Ibrahim Bah 6/11/25 Ibrahim Bah 6/11/25

The World Owes Haiti an Apology: The Perils of US Intervention

The United States is a country that wears its values on its sleeve and thus takes it upon itself to carry the weight of the world on its shoulders. Upon its very birth, it stood upon a foundation of freedom, justice, democracy, fairness, and opportunity, principles that it proudly emblazoned on its seminal Constitution and that it immortalizes in its physical monuments. These are the traits that define the outlook of America’s history; these traits make up the hallowed, almost deified American Dream; these are the traits that Americans seek to embody at home and abroad. It is what distinguished early America from the antiquated and repressive monarchies that it sought to free itself from. Yet, travel to Haiti, a nation scarred by American intervention, and these traits will seem like a myth when ascribed to the U.S. Travel to Haiti, and it will seem like freedom and justice are in short supply.

Seemingly from its inception, the Caribbean country that makes up around one-third of the island of Hispaniola has been mired in a stubborn, unrelenting downward spiral of abject poverty, political instability, and despair. The reputation of being “the poorest country in the Western hemisphere” has clung to its national character for over a generation and supersedes any further conversation about Haiti. The irony is, Haiti was once the wealthiest colony in the entire Western Hemisphere. The juxtaposition between its former abundance and its current suffering can be explained by the legacy of colonialism and occupation, originally occurring under the Spanish, and later the French and American imperial projects.

The story of Haiti’s contact with the West unfolds in a familiar way to its peers in the Western Hemisphere. Initial Spanish contact brought disease, which ravaged the indigenous populations, as the Spanish crown enacted the racial and economic hierarchy that facilitated its rule. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were trafficked onto the island via the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Amid weakening Spanish power, France laid claim to the Western part of Hispaniola, transforming the colony into an economic powerhouse fueled by cash crops like timber, sugar, and coffee. But in 1791, Haiti was struck by an intriguing turn of events: a massive slave revolt, led by the revolutionary and ideologue Toussaint L’Overture, proved an existential threat to French colonial rule. After thirteen years of brutal war, the former Haitian slaves successfully declared independence, in a land free from the tyranny, exploitation, and humiliation of slavery. This constituted the world’s first ever successful slave revolt to gain independence, and mirrored the effect of the “shot heard ‘round the world” so embodied in American ideals.

Yet, even from the outset of Haiti’s existence, America’s presence could be felt. Though early in the United States’s lifespan, the young nation had already demonstrated an interest in its peers in the Western hemisphere, in a foreign policy approach that would eventually culminate in the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. supported the global isolation of Haiti during the Jefferson administration, maintaining its alliance with France and the global balance of power. However, the U.S. had its own vested interest in preventing the success of the Haitian Revolution: the Jefferson administration did not want the country’s own slaves to revolt following inspiration from their Haitian comrades, especially given its already tense racial politics. Of course, Thomas Jefferson and his peers would never admit that their approach directly contradicted the premise of universal rights and economic freedom, upon which they had fought a war with the British less than thirty years earlier. But from its very birth, Haiti was defined by the interests and potential aggression from foreign powers, a trend that would only continue.

Shortly after Haitian independence, the French levied enormous debts upon Haiti, which it was forced to pay under threat of force, to make up for the lost wealth of French slave owners and landowners. This was a threat made to Haiti, which was already outgunned and underdeveloped due to the existential war it had just fought. Haiti was forced to take out loans from French banks to pay this debt, and then accrue additional debt from French banks to cover its original debt. So while France continued to profit from its former colony long after its occupation, Haiti was deprived of the essential income needed to develop infrastructure, education, and other systems needed for a stable government. Its rural farmland continued to supply cash crops, as its infrastructure and farming methods grew increasingly antiquated, and as its people languished for generations. Around World War I, the United States re-entered the picture.

In 1915, the Wilson administration occupied Haiti, under the pretense of establishing stability (eventually a common refrain in U.S. foreign policy) after the assassination of their president. The Americans also wanted to curb growing French and German influence (owing to their debt policies and economic interests toward the nation, respectively) and prevent their intervention during this time of chaos. But instead of ensuring stability and lasting peace, American intervention was brutal, corrupt, and altogether scarring to the Haitian people. The U.S. seized Haitian economic assets and land, enriching American banks and government coffers while damning the Haitians to debilitating yet familiar exploitation. Yet more damning, perhaps, is how U.S. Marines killed 15,000 Haitians who rebelled against American rule, and made chilling examples of opposition leaders.

Make no mistake: U.S. intervention was not welcomed by the Haitian people, and this pattern of U.S. occupation and profiteering in the name of democracy or stability can be found across the Western Hemisphere. Around the same time, the U.S. effectively forced the creation of, and profited greatly from, the Panama Canal; it replicated a similar model of Haitian occupation in Cuba following the Spanish-American War; a few years before its actions in Haiti, the U.S. had ended a bloody, years-long war for control of the Philippines. While the Americans would often establish infrastructure in the countries they intervened in, these institutions were often not accessible to much of the country’s poor majority. But more importantly, even if this infrastructure (roads, ports, the Panama Canal itself) immediately or eventually created value or otherwise brought economic or social success to a community, I would assert that that value is incredibly dwarfed by the value of a people’s self-determination, self-governance, and control over its resources. I would surmise that the Founding Fathers would be inclined to agree with that statement. For the United States, freedom, justice, stability, and prosperity were the shades under which it imposed its will and hegemony onto others, relegating smaller countries to the very fate that it had escaped from itself at birth, and leaving death and destruction in its wake.

While formal U.S. occupation ended in 1934, its influence over Haiti continued to loom large–most notably in its control over Haitian finances lasting until 1947. As Haiti weathered the brutal dictatorships of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier during the 20th century, the United States propped up their regime in the interest of Cold War hegemony, especially after the Duvalier regime made concessions to Washington, including tax breaks for foreign companies and anti-communist alignment. Haitians continued to suffer violence, imprisonment, repression, and poverty on the part of the state; the cascading disasters of Haiti’s history had left the country’s systems in disrepair. All the while, a deep well of corruption continued to replenish the country’s elite, a chasm of inequality separating rich and poor. Haiti’s ongoing crisis only deepened after a devastating earthquake in 2010, a 7.0 magnitude wave of destruction that killed an estimated 300,000 people and displaced another million. This brings us to Haiti’s current conditions: after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the nation has been overrun by gangs, who contend for control in the capital, Port-au-Prince. The actual government has lost much of its legitimacy following the aforementioned political turmoil, and the Haitian people are caught in the middle. A UN-backed intervention force, this time led by Kenyan police, has been dispatched, to minimal success.

What can we take from this? Again and again, even after Western colonialism and the Cold War, the United States’s intervention has damned Haiti to a fate it did not choose and did not deserve. American intervention was done in the interest of profit and hegemony, instead of the freedom and democracy that the country prides itself on. The common notion that Haiti’s current condition is the result of the failure of its people and the deep corruption of the country is, at best, reductive. Persistent foreign occupation and violence severely hindered the nation from creating strong institutions and infrastructure. Moreover, the support for illicit regimes (like the Duvalier dynasty) and the constant misappropriation of funds reinforce the vast inequality that Haiti experiences while preventing the socioeconomic mobility of the Haitian people, even given the country’s abundance. Indeed, many of the skilled and professional among Haiti’s population have migrated outward, many of them to the United States, where they are often the victims of xenophobic rhetoric.

This fashion of American intervention was not just practiced in Haiti, though. It is a trend across recent American history, done in the interest of preventing communism or maintaining stability, but often ignoring the will and perpetuating the suffering of the people within. During the Arab Spring in 2011, as Egyptians rallied in the streets demanding freedom and self-determination, the United States continued to support the authoritarian Mubarak regime in the interest of regional political and economic stability until the final hour, once its collapse was all but inevitable. Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was, in large part, a failure: Iraq today maintains an unstable democracy, and the U.S.’s actions created a power vacuum that left an easy entrance for the Islamic State, one of the most destructive terrorist groups of the 20th century. There are also examples where the U.S. didn’t intervene, but should have: the United States, “leader of the free world,” sat idly by as the Rwandan genocide saw the senseless deaths of hundreds of thousands. President Bill Clinton himself publicly recognized this mistake during a visit to Rwanda after the genocide. Time and time again, the United States did not stick up for its values. However, there is precedent for positive examples of U.S. intervention and peacemaking when there is political will. American involvement in Somalia in the 1990s, while originally invoking the infamous “Black Hawk Down” debacle, eventually pioneered a positive model of diplomacy. The peace process was aided by the measured stability induced by foreign involvement, remained in the country until the peace process was fully complete, and made use of local power brokers to bring agreements that were effective–all lessons that can be applied to the current situation in Haiti.

The Haitian people have suffered for generations. The United States and the world owe Haiti an apology. But an apology is not enough. The United Nations, with the backing of the United States and other important countries, must make a concerted effort to re-establish stability and the basic functioning of the Haitian state. While this is a form of intervention, it is a necessary one to prevent Haiti’s continued misery. From there, these organizations must work with Haitians to create Haitian-led institutions; there is precedent for state-building like this within Haiti (with the Aristide regime) and outside of it (the re-establishment of the democratic Sierra Leonean government by UN and UK forces after the rebel takeover in 1996). But one thing must remain true: the next chapter of Haiti’s future must be written by the Haitian people.

Zach Veloz 4/15/25 Zach Veloz 4/15/25

Panama’s Recent Response to Trump’s Canal Desire

Panama’s president, José Raúl Mulino (EPA/FMT image)

On March 5th, Panama and BlackRock reached a deal granting the US company control of the Balboa and Cristobal ports in the Panama Canal. While the Panamanian government granted this concession in an effort to ease tensions with the United States, it has instead instigated US President Donald Trump's further ambitions of owning all the ports. Panama’s current strategy of appeasement is ineffective in maintaining its sovereignty and, absent readjustment, could ultimately lead to a domino effect in which Trump's imperial ambitions permeate the rest of Latin America.

A US focus on the region isn’t unheard of; since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the US has adopted a hands-on approach to Latin American politics. During the Cold War, the United States became heavily involved in Latin American politics, spreading capitalist ideals in the wake of communism. Notable examples include Operation PBSuccess, which overthrew the leftist Guatemalan president in favor of a right-wing dictator allied with the US, and the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs, which hoped to depose communist dictator Fidel Castro in Cuba. Earlier, in 1904, US President Theodore Roosevelt struck an agreement with Panamanian separatists, who were striving for independence from the Colombian government, to build the Panama Canal. The deal permitted the US to construct an artificial canal in exchange for its support for Panama’s rapidly growing independence efforts. Construction was finalized in 1914, and the US controlled the “Panama Canal Zone” until 1977, when the Torrijos-Carter treaties relinquished control to Panama gradually by 1999. During the 1990s, Panama continued dealing with US intervention despite gaining canal control. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush launched Operation Just Cause, aiming to depose the military dictator Manuel Noriega, who was suspected of drug trafficking and allying with Soviet-backed governments in Latin America. The US sent troops to Panama, capturing and convicting Noreiga, causing the deaths of around 300 civilians while leaving the state with a democratic structure that has endured to this day.

Once Trump came into office for his second term, his pursuit of regional and economic security against foreign powers, such as China, led him to the canal. He argues that the Torrijos-Carter treaty is a “disgrace” to US pride, and therefore should be invalidated. In the 21st century, the US has shifted to economic control of Latin America with heavy investment in the region. From a trade standpoint, Trump’s interest in the canal is clear: access would be economically beneficial for the US, granting them control over trade and shipping in an area where 40% of US container traffic goes through. In doing so, they can obtain cheaper rates for the US and impose higher rates for their adversaries, consistent with Trump’s America First trade policy. Beyond that, Trump’s move is also motivated by a desire to hedge back against major attempts from the Chinese government to get a foothold in the region via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese have helped construct several projects in Latin America, and are in the process of constructing many more in the future, threatening US power in the region. With the increase of Chinese economic expansion, the Trump administration has aggressively diverted its focus to the region to maintain the US’ regional sphere of influence and strengthen its position.

In light of Trump’s aggression, the Panamanian response has been a policy of appeasement and accommodation. Following Trump’s inauguration, the state audited two Chinese ports in the canal, both part of the BRI, to gain favor with the new administration. During Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first mission abroad, the Panamanians granted the US free passage of warships through the waterway, allowing the US to consolidate influence and defend against rivals like Venezuela. Further attempts have been made to move closer with the US: President José Mulino has withdrawn from the BRI as a whole, coinciding with US skepticism of Chinese influence within the Canal–information Rubio brought up to the Panamanian president. This policy has continued to be problematic, as in April 2025, US troops are now set to deploy near the canal in Panamanian territory. The idea of Panamanian sovereignty has begun to slightly erode, unable to stop US authority within its territory.

Mulino’s objective has become unsuccessful; rather than neutralizing Trump’s aggression, it has failed to satiate his appetite. The day after the deal with BlackRock was announced, Trump addressed Congress, asserting that the deal implied Trump was reclaiming the canal from Panama. President Mulino has responded by accusing Trump of lying in the address. He emphasizes that “the transaction was purely commercial,” based on mutual interest, and not a form of concession. The Panamanian Canal Authority immediately rejected the claim of US warships, and a statement posted on X reaffirmed Panamanian sovereignty of the canal. Despite Mulino’s statements, the Panamanian government has been reluctant to use many of its resources to reaffirm its sovereignty in the face of US antagonism. Recently, Mulino met with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in an attempt to address certain concerns. In this meeting, the US was said to have been granted a cost-neutral compensation scheme for US warships and joint military training in the canal. While the statements struck a friendly tone, the point of Panamanian sovereignty remains. The government has refused to consult the United Nations or the Organization of American States about the issue. Recently, Mulino met with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in an attempt to address certain concerns. In this meeting, the US was said to have been granted a cost-neutral compensation scheme for US warships and joint military training in the canal. While the statements struck a friendly tone, the point of Panamanian sovereignty remains.

Panama’s genuflection to Trump could encourage him to force the hand of other nations in Latin America. As more and more nations in Central America have been welcoming Chinese cooperation, such as Costa Rica and Guatemala, Trump will likely turn his attention to these nations to expel Chinese influence.

This move has also worried the maritime powers that use the canal to shorten maritime trade and reduce shipping costs, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru. The threat of US invasion and ownership of the canal could disrupt a vital shipping route, especially integral to these three nations, who rely heavily on trade with Europe and other Atlantic regions for resources. President of Colombia Gustavo Petro and Chilean President Gabriel Boric have continued to fight for the sovereignty of Panama through statements expressing unconditional support and denouncing Trump, while President Petro and Mulino are working together on other agreements, such as a bill reinforcing Panama’s sovereignty, a clean energy project, and issues on migration.

In the meantime, to push back against Trump, Panama should take a harder stance on preserving their sovereignty and avoid the horrors of further US intervention. Their policy of appeasement has only been to the detriment of Panamanians and can embolden Trump to push his limits as far as he can in Latin America. Panama must adopt a new strategy, potentially aligning closer with nations such as Canada, Mexico, and Colombia, which have already gone head-to-head with Trump on trade matters. All of these nations have responded to Trump’s aggression by appealing to international law, condemning Trump while threatening retaliation, and imposing tariffs with varying levels of success.

This could be through publicly criticizing US actions at the UN and OAS, invoking international law to defend its rights, and finding alternative economic partners, such as Mercosur, to open new economic opportunities, protect the canal, and strengthen regional independence in the wake of China and the US competition. Currently, Panama’s future is surrounded by uncertainty regarding Trump’s next steps for targeting the canal, and if they fail to reorient their current strategy, it may result in the US eventually taking full control of the canal through coercive means.

Ibrahim Bah 4/1/25 Ibrahim Bah 4/1/25

The Looming Roar of the African Lions: The Potential of Sub-Saharan African Development

A sea of change is beginning to strike Sub-Saharan Africa: economically, politically, and culturally, its immense potential is beginning to rise from the ashes of imperialism and the challenges that it has faced in the global ecosystem. Africa’s young and growing population, vast abundance of natural resources, and enterprising population make it the setting for much of the world’s future, especially concerning the environment and renewable energy. Yet, the continent’s continued vulnerability and inequality present uncertainty. This major shift is inevitable, but the question is whether it will occur on African terms, rather than in service of global powers like Russia and China, who have caught on to the change and reacted accordingly. The rest of the “developed” world seems to be lagging in the attention it pays to Africa’s growing development. But as the continent’s many nations strive to take advantage of this rapid development, one country boldly and proudly stands at the forefront.

Rwanda, the international aid darling. Rwanda, the careful result of reform and reconciliation. Rwanda, an African Miracle.

Rwanda’s success story following the brutal ethnic genocide in 1994 has been hailed across the world as a model for African development and governance. The capital, Kigali, has painstakingly transformed itself into a global city, dubbed the “cleanest city in Africa,” with its Convention Center being a crowning achievement atop the seat of national pride. Rwanda’s Vision 2020, masterminded by its longtime leader Paul Kagame in 2000, sought to refashion the nation as a “middle-income country” with a modern economy that could compete on an international scale. Most observers would agree that Vision 2020 was largely successful: the level of absolute poverty in Rwanda decreased dramatically [put in data here]. Rwanda now houses a robust service sector powered by tourism, finance, technological innovation, and its strong agrarian economy. Its parliament was the first to have a female majority, speaking to its renewed commitment to gender equality on a national level. Most importantly, at least on the surface, it reconciled its ethnic tensions and established a legitimate state that is safe and secure.

Rwanda’s success has made it a prized source for international aid, as it becomes the quintessential image of an African state primed for success in contrast to its under-developed peers. Accompanying Rwanda’s success, however, has been an internalized tightening of state power, with attempts to consolidate its regional assets. This can be seen through its support of the M23 insurgency group that is currently ravaging the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These actions threaten Rwanda’s hard-earned success while damaging its regional influence.

It is important to note that Africa is not a monolith; its near-infinitely varied people groups, histories, and societies make it impossible to essentialize despite their shared history of Western imperialism and economic struggle. But in many ways, the tale of Rwanda is a microcosm for the larger forces currently at play in the continent. As mentioned, Sub-Saharan Africa will see rapid urbanization and economic development because of its internal advances and greater moves toward integration on the regional, continental, and global scale. This development must prioritize long-term sustainability and African agency amid political turmoil and the lasting scars of colonialism and neocolonialism.

How the Colonial Past and Neocolonial Present Stifle Development

The long, dark legacy of European colonialism in Africa has posed a myriad of challenges to its attempts at overcoming said history. The colonialism following the Scramble for Africa in 1884 meant that European powers set up the infrastructure and systems for resource extraction but little else. More insidiously, however, European countries intentionally stoked ethnic cleavages to dissolve social cohesion, prevent political uprisings, and exercise a divide-and-conquer style of rule. This is seen predominantly in the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in none other than Rwanda. Before European coercion, these groups lived mostly harmoniously. But, by provoking these tensions through favorable treatment towards Tutsis, the Belgians sowed the seeds of a longtime ethnic resentment that eventually led to their widespread blame for political instability and subsequent marginalization, and culminating in a disastrous genocide a century later. Even after the decolonisation movement began, the Europeans drew borders with no consideration of the unique social, religious, and ethnic groups throughout the continent (once again treating Africa as a monolith), further encouraging political tensions that would mar the political conditions of many African nations.

