans to stay in the South Pole region.

Throughout his report, Cheng stresses that Chinese efforts and advancements in Antarctica does not make the United States or other nations worse off, but rather that there are a lot more resources being spent in that region. So, by having China as a collaborator or a part of a partnership group, the Antarctic Treaty members, especially the United States, will be able to utilize far more joint means as opposed to working alone. Cheng through multiple examples and reasoning, emphasizes that in the South Pole region, cooperation, even with rival nations, has no particular threat for America. Cheng ends his report by concluding that “Consequently, like cooperation in the Gulf of Aden, the Antarctic is an area where the U.S. and China have much to gain through greater cooperation and little to lose. Antarctic cooperation is therefore well worth exploring, to help improve bilateral ties without infringing upon either side’s core interests.”

In his report, Cheng makes it clear that it is necessary to take into account the variation in location when talking about the national and foreign interests of the United States. Thus, relationships between China and America may be quite rival in area, such as South China Sea, Africa, or South America; nonetheless, the affairs in a place like Antarctica may be contrasting. This conclusion may also be used with correlation to Russia and other nations that are not considered allies of the United States. Ultimately, as long as America does not see any particular danger with regards to the Antarctic cooperation, benefits from future partnerships will exceed the possible disadvantages that combined efforts may present.

New Value of the Continent

Antarctica is not owned by anyone and can be freely used by humans in accordance with international law and the Antarctic Treaty; as a result, people all over the world should have equal access to the continent in years to come. While tourism in Antarctica is relatively new in the South Pole area, it is a growing activity. Visitors nowadays are willing to pay large sums of money to experience this pure and magnificent place, that only a small percentage of people have ever been to. An article in Financial Times by Leslie Hook and Benedict Mander reports,

“For most tourists — who pay between $10,000 and $100,000 for a trip — visiting Antarctica involves stepping off the boat at just a handful of highly regulated landing sites. But there are loopholes in the system, such as private yachts that flout permitting rules, as well as a growing number of tours that involve activities such as kayaking or skiing.”

The price, conditions, and available infrastructure of such Antarctic tourist journeys makes it extremely hard for the majority of people to go and visit the continent. Even though, Antarctica is undoubtedly difficult to get to and even more difficult to stay on, people are still capable of making constant progress as technology and our wealth of knowledge advances. Tourism on the icy continent is no different. Hence, this progress can be accelerated by creating new Antarctic partnerships and cooperating groups that will focus on the the processes of getting the general public in and out from the continent. In that case, nations can share experiences or focus on what they have comparative advantage in doing. It is vital to state that the United States may end up collaborating with nations that have a long and not always pleasant history with America and vice versa. As the authors of the article indicate, “The US, Russia and China all have critical infrastructure in Antarctica to aid their global positioning systems.” As the statement implies, the three countries have the dominant positions on the icy continent. Thus, it is logical to assume that for the United States, cooperating with Russia, China, or even both countries can bring the most benefits.

Yet, this potential can have a huge obstacle in its way. Significant political and cultural differences between the three nations, heated by the recent US-China trade arguments and Russia’s condemned behavior on the international arena, may primarily resist and blockade the bilateral or multilateral cooperation in Antarctica between America and the two Eastern countries. However, if the United States, through various diplomatic and scientific channels, were able to negotiate the initial South Pole cooperation deals with its two rivals, the future of humankind may see the totally unexpected outcome. Ultimately, with combined efforts, the overall travel experience, cost, and Antarctic’s own infrastructure can be drastically improved, making the Antarctic tourism more affordable and enjoyable. Also, such cooperation will improve the logistics of Antarctic research, which can upgrade the conditions scientists live and work in.

Nonetheless, the Antarctic Treaty members should also pay close attention to the environmental aspects of their future activities on and around the icy continent. Thereof, it will be essential to connect the future discoveries and progresses with new regulations, agreements, and international “manners”. The Antarctic nations will have essential tasks in the years to come: making the icy continent more accessible for travelers and reducing the environmental risks and problems.

The Antarctic cooperation is a field of international affairs that has not been thoroughly studied yet. Nonetheless, with the extraction of resources, advancement of sea level research, space observations, and Antarctic tourism development, countries will become more and more interested in the icy continent. Eventually, in spite of the different aims, cultures, governmental contradictions, and political hostility, the nations will be able to benefit from the bilateral and multilateral partnerships in Antarctica. Consequently, the United States with its capabilities and interests should not miss out on this opportunity. Moreover, America has all the resources and global recognition to become a leader in promoting, organizing, and maintaining such cooperation. By interacting in the logistic, touristic, infrastructural, and scientific fields, the world’s nations can make much greater progress together than separately. Nations like China and Russia may not be allies to the United States and are usually looked at as rivals.

Nonetheless, with combined infrastructural and other efforts, as well as by letting Antarctica shape new relationships, the cooperation on the South Pole continent is nothing but possible, even between completely different nations. The Heritage Foundation researcher Dean Cheng states that, “U.S.–China cooperation in Antarctica is a positive, admittedly limited, opportunity.” America, by leading and contributing to the partnerships in Antarctica will not only strengthen its own positions and advance its own progress on the icy continent, but will also create an example of a successful cooperation for other countries, which will ultimately benefit the whole humankind. Additionally, relationships and experiences that will be built in Antarctica can become a moving force for similar cooperation in other regions of the planet, making global affairs less hostile and more genuine.