In terms of economic policy, the developed world has structured its economic interactions in such a way that Africa is continually exploited for its resources with little in return. The soil beneath African feet continues to enrich and bless the world with inconceivable abundance. The DRC, for example, holds 78% of the world’s cobalt stores–a critical mineral used in lithium batteries that power much of the world’s modern technology, from phones and computers to technology for defense and renewable energy. Nigeria is home to a large wealth of oil, which makes up much of its modern economy. Countries like Sierra Leone, Botswana, and South Africa constitute much of the world’s diamond market. The diamond market, in particular, can serve as a case study of how systems of African economic exploitation manifest and linger. The De Beers Mining Corporation, founded by Cecil Rhodes, almost single-handedly created the global demand for diamonds and drove their procurement from Sierra Leone and South Africa. The cost of exploitative labor and extraction practices is deeply exemplified in the immense poverty in Freetown or Johannesburg, where the poor toil away while De Beers profits lavishly from the global diamond trade.

Much of the focus on neocolonialism has been on debt-trap diplomacy and the controversy surrounding systems of international aid. While international aid to Africa is crucial and has been successful in places like Kenya or Uganda in combating the spread of diseases like AIDS or Guinea worm, systemic corruption means that much of that aid does not reach the people who need it. Aid can often be used as a form of soft power (by Western powers or otherwise), to generate international goodwill for the country providing it. For instance, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has worked to massively upscale Africa’s infrastructure through the construction of railroads, bridges, roads, and ports. Beijing has invested billions of dollars into these projects to expand its soft power. There is widespread criticism of BRI investment as it relates to growing Chinese influence and the narrative of “debt-trap diplomacy,” wherein China finances a project it knows the country cannot pay back and seizes control of said project as a return on investment. Generally, debt-trap diplomacy is a myth; these narratives miss details of the negotiations between countries and usually say investment will benefit African countries in the long term through the resulting economic investment. However, there are legitimate concerns with the BRI, including the lack of transparency on China’s part and the risk of actual (and not perceived) exploitation. All this being said, there are legitimate concerns with foreign investment in Africa and neocolonialism. Often, multinational organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Center (WTO) will make loans to African economies, but with specific lending requirements that prompt African countries to implement neoliberal economic policies that favor the power players on the world market. This leaves African economies reliant on foreign aid and unable to achieve self-sufficiency under an African-led vision for the future.

Other Models of Development Worldwide

Given the many barriers around participation in the global economy laid out here, how are African countries supposed to overcome these seemingly insurmountable obstacles? We can look to other countries that exemplify the transition from poor, struggling economies to robust and successful ones. Perhaps the strongest historical example is the rise of the four Asian Tigers: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. These countries, now integral in the globalized world order for their importance to finance and technology, were able to transition from their largely agrarian, struggling post-World War II societies into highly urbanized and educated service economies. A combination of encouragement of popular education and a skilled labor force to serve in new sectors, alongside clever investment in finance and technology, allowed for a major decrease in poverty rates and prosperity in economics, governance, and culture, taking place in only one or two generations. Rapid development has been enhanced by strong government involvement in economic and social policies (especially education and investment in development companies) and a more open market fit for the globalized world. The development of Botswana and the aforementioned Rwanda, two African success stories, have followed similar trajectories. Both nations combined heavy government involvement, an emphasis on education and the stemming of brain drain (the loss of skilled professionals from developing countries to developed countries), a scaling-up of the native industries regarding agriculture and mining, and clever investment in the interest of developing a service economy to overcome and generate wealth. Yet, some issues should be noted with this development: these economic windfalls are often distributed unequally. This is a trait shared both among the Asian Tigers and nations like Rwanda, Botswana, and Nigeria. While the absolute level of poverty decreases, wealth is not enjoyed by the nation at large. Instead, it is concentrated among the upper classes, the political elite, and national oligarchs. This is a challenge that must be addressed through better social policies aimed at decreasing corruption and benefiting the people.

Intergovernmental Organizations and Greater Economic Integration

Sub-Saharan Africa has already been moving toward the political and economic integration between states that fosters development. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have pursued policies including a shared currency (the West African Franc), free movement between states, and a peacekeeping force, cleverly adapting policies found in other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the European Union (EU). The East African Community (EAC), in a similar fashion, has promoted free trade and an eventual group currency. The African Union (AU) serves as a binding continental force that asserts political and economic priorities. Through organizations like BRICS (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and expanding into other countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South America) or the African Development Bank, African countries are forming strategic relationships on the world stage. These are all positive efforts that, if thoroughly continued, will result in greater potential for African development.

It is important to note, however, that political and social instability threaten to undermine the strides noted here. Urgent flare-ups of terrorism, perpetrated by groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, can threaten the lives and livelihoods of communities while discouraging foreign investment and creating greater security risk. The influence of repressive authoritarian governments threatens IGOs as seen by the authoritarian military leaders in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali withdrawing their states from ECOWAS, causing the bloc to lose half of its landmass. Conflicts over land and resources, as can be seen in the Nile River Dam conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt, discourage essential economic cooperation. Corruption is a pervasive parasite that siphons off the monetary earnings and hard work of the African people. The African dream is within reach, but it will take a stringent effort, transparency, and security of African countries to attain and maintain.

The Way Forward

The future of African development is promising but uncertain. We have seen the success stories, but there is still much ground to cover for the dream to translate to reality. Attention must be paid to nourishing, educating, and honing the skills and passions of the African population. This entails a wide range of actions, from preventing the spread of disease and direct or structural violence to governments providing social services and robust and accessible K-12 and higher education. Attracting diaspora communities abroad through incentives could help reverse the effects of brain drain and bring experts to boost advancements in finance, tech, medicine, or scholarly research. The African people of today must be able to fulfill roles that are necessary to create the Africa of tomorrow. The admirable pursuit of regional integration already shown by states in East and West Africa should continue in a manner similar to the European Union. Moreover, governments must direct international aid and non-governmental organizations towards practical and efficient uses of money and resources. With all of this being said, the world must also respond in kind. Their assistance and investment should not transform into another iteration of exploitation but rather should inhabit mutual collaboration that stresses the agency of African countries. After all, given Africa’s growing importance to the world’s needs, it would be better for countries to work with Africans in a way that they would appreciate and thus reinforce. Ultimately, it will be up to the African people to sail through this sea of change into a better future.

Vincent Iannuzzi-Sucich 3/30/25 Vincent Iannuzzi-Sucich 3/30/25

Meet America’s New Sheriffs

“President-elect Donald Trump and Kash Patel, his pick to lead the FBI, during the Army-Navy football game at Northwest Stadium in Landover, Md., on Dec. 14, 2024.” Doug Mills / The New York Times/Redux via NBC

The Trump administration would like you to know that there is a new sheriff in town. They invoke the trope frequently, from a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Facebook post praising President Donald Trump and DHS Secretary Kristi Noem for deterring illegal immigration to a speech by Vice President JD Vance in which he lambasted European nations for their anti-hate speech laws. In Western films, where the trope originates, the archetypical “new sheriff” arrives in a frontier town ruled by corrupt or incompetent lawmen, deposes them, and establishes a new order that promises a truer form of justice. In the month since Trump returned to Washington, purges in every major part of the federal law enforcement apparatus have left it beyond doubt that a reordering is underway. However, the kind of justice that Trump’s emerging order will produce largely remains to be seen. The task of forging this order will fall to the new wave of conservative officials appointed to replace their mostly non-partisan predecessors.

To lead the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), America’s premier federal law enforcement agency, the Trump administration has appointed a pair of loyalists, Director Kash Patel and Deputy Director Dan Bongino. Both have a skeptical relationship with the agency. Patel, an embittered former federal prosecutor, spearheaded the Republican-led House Intelligence Committee investigation into the FBI’s investigation of Trump’s ties to Russia. During this investigation, the CIA criminally referred him to the Justice Department (DOJ) after he allegedly disclosed classified intelligence related to the investigation to people without clearances. Patel was ultimately not charged with a crime. Patel has asserted that the FBI is part of the “deep state” and even proposed turning the bureau’s headquarters into a museum showcasing its crimes. Multiple FBI officials made Patel’s so-called “enemies list” of government officials supposedly part of the “deep state,” including former Directors James Comey and Christopher Wray. If anything, Bongino, a prominent right-wing podcast host, has been an even more virulent critic, arguing without evidence that the bureau hid information about the pipe bombs planted outside the Democratic and Republican National Conventions because they were part of an “inside job” to frame Trump supporters for the violence.

Given their appointment of two men who hold the agency in contempt to its highest positions, it is unsurprising that the Trump administration has also sought to purge disfavored individuals from the bureau. Under the direction of Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove, eight senior executives were fired, and an additional seven executive assistant directors (who had led the bureau's Criminal, Cyber, Human Resources, Information and Technology, National Security, Response and Services, and Science and Technology branches) were demoted. Bove, who previously served as one of Trump's personal defense attorneys, has also sought the names of all FBI agents who worked on cases related to the January 6th Capitol riot. That effort concluded with a legal agreement not to publicly reveal the names of agents who worked on those cases without giving them two days’ notice and the opportunity to contest the decision in court. Despite this seeming victory, one of the agents most strongly resisted Bove’s attempt to access the names, James Dennehy, was forced out not long after the agreement was signed. Dennehy, who led the FBI’s New York field office, had told his staff that he would “dig in” in response to the firings of senior FBI leaders.

Retaliation against those who worked on Capitol riot cases has not confined itself to the FBI. The interim U.S. Attorney for Washington D.C., Ed Martin, has overseen the demotion and firing of prosecutors who worked on cases related to the January 6th attack, as well as the forced resignation of a prosecutor who refused to freeze Biden-era environmental funds. Martin, who previously represented three Capitol riot defendants, recently referred to himself and those working under him as “President Trumps’ [sic] lawyers”. Martin has expressed openness towards pursuing other political goals on behalf of the Trump administration, including threatening to prosecute Democratic lawmakers for statements that he argues are tantamount to incitement of violence. Martin’s office has sent legal threat letters to Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Representative Robert Garcia (D-CA), accusing them of threatening violence against their political opponents. In particular, Schumer’s comments, in which he stated that Supreme Court justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch had “released the whirlwind” and “w[ould] pay the price” following a 2020 abortion-related case, caused a stir when they were made. Following condemnation from the American Bar Association, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Congressional Republicans, Schumer apologized on the Senate floor. Despite this widespread backlash, the letter from Martin was the first indication that Schumer might face legal consequences for his remarks, which likely do not meet the legal standard for true threats.

Perhaps the most dramatic showdown between Trump’s appointees and the old order came in the Justice Department’s Southern District of New York (SDNY), an office with such a reputation for independence that it has been nicknamed “the sovereign district.” Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove, once again serves as the administration’s chosen enforcer. Bove, a former SDNY prosecutor, has a complicated relationship with his old office, having been investigated there multiple times for allegations of abusive behavior towards his subordinates. The recent clash occurred after Bove ordered interim U.S. Attorney Danielle Sassoon to dismiss a corruption case against New York City Mayor Eric Adams, a Democrat, who was charged in September with accepting bribes from Türkiye. Sassoon, a registered Republican and member of the Federalist Society who clerked for Justice Antonin Scalia, refused to do so, instead accusing Bove of arranging a quid pro quo in a letter to his boss, Attorney General Pam Bondi. According to Sassoon’s account, Adams’ lawyers informed Bove that the mayor would only be able to assist the administration in conducting immigration enforcement if the charges against him were dropped. Sassoon then offered to resign if the Department of Justice was still unwilling to allow the case to go on. Bove responded with a blistering eight-page letter accusing Sassoon of insubordination, accepting her resignation, placing the line prosecutors working on the case on leave, and defending the decision to dismiss the case. Bove accused the prosecution of being politically motivated, echoing allegations made by Adams’ lawyers that the Biden administration had prosecuted him in retaliation for his criticism of their immigration policy. Bove also defended the idea that advancing the Trump administration’s immigration policy was a legitimate reason to drop the case. Following Sassoon’s forced resignation, seven other lawyers, comprising nearly all of the supervisors in the SDNY’s Public Integrity unit, resigned. One of them, Hagan Scotten, another conservative who clerked for Chief Justice John Roberts, accused the administration of choosing to dismiss the case without prejudice in order to use the threat of reopening the case as leverage against the mayor, calling any lawyer who would obey the directive to dismiss the case a “fool” or a “coward.” The morning after the mass resignations took place, Bove summoned the remainder of the Public Integrity unit to a meeting in which he informed them that he wanted a prosecutor from the unit to cosign the motion to dismiss. He then left the unit time to decide who would sign the motion. After a discussion in which the unit reportedly considered resigning en masse, Edward Sullivan, an experienced anti-corruption prosecutor who is nearing retirement, offered to sign the motion, supposedly to avoid a mass firing. The dismissal was filed just hours later. Around the same time, Eric Adams gave federal immigration agents access to the jail complex on Rikers Island, becoming one of the first public officials outside of the administration to accede to its demands under legal pressure. During the old order, the apolitical nature of America’s federal law enforcement institutions was assumed but rarely felt. Now that the officials who defined and defended these institutions are gone, the Adams case shows the consequences of their removal.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth became the latest Trump administration official to move against his department’s law enforcement apparatus with his firing of the top Judge Advocate Generals (JAGs) for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The JAG Corps forms the core of the US military’s criminal justice system, fulfilling a variety of roles from prosecuting and defending accused criminals to advising senior military leaders on the legality of their actions. It is this latter role that has earned them Hegseth’s ire. Hegseth, a consistent defender of American war criminals, blamed JAGs (derided in his book The War on Warriors as “jagoffs”) for imposing restrictive rules of engagement that he believes crippled the American war effort in Afghanistan. Hegseth has only just begun to replace the fired JAGs, recently appointing his personal lawyer, Timothy Parlatore, as a commander in the Naval Reserve JAG corps. Parlatore previously served as defense counsel for two Navy SEALs: Eddie Gallagher, who was demoted for photographing himself posing with a corpse, and another SEAL who was charged with sexual assault. In a letter to Congress, five former Defense Secretaries, including one former Marine Corps General James Mattis, who served during the previous Trump administration, have denounced the firings of the JAGs and other military leaders, condemning what they saw as the President removing constraints on his power. Their letter was hardly necessary. At a press conference a few days earlier, Hegseth had all but said as much, stating that the fired lawyers would have been “roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief.”

Intent is often difficult to discern in the actions of the Trump administration, particularly as its reign remains in its early stages. However, Trump has shown a repeated tendency to appoint officials to the leadership of agencies that they have reason to despise. Kash Patel, who launched his career in conservative politics attacking the credibility of the Russia investigation, sees the FBI as a tool of the deep state. Ed Martin represented Capitol rioters imprisoned by the office he now leads. Emil Bove gutted the DOJ office where he had faced multiple investigations. Pete Hegseth, who had always chafed at the idea of men in suits telling men in boots how to fight, was given authority over the JAG corps. From the President down, a sense that they have been greatly wronged - and that retribution is necessary - pervades the Trump administration. Now that they have struck against their enemies in the government, nearly all of whom are either gone or on their way out, what comes next is unclear. What is clear is that the sheriffs of the old order are gone. The lawmen who run Washington now prize a single virtue: loyalty. Those who can’t get behind that had best be on their way.

Liv Bush-Moline 3/17/25 Liv Bush-Moline 3/17/25

Trump & Content Creators: The Sexist Entanglement that Targets Young Men

Following Trump’s re-election, social media platforms witnessed an explosion of misogynist speech, centered on the virality of far-right misogynist and white supremacist, Nick Fuentes, who popularized the phrase “your body, my choice.” In just the 24 hours following Trump’s re-election, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue reported a 4,600% increase in the posting of the phrases “your body, my choice” and “get back in the kitchen” on X. This is no coincidence. After Trump announced he was pursuing re-election in November of 2022, he dined with Fuentes at his Mar-a-Lago home, along with Kanye “Ye” West, who has come under intense scrutiny for his blatantly antisemitic posts and selling swastika merchandise on his Yeezy website. But while online sexism saw a massive, overt influx post-election, it’s simply the consolidation of more covert online trends that have been present for years, normalizing and disseminating misogynistic themes. This trend backwards into misogyny is not a mere apparition, but rather a corrupt and engineered manipulation to garner support for right-wing candidates.

In recent years, “alpha male” online personalities have gained notable traction, such as self-proclaimed misogynist Andrew Tate, and the aforementioned Nick Fuentes. The consequential harms of these sexist individuals holding platforms are exemplified by the media personalities themselves: both Tate and Fuentes now face charges for violence against women.

Tate, during his peak popularity around 2022, peddled disgustingly sexist narratives to his audiences, including how rape victims must “bear responsibility” for their attacks, that women are men’s property, and how he prefers to date women who are 18 to 19 years old, so he can “make an imprint” on them. In 2022, Tate was arrested in Romania on charges of forming an organized crime ring, investigated for potential human trafficking and sexual intercourse with minors, as well as accused of sexual aggression charges in the UK in 2024.

Fuentes, on the other hand, considers himself a sexist, a white supremacist, and a proud “incel” (short for involuntary celibate). His wide array of deeply problematic claims include that rape is “so not a big deal,” and that women are too emotional to make political decisions, among other narratives that range from fascist to anti-semitic to homophobic. Fuentes faced battery charges for pepper spraying, shoving, and breaking the cell phone of a woman who knocked on the door of his Illinois home. He has now asked a Cook County judge to seal his records of the battery case.

The most alarming layer to this issue is the relationship between these individuals and our governing body. The Trump administration began pressuring Romania to lift the travel restrictions on Tate and his brother Tristan. Less than two weeks later, the travel ban was lifted and the Tate brothers flew from Romania to Florida, where they credited Trump for making them feel safe upon their return—although, the UK is currently considering submitting an extradition request on grounds of the brothers’ pending charges of rape and human trafficking. Similarly, Republican lawmakers have collaborated with Fuentes’ America First Foundation, with multiple members of Congress, including Rep. Paul Gosar of Arizona, former congressman Steve King, and Arizona Senator Wendy Roger, who have publicly appeared at his events. This comes in addition to the aforementioned dinner between President Trump and Fuentes prior to his re-election campaign.

Trump’s 2024 campaign was devoted to collecting endorsements from popular male influencers and internet personalities such as Paul brothers Logan and Jake, TikToker Bryce Hall, streamer FaZe Banks, streamer Adin Ross, and so on. Podcast host and content creator Tana Mongeau claimed that she declined an offer of millions to endorse a presidential candidate and was made aware of a lengthy list of influencers that received and accepted similar offers. Mongeau implied that this was an offer to endorse Trump, stating that her views did not align with the candidate of the endorsement; she later publicly endorsed former Vice President Kamala Harris. Nonetheless, it seems as though Trump’s election strategy paid off, with the young male vote shifting significantly in Trump’s favor: 56% of young male voters say that they voted for Trump in 2024, compared to 41% in 2020.

There seems to be quite a mutualistic relationship between these content creators and Trump: content creators gain more traction and popularity, Trump gains more votes. This relationship rides on one foundational idea that is exploited by both the media personalities and Trump: framing young men’s unhappiness and dissatisfaction to be a result of the deviation from “tradition” and classic gender roles, which calls for a sharp reversion to remedy the issue. This framework of blame provides a clear-cut explanation for the “male loneliness epidemic,” which describes the high levels of loneliness that men have been feeling in recent years. Yet in reality, women and men self-report loneliness at almost the same rates: 15% for women, 16% for men. So, why is there this consensus of higher male loneliness in the first place?

The issue lies in the patriarchy, of course. Through childhood development, those assigned male and female at birth are treated differently based on their perceived gender, from which they learn a schema of behaviors and traits associated with that gender stereotype. These are aligned with the typical patriarchal design, where boys are encouraged to play roughly and act tough, and girls are expected to play cooperatively and quietly. Through this socialization and reinforcement of toxic masculinity, boys have less opportunity to learn how to healthily feel, articulate, and cope with their emotions. Toxic masculinity is built on seeing anti-femininity and toughness as power, which also reinforces the idea that women are weak, less intelligent, and less capable due to their emotions.

Along with this harmful and limiting gender socialization, screen time and smartphone usage have a positive correlation with rates of loneliness. This generation of young adults has grown up with near unlimited access to the Internet, and was isolated during a critical period of socio-psychological development over the COVID-19 pandemic. The key difference, generally speaking, is that girls have been more societally socialized into cooperative and emotionally supportive friendships where the barrier of toxic masculinity is not a common factor. Men don’t necessarily have fewer friends than women do, but less intimacy in those friendships. Seeking professional help and turning to close friends for support is far less common for men, likely due to the lasting stigma surrounding mental health and a fear of appearing weak.

According to a famously cited study by a Harvard University psychiatrist who spent three decades tracking the health and mental wellbeing of 724 American men, men overwhelmingly see relationships as the key to a healthy and fulfilling life. The emphasis and pressure placed on romantic relationships being the necessary condition for men’s happiness becomes a self-reinforcing cycle of dissatisfaction; when the perceived key to happiness is supportive long-term relationships, the inability to emotionally connect with others presents a significant obstacle. It also places the entire burden of emotional labor upon the woman in the relationship (in the stereotypical heteronormative context), due to male friendships’ tendency to lack emotional depth and support.

Additionally, self-reported “loneliness” seems to be conflated by many men with celibacy or singleness. This sort of thinking created the incel community that Fuentes is a proud member of: a population of men who have been unable to secure any sexual and romantic partners, and blame society and women for this perceived oppression against them. Feeling entitled to women and sex is inherently problematic, but this population is also particularly vulnerable to extremist and radical narratives due to their high levels of social isolation. In fact, teen boys that spend greater quantities of time socializing and engaging in political discussion online are the most vulnerable population to radicalization. The combination of these factors paints this population of young men as the ideal targets for politicians pushing right-wing agendas or alpha male influencer content, both of which promise a return to tradition and gender roles as the solution to their qualms— effectively scapegoating women rather than addressing the root of the issue.

The practice of paying off influencers and content creators to sway their audiences' political opinions presents great potential for violating our democratic processes. Additionally, personalized algorithms have a high potential to create filter bubbles and echo chambers that can repeatedly push radicalizing or harmful content. The intertwinement of the media sphere and our current administration is already concerning, with the most prominent social media platforms bowing down to Trump’s administration; politicizing entertainment and weaponizing algorithms for political means is a threat to democracy. The explosion of sexism on media platforms should be taken seriously— the seemingly harmless entertainment content that viewers consume can socialize them into problematic beliefs, leading to a sense of normalcy in the face of bigoted policy changes, or swaying vulnerable populations towards radicalization. The consequences of ignoring this rapidly spreading phenomenon are severe, with dozens killed by incel-related attacks over the past decade. Without comprehensive action against this multifaceted issue plaguing our socio-political atmosphere, it’s clear that these widespread harms will continue to escalate.

Carmine Miklovis 2/25/25 Carmine Miklovis 2/25/25

The Last Bastion of U.S. Democracy

In the month since his return to office, President Donald Trump has made extensive use of executive orders (EOs) to turn his campaign promises into reality. From signing an order pausing all foreign aid, to banning trans women athletes from participating in women’s sports, Trump has not shied away from testing the reach of the EO. Federal courts, however, have blocked a number of these measures, including the orders on birthright citizenship and Trump’s efforts to freeze federal funding. In response, Vice President JD Vance and Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) head Elon Musk have shown defiance to court orders, criticizing the supposed overreach by the courts and calling for the impeachment of justices who have halted Trump’s agenda. As calls have grown for Trump to ignore these warnings, some scholars warn that doing so could create a constitutional crisis. As such, it’s likely that the challenges from the executive branch may eventually fall into the hands of the Supreme Court. Luckily for those fearing the worst, the Court may be Trump’s biggest check in his second term.

The court hasn’t been particularly favorable to liberals in recent years, handing a series of detrimental decisions that overturned the federal right to an abortion, disposed of the Chevron doctrine, limited the EPA’s ability to mandate reductions in carbon emissions, and dismantled affirmative action. As such, many have grown pessimistic about the politicized nature of the court, worrying about upcoming decisions on racial gerrymandering, the ability of the government to regulate “ghost guns,” and gender-affirming care for minors. However, while the court isn’t going to make an ideological 180 in the next four years, they’re also not going to give Trump free rein to do whatever he wants.

For any given case, at least five justices will have to vote to uphold a federal court decision. Based on the ideological composition of the court–six conservative justices to three liberals–some may be quick to foretell doom. Don’t let the pessimists fool you, however–it’s a misnomer to say this is a 6-3 conservative court; it’s better characterized as a 3-3-3 court split between liberals, institutional conservatives, and hard-line conservatives. Chief Justice John Roberts, along with Associate Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett–the Court’s institutional conservatives–have all shown a willingness to compromise. Throughout the 2022-2023 session, the justices agreed with members of the liberal bloc about 80% of the time in non-unanimous decisions. As such, the odds of them moving to uphold the Trump-restricting decisions of the lower-level courts–due to institutional concerns–are better than cynics may expect.

In any given case, liberal Associate Justices Elena Kagan, Ketanji Brown Jackson, and Sonia Sotomayor are surefire votes against Trump. The set of issues that the liberal justices see eye-to-eye with him on are few and far between. Among the conservative bloc, there are four justices who could reasonably make up the other two votes needed. Which two justices are most likely to break off is largely dependent on the issue, however.

On Trump’s budget tweaks, for example, the two conservative justices most likely to join the liberal justices in striking them down are Roberts and Kavanaugh. As several former secretaries of Treasury have pointed out, Roberts has previously written against executive overreach on financial affairs, arguing that “no area seems more clearly the province of Congress than the power of the purse.” Similarly, Kavanaugh wrote explicitly against it, saying that “Even the president does not have unilateral authority to refuse to spend the funds.” From cutting USAID to everything to do with Musk’s DOGE, expect the court to strike down these efforts to restructure the executive branch.

On a ruling regarding birthright citizenship, hardline conservative Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch could prove to be an unlikely ally for liberal justices. In April 2022, Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in United States v. Vaello-Madero called for the overturning of the Insular Cases, a set of rulings from the Spanish-American War asserting that constitutional rights do not fully apply to citizens of incorporated U.S. territories. Gorsuch’s decision to explicitly critique the rulings is noteworthy, and could signal that he may adopt a broad interpretation of jurisdiction (at least territorially) in a ruling on birthright citizenship. Similarly, the precedent-focused Roberts will likely vote in favor of birthright citizenship, a principle from the 14th Amendment that has been upheld in Dred Scott v Sanford and United States v Wong Kim Ark.

Expect Gorsuch and the chief justice to once again come together for any ruling relating to same-sex marriage or LGBTQ+ rights. For Gorsuch, his majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, a 2020 case that ruled against workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation, may provide a preview on how he could approach similar cases that may arise in the coming terms. In his opinion, Gorsuch argued that “It is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating ... based on sex.” This ruling, which Roberts joined him on, could provide a framework for how the two justices would treat similar cases of discrimination by Trump.

Additionally, while Roberts dissented in the original Obergefell v. Hodges ruling, which legalized same-sex marriage, his respect for precedent might motivate him to cast a vote to uphold the ruling, should a challenge come before the court. A defining feature of the chief justice is his ability to put precedent before ideology, as displayed in his vote to support upholding Mississippi's 15-week abortion ban, but opposing the full overturn of Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.

If the decision involves precedent or could impact the court’s credibility as an independent body insulated from political pressures, expect the institutional conservatives to step in. Roberts’ long-standing focus on the court’s credibility and legal integrity has been reinvigorated in recent years, with the chief justice reiterating the vitality of judicial independence in his 2024 end of the year report.

This sentiment seems to be echoed by Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett, who recently chose to recuse herself from a case involving her alma mater, Notre Dame. While not as much of an institutionalist as Roberts, Barrett has shown a respect for the court’s reputation, as well as a desire to not be seen as a political pawn who only serves to advance Trump’s agenda. In cases like Fischer v. United States, which dealt with the applicability of provisions in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act against participants in the January 6th insurrection, Barrett surprised observers by breaking with her conservative peers. Instead, she joined Sotomayor and Kagan in a dissenting opinion that called for a broader interpretation of the statute to prosecute individuals at the attempted coup d'état. Writ large, she was the most likely conservative justice to vote for a liberal outcome in the 2023-2024 term (a title that has historically belonged to Roberts). Beyond that, Barrett has voiced support for a binding ethics code for justices on the court. The move may be an indirect dig at fellow conservative Associate Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas, who have come under fire for failing to disclose millions of dollars of luxurious gifts from Republican donors. As such, while Barrett voting with the liberal bloc is by no means a guarantee, it certainly isn’t out of the question.

Similarly, Kavanaugh has proven remarkably similar to Roberts, voting with him 95% of the time during the 2022-2023 term. Kavanaugh voted with Roberts and the liberal justices to uphold a test to determine the existence of discriminatory voting rules in Allen v Milligan, and took a more liberal interpretation of the 4th Amendment’s usage of “seizure” in Torres v. Madrid. While both Kavanaugh and Barrett have broken with Roberts on key issues, such as abortion, they have relatively stayed in line, voting with him more often than they voted with any other individual.

The bloc has moved together to prevent potential executive power grabs before, such as in Moore v. Harper, where they voted against giving state legislatures unregulated power to set the rules for federal elections in their own states. Under a different interpretation, allowing state legislatures to have unchecked power over federal election laws could create a situation where states with Republican-controlled state legislatures hand over their electoral votes won by a Democrat (e.g. Kamala Harris) to a Republican (e.g. Donald Trump). This concept, known as the independent state legislature theory, raised concerns from some experts about the implications for American democracy. The bloc, however, recognizing the risk at stake, voted to reject the ideal. In similar cases that may bring into question the Court’s credibility, expect any permutation of Roberts, Barrett, and Kavanaugh to join the Court’s liberals to uphold the lower court.

While Barrett and Kavanaugh have mostly followed Roberts and his respect for precedent, Gorsuch–who isn’t motivated by the same institutional concerns–has charted his own course, producing a number of distinctive opinions over the years. Although Gorsuch is a hard-line conservative, most frequently aligning with Thomas and Alito, he’s shown a willingness to break from Trump on hot-button issues like immigration, indigenous sovereignty, and (as mentioned) LGBTQ+ rights. In his nomination, he noted a willingness to break from the president if the law necessitates it. He also harbored disdain for political name-calling by a president to a justice following an unfavorable decision–a sentiment shared by Roberts. He exercised this independence, voting with Kavanaugh and the court’s liberal justices to have Trump release his tax records, much to the president’s chagrin. As such, while Trump appointed Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, assuming the three’s loyalty to the president exceeds their legal integrity is a faulty speculation.

While Thomas and Alito could vote to solidify a unanimous decision, they don’t share the same institutional concerns that motivate Roberts, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, nor do they share the motivations behind Gorsuch’s track record of decisions. Instead, they tend to provide originalist decisions, adopting a stricter reading of the Constitution that usually bodes well for Republicans. That being said, as a whole, the Court is not as partisan as reporting makes it out to be, despite having a few high-profile, ideologically-bending decisions in recent years. Indeed, half of decisions in the 2022-2023 term were unanimous. Even polar opposites, like Sotomayor and Alito, have still ruled together in non-unanimous decisions more often than they did not.

Furthermore, plenty of recent decisions have involved surprising majorities. Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co, which dealt with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, had Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Jackson in the majority and Roberts, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett in the dissent. Similarly, in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, which discussed whether the Interstate Commerce clause could allow California to impose anti-animal cruelty standards on exporters from outside the state, had Sotomayor, Kagan, Thomas, Gorsuch and Barrett in the majority, and Roberts, Kavanaugh, Alito, and Jackson in the dissent. Only 8% of decisions from the 2022-2023 term were 6-3 across ideological lines. The depiction of the court as a solely political entity is wholly inaccurate.

As the president tests the limits of executive power, the Supreme Court may prove to be the ultimate check to Trump’s more radical and destructive impulses. While Trump appointed a third of the justices on the court, they aren’t his cronies, and will instead demonstrate a commitment–albeit a varying one–to the rule of law and preservation of credible institutions. As Trump rebuilds the government and redefines what it means to be president, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to be the safeguard that U.S. democracy needs to endure a second Trump administration.

Ella Rutman 2/23/25 Ella Rutman 2/23/25

Trump’s Ambitions to Purchase Greenland

In recent months, U.S. President Donald Trump has reignited efforts to acquire Greenland–much to the dismay of the island’s inhabitants. His interest in purchasing the Danish territory goes back to 2019, although this proposal was widely dismissed at the time as a joke. This time around, however, the president and high-level officials around him have made one thing clear: he’s deathly serious. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has confirmed what many Europeans have been fearing: that the new president’s interests are “not a joke.”

While Trump’s interest in buying the Danish island has faced mockery, an American focus on the Arctic region is nothing new. In fact, it goes back to the nineteenth-century. In 1867, President Andrew Jackson purchased Alaska from the Russians. The signing of the Alaska Treaty made the U.S. an Arctic state, gave them access to the northern Pacific Rim, and removed Russian presence from North America.

U.S. ambitions in the Arctic did not end there. In 1910, the U.S. ambassador to Denmark, Maurice Egan, proposed a three-way land swap: the U.S. would cede Mindanao–an island in the Philippines–in exchange for Greenland and the Danish West Indies; Denmark would, in turn, further exchange land with Germany. Furthermore, in 1946, officials offered to buy the island for $100 million in gold. These rejections did not deter American determination, however, and Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union only heightened military aspirations in the following years. Because of its location between the period’s superpowers, it had a unique geostrategic importance for the U.S. This recognition resulted in the 1951 Greenland Defence Agreement, allowing the U.S. to establish military bases on the island. The importance of the agreement lies in the fact that it is an explicit legal precedent that allows the U.S. to have influence within Denmark’s territory. This has enabled the creation of the Pituffik Space Base, a key mechanism in receiving early missile warnings.

To understand why this whole extravaganza is critical, it is insightful to look at the international balance of power. As geopolitical tensions rise between the global superpowers–the U.S., Russia, and China–the Arctic territory becomes increasingly paramount. Similar to Cold War interests, obtaining reach over Greenland is of large military benefit. Trump said to reporters from the White House, “Greenland is necessary not for us, it’s necessary for international security,” adding “you have Russian boats all over the place, you have China’s boats all over the place — warships — and they [Denmark] can’t maintain it.” Strategically, the administration’s standpoint is clear: it allows the U.S. to counterbalance against its rivals.

In addition to military importance, the climate crisis has given the territory a greater economic security incentive for the U.S. A 2025 report found that the Greenland ice sheet is melting faster than ever before. As the ice caps recede, new mineral deposits are exposed, providing access to Greenland’s rare earth elements (i.e., lithium, niobium, hafnium and zirconium). The urgency stems from the pressure to keep up with China and counter the threat posed by its dominance over the supply chain. Another economic incentive created by the melting ice caps is the creation of new shipping lanes in the Arctic. According to the Arctic Council, shipping increased 37 percent from 2013 to 2023. By revealing new routes, cargo ships have to travel shorter distances between population centers.

Trump’s calls haven’t been ignored by Denmark, its neighbors, or the Greenlanders whose future is at stake. The Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has made it clear that the territory is “not for sale” and that “Seen through the eyes of the Danish government, Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders.” This sentiment rejecting the Trump proposal is reflected in the constituency. According to new polling, 85% of Greenlanders are against joining the U.S. Many are even offended at the proposition. Aleqa Hammond, Greenland's first female Prime Minister said, "He's treating us like a good he can purchase.”

But words are not enough to fend off the Trump administration and their expansionist ambitions. It was announced in late January that Denmark will divert 14.6 billion Danish crowns ($2.05bn USD) into security. Centered around the Arctic waters, the country will obtain three new ships, more long-range drones, and greater satellite capacity. In support, NATO has also discussed the prospect of sending troops to defend the state. Because Denmark is allied with NATO, Greenland is protected under Article V in the original North Atlantic Treaty–the Mutual Defense Clause. If the U.S.invades Greenland, they invade NATO, and all member states will come to Denmark’s defense. Some states, such as France, have even weighed the possibility of sending troops in response to Trump’s threats.

Analysis (by Carmine Miklovis)

Seizing Greenland would be a miscalculation by the Trump administration. While the U.S. would decisively win any military or economic conflict against Denmark, the losses wouldn’t be on the battlefield; instead, the U.S. would be putting a stake through the heart of one of its most important alliances: NATO.

A U.S. invasion of Greenland would be an unprecedented strategic blunder. Triggering Article V would pit the U.S. against nearly every single one of its closest allies. While Trump’s foreign policy is erratic, there’s some semblance of coherence that suggests that he wouldn’t go this far. Instead, it’s likely that Trump will attempt to pressure the Danish government through economic coercion. While Trump likely won’t outright sanction Denmark, he’ll use every tool in his arsenal to squeeze a favorable agreement out of them. Whether this will work as intended, however, remains to be seen. It’s unlikely that the president will impose steep tariffs on the entire alliance, given EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s promise to reciprocate any tariffs clashes with Trump’s domestic promise of lowering food prices. As such, the rest of the EU–who largely supports Denmark’s claim to Greenland–may be able to circumvent higher tariffs on the Danes.

This entire charade risks unnecessarily souring transatlantic relations at a time when the alliance is vital to U.S. interests. The more forceful Trump is in his rhetoric and actions, the more he will strain relations with its European allies. This move, along with the imposition of tariffs on the EU and the de-emphasis of NATO by Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in recent weeks, marks the Trump administration’s broader disregard for the alliance as a whole. While once pivotal to global security, the U.S. has made it clear that its priorities lie elsewhere–much to the dismay of its European allies.

Greenland can still serve the United States’ security goals without the U.S. adopting the island as a territory. Instead, if Trump wants to utilize the island for its strategic importance, he can do so by expanding the use of the island in NATO operations. He then could use the island to better position the U.S. in the Arctic without it serving as a point of contention with the nation’s most valuable alliance. Pivoting the focus could turn the issue from a source of enmity in the transatlantic alliance to a unifying force.

Perhaps negotiating favorable conditions for positioning U.S. troops on Greenland has been Trump’s goal all along, and this is just his roundabout way of achieving it. This unconventional path could allow him to tout a win to his base, telling them that he negotiated better conditions—albeit on something that would otherwise be easy to achieve. Perhaps Trump is testing the waters, seeing what concessions he can extract out of the EU. Maybe the U.S. is abandoning the alliance to chart its own course. Or maybe there is no grand strategy at all, and he’s just stirring trouble or seeking to achieve a tangible legacy driven by motives of self-interested glory. Regardless, if the U.S. obtains Greenland, Trump will be sure to claim the deal as a domestic political win. However, it would be a tremendous loss internationally and should be a serious consideration as he crafts his foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe. Thus, while this might garner domestic support, he could lose big in the international arena, and add pressure to the already splintering relationship between the United States and their European allies.

Alex Dischler 2/12/25 Alex Dischler 2/12/25

Global Health in Crisis: The Ripple Effect of The U.S. Withdrawal from The WHO

On his first day in office, President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the World Health Organization (WHO). Within the executive order, Trump cited the WHO’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, failure to adopt reforms (i.e. including Taiwan in proceedings and doing independent scientific investigations), failure to be independent from other states (namely China), and making the U.S. pay dues that are far too high. However, pandemics don’t care about nationalism. Abandoning the WHO does nothing but make the U.S. more vulnerable while alienating allies and weakening global disease response efforts. If the goal was to protect Americans, this move does the exact opposite—it’s reckless, shortsighted, and frankly, foolish.

Global health governance

The U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) disrupts global health coordination and security by weakening international responses to public health crises. The WHO plays a central role in pandemic preparedness, outbreak response, and global disease surveillance, ensuring that countries share critical information and coordinate containment measures. By leaving the organization, the U.S. risks diminished access to real-time epidemiological data, medical research, and collaborative response efforts that are essential for mitigating future health threats. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, the WHO facilitated the rapid dissemination of information regarding the virus' spread and coordinated vaccine distribution efforts through COVAX (an international program aiming to expand access to COVID-19 vaccines). Without direct participation, the U.S. will face delays in obtaining crucial health data, reducing its ability to prepare for and respond to emerging outbreaks effectively. Additionally, this withdrawal could undermine global trust in the U.S. as a reliable partner in international health governance, weakening its influence in shaping health policies and emergency response strategies. Ultimately, this decision risks hampering both U.S. public health security and broader global disease response efforts, as pandemics and outbreaks require multilateral cooperation to contain and control.

Financing WHO

As one of the largest contributors to the WHO, the U.S. has historically provided substantial financial support for global health initiatives, including disease eradication programs, vaccine distribution, and emergency response efforts. Without these funds, the WHO will struggle to maintain essential health programs (vaccinations, maternal and child healthcare, chronic disease appointments, etc), particularly in low-income countries that rely on its support for basic healthcare infrastructure and outbreak preparedness. The consequences of this financial instability will be severe. The WHO plays a critical role in coordinating immunization efforts, medical aid distribution, and epidemic response, particularly in regions with limited resources. The loss of U.S. funding will disrupt these programs, exacerbating global health disparities and weakening the world’s ability to respond to future pandemics. Reduced WHO capacity does not just affect other countries; it increases the risk of uncontrolled outbreaks that could easily spread across borders, ultimately threatening U.S. public health as well.

Eradication of disease/global health equity

The WHO has been instrumental in combating diseases such as polio, HIV/AIDS, and malaria, coordinating international vaccination programs and treatment initiatives to limit the impact of the pathogens. The U.S., as one of the largest contributors to the WHO, has played a pivotal role in funding these programs. The withdrawal of U.S. support jeopardizes these critical initiatives, potentially leading to a resurgence of preventable diseases, particularly in low-income countries that depend heavily on WHO assistance. Moreover, the thawing of permafrost due to climate change poses additional risks. As permafrost melts, it can release ancient pathogens that have been dormant for millennia, potentially leading to new disease outbreaks. A well-funded, coordinated global health response is essential to monitor and address these emerging threats. However, the U.S. withdrawal from the WHO undermines such efforts, leaving the global community less prepared to handle these challenges.

Disease surveillance

The WHO facilitates international collaboration by coordinating research and disseminating vital information on disease outbreaks, such as tracking new COVID-19 variants. By exiting the organization, the U.S. not only forfeits access to this real-time data but also diminishes its role in contributing valuable health information, thereby weakening global efforts to monitor and control diseases. This disruption in collaboration hampers the ability of all nations, including the U.S., to respond effectively to public health crises. As noted by the American Medical Student Association, the withdrawal isolates the U.S. from a key global health body, diminishing its ability to influence international health policies and initiatives that directly affect the safety and security of its population. Moreover, the absence of the U.S. in the WHO's coordinated efforts could lead to delays in identifying and containing outbreaks, increasing the risk of widespread transmission. The Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health emphasizes that withdrawing from the WHO would hamper national and international pandemic preparedness efforts, potentially leading to public health disasters.

Economic/global health consequences

Pandemics have massive economic consequences, from disrupting global supply chains to forcing costly government interventions. The COVID-19 pandemic alone caused trillions in economic losses, and stimulus measures such as direct payments contributed to inflationary pressures. By weakening the WHO, the U.S. increases the likelihood that future pandemics—like the ongoing spread of avian influenza—will last longer, cost more, and require even more drastic financial interventions. Failing to contain outbreaks quickly doesn’t just put lives at risk; it directly threatens economic stability at home and abroad.

Beyond economic fallout, withdrawing from the WHO also means the U.S. is no longer bound by international health regulations (IHR), which are critical during global health emergencies. The IHR framework ensures coordinated international responses to pandemics, mandating transparency and containment measures that prevent localized outbreaks from escalating into global catastrophes. Without these obligations, the U.S. could mishandle emerging threats, increasing the risk of uncontrolled outbreaks that could devastate both public health and the economy. By abandoning international health cooperation, the U.S. is choosing short-term isolation over long-term security—putting both lives and financial stability on the line.

Military/biodefense

The WHO serves as a critical platform for early warnings about infectious diseases, facilitating rapid information exchange and coordinated responses among member nations. By exiting the organization, the U.S. forfeits access to this vital intelligence, potentially delaying its awareness of emerging health threats and compromising its ability to implement timely countermeasures. This gap in early warning systems could lead to delayed responses to outbreaks, increasing the risk of widespread transmission and endangering public health.

Moreover, U.S. military personnel deployed overseas rely on WHO-led initiatives to combat endemic diseases in their regions of operation. The WHO's efforts in disease surveillance, vaccination programs, and health infrastructure support are integral to maintaining the health of service members. Withdrawal from the WHO jeopardizes these collaborative efforts, potentially exposing military personnel to higher risks of infection. While the U.S. Department of Defense has its own health surveillance and vaccination programs, these are often implemented in conjunction with WHO guidelines and support. The absence of WHO collaboration could lead to gaps in disease prevention measures, adversely affecting the health and readiness of U.S. forces.

Ironically, many service members who may support the withdrawal are the same individuals who will face increased health risks as a result. According to a 2024 Pew Research Center survey, 63% of veteran voters identify with or lean toward the Republican Party. This not only undermines global health security but also directly endangers the well-being of U.S. military personnel, who depend on international cooperation to safeguard their health during deployments.

Modeling

The U.S. withdrawal from the WHO did not occur in isolation–it set a precedent for other nations to disengage from global health governance, further weakening international cooperation. Argentina, for example, has followed the U.S.’s lead and has withdrawn from the WHO, citing similar concerns to President Trump. This sets the stage for a potential domino effect, where countries begin prioritizing nationalist policies over collective health. The consequence is clear: a fragmented global health system wherein nations are isolationist and fail to track pandemics, diseases, and any type of healthcare-related data. This shortsighted nationalism ignores the reality that no country, no matter its power, can single-handedly end a pandemic. If more states begin to follow suit, the world will be at significant risk regarding future health emergencies, leading to higher mortality rates, prolonged economic disruptions, and general instability.

Liv Bush-Moline 2/6/25 Liv Bush-Moline 2/6/25

The Truth Behind the “Illegal Alien”: Debunking Anti-Migrant Talking Points

Image credit: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

In the past few weeks, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency at the southern border, attempted to end birthright citizenship, suspended US refugee admissions, shut down the Biden administration’s immigration programs, and ordered for Guantanamo Bay to be prepared to house up to 30,000 migrants. Amongst this barrage of activity undertaken by President Trump, nothing exemplifies the US shift to reject its “melting pot” roots more than the intense influx of raids by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), paired with his consistent anti-immigrant rhetoric. The recent ICE raids have evidenced racial profiling, with American citizens being detained on the basis of their race or skin color, including indigenous American citizens of tribal nations. ICE has also been granted the authority by President Trump to apprehend migrants in or near schools, churches, and hospitals, prompting pushback from public schools. Sowed by claims of high crime rates from undocumented immigrants and stolen American jobs, the seeds of xenophobia have been planted quite deeply. But is there any factual basis to these anti-immigrant arguments?

The extreme rise in anti-immigrant hate, discrimination, and administrative action necessitates an examination of the truth and facts on the topic. In an assessment of the common arguments against migrants in the US, there is little to no evidence supporting the claims of high crime rates, violence, and job-stealing.

CLAIM: Migrants are criminals, murderers, terrorists, violent, etc.

“Not only is Comrade Kamala allowing illegal aliens to stampede across our border, but then it was announced about a year ago that they’re actually flying them in. Nobody knew that they were secretly flying in hundreds of thousands of people, some of the worst murderers and terrorists you’ve ever seen,” said Trump at a news conference in Los Angeles, California on September 13, 2024.

FACT: Data indicates that immigration, including undocumented populations, is not linked to higher crime rates; in reality, the inverse is true.

Studies have shown that immigration is not linked to higher crime rates. In fact, communities with greater immigrant population concentrations have been observed to have lower crime rates and increased levels of social connection and economic opportunity, which are factors indicative of neighborhood safety.

Additionally, when it comes to claims of terrorism, a 2019 CATO Institute study examined terrorist attacks from 1975 to 2017 and found no association between immigration and terrorism. The study assessed terrorism’s relationship to immigration status, comparing native-born terrorism to foreign-born and undocumented migrants, and found that, in the 43-year period analyzed, there were 192 foreign‐born terrorists and 788 native-born terrorists who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil. The vast majority of attacks that were planned, attempted or carried out were made by native-born terrorists. Additionally, the chance of a citizen being killed in a terrorist attack by a refugee on U.S. soil is about 1 in 3.86 billion per year, and the chance of being murdered by an attack committed by an undocumented immigrant was found to be zero.

Cases such as the tragic murder of Laken Riley have been wielded as examples and proof of this migrant-criminal generalization, despite their statistically unlikely nature. Native-born US citizens have been found to have significantly and consistently higher rates of violent crime in comparison to undocumented migrants, although these instances receive far less media attention. The case of Laken Riley in particular became a major campaign talking point for President Trump, who signed into law the Laken Riley Act in her honor. Ultimately leading many to overestimate the crime risks of migrants, specific cases like this have been utilized to continue the dissemination of the dangerous migrant narrative.

CLAIM: Migrants steal American jobs and hurt the US economy.

“Virtually 100% of the net job creation in the last year has gone to migrants. You know that? Most of the job creation has gone to migrants. In fact, I’ve heard that substantially more than — beyond, actually beyond that number 100%. It’s a much higher number than that, but the government has not caught up with that yet,” said Trump in August of 2024.

FACT: Immigration helps boost the economy, and is not linked to higher American unemployment.

The Congressional Budget Office reported in 2024 that immigration contributes significantly to economic growth, rather than stunting it. Economists believe that post-pandemic, the surge in immigration led to growth in the economy without contributing to price inflation.

Furthermore, concerns about migrants stealing jobs from Americans have also been debunked. The rate of unemployment for US-born workers averaged around 3.6% in 2023: the lowest rate on record. The claim that more immigrants displace US-born workers is simply not factual, otherwise the unemployment rate would be significantly higher. The truth is that US-born workers have very low interest in labor-intensive and commonly agricultural jobs, which are then filled by migrants.

Government data indicates that immigrant labor actually provides promotional opportunities for US-born workers, and that a mass-deportation event would cause costs of living to skyrocket. This is because immigrants tend to take jobs that are complementary to native-born workers, not acting as substitutes to them, but as supplements. Additionally, immigrants contribute not only to the labor supply, but to labor demand as well due to their consumption of goods and services. This is furthered by the entrepreneurial tendencies of many high-skilled immigrants; immigrants have been found to start businesses at higher rates than native-born workers, generating jobs and long-term economic growth.

CLAIM: Migrants should just go back to their own country.

“Why don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came,” tweeted Trump in 2019, targeting progressive Democrat congresswomen who had been outspoken against his immigration stance.

FACT: According to a study on those migrating to the US from Latin America and the Caribbean, nearly 73% have been victimized by violent crime in their home countries, many of which have been destabilized throughout history by US interventions.

The largest population of migrants in the US is from Mexico, making up around 23% of the country’s total immigrant population. In 2022, a UN International Organization for Migration survey found that 90% of Mexican migrants fled due to violence, extortion, or organized crime.

Similarly, undocumented immigration from the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) has been increasing steadily over the past 30 years. Looking at the US involvement in these countries, all three have been destabilized by past US intervention.

During El Salvador’s 12 year long civil war from 1979 to 1992, the US government backed the repressive regime that dispatched paramilitary death squads against civilians. Post-war, El Salvador saw an explosion of gang violence across the country. Guatemala has been plagued by national instability for decades, which was largely exacerbated by a 1954 CIA-backed coup that triggered an armed insurgency. Guatemala has since faced decades of human rights abuses committed by its leaders. The 2009 Honduras coup was supported by US DoD officials, and led to an age of violence and instability in the country that's effects are still felt today. Post-coup, Honduras has faced extreme poverty, economic inequality, and gang violence.

Additionally, studies have examined the distinct correlation between US firearm manufacturing and the rates of gun violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. The US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives indicates that a large sum of guns recovered from crimes in El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico were manufactured in the US. The US remains one of the main legal firearm exporters to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, and the US Government Accountability Office reported that these legal exports are often diverted to criminal networks.

Global migration has increased overall over the past few decades, hitting a record high in 2023. As of May 2024, over 120 million people have been forcibly displaced due to human rights violations, persecution, conflict and violence around the world, including 6.4 million asylum seekers.

CLAIM: They should just come into the country legally.

“The current administration terminated every single one of those great Trump policies that I put in place to seal the border. I wanted a sealed border. Again, come in but come in legally,” said Trump in his speech at the Republican National Convention in July of 2024.

FACT: It’s not that migrants do not want to enter legally, but rather structural, institutional, and financial obstacles impede them from doing so.

Many migrants do want to come into the US legally. The process however, is extremely time-consuming and difficult to navigate. In the years following the outbreak of COVID-19 there has been a massive backlog in cases, amounting to 2 million pending cases in 2023— more than triple the amount from 2017. Partly due to understaffed immigration courts, the backlog means years of waiting for a case to be heard. Beyond shortages in immigration judges and staff, the DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review has been found to have “longstanding workforce management challenges,” and “did not have a strategic workforce plan to address them,” according to the US Government Accountability Office.

Additionally, immigrants and asylum seekers are five times more likely to win their case if they have a lawyer. Unfortunately, publicly-funded lawyers are not a right for migrants, and even if they were , there is a massive shortage in immigration lawyers to begin with, and they are often far too costly to obtain. To make matters worse, many migrants don’t speak English, and ICE provides little guidance on how to go about legal processes, and certainly not any translated versions of instructions or resources.

THE BOTTOM LINE:

As Trump continues his flurry of anti-immigrant actions, it’s essential to remain vigilant to the facts and truth. We must work to see these baseless claims as what they truly are: hateful rhetoric, not factual arguments. Diversity in the US should be celebrated, not abhorred. Dehumanizing language should have no place in the US government, especially not in our highest office. Maintaining a high integrity of indiscrimination and empathy for one another is more necessary now than ever, especially in wake of Trump’s anti-DEI initiatives.

All of these actions are justified by Trump with claims of high levels of violence and crime committed by undocumented immigrants, often paired with extremely degrading language of animalistic and impure nature. The claims by Trump of migrants being “animals”, “not people”, and “poisoning the blood of our country” strikingly resemble the verbal dehumanization that precedes massive cultural violence and genocide. In his book Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler used the phrase “blood poisoning” as a way to criticize the mixing of races, and during the Rwandan Genocide Tutsis were commonly referred to as “cockroaches”. This sort of dehumanization is designated as the fourth of the ten stages of genocide.

With the first flights full of deported migrants landing in Guantanamo Bay this past Tuesday, our full attention must be on the treatment of migrants, legality, and ethics of this detainment. Guantanamo Bay has repeatedly been subject to strong criticism by human rights groups for violating basic human rights, holding detainees without charges or trials, and violating the US Constitution; the implications of holding deported migrants at the facility are quite alarming, with high potential for human rights abuses obscured from the public eye.

Ibrahim Bah 1/30/25 Ibrahim Bah 1/30/25

The Trump Administration’s Oncoming Attack on Birthright Citizenship: What Does It Mean to Be an American?

American birthright citizenship, and the associated rights and liberties, is core to the American experiment. The idea that someone born in the fifty states, regardless of their race, gender, status, or parents’ country of origin, is entitled to all of the freedoms, protections, and civic responsibilities that the United States has to offer, is an incredibly compelling one. American citizenship is intrinsic and inalienable. It has given us some of the nation’s best and brightest and created a distinct national identity; we can recognize our distinct ethnic, religious, or regional differences while living in the same communities, voting together, catching a football game, and so on. It unifies us – we are all “one America.” It is what allows American communities to become cohesive and truly great; removal and separation breaks down the communities that make up our nation. It is this integral, compelling core value that is being challenged by recent executive orders by the Trump administration.

Mere hours after being inaugurated again, President Donald Trump signed an executive order “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” In doing so, the Trump administration seeks to “protect” American citizenship by redefining birthright citizenship to require both parents of a child to, at minimum, be legal residents of the US (green card holders) or full citizens. Prior to this, any child born on US soil was granted birthright citizenship, regardless of their parents’ legal status or nationality. This principle was codified in the 14th Amendment, which was designed to overturn the court precedent established in Dred Scott v Sanford, the landmark 1856 Supreme Court case that denied African-American slaves American citizenship despite being born on American soil. It was further solidified in another SCOTUS case, United States v Wong Kim Ark, in which a Chinese-American born in San Francisco had been denied citizenship on the basis that his parents were Chinese nationals during the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act, even though his parents were considered permanent residents of the United States. Ultimately, in the case Wong Kim Ark was found to be a citizen, therefore establishing the precedent that the parents’ origin is irrelevant to the citizenship status of their child. Birthright citizenship applies in almost all cases, with children of foreign diplomats being the only exception, as they’re not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. The question is, how does this executive order overturn years of legal convention?

It is that exact phrasing in the 14th Amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” (meaning the jurisdiction of the United States) that the Trump administration has used to justify the executive order. In essence, the executive order asserts that a child born to parents that are not in the United States legally or are in the United States temporarily (on a visiting or student visa) is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but rather the parent’s country of origin. In other words, the administration has exploited the vagueness of the terminology to say that the US has no legal responsibility to someone whose parents do not hold permanent residence in the US. Executive orders, from a legal standpoint, are used to direct how the executive branch should enforce legal policy; often, they are used to enact policy that would otherwise be legislatively difficult, but it is still possible to legally challenge or prevent an executive order through the legislative and judicial branches. For the time being, a federal district court judge has blocked the order temporarily on the grounds that it is built off a bad-faith constitutional interpretation, calling it “blatantly unconstitutional.” But, the directive still holds political weight; it makes good on Trump’s political promises, yes, but it also establishes a more essentialist view on what it takes to be an American, especially in the context of the country’s changing demographics and rising rates of global migration. Moreover, it is an order that, while likely to be overturned, still inflicts fear in both his political opponents and any prospective migrants.

Where do we go from here? Should the case go to the Supreme Court, there is a good chance that even the Trump-appointed justices break from the administration. Justice Amy Coney Barrett has been shown to break rank in favor of logical and clear constitutional rulings, highly valuing her own conservative principles and not wanting to serve as a mere pawn to the Republican agenda. Chief Justice John Roberts places high value on judicial precedent; this is evident in his concurring opinion in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which he emphasizes judicial restraint and stare decisis. Justice Neil Gorsuch has also occasionally taken more diverse ideological stances, authoring the majority opinions in Bostock v Clayton County and McGirt v Oklahoma, opposing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and in support of the sovereignty of Native American lands. Something with this clear of a judicial precedent is unlikely to be overturned easily, but it is still a possibility; in recent years, the court has shown a willingness to overturn long-held precedent, especially given the recent decisions overturning Roe v Wade and Chevron v NRDC. More than that, however, this executive order has opened the political and ideological floodgates. The country is facing an intense, vehement reckoning over immigration, from the looming crackdown on irregular migration to the political battles over H-1B (work visa) recipients. Amid these political battles, we again ask, what is the meaning and value of American citizenship? Who deserves to be a citizen? This executive order may well be a step toward a narrower, more exclusive definition of what an American citizen is.

Liv Bush-Moline 1/29/25 Liv Bush-Moline 1/29/25

A Double-Edged Sword: AI, Journalism, and the Era of Trump

Artificial intelligence’s (AI) explosion in popularity has spanned nearly every industry, acting as a catalyst for rapid transformation across the makeup of many sectors. The media and journalism world is no different, adopting AI to increase efficiency and convert large sums of information into digestible outputs for the general public. Utilized to expedite transcriptions, facilitate content production and drafting, and assess audience analytics, AI has become a powerful tool for many journalists. However, the negative implications of AI implementation into journalism are twofold: replacing human journalists with machines, and compromising the integrity of journalism as a whole. Absent oversight or guiding standards, these developments could undermine the five values of ethical journalism—accuracy, independence, impartiality, humanity, and accountability—destabilizing the foundation of free and open media.

In terms of replacement, the field of journalism is experiencing a period of mass layoffs. Whether these layoffs are a result of AI’s growing popularity in the industry, or conversely, AI is being utilized as a means to lessen the load on short-staffed outlets, there is an undeniable relationship between the two. While some argue that AI is simply a supplemental tool in journalism, not a replacement mechanism, the phenomenon of automation bias across many various manifestations of AI remains problematic. The human tendency to over-rely on automation can completely overtake human decision-making for the sake of expediency and ease. For example, younger generations are losing the ability to read physical maps in favor of putting their full faith in navigation apps. This blind trust can lead to disastrous situations so common that they’ve earned their own moniker: “death by GPS.” In journalism, automation bias can mean reporters spend less time verifying AI-generated content, inclined to trust it at face value despite generative AI (GenAI) needing significant human oversight due to its experimental nature.

Additionally, layoffs in journalism disproportionately impact marginalized groups, specifically people of color and women. This issue of declining diversity in journalism mirrors the recent pushback against Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives spearheaded by the Oval Office. The devaluation of marginalized voices is problematic in any context, but in the media field particularly, a reduction in perspectives can create an environment conducive for harmful misinformation and inaccurate representations. Replacing journalists with AI exacerbates the potential for extremely biased reporting, due to the fact that GenAI models are commonly known to amplify both racial and gender-based stereotypes. Without someone in the room to add their lived experience and nuance to the conversation, journalists may unknowingly perpetuate negative stereotypes or greenlight AI-generated content that does.

Journalists are already fighting an uphill battle against AI-generated misinformation. Falsely generated AI news and deepfakes have made it increasingly difficult for journalists to verify facts in their reporting. These technologies have the power to sway public opinion and quickly spread false information during crucial times, such as crises and elections. AI’s use on both ends, for content creation and content verification, manufactures a cyclical media landscape dependent on AI. This becomes an epidemic of “platformization” of newsrooms, due to tech giants like Google and Microsoft selling newsroom AI products that can render publications completely dependent on Big Tech for their journalistic processes. Preserving the integrity of unbiased and truth-based reporting is becoming more and more crucial as social media platforms are overrun with unregulated misinformation.

As previously mentioned, AI-produced outputs necessitate human oversight to catch any errors born from the nature of models trained on the Internet; troves of both factual and fake information live on the Internet, which ChatGPT and other GenAI models indiscriminately draw upon to craft their responses. With this comes an increased risk for AI to plagiarize sources without accreditation, unbeknownst to the journalist using the output for their own publications. GenAI is also known to “hallucinate” by creating and dispensing baseless information as fact; ChatGPT has even fabricated entire articles, and then tacked on the names of real reporters as the authors. When adopted into media environments, GenAI’s implementation muddies the world of credit attribution and factual integrity, while simultaneously pressuring journalists to prioritize speed over accuracy. Accelerating the processes of journalism with AI leads to higher competition to break stories first, which can reduce time spent on necessary fact-checking and verification.

The most recent developments regarding AI and journalism come from OpenAI; while already enmeshed with 19 popular news publishers, OpenAI is now moving to directly fund local Axios newsrooms enabled by OpenAI products. The partnership’s ultimate vision is an AI “super-system” that ascends beyond the one company, and would quality-control editing, create visuals for articles, and control distribution of articles.

It seems this super-system is already materializing in some respect, with President Trump’s endorsement and partnership in the $500 billion AI infrastructure venture with a company called the Stargate Project. The partnership extends across borders, consisting of OpenAI, Oracle, Japan's Softbank, and the United Arab Emirate’s (UAE) MGX. This would fund massive AI data centers in the US, and supposedly generate hundreds of thousands of American jobs. However, the origin of the $500 billion is up for debate, with Elon Musk commenting that “they don’t actually have the money.” Alternatively, one source claims that the bulk of funding is coming from the technology arm of the UAE’s sovereign wealth fund. Such significant foreign funding in our media and content-producing sphere is cause for concern, especially when considering multiple countries’ attempts to meddle in US affairs in the past.

President Donald Trump’s policy stance on AI remains consistent with his enthusiasm towards the Stargate Project, seeing as he just signed an executive order rescinding former President Joe Biden’s 2023 executive order that sought to establish guardrails and standards for AI usage and development. Biden’s extensive executive order touched on many aspects impacted by AI, requiring transparency from prominent AI developers, standards of safety and security created by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, as well as stipulations pertaining to privacy, consumer protections, and civil rights. Trump’s executive order “calls for departments and agencies to revise or rescind all policies, directives, regulations, orders, and other actions taken under the Biden AI order that are inconsistent with enhancing America’s leadership in AI.” In other words, anything inhibiting or hindering the profit and expansion of the AI industry in the US is to be effectively eliminated.

President Trump’s coziness with Big Tech presents another alarming layer to this issue. Trump is already in cahoots with Meta, Tiktok, and X, so the link between Trump, OpenAI, and newsrooms like Axios becomes particularly troubling. With the end of fact-checking across Meta platforms, and the rapid dissemination of misinformation on social media in general, the importance of reputable journalistic reporting is more essential now than ever.

The implementation of AI into journalism must be done with intentional and careful considerations of the advantages and disadvantages of the tool, as well as clear guidelines for use and credit attribution. Transparency in how, when, and why AI is utilized must become the standard. Otherwise, we risk devolving into a period where reputable reporting is nonexistent or highly inaccessible. At a time of such heightened political tensions and ever-evolving current events, protecting the integrity of journalism must be a priority.

Guest User 12/22/23 Guest User 12/22/23

Ukraine: Voting Under Martial Law

Contributor Helen Lallos-Harrell explores the complex decision with which Ukraine grapples — whether or not to hold elections under martial law and the ongoing war with Russia.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, has voted to keep the country in a state of martial law. The initial decree, issued by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 24, 2022, had dictated that all national and regional authorities must come together to ensure the defense and public safety of all of Ukraine. The Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law (passed in 2015) regulated temporary restrictions of the constitutional rights and freedoms of both individuals and legal entities. Additionally, all citizens of Ukraine aged 18-60 eligible for military service have been liable to be called to serve, as regulated by general mobilization. For Ukrainian citizens in their daily lives, martial law has meant restricted freedom of movement, banning public demonstrations, stricter ID checks, and an enforceable curfew. Additionally, the government can “use the capacities and workforce resources of public and private enterprises for defense needs,” including controlling public media.

The continued enactment of martial law may complicate Ukrainian elections next year. During the entire course of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s head of state has remained the same. President Zelenskyy was elected to serve a five-year term in 2019 and would be up for reelection in March during the 2024 cycle. In early September 2023, while the question of elections being held was still up in the air, President Zelenskyy stated that he was “ready for the elections,” but he stipulated, “I mean, we’re ready if it is necessary” — noting the challenges accompanying a wartime vote. Under martial law, elections are currently suspended, meaning Ukraine would not need to hold presidential elections in 2024. However, until early November, the question remained of whether the elections would occur. In a November 6th address, President Zelenskyy cleared the uncertainty, saying it is “not the right time” for elections in Ukraine. He continued with a message of unity, telling listeners, “We must realize that now is the time of defense, the time of the battle that determines the fate of the state and people, not the time of manipulations.”

Zelenskyy’s message touched on the difficulties of holding elections during wartime. Free and fair elections require a significant effort and devotion of time on the part of the government. For Ukraine to hold an election now would present considerable challenges for the entire country. But what should be prioritized? Even in a time of war, do democratic elections take ultimate precedence? Does holding elections protect individual rights, or does it make the entire country vulnerable? If so, should overall safety supersede personal freedom?

An election during wartime is a familiar concept to many parts of the world. For instance, the 1944 United States presidential elections took place in the throes of WWII. They ran relatively smoothly, with incumbent candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt securing the victory. However, in 2023 Ukraine faces a vastly different situation than 1944 United States. Consider that WWII was fought primarily on European soil, and the United States was part of an alliance; it was not fighting on home soil by itself like Ukraine. So, while wartime elections are not unprecedented, Ukraine’s situation is relatively novel, which makes it challenging to seek guidance through historical comparisons.

Another complicating factor is that Ukrainians can be conscripted for service at any time. According to martial law, all males between 18 and 60 are considered liable for military service. Although many of those who are eligible for service have volunteered, Ukraine faces a troop shortage, and mobilization is a matter of survival for the country. Mandatory service adds a deeper layer of complication to a situation where elections are not being held. When individuals are called to serve a country but do not have adequate voting representation in that country, it presents serious qualms about the state of democracy. And in these times, a decision must be made – does safety come before freedom?

Understanding the impact elections have during wartime is essential to recognizing how war often prevents the full exercise of democracy. Elections are another measurable loss the people of Ukraine have suffered since Russia’s full-scale invasion. And they make a peaceful resolution of the war all the more necessary.

Sarah Marc Woessner 12/22/23 Sarah Marc Woessner 12/22/23

Dollars for Diplomacy

Staff Writer Sarah Woessner explores the role of economic diplomacy in mitigating conflicts and fostering global peace.

In a global landscape that is constantly evolving, economic diplomacy is emerging as a powerful tool for mitigating conflict and promoting world peace. Economic diplomacy is a form of diplomacy that involves the strategic use of economic tools to advance countries’ national interests while promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. As nations attempt to navigate a complex global economic landscape that has been weakened by rising geo-political tensions, it has been realized, in recent years, that economic prosperity and stability is often the basis for lasting peace. This realization has played a pivotal role in international relations, with the increased role of economic diplomacy. This diplomatic approach not only aims to resolve disputes through economic tools, but also highlights the importance of working together – as nations – to solve some of the world’s most pressing issues, to bridge the gaps, and foster long-lasting peace.

The United State’s Department of State defines economic diplomacy as a “means to both harness global economic forces to advance America's foreign policy and employ the tools of foreign policy to shore up our economic strength.” Economic diplomacy plays a crucial role in shaping the landscape of international relations, international trade, and promoting peace. In contrast to traditional diplomatic approaches which tend to rely primarily on political and military forces, economic diplomacy focuses on economic policies and tools to advance a country’s strategic goals. These policies are created with the intention of fostering mutual benefits for the countries involved. In an interconnected world in which countries become dependent on one another, the establishment of strong economic ties is crucial and has the potential to lower geo-political tensions when the parties’ interests are represented and taken into considerations during the decision-making process.

Living in such an interconnected world poses an important challenge for countries, who must first and foremost protect their local economies. Governments must work towards achieving economic diplomacy, which encompasses creating strong economic ties with other nations, while protecting domestic companies, and achieving their strategic goals. Doing so can be particularly challenging for countries who have not only different priorities and objectives, but also vary in their economic needs; some nations may seek new foreign investments, other more technological development and some access to more natural resources. Countries have different trade balances, especially in terms of exports and imports, and also because countries have a comparative advantage in the production of various goods and services. Economic diplomacy comes into play as nations have to navigate the complexity of trade imbalances, through the negotiations of fair trade agreements, macro-economic tools such as tariffs and protectionism policies. The negotiations of trade alliances become crucial to achieve economic diplomacy, ensuring an agreement representing the interests of the nations involved in the negotiations is met. A failure to reach a mutually beneficial agreement in international trade could lead to conflicts, such as trade wars, which negatively impacts the economy of many countries, and the overall balance of trade. Trade disputes may lead to job losses, decrease in productivity, diplomatic tensions, and a rise in products and services’ price.

Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1955, 164 nation-states have joined the international organization which plays a pivotal role in the global economic landscape, serving as a multilateral forum for regulating international trade and fostering a rules-based system. The goal of the WTO “operates the global system of trade rules and helps developing economies build their trade capacity”. These rules have been important to ensure that international trade runs as smoothly, predictable, and freely as possible, the WTO advocates on its website. Although the WTO is the largest in size, a significant number of trade organizations and trade agreements have been created since, in a continuing effort to increase global trade, advance the global economy through the promotion of fair trade practices, and through agreements. In a globalized world, the establishment of these organizations has been important in the promotion of international trade, economic cooperation, and the development of emerging markets.

In 2012, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) published a report that explicitly references how business can promote peace. Since then, numerous organizations have presented research, analysis and reports on how business, trade and entrepreneurialism can contribute to the promotion of peace in the international and diplomatic scene. The USIP report first acknowledges the continuing violence and instability in our world - although this report is ten years old, its statement is still pertinent to this day - it is growing more important for nation states and their national governments to seek other means of promoting peace. There are five main ways in which corporations have the potential and the ability to promote stability: by providing jobs and economic opportunities; by respecting the rule of law and international labor and environmental standards; by adopting principles of corporate citizenship; by undertaking risk assessments specific to the political environment of conflict-affected regions; and, in certain circumstances, by engaging in Track Two diplomacy, as outlined in a report from USIP.

The USIP provides an argument that ethical businesses are already contributing to peace, and the awareness of the consequences of their behaviors only further motivates these firms to act ethically. Economic activity is a significant factor in mitigating conflicts, studies by both the World Bank and the United Nations respectively have shown a correlation between poverty and violence. Economic growth often leads to an increase in economic activity, which in turn creates more employment opportunities. Employment can provide individuals with a steady stream of income, thereby enhancing their economic welfare and reducing the likelihood of them being involved in illegal or criminal activities due to lack of alternatives or because of a sense of hopelessness. Similarly, economic activity can alleviate poverty by increasing household disposable incomes.

The report emphasizes the importance of the rules of laws, and international standards when conducting business in a foreign country. Unethical business practices not only harm the reputation of the companies involved but can also have severe social, environmental, and economic consequences. For instance, a lack of commitment to ethical business practices can further negatively impact a company’s productivity level, lead to legal issues, and can create a hostile business environment. In today’s ever-changing world and with the rise of geo-political tensions, it has become increasingly important for large companies – but also for governments – to respect the rule of law and abide by international labor and environmental standards that can contribute to peace. For example, companies can work to raise the awareness of child labor, unsafe working conditions, or protecting workers. The lack of ethical business practices has the potential to negatively impact the communities in which the company operates, the disregard of labor laws can lead to social unrest, protests, but also the tarnishing of a company’s public image. Corruption has the potential to fuel instability and violent conflicts. Therefore, businesses that uphold robust ethical principles and maintain a strict zero-tolerance stance against corrupt practices play a pivotal role in promoting peace.

The report further mentions corporate citizenships, which can be defined in simple terms as a commitment to ethical behavior in strategy, operations, and culture. Today, many companies have what we call a “Corporate Social Responsibility '', an annual report that aims at highlighting the company’s efforts in terms of sustainability, but also responsible and ethical business practices. These reports become very important to foster peace as it demonstrates the company’s commitment to various stakeholders, emphasizing its role beyond profit-making and towards contributing positively to society. The last two methods by which corporations can contribute to the promotion of peace involve participating in Two Track Diplomacy and implementing practices and risk assessments. Two Track Diplomacy is especially significant in situations where two governments experience tensions. In this approach, the involved governments come together to engage in discussions and collaboration on issues of mutual benefit. On the other hand, practices and risk assessments are crucial for companies operating in regions marked as conflict-sensitive. A proper understanding of the business practices of the country, and an awareness of the political landscape become important for companies, thus, a risk assessment must be made to determine the potential challenges and opportunities.

While the USIP specifically mentions five ways through which businesses can foster peace, additional research from other organizations such as the The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) emphasizes the role of the private sector in building peace. The main argument of the study argues that firms can effectively contribute to economic development and stability initiatives in precarious environments by means of deliberate engagement and proactive dialogue. Similar to the USIP’s report, UNITAR mentions the important role of the private sector in the creation of jobs and investments, both vital to a country’s economic stability and security. The report mentions an important point that “economic development does not automatically lead to peace; rather it takes unconventional approaches from economic actors to contribute to peace and it takes collaboration from a variety of actors to make this link work.” This is particularly important to remember when researching and analyzing how the private sector can foster peace, there are many factors to consider and various ways through which economic tools can contribute to peace.

UNITAR further highlights the importance of balancing risk-opportunity to promote long-term success. Indeed, many regions present challenges for companies that they must be able to navigate, this includes weak infrastructures, geo-political tensions, or even opaque power structures. Emerging markets and developing economies are central to global trade, development and economic well-being. However, these countries often face political and economic instability, creating a hostile environment for conducting business. It becomes imperative for the private sector to effectively navigate the intricacies of these markets, to engage with diverse stakeholders and to use appropriate economic tools. This approach is essential to promote peaceful conflict management and uphold the principles of good governance as part of their core business practices.

Although there is no right answer as to how economic diplomacy can foster peace, there are a number of ways, as highlighted by the USIP, through which companies can utilize economic tools to promote peace. This research provides a good starting point for companies seeking to promote ethical, sustainable, and responsible business practices, while learning how they can – as large corporations – contribute to peacemaking. In the pursuit of peace, highlighting effective communication and fostering robust relationships is crucial. This emphasis serves not only to facilitate dialogue but also to work towards achieving the ultimate objectives of all parties involved.

While this article focuses primarily on the role of the private sector in promoting peace, the important role played by the government in economic diplomacy should not be overlooked. Governments have the power and ability to control various aspects of the economy, including regulatory frameworks, trade policies and international agreements. In addition, governments have the ability to take action to tackle socio-economic disparities, promote growth and create an environment conducive to stability. Moreover, government efforts in sensitive regions (those often faced by geo-political tensions) can extend beyond simple economic considerations to include diplomatic efforts such as peace negotiations and the establishment of international partnerships. In these contexts, governments tend to act as mediators in establishing diplomatic relations that contribute to global stability, and foster peace.

Economic diplomacy as a means of mitigating conflict and fostering peace cannot be achieved without the strategic partnership of governments and the private sector. As the private sector drives economic growth, innovation and job creation, governments are responsible for providing the overall framework and strategic direction, aligning economic interests with diplomatic objectives. Recognizing and leveraging the two sectors' strengths is a key part of promoting sustainable peace and economic prosperity. Further research should be conducted to analyze case studies in which economic diplomacy has effectively been used as a means of fostering peace or mitigating conflicts in hostile regions of our world. In the future, it will be interesting to look at how international organizations will take into account economic diplomacy and business as a means to promote peace, shifting away from classic diplomatic tools.

The rise of geo-political tensions poses a big challenge for nations seeking to promote peace, especially because corporations have a tendency to focus on their own best interests, often disregarding the needs of communities. It becomes important for governments to make companies aware of the positive ways through which they can contribute to diplomacy, focusing on peace, stability, and trust over profits. In a highly competitive landscape, working together to achieve strategic goals becomes more than crucial; collaboration is the key driver of promoting peace.

Guest User 12/22/23 Guest User 12/22/23

On Skepticism Surrounding the Asian Way of Peace

Staff Writer Mia Westfere investigates the criticisms leveled at the phenomenon known as the “Asian Peace,” bringing to light how Western apprehension of challenges to U.S. hegemony might play a role in fostering an overly cynical outlook.

Knowing peace as a concept is no less difficult that knowing peace as a human being. Throughout various historical, cultural, and analytical contexts, the concept of “peace” has accumulated many different definitions, often measured against the antithetical concept of “conflict.” In order to make sense of the so-called “Asian Peace,” let us first attempt to make sense of peace from the perspective of Eastern philosophical tradition, before differentiating peace into “positive” or “negative” varieties.

In the Asian context, a profound cultural emphasis on peace endures. Soft imagery such as that of wind and water are prevalent through Eastern philosophical canon. The Daodejing of Laozi, the ancient classic that serves as the foundational text of Daoism, is rife with water metaphors, helping to popularize the practice of Daoism as The Watercourse Way. The Way of Laozi is one where virtue lies in peaceful means, not through strength of arms. The ways of life preached by Confucius and Mo Zi likewise emphasize that peace is mankind’s ultimate mission (Barash and Webel 6). Confucianism upholds harmony through stable hierarchy as the means of achieving lasting peace, whereas Mohism preaches a universal love for all (6). While Eastern philosophy also holds bravery in battle and strength in encounters with violence as virtues in high regard, the way of peace remains a commanding narrative in Asian culture. In the modern day, the People’s Republic of China has sought to characterize its regime as one that follows the way of peace, hence favoring messaging that portrays a “peaceful rise” to power. Chairman Xi Jinping insisted that, “The love of peace is in the DNA of the Chinese people.” These attitudes attempt to paint a picture wherein Asia simply has an ingrained affinity for peace, a commitment formed by thousands of years of philosophical meditation. Under this narrative, the recent decades' absence of war in the region of East Asia seems like the fruits of an exceptional way of peace.

The so-called Asian Peace, marked by a rapid decline in battle-related deaths and the absence of new interstate wars since 1979, is far more complicated than the imagined monolith of a peace-loving Asia finally realizing its philosophical principles. While the shortcomings of the Asian Peace rightfully deserve to undergo scrutiny, this article will also examine whether the onslaught of criticism directed at the Asian Peace is wholly fair, or if skeptics are overzealous in pursuit of defending U.S. hegemony at the expense of dismissing positive effects on human security. That said, the limitations of the Asian Way of Peace are manifold. For one, the Asian Peace only really encompasses East Asia, excluding India, for example, due to the Kargil War with Pakistan. Some have even called it the ASEAN Way, narrowing down the geography further to Southeast Asia. Many remain critical of peace in East Asia as founded upon political and civil repression in order to achieve economic growth. This argument often upholds positive peace, where human freedoms flourish, as the kind worth celebrating, whereas negative peace merely refers to the absence of war. Coined by 20th century French philosopher Raymond Aron, the term negative peace mostly operates as the complement to conflict; one well-known example of a robust negative peace is the Pax Romana, which the Roman empire maintained through force and subjugation of enemies (Barash and Webel 7). On the other hand, positive peace, most fully explored by Johan Galtung’s writings on structural violence, refers to the absence of barriers to human well-being and potential to succeed (7). With the exceptions of Mongolia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, most modern East Asian countries fail to earn a “free” score according to Freedom House’s most recent data set. Lack of access to political representation and denial of civil liberties are clear examples of structural barriers to free participation in society. Still, even without the distinction between positive and negative peace, East Asia has not been without tumult and conflict. The Senkaku or Diaoyu islands remain in dispute between Japan and China, the South China Sea experiences periodic disturbances, and Taiwan maintains de facto independence to the PRC’s great displeasure. The Korean Peninsula is locked in a frozen armistice. The Rohingya minority in Myanmar faces genocide amidst the ongoing civil war. The Philippines continues to grapple with insurgencies, separatist movements, and religious strife. The Asian Peace is not all that peaceful, and yet, in both relative and absolute terms, the region has far and away defied the predictions made under realism in the post-Cold War order.

Rather than devolving into violent conflict to settle an uncertain balance of power, East Asian states have chosen cooperation with one another in the majority of cases, which has resulted in relative restraint when conflicting interests do arise. One explanation is that the great power contest between China and the U.S-Japan alliance replaced Cold War bipolarity, while other realist explanations emphasize the importance of ASEAN and its partners as a type of security arrangement. Increasingly, research around Asian Peace has revolved around the question of U.S. global hegemony and China’s rise to the position of regional hegemon. However, this focus does not align with the view that ASEAN is the epicenter of the Asian Peace. In fact, some research suggests that U.S. hegemony is not at all correlated with regional East Asian security, and is even negatively correlated with the security of U.S. allies. The ASEAN Way of Peace viewpoint relegates China to a more minor role in the community of nations committed to no war, conflict avoidance, and face-saving measures. The ASEAN Way also finds favor in liberal thinking, the school of thought that believes economic interdependence between ASEAN members and dialogue partners allows them to prioritize business pursuits above territorial ones. This explanation more fully accounts for the northeast region managing to get along, which tends to have chillier relations than the warmer community in the southeast. China and Japan, for example, have relations commonly described as “hot economics, cold politics.” Most scholars, including those that call for a constructivist assessment of the Asian Peace, conclude that the phenomenon cannot be attributed to any one cause. Over time, attention from both researchers and policy makers has become more focused on the interactions China has with the “neighborly community” it currently finds itself enmeshed in.

A constructivist reading of the security structures and liberal economic interests is also an important lens through which to consider the ramifications of cultural violence in the region. Cultural violence refers to the norms and attitudes about violence reinforced by the dominant societal discourses (Barash and Webel 7). Cultural violence normalizes, legitimizes, and may even celebrate the use of force. Structural and cultural violence are intimately entwined and usually reinforce one another. Together they can result in a negative peace, whereby people may suffer from censorship, limits on assembly, lack of representation, and stifled economic opportunity, but have come to accept the narratives that there are no ways to change the system for the better. Cultural violence in Asia contrasts with the culture of peace that seems evident with a cursory glance at Asian philosophy. However, it is important to note that “structural” and “cultural” violence are not wholly uncontested concepts, and this may contribute to philosophical discrepancies. For example, peace and conflict literature is unclear whether all forms of hierarchy commit some form of structural violence, and whether norms particular to one culture or another can be considered violence (Barash and Webel 8). For understanding the Asian Peace this presents particular problems, especially given the great importance afforded to hierarchy as the mechanism for social harmony under Confucianism. It is therefore important to keep in mind that these peace and conflict concepts were largely formulated with Western philosophical traditions in mind, and that grafting them onto the Asian context is not uncontroversial.

At the same time, given the rather slow development of political and civil freedoms in East Asia, there is some valid anxiety about democratic backsliding undoing any progress at all. Economic disruptions are a key source of vulnerability to autocracy. Between the fallout from COVID-19, supply chain disruptions exacerbated by conflict elsewhere, and trade wars between the U.S. and China, should economic conditions worsen in the region, there is a limited likelihood of a positive sort of peace ever emerging. There is even some speculation about the possibility of an “East Asian Spring,” echoing the emergence of violent protests in the Middle East as a response to repression in the early 2010s. From this point of view, it is only a matter of time before the Asian Peace erupts into violent dissatisfaction. In the U.S., this kind of discourse supports the prediction that China is bound to spoil the seeming calm on the surface. The popular consensus reached in Washington is often peace through deterrence and domination. The U.S. likes to take a lot of credit for the peace in East Asia, and while it's true that alliances in the region and normalization of relations with China have helped to stabilize the situation, there is also an argument to be made that the U.S. is the most likely party to be the spoiler, not China. This is connected to the argument that world domination by the U.S., a Pax Americana, is not a path to sustainable peace, much less a positive one. For example, many U.S.-based policy makers assume it is a foregone conclusion that China is bound to invade Taiwan and therefore call for heightened security measures, whereas the Taiwanese themselves do not see a military response as a viable solution. The U.S. attempts to enforce a worldview where peace can only be maintained by fear of American military might, even though fear is neither an ingredient in positive peace nor a sustainable foundation for peaceful communities. The U.S. has grown more defensive over Taiwan in proclaiming its love for democracy. For all the U.S. maintains a poor track record in installing democratic polities, it is true of both Taiwan and South Korea that they managed to transition from authoritarian regimes under martial law to societies that enjoy high levels of political and civil freedom. These transformations took place with relatively limited bloodshed, and they happened in spite of the U.S. originally backing the authoritarian governments it had helped bring to power. Although, some might insist that seeking U.S. approval eventually helped create the conditions for democratization. If we take democracy as a prerequisite for anything resembling a positive peace, then it is important to note that these transformations took place in the context of an emerging regional norm of negative peace. Negative peace is an unskippable step towards the loftier goals of positive peace and should not be treated as a failure in and of itself.

So why is there so little hope for the rest of East Asia to democratize and work towards a more positive peace? Fears about China’s rise typically play a role, but so too does American antagonism. Washington tends to focus on China as a threat meant to be contained rather than focusing on how to create conditions favorable to continuing the peace in East Asia. East Asian countries are under pressure from the U.S. to choose sides, but choosing sides is something that’s done in anticipation of a conflict context, not in a community committed to peace. The U.S.’s affinity for a conflict-oriented approach is unsurprising, given the culture of war that permeates American society. A look at U.S. history reveals that war is the mechanism of community-building in the American context; the Civil War was the trigger point for the disjointed states to become the singular United States. The creation of the American identity came to hinge on violent contexts throughout the 20th century wars as well. Addressing American cultural violence does not detract from the fact that China today inherently commits structural violence against its people by virtue of being an authoritarian dictatorship. There is a real risk of the East Asian peace disappearing under the stressors of this rivalry, but assuming the worst outcomes is defeatist. Peace is worth fighting to maintain, and the examples of South Korea and Taiwan suggest that there is precedent in the Asian context for positive peace to emerge without devastating revolution or protracted armed conflict.

Maybe China really could adhere to the principles of a peaceful Asia and make a peaceful rise up the global hierarchy. As it stands, realism is the most common lens applied to make predictions about the fate of Asian security, which imbues a deep cynicism about great power rivalry between the U.S. and China. Without a doubt, China’s rhetoric about peace needs to be taken with a grain of salt, but so too do the narratives discounting the power of peace, negative though it may be. For one, critics often characterize Chinese messaging about regional harmony and cooperation as evidence that, like the U.S., the PRC has decided it is time to ask their neighbors to choose sides, that they are dissuading other countries from seeking recourse in international law for grievances, and that they are creating the conditions for regionalism with themselves at the helm. China’s peace rhetoric is dismissed as a means of weeding out U.S. influence, both as a regional player and as the de facto leader of global institutions such as the International Court and the World Bank. Moreover, ASEAN’s preference for informal approaches to security rather than formal arrangements is taken as evidence that East Asia is distancing itself from the global security framework that the U.S. commands. Proponents of realism frame these situations in narratives that envision inevitable conflict between the rising power and the waning one. This worldview draws sides in a conflict that has yet to fully manifest, if it ever will. From this perspective, China’s rise carries the implicit threat of America’s downfall. The peaceful or potentially violent means of China’s choosing are relatively irrelevant to these fears of a shifting world order.

Some might say that the U.S. has a greater interest in maintaining its own hegemony than it does in promoting sustainable peace around the globe. A more charitable reading is one that suggests the U.S. simply has not learned yet that its primacy is no longer a guarantor of peace in the long term. The U.S. has a habit of equating its own brand of democracy with peace, and any alternative to that formula is a clear threat. On balance, however, the U.S model of positive peace is less than exemplary. Setting aside the various oversea projects that have exacerbated conflict, America itself is a violent place: mass incarceration, poverty, high maternal death rates, systemic racism, mass shootings, and barriers to healthcare and education are only a few examples of ways America exhibits both direct and structural violence within its own borders. In fairness, China does not lose out to its seeming rival in the realm of rampant violence; in addition to the political repression mentioned earlier, domestic and sexual abuse remains widespread, as does restriction of LGBTQ+ rights. Moreover, crackdowns in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang are worryingly restrictive and violent. Perhaps there’s something to be said, to the credit of the realist point of view, that those at the top of the global hierarchy do not become hegemon through pacifism and a righteous commitment to positive peace. However, skepticism should be more-even handed; dismissing the prospect of an enduring Asian Peace out of fear of China runs the risk of turning a blind eye to the damage done by the United States in its tenure at the top. Worse, this runs the risk of refusing to believe better, more peaceful outcomes are possible. Positive peace is an ideal, much like the concept of a more perfect union, but when we start to imagine a more perfect world order, it cannot begin by accepting the inevitability of conflict.

Barash, David P., and Charles Webel. Peace and Conflict Studies. SAGE Publications, Inc., 2022.

Guest User 12/22/23 Guest User 12/22/23

From Terrorist to NATO Ally: Kosovo Liberation Army

Staff Writer Anna Keyes investigates the endurance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War, outlining the broader historical ehtnic conflict of the region in the process.

Twenty thousand mourners congregated to bid a somber farewell to Halit Gecaj, a revered Kosovar Albanian teacher who had been killed by a stray bullet during a fight between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb policemen. Amidst the solemn crowd were a trio of masked figures, shielded by a cloak of enigma. One of the men took a stride forward and addressed the crowd, calling upon his fellow countrymen to resist the “inhuman violence of the Serbian invader” (Mueller 26). It was November 28th, 1997 and the KLA had made its first public appearance (“Background”).

The KLA was instrumental during the Kosovo War, which lasted from February 28th, 1998 to June 11th, 1999, an irredentist conflict fought over control of Kosovo, a province composed of majority ethnic Albanians yet dominated by Serbia under communist rule. Belligerents consisted of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) versus the ethnic Albanian guerilla groups, the KLA and Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), which were joined by NATO in March 1999. A Muslim-majority nation, secular nationalism had superseded religious infiltration in Albanian politics since the 1878 founding of the League of Prizren, a party which coalesced at the cessation of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, opposing the proposed partition of neighboring Balkan states and asserting Albanian independence (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1 and Gawrych 147). Albanians had never been granted sovereignty until November 28th, 1912, coincidentally the same day as Halit Gecaj’s funeral. Fighting an enduring struggle for independence, Albania, and by extension, Kosovo, boast a history rampant with guerilla movements, yet most of those that existed between 1979 and 2001 enjoyed a brief glory period, then withered away as fast as they emerged. The sheer resilience of the KLA shocked western policymakers who had been monitoring regional trends (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1). The KLA suffered tremendous losses, yet achieved massive success mobilizing popular support and won the war, alongside NATO. A plethora of factors have contributed to the success of the KLA, which arose out of severe ethnic strife. Thus, this article explores the ethnic conflict that permeated Kosovar society and analyzes the origins and success of the KLA.

Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo

Spirits lifted for Kosovar Albanians in the mid-1960s through the 1970s. Long-time communist president Josip Tito had dismissed anti-Albanian secret police chief Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966, and in 1974 Yugoslavia had adopted a new constitution which granted Kosovo de facto republic status under Serbia, permitting it to “Albanize.” Almost immediately, a backlash erupted: The following years witnessed a mass exodus of Serbs, Turks, Roma, and other ethnic minorities from Kosovo as Albanians gained stride toward equality. Those fleeing complained of discrimination from Albanians, who had always been the majority ethnic group in Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians refuted these claims, suggesting economic despair as the impetus.

Simmering ethnic tensions finally boiled over after 1980 upon Tito’s death, splintering the decentralized political system and abandoning it to the reckless forces of nationalist politics (Woehrel and “Background”). No longer barred by repressive barriers integral to the communist regime, March 11th, 1981 witnessed mass demonstrations led by students in favor of full republic status for Kosovo. Students were joined by thousands of laborers who demanded better living conditions in addition to independence. The standard of living had certainly exacerbated under decaying economic conditions during the 1980s, fueling the strength of the protests and the violence of the retaliation (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2). Massive crackdowns and incidents of police brutality ensued: Serbian police arrested over 2,000 protestors, between 1,200 and 2,000 of whom received lengthy prison sentences (Walsh and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2). Officials of Kosovo’s League of Communists, who were blamed for the protests, were fired from their positions, and expelled or convicted. Serbian authorities claim the crackdown resulted in 11 deaths, Albanians assert 1,000 people perished, while Amnesty International suggests the figure is closer to 300. Belgrade’s ruthless response radicalized a portion of Kosovar Albanians, although until the late 1990s most adhered to peaceful resistance against Serbian oppression (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2, Judah 21 and Walsh).

The trend of brutality soared after Slobodan Milosevic was elected as president of Serbia in 1989. Milosevic weaponized centuries of anti-Albanian sentiment and fabricated tales of Serbian historical linkages to Kosovo in a strategic attempt to rouse public support for the regime’s suppression of independence claims. This rhetoric was prevalent not only in his speeches; Serbian nationalism and anti-Albanian sentiment were deeply embedded in law. In 1990, Serbia adopted a new constitution which revoked the autonomy of both Kosovo and another de facto republic, Vojvodina. 350,000 Kosovar Albanians fled during this time. Police brutality, arbitrary detention, and torture continued within the corrupt penal system, ethnic Albanians the usual target. Police invaded civilian homes lacking a warrant and arrested those merely passing through areas with high rebel activity. Ethnic Albanians were even increasingly fired from their professions (“Background”). Amidst this ethnic turmoil the KLA had been born.

Origins of the KLA

Economic tensions and concerns over living conditions enabled radical political groups to swarm in, casting a tinge of communism to cries for secession. Such groups included the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo (GMLK), the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosovo (MNLK), the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ) and the Movement for the Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (LRSHJ) (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2-3). The LRSHJ, for example, was a Maoist organization founded in 1982 by loyalists to Albanian communist dictator Enver Hoxha. They asserted Kosovo could only be freed from Serbian oppression through an armed uprising and longed for a “greater Albania,” comprising Kosovo, western Macedonia, eastern Montenegro, and Albania itself (Judah 21). In 1982, these four communist parties consolidated into one, the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK). At a clandestine conference in August 1993, the LPRK renamed itself as the People’s Movement of Kosovo (LPK) and abdicated from its communist stance. Furthermore, it officially declared an army, the KLA (Walsh and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3). The KLA, however, had debuted its first attack earlier that year in May: In Glogovac, a town in central Kosovo, KLA members murdered two Serbian police officers and wounded an additional five (Hedges 26). In 1996, the KLA began executing coordinated attacks on both Serbian police and civilians, although research suggests an opposing group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) to have been responsible for the February 11th, 1996 series of assaults on Croatian Serb refugees (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2 and “Background”). By the spring of 1998, the group had seized control over roughly 40 percent of Kosovo, forcefully expelling Serbs, resorting to abduction and murder in the process (“Background”). Unlike the LPK, the KLA was never a unified movement that adhered to a single ideology. After the outbreak of war in 1998, its tremendous popularity propelled it to the center stage of the fight, eclipsing the LPK and rival groups. Ultimately, the KLA was a collection of armed formations stringed together by a shared desire for independence. Furthermore, several armed groups were strictly “KLA” in name only.

Researchers have identified six factions of the KLA, the first being the LPK. The second is the LKCK after the outbreak of war in 1998, which merged with the KLA. The third is KLA official Hashim Thaci and his crowd of student activists, the fourth is longtime KLA rival Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)’s prime minister Bujar Bukoshi and his supporters, the fifth Adem Demaci, often deemed the “Yugoslav Mandela,” who served as the KLA’s spokesman from August 1998 until May 1999, and the sixth the Jashari Clan, who had been massacred by Serbs in 1998 (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3-4).

Ideological Makeup and Membership

The KLA is unique as a guerilla group for its pervasive ideological divide: it attracted both fascists and communists. Among fascists were those descended from Albanians who served in right-wing militias and the Skanderbeg volunteer division of the SS during World War II. Many also claimed ancestral ties to Albanian right-wing kacak rebels who led revolts against Serb rulers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Among the kacak descendants were the Jasharis (Hedges 26 and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3). The communists who staffed the KLA were largely Stalinists and loyalists to Hoxha who had been educated at the University of Pristina (Hedges 28). A substantial portion of KLA members had been incarcerated during Tito’s reign for separatist activity (Hedges 26). A collective yearning for independence and adherence to Albanian nationalism sustained the ideologically messy KLA and undoubtedly contributed to its success.

Opposition to Ibrahim Rugova and the LDK

Before the official outbreak of war in 1998, the KLA battled with its opposition: Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK. Former literature professor Rugova presided over the LDK from its founding in 1992 until 2000. Rugova advocated nonviolence and peaceful resistance, citing Serbia’s wins in the Croatian and Bosnian wars as reasons to stray from outright armed uprising (“Background”). Until the late 1990s, the general Kosovar Albanian public gravitated toward the LDK’s pledge to nonviolence (Walsh). Yet a pivotal moment occurred in 1995 that would steer the public in the direction of the KLA’s calls for an armed struggle. In 1995, the 1992-1995 Bosnian War ceased upon the signing of the Dayton Agreement. Conditions of the accords humiliated Kosovar Albanians, whose struggle for independence was omitted entirely. Furthermore, Bosnian Serbs were also handed control of nearly half of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite being responsible for genocide and Serb-dominated Republika Srpska was granted EU recognition. Feeling betrayed by western powers and disillusioned with peaceful resistance, Kosovar Albanians increasingly mobilized in favor of the KLA (Hedges 31).

The opposition between the LDK and the KLA furiously raged on. The KLA accused Rugova of being a “traitor” while Rugova publicly alluded to Serbian infiltration within the KLA (Chossudovsky 31 and Perritt 15). Both groups operated competing funds, the LDK orchestrating the “Three-Percent Fund” calling on the Albanian diaspora to donate three percent of their income to the Kosovar cause, while the KLA administered the “Homeland Calling Fund” which employed revenue for training and purchase of arms (Perritt 16 and Walsh). During the war, money meant for the LDK was often diverted to the KLA (“Background”).

In the mid-1990s Bukoshi established the LDK’s military wing, FARK, advertised as a better-organized, more professional alternative to the KLA (Perritt 81 and 86). FARK membership consisted of ethnic Albanians who had served Sarajevo during the Bosnian War (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 4). Both groups endured a vicious rivalry, KLA officials referring to FARK as “cowards” and “traitors,” suspecting them to be sympathizers of the Serbian regime (Brown 6). Curiously, FARK soldiers had been spotted donning the KLA insignia (Brown 6). Perhaps this choice was a manifestation of the rivalry, for Serbian-aligned paramilitaries were documented to have sported similar KLA patches in mockery (HRW D1108). On September 21st 1998, the conflict reached a climax when KLA members assassinated FARK official Ahmet Krasniqi (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 4). FARK continued to battle with the KLA until later that year when the KLA absorbed it as the 138th Brigade (Rathfelder).

Ultimately, FARK had been established too late in the conflict to gain an advantage over the KLA’s superior recruiting and funding. The KLA had been preparing for an armed rebellion since its founding in the early 1990s and dutifully manufactured propaganda and recruiting networks. The LDK’s harsh scrutiny toward the KLA led a substantial portion of the public to lose their trust in the LDK (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5). The public was also ready to embrace an armed struggle after a decade of immense violence inflicted toward them and the overall futility of peaceful resistance.

The Kosovo War of 1998-1999

Kosovo was crawling with Yugoslav army personnel, who numbered 50,000 by February 1998. Between February 28th and March 5th, 1998 units of the Serbian Army assembled in Kosovo’s central Drenica valley and unleashed a maelstrom of destruction under the guise of “anti-terrorism.” On February 22nd, U.S. official Robert Gelbrand branded the KLA as a “terrorist organization,” greenlighting the attacks (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5 and “Background”). Collectively known as the Drenica Offensive, this series of attacks is considered the beginning of the Kosovo War. Unable to beat the more powerful Serbs, the KLA’s first major offensive attempting to capture Orahovac in July 1998 failed. Serbia rapidly regained control over Kosovo territory, including areas that had once been KLA strongholds (“Background”). Despite suffering brutal losses during the summer, the KLA refined its strategy as the war progressed: In the few areas still dominated by the KLA, police and courts remained functioning. Accounts from the battlefield reveal KLA soldiers were disciplined, obeyed commanders, adhered to strict security procedures for foreign journalists, distributing press passes and regulating entry (“Forces of the Conflict”). Nevertheless, the KLA conducted precarious tactics that jeopardized the safety of civilians. For example, they often directed guerilla attacks against Serbian checkpoints or patrols located not far from villages, heightening the risk of retaliatory assaults on innocent villagers. A theory put forth is that the KLA intended to lure the Serbs into retaliation, in which they would reap the benefits of publicized massacres. In other words, increased publicity generated from civilian death would boost sympathy for the KLA’s cause (“Forces of the Conflict”).

Ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians occurred during the war. Evidence suggests the campaign was tactical in motive, directed toward residents of KLA strongholds (Hedges 25). During the Kosovo War, ethnic cleansing was marked by summary executions, forced relocation, mass killings, false imprisonment, rape, and the systematic destruction of farmland and towns (Kosovo War Crimes doc 1999). By March 11th, 1999 over 400,000 people had been forced to flee Kosovo. Estimates range from 20,000 to 45,600 for the number of rape victims (House Committee, Kosovo’s Wartime Victims). A multitude of firsthand accounts confirm Serbian forces brutalized anyone they suspected of having ties to the KLA. Broken limbs, shattered jaws, and gunshot wounds were among the most commonly reported injuries (“Background”).

The KLA owes much of its success during the latter portion of the war to Western aid, specifically NATO’s involvement. The January 15th, 1999 slaughter of 45 Kosovar Albanians in Racak appalled the West. Thus, the Rambouillet Conference was convened in February, where Milosevic refused to sign a peace treaty that Albania had agreed to. Given Serbia’s unrelenting refusal to concede, NATO launched the air-bombing campaign Operation Allied Force on March 24th, 1999. The war finally concluded on June 11th, 1999 (“Background” and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 6).

Albanian Gun Culture

A profound and enduring affinity for firearms saturates Albanian culture, dispersing into nearby Albanian-dominated Kosovo: By early 1989, Kosovars held permits for 58,612 weapons (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 7). The Kanun, the secular law code integral to Albanian society, stipulates a “blood feud” if one’s honor has been tainted. During a “blood feud” the aggrieved family attempts to kill a male relative of the offending family. Thus, Albanians utilize guns to streamline this process. In post-war Kosovo, many produced guns in the event of a property dispute (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1-2). Guns and weaponry are vital components of Albanian society and this is one reason why the KLA successfully rose.

The KLA endured through tumultuous times because of the easy access to weapons after neighboring Albania’s catastrophic economic crisis: In 1997, its pyramid scheme economy collapsed. Dissatisfied with ruling President Sali Berisha of the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), people rioted in the streets, burning down police stations and town halls, looting the weaponries (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5). Over 100,000 small arms found their way smuggled into Kosovo, where they were sold for prices as low as fifty Deutsche Marks (2 USD in 1997) (“Background”). The economic collapse of Albania fueled the resilience of the KLA, providing the guerilla group with an adequate supply of arms.

Conclusion

The KLA suffered tremendous losses during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War yet managed to maintain its reputation as a formidable force and, with the aid of NATO, ultimately won the war. Their success stemmed from a deeply embedded gun culture in Albania, assistance from NATO and the West, poor capabilities of rival groups, a single unifying demand for independence that cut across political divides, and a significant history of ethnic tensions that invigorated the Kosovar population’s drive for armed conflict.

References

Brown, Justin. “New Guerillas Rival Old Rebels to Kosovo.” The Christian Science Publishing Society. 3 Sept, 1998, p. 6.

Chossudovsky, Michael. “Kosovo ‘Freedom Fighters’ Financed by Organized Crime.” Peace Research 31, no. 2, 1999, pp. 29-42.

Gawrych, George. The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913. Bloomsbury Academic: London, 2006.

Hedges, Chris. “Kosovo’s Next Masters?” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3, 1999, pp. 24-42.

Human Rights Watch. “Background” in Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 1st. Human Rights Watch, 2001.

Human Rights Watch. “Forces of the Conflict” in Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 1st. Human Rights Watch, 2001.

Judah, Tim. “The Growing Pains of the Kosovo Liberation Army” in Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, 1st. Michael Waller and Kyril Drezov and Bulent Gokay, eds. New York: Routledge, 2001. Pp. 20-24.

Koktsidis, Pavlos-Ioannis and Caspar Ten Dam. “A Success Story? Analyzing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans.” East European Quarterly 42, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1-20.

“Kosovo: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in the Glogovac Municipality.” Human Rights Watch. D1108. 1 July 1999.

Mueller, Jennifer A. “International Norms as Weapons of War: The Kosovo Liberation Army, 1996-1999, A Preliminary Discourse Analysis.” American Political Science Association, 2011.

Perritt, Henry H. The Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008.

Rathfelder, Erich. Kosovo: Geschichte eines Konflikts. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010.

Walsh, Lynn. “The KLA and the Struggle for Kosovar Self-Determination.” Socialism Today 39. June 1999.

Woehrel, Steven. “Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current Conflict.” CRS Report for Congress. CRS Issue Brief 98041. Washington D.C.: GPO, 5, June 1999.

Guest User 11/9/23 Guest User 11/9/23

The KDF and Diverging Views on the Protection of Civilians in AMISOM

Contributor Will Brown uses new research to probe the relationship between the conceptualization of the Protection of Civilians by peacekeepers and their operational environment, focusing on the Kenyan Defence Forces in Somalia.

It is generally understood that uniformed personnel serving in peace operations, from a variety of different militaries and in a variety of different settings, will understand and conceptualize their experiences and operations in different ways. This is true when we examine how personnel from different Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) view the Protection of Civilians (POC). As Fiifi Edu-Afful notes in his IPI report on peacekeeping in non-permissive environments, “the mindset of peacekeeping contingents is often predicated on the concepts and attitudes imparted through the training and doctrinal perspective of the TCC that deployed them.” However, what happens when the views of peacekeepers differ from their training? I explore a possible case of this occurring through the example of Kenyan peacekeepers deployed in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Through conducting interviews, reviewing archival documents, and analyzing open-source information, I found that there is a disconnect between what Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) personnel were taught regarding protection and what they actually believe. This article examines that difference, how it came to be, and the implications of the existence of that disconnect for future research and policy. However, it is important to caveat that this research is currently exploratory as it is based on relatively limited data and observations.

This article begins by examining how KDF personnel are taught about POC and what concepts they are taught, which are based around conventional existing UN doctrine. It then looks at how KDF personnel who served in AMISOM actually view POC, which is more outcomes-based, community-focused, and holistic. It then examines possible reasons why this disconnect occurred, building off the KDF’s organizational history and the operating experience they found themselves in in Somalia. It then concludes by presenting some concluding thoughts and implications for policymakers and academics.

KDF pre-deployment training, mostly based at the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC), had limited specialized protection training, and what specialized POC training was offered was based on pre-existing UN doctrine, such as the published “Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United nations Peacekeeping” and the “Protection of Civilians Handbook,” that emphasizes certain methods and objectives One reviewed training schedule, for infantry units deploying to a UN mission, included only a single 45 minute training block fully dedicated to the “Protection of Civilians.” It’s likely that personnel deploying to AMISOM received similar levels of total pre-deployment training but with even less of a theoretical emphasis on POC. A civilian working at the center noted that both UN and AU pre deployment training used a similar structure and two-week training schedule. However, multiple trainers who worked with the KDF noted that units deploying to Somalia received a stronger focus on “basic soldiering skills,” given the harsh environment and by extension a lesser focus on academic topics, such as the module on POC compared to pre-deployment for UN missions. These modules were usually a combination of lectures, discussions, and scenario-based learning.

While we don’t currently know what material is specifically taught in AMISOM pre-deployment training, a review of training material gives us a strong idea of how the IPSTC conceptualized POC as a general concept before it was made mission specific. This can be determined by their facilitators’ guide for their specialized “Protection of Civilians” course that, while not in and of itself widely attended within the KDF, shows how the IPSTC views POC and might teach at a smaller scale to those deploying to Somalia.

The conceptualization of POC offered by the specialized POC course is almost entirely in line with existing UN doctrine. In the course, POC activities are divided into three tiers of operation (Protection through Political Process, Protection from Physical Violence, and Establishing a Protective Environment) across four phases (Prevention, Pre-emption, Response, and Consolidation). In UN doctrine, POC activities are also divided into three tiers of operation (Protection through dialogue and engagement, Provision of physical protection, and Establishment of a protective environment) also across four phases (Prevention, Pre-emption, Response, and Consolidation).

Despite the differences in mandate and operating environment, the use of UN doctrine makes sense. It is already well established, developed, and tested. Thus, it makes sense to teach it to those deploying to AMISOM. Even if the difference in mandate (AMISOM, for example, does not have an active protection mandate unlike many UN missions) makes some parts of it irrelevant. However, the ways in which personnel trained in UN doctrine interact with their operational environment combine to form a new conceptual framework for POC.

KDF personnel who had served in AMISOM, however, displayed a very different conceptualization of POC. This manifested itself in two ways. First, they conceptualized POC as community based and outcome based rather than process based and based around particular incidents as in standard doctrine. Second, they focused on how POC could “work” for the KDF.

Firstly, KDF personnel viewed POC on a community level. When asked what a “successful POC” looks like, one KDF officer who had served in AMISOM answered that it involved a scenario with reduced violence, where people could go back to businesses and students could go back to school. Importantly, this is outcome-based. It describes what happens when POC activities are implemented well rather than describing what activities would help create that environment. It was also community-based. It describes improving conditions for the community as a whole rather than protecting specific targeted individuals or groups from imminent physical harm, which is what UN POC doctrine prioritizes.

There was also a desire to view POC through the lens of AMISOM’s stabilization and peace enforcement mandate. Another KDF officer, who served in AMISOM as part of a EOD unit, described teaching civilians how to recognize IEDs as a POC success. While this obviously mitigates civilian harm and is a clear-cut case of POC, he also highlighted how that was useful for the KDF because it allowed for local civilians to better report possible threats to KDF patrols. Similarly, many AMISOM public statements on POC and increased POC awareness focus on civilian harm mitigation or reducing the threat to civilians from one’s own action, instead of from other actors. This is in order to prevent backlash and loss of support amongst the mission. Several sources spoke of established loss of local support, partially as the result of civilian casualties caused by AMISOM, as a key challenge to mission effectiveness. This suggests that, especially in non-permissive environments where POC is not a core mandated activity, POC activities (such as training civilians to recognize IEDs) is viewed as a means to an end (stabilization) rather than an end in and of itself.

While there is a clear difference between what KDF personnel are taught regarding POC and what they actually believe, it is less clear why that gap occurs. One reason may relate to the operational environment. AMISOM and the Somali context is very different from the average environment where UN peacekeeping operations operate (such as the DRC and South Sudan) in two major ways: the mission mandate and the operating environment.

Compared to many other African conflicts, the conflict in Somalia features fewer cases of large scale and deliberate targeting of civilian population. Using data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), we can track violence dynamics. During AMISOM’s 8+ years of operation, ACLED only recorded 37 attacks against civilians with 10 or more fatalities. In contrast, during the first six months of 2022 alone, the DRC saw 29 such attacks, the Central African Republic 12, Mali 34, and South Sudan 19. In contrast to other conflicts, where the large-scale massacre of civilians is a common tactic by armed groups, most Somali civilians who died in conflict die in smaller scale incidents such as assassinations, IEDs, and crossfire during battles between different armed groups.

There are also key differences between UN peacekeeping mandates and AMISOM’s mandate. While all large-scale UN peacekeeping operations are mandated to protect civilians from imminent physical harm, AMISOM lacks such an explicit mandate. However, interviews with KDF personnel showed an internal buy-in to do POC amongst KDF personnel, and conducting POC activities was still encouraged to some extent by AMISOM leadership.

These two factors partially explain the difference in POC conceptualization. In UN missions, where the explicit mandate is to protect civilians from “Imminent Physical Harm,” POC becomes focused on ways to prevent incidents, where “Imminent Physical Harm” occur on a large scale such as massacres. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this, such as mediating local conflict, conducting military patrols, and developing early warning networks, but the objective is the same. The conceptualization of POC develops along that line. In contrast, civilian casualties in Somalia don’t largely occur as a result of large-scale attacks that result in “Imminent Physical Harm.” Instead, they largely occur as a byproduct of the conflict between the government and Al-Shabaab. Thus, the KDF vision of POC, where the successful implementation of POC programs is framed around communities returning to normalcy as a result of stabilizing the community in general, rather than preventing specific negative events. This is speculative, but the view could be that, by reducing and ending the conflict between armed groups, the threat to civilians brought by the conflict is coincidentally ended, thus protecting civilians. The lack of mandate also means that AMISOM personnel aren’t mandated to intervene in cases of “Imminent Physical Harm.” They are, however, mandated to defeat Al-Shabaab and (theoretically) end the conflict and, thus, the threat to civilians as a result of that conflict.

While environmental effects of the Somali context were the primary driver in the division between what KDF personnel were taught regarding POC and what they believed, there are probably also other secondary contributing factors. While these factors would require further research to be fully understood, there are some factors within the KDFs organizational culture that might influence the development of their views on POC. The KDF was formed immediately after independence with the assistance of their former colonial masters and have had a close working relationship with the British ever since. The KDF fits the mold of a colonial military, where the military is consistently trained, equipped, and supported by the former colonial power. Compared to many of its neighbors, the KDF has a strong history of political non-interference in domestic affairs. The KDF also hasn’t fought in any major conflicts beyond some small domestic counterinsurgency efforts until their commitment to AMISOM. Several foreign trainers I’ve spoken with highlighted how this level of intensity marked a new challenge for the KDF, forcing the organization to further professionalize, receive additional training, and adopt modern COIN doctrine when they previously never had to. This collective experience means that the Kenyan experience in Somalia is possibly formative for the KDF’s conceptualization of itself and how it operates. The reason why the KDF’s view on POC lines up with the Somali context so well, versus being incorporated into a wider schema, is because AMISOM has represented the first and most dominant experience of the KDF with regards to POC.

Peacekeeping is becoming an increasingly multilateral institution, as more and more countries from different regions and backgrounds deploy troops to peacekeeping missions. As this article has established, the environment peacekeepers are deployed in has a significant impact on their views towards their activities and peacekeeping concepts. There is room for more research on this topic. While it has been laid out here that KDF personnel have a unique view on protection, there is room to explore how personnel from different TCCs view POC through their own separate lenses. Within that, there is also room to explore how the different combinations of military culture, training/doctrine, and operational experience can impact the perceptions of peacekeepers. This, in turn, will help policymakers, planners, and practitioners better understand the diversity of views within peacekeeping and help them better conduct successful implementations of POC mandates.

Guest User 10/30/23 Guest User 10/30/23

Propagate By Poison: The Landscape of China's Rural-Urban Dichotomy

Staff Writer Mia Westfere outlines the multifaceted dimensions of China’s urban-rural divide, untangling its historical roots and the web of contemporary challenges it poses to political-economic stability.

For thousands of years, the agrarian heartlands were the very heartbeat of Chinese civilization. Writing years before the establishment of the first imperial dynasty and long before the industrialization of China, reformer Shang Yang deduced that harnessing the plow was the path to harnessing power in the context of the tumultuous Warring States era. His recommendation of “emphasizing agriculture and restraining business” to the Qin state passed down through the subsequent dynasties. Though Shang Yang’s reforms were a boon to Qin productivity, state wealth, and facilitated the establishment of the first Chinese empire, modern China has chosen to address its current challenges with a different approach. While the contrast between agriculture and business remains intact, the growing chasm between the rural and urban worlds may have more negative political ramifications than positive ones in the current Chinese political economy.

Today, the People’s Republic of China’s wealth and power can be found concentrated on the coasts, which have rapidly developed since the 1978 implementation of an “open door policy” ushered in a frenzy of technology absorption and economic entwinement with the world market, marked especially by special economic zone development. Around this time, prevailing perceptions in China conceived the rural sector and the developed, urbanized one as rather disjointed, with economists and policymakers at the forefront of the Coastal Development Strategy envisioning an increased interdependence between the two spheres. The last phase within this roughly 20 to 30 year plan prescribed a leveraging of the wealth derived from industry to develop the agricultural inland areas.

More than 30 years have gone by since this framework was first introduced, and the integration of urban and rural prosperity leaves much to be desired. Income inequality, disparity in education opportunities, and stark differences in market participation show the huge gaps that persist between the urban and rural worlds of the same nation. This sharp contrast is due largely in part to the Hukou system, a policy set by the central government under Mao in 1958, which local governments possess the authority to enforce today. Under this system, citizens must register their birthplace as their permanent residence and can only change this registration by obtaining a special permit. Local governments set numerous bureaucratic hurdles for would-be migrants to jump over in order to control demographics and human capital. Given that the typical direction of migration in China is from poorer, rural areas to wealthier, urban ones, newcomers to the metropolises have an especially onerous time obtaining permits, and therefore frequently find themselves barred from accessing public social support services and stalled in their quest for upward mobility. As a result, the polarization between urbanites and country-dwellers persists.

Sowing Division Under Maoist Socialism

Mao Zedong, a so-called son of the soil, led his army of peasants to victory against the Chinese Nationalist Party and ushered in an age of “Socialist Serfdom.” On an ideological level, Maoism is grounded in the quest for equality, in the destruction of the hierarchical feudal ways and days of old. In reality, the disenfranchisement of Chinese rustics is in many cases firmly rooted in Mao-era policies. As with many other facets of modern Chinese society, stepping out of the shadow cast by Chairman Mao’s legacy poses a serious challenge to untangling the political, economic, and social aggravations of this fissure.

From the very beginning of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule, cities have been an exceptional pressure point on regime stability. For most of the Chinese Civil War, cities stayed loyal to the Chinese Nationalist Party, and before that, were largely beholden to foreign interests and exploitation. The CCP desperately needed to grab the reins of these hotspots of crime and dissension, and they perceived the influx of post-civil war migration as a key source of destabilization. Hence, while the immediate aftermath of the war saw the pattern of urban migration that one might expect in the wake of major upheaval, the CCP began to devote serious time and effort to taming both the urban and rural populations- typically by offering the former a carrot and the latter a stick. For example, the countryside was negatively affected by the implementation of the Unified Purchase and Unified Sale system in 1953 by the state setting the price at which it would buy the mandated quota of crops, which naturally came under market value. The government then distributed the purchased food in urban centers, lowering the cost of living there and thereby necessitating more stringent migration policies. Consequently, the hukou system came into effect in 1958, granting governments the power to control people’s movements.

The government promptly began to exercise its newfound powers by recruiting millions to work in the factories meant to fuel the Great Leap Forward. This leap landed with a faceplant, and tens of millions of workers were deported back to the countryside, where tens of millions of people subsequently starved to death. The consequences of this were not only that migration to cities became even more difficult, but also that rural areas were increasingly left to fend for themselves. Depressed by unemployment and all the social ills that entails, rural regions were mandated by Mao to dust themselves off and get to building infrastructure that would boost agricultural production. That surplus, of course, would be handed over to the government at cheap prices to then be exported overseas in order to fund industrial development. The Mao era undoubtedly exhibited urban bias, a bias which persists today. Back then, as is largely the case now, urbanites enjoyed many more public goods and social services than their rural counterparts, such as education, maternity leave, pensions, medical care, and housing assistance. Moreover, the welfare provided to urban residents was in no small part funded by the labor of farmworkers, as by some estimates, the practice of buying agricultural goods at low prices resulted in the government transferring around 534 billion yuan away from the rural sector between 1955 and 1985.

It might be curious that for all the CCP is anxious about discontentment breeding regime instability and achieving social harmony, their long-held practice of neglecting the well-being of the rustics continues to drive a wedge in between the urban and rural populaces. But this is not without consequences; dissatisfaction on both sides has long driven protests and government insecurity, perhaps hinting at an overall pattern of poison from within.

Seedlings of Social Unrest

So what about the reform era? Surely, the government after Mao’s death saw some improvement in the lives of farmers. And indeed, while fiscal policy did raise the price at which the government purchased agricultural goods, thereby benefiting rural areas, the government quickly caved to pressure from urbanites, who sought to maintain their relative advantages. As was the case under Mao, the CCP feared the political repercussions of disgruntled city-dwellers and thus resumed the pattern whereby urban citizens cowed the government into maintaining their higher standards of living.

Even when the government chose to respond to political unrest with military action, such as in 1989 when inflation racked the urban cost of living to the point of protest, the follow-up included amendments to the economic policies in order to quell urban discontent. Furthermore, although the reform period is known for walking back the controlled economy model, pressure for urban protections led to fund transfers to subsidize struggling state-owned enterprises.

For all that the reform period championed economic growth, the government considered it worthwhile to sacrifice economic efficiency in order to ensure regime stability. At the same time, the CCP greatly relies on its ability to deliver on economic outcomes in order to keep the peace. By centering the economic heart of China in urban centers, and devoting significant resources to keeping that heart beating, even at the expense of rural reforms, the government has trapped itself in an unsustainable cycle. With every turn of this cycle, the second-class status of rural citizens becomes more entrenched.

To better compare, consider the CCP response to rural outcry. In the 2000s, the government continued to take over land for urban development with an explicit lack of regard for local input, and these protests were punctuated with a 2010 demand to end the Hukou system. At the time, Premier Wen Jiabao had alluded to the possibility of dismantling the system, but when the government had to respond to the clamor by suppressing circulation of these sentiments, he quickly changed his messaging to suggest more moderate changes.

Herein lies the tension between social stability and economic improvements. To some degree, the economy is an ever-growing vine attached to the tree of Chinese societal harmony. The vine enhances the outward vibrancy of the tree, bestowing a majestic weight, and to remove the vine would peel off the protective bark with it. And yet, cultivating the vine has allowed it to grow beyond the tree’s control, consuming the life force of its host.

This Season’s Harvest

While the economic risks the CCP continues to run by not addressing the growing gulf between rural and urban residents are surely troubling, it is important to acknowledge that the divisions Hukou creates have a human impact on real people’s hopes and dreams and happiness. Where someone lives and what industry they work in is part of a much greater story about what they call home.

The families of those migrants who attempt to make it in the metropolises despite their rural Hukou status are left behind on one side of the river while their loved ones desperately try to swim across. This has led to the phenomena of “left behind children,” a vulnerable group of youths who are emotionally, mentally, and academically delayed while their parents attempt to escape rural poverty. As an earlier section mentioned Socialist Serfdom, whereby Chinese society under Mao saw the systematic treatment of rural residents as the underclass, it appears this lowest class has split off into an additional caste, made up of migrants. While they do not have the same privileges as urban Hukou holders, they do have access to the amenities of city living and in general enjoy higher standards of living compared to the countryside. This comes at the cost of the families they leave behind, as Hukou restrictions limit access to both childcare and quality education. It is estimated that 1 in 5 children in China are “Left Behind,” unable to see one or more of their parents for most of the year.

On the flipside of this, the fallout from the Covid pandemic and the subsequent rise in youth unemployment saw numerous remarks made in the spring of this year regarding a push to return China’s youths to the countryside. Are we seeing the start of a new wave of “rustication”? President Xi has recently encouraged young professionals to focus on reenergizing rural areas, to convert their urban-bred talents into countryside innovation. The idea seems to have had a decent reception, with reports by the Chinese government of increased migration to rural parts leading to improved agricultural production and higher quality rural tourism. Social media has likely played a role in idealizing farm life, an Asian counterpart to the popular cottagecore aesthetic. However, the idyllic pastoral life is not at all like influencers portray, which the young rusticated urbanites soon discover. The comforts and economic opportunities of the city still hold considerable sway over someone’s choice of where to live, especially if that person is born with an urban Hukou and thus has greater options available. These accounts make it difficult to believe at face value CCP messaging about the great enthusiasm the youth supposedly have for rural life and reads more like an attempt to preempt social turmoil brought on by idle, disillusioned young people. The government’s decision to stop reporting the rate of youth unemployment altogether makes the whole narrative even more suspect.

This sense of disillusionment is growing stronger especially in the housing market, which like many aspects of the Chinese economy is an incoming crisis of the government’s own making. The housing market remains a sector under immense government oversight if not outright control, and the current issues it poses is in no small part linked to the Hukou system. Hukou is an instrument with which the government can control demand, and this leads to neglect of the supply side. Moreover, poor property tax systems render them an inadequate means of adjusting housing prices. And of course, in spite of the difficulties the government sets in citizens’ ways, the advantages of living in a city are still much greater in many cases than the difficulties. Decades of urban bias have built myriad social services, and even for those migrants who do not have the urban Hukou status to take full advantage of welfare, having some benefits is better than none. Although, because of the aforementioned informal caste system, migrants tend to be relegated to renting, which comes with significantly fewer benefits than home ownership. Home ownership is made even more valuable by the fact that it often dictates who gets priority to send their children to the best schools. Sometimes, even the length of time a person has resided in a school district can give them the upper hand in admissions.

In essence, the urban populace has been pitted against one another to fight for limited housing, but the government has made housing so necessary to access the full benefits of being an urban resident that demand climbs even as the fight becomes more fatiguing. The Hukou system ostensibly seeks to curb the demand, but in fact it only aggravates these various points of contention.

The housing crisis is a symptom of the Hukou system failing both Chinese citizens and the Chinese government. But while the former would likely be better off with the abolition of the system, the latter clings to any means of controlling its people. Some have suggested that the government simply does not know how to bring Hukou to an end without sparking an upheaval that would threaten the very stability it is trying to maintain, while others speculate that this is a sign of local governments flouting central government recommendations. Perhaps it is instead correct, if radical, to say that the system of Chinese government itself is unsustainable, constantly locked in desperate need to bolster prosperity and keep a leash on the beast it scrambles to feed.

With this understanding, the urban-rural divide is clearly antithetical to the themes of social harmony and cohesion that the CCP supposedly desires. And yet, to stay in power the CCP has had to exacerbate this divide time and again or risk its grip on power. It seems that this contrast is useful neither for economic efficiency nor for stability, and yet without it those goals could not stay afloat. There is a Chinese saying that warns not to drink poison to slake one’s thirst. The poison here is the polarization between the urban and rural worlds, while the Chinese government thirsts for authority and economic strength.

Guest User 10/29/23 Guest User 10/29/23

Schrodinger’s Breakaway Region: Russia and the Issue of Transnistria

Contributor Charlotte Freer explores the effects of the war in Ukraine and other geopolitical factors on the “Transnistria problem.”

Since February 2022, the existence of “breakaway” or separatist regions in Eastern Europe have skyrocketed into mainstream news and political analysis. A full year into the Russian-Ukrainian war has heightened the discussion of what could come post-war for separatist regions and the consequences of those outcomes. This also has implications for the separatist region of Transnistria, located in Ukraine’s neighboring country of Moldova. While recognized only by Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Republic of Artsakh, Transnistria, or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, has operated as a quasi-state since the government of Moldova designated it as an autonomous territorial unit in 2005. It is crucial to remember that the day when the existence of Transnistria is questioned is imminent. It is not whether this question will be raised, but more so when Transnistria’s existence will be questioned, how it will be questioned, and whether there is an answer to the “problem of Transnistria.”

Before delving into these questions, it must be explained why Transnistria is a “problem.” From a Western perspective, Transnistria is occupied territory. With the war in Ukraine raging, more conversations are being had about the status of separatist regions with a Russian military presence. Increasingly, these areas are being looked at as regions that must be liberated from Russian militarization. In the words of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “we believe that the territory of Transnistria is the territory of the independent state of Moldova, and they [Russians] are constantly making provocations.” The outcome of the war in Ukraine will have ripple effects globally. As such, from a western democratic perspective, the existence of Transnistria is a problem that will eventually need to be resolved.

In early 2023, it seemed the day of reckoning for Transnistria was on the horizon. On February 9th, President Zelenskyy announced that Ukrainian intelligence had discovered a Russian plot to “destroy” Moldova. Moldova, like Ukraine, has continued to drift further away from Moscow’s sphere of influence after the election of President Maia Sandu in 2020. Since her election, Sandu has been vocal in her belief that Russia should withdraw its military personnel from Transnistria. Early in her presidency, Sandu stated that it was her opinion that there was foreign interference during the dissolution of the Soviet Union which created the Transnistrian conflict to hinder Moldova’s strides towards independence. There has been a Russian military presence in Transnistria since 1992, when the cease-fire agreement between Moldova and Transnistria established the presence of troops as “peacekeepers.” As of today, Transnistria houses approximately 1,500 Russian armed forces personnel, seven Mi-24 attack helicopters, and around 100 armored vehicles. While these numbers may not call for immediate alarm, the presence of Russian military, and the memory of the Transnistrian war in the early 90’s, has been a looming presence since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelenskyy’s announcement of Russia’s plans for Moldova stoked pre-existing concerns over whether Moldova is the next country to be invaded.

As one of the Eastern Bloc’s “frozen” conflicts, Transnistria has remained in stasis since the end of the Transnistrian War in 1992. The region itself is often referred to as a relic of the Soviet Union, complete with a statue of Lenin in front of its parliament building. As a result, Transnistria can be viewed as one of the few remaining areas that is deeply entrenched in the Soviet sphere of influence. Over the years, as tensions and annexations in Eastern Europe have ebbed and flowed, so have concerns over conflict flaring in Transnistria. None of these concerns have resulted in tangible conflicts, but with the war in Ukraine seriously upending the status-quo, there seems a real possibility that Russia may jolt Transnistria out of its liminal state and into conflict.

Skeptics of this argument would claim that Russia will not want to risk angering the West further by instigating violence in a second country. However, one must look back to February 2022 and realize that Russia fully intended to drag Moldova into its invasion of Ukraine. In late January of 2022, it was reported that Russia intended to pursue a false-flag operation in Eastern Ukraine, supposedly to justify what was at the time, a hypothetical invasion. If this plan had worked, it is not unfounded to say that Russian troops could have moved into Ukraine through Transnistria. American officials even went so far as to say that this operation could occur in Transnistria as well as in place of Eastern Ukraine. In March 2022, a photo showed Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko in front of a war map wherein there appeared to be Russian troop movement into Transnistria from Odessa. So far, none of these scares have resulted in troop movement or violence in Transnistria- potentially because Russia has yet to formulate a feasible excuse to do so. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is in flagrant violation of international law; Russia has stuck with its claims of “denazifying Ukraine” and “protecting the Russian minority” in Ukraine while also preventing Western encroachment via NATO expansion.

In early 2023, news coming from Russia and Moldova told a story of a frozen conflict thawing out at a concerning rate. After President Zelenskyy’s announcement on February 9th, Russia moved quickly to deny these claims. However, these claims were soon corroborated by President Sandu who announced that Russia’s plans were to use foreign saboteurs to attack government buildings in Chisinau with the goal of creating violence and havoc in the city. Externally, Russia has started to increase the severity of the narrative involving Transnistria. On February 23rd, Russia stated that Ukraine intended to launch an invasion into Transnistria as retaliation for an “alleged” offensive by Russian troops from the territory of Transnistria.” The Russian Defense Ministry alleged that Ukraine was “amassing troops” along Ukraine’s border with Moldova and that this provocation posed a “direct threat to the Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” which Russia would protect if necessary.

This builds to answer the question of how the existence of Transnistria may be reckoned with. Despite Russia’s leaked plans and thinly veiled threats, as of April 2023, it seems unlikely that Russia has the military capacity or wherewithal to successfully invade Transnistria and/or Moldova. As reported by The Economist in March 2023, Russia has had an estimated 60,000-70,000 fatalities in Ukraine since the start of the invasion in February 2022. Adding the additional soldiers who were wounded or missing brings the total losses to an estimated 200,000-250,000. For perspective, in the early days of the war, it was estimated that approximately 150,000 Russian troops had entered Ukraine. This would mean that approximately a year after the initial invasion, Russia has lost 100% of its initial troops plus anywhere from 50,000-100,000 more. The rate at which Russia is losing troops is also incredibly high; American General Mark Milley said in an interview, that an estimated 1,200 Russian soldiers were killed in a single day around the area of Bakhmut. Russia has also suffered heavy artillery losses, having lost 1,000 tanks with another 544 tanks captured by Ukrainian forces. These losses have accumulated to roughly 30% of Russia’s tank force. Oryx, an open-source monitoring website, calculates total Russian equipment losses at 9,100, while Ukraine’s total losses are estimated to be 2,934.

It could be argued that Moldova does not have the military strength to fend off a potential Russian invasion regardless of Russia’s troop losses. Moldovan Armed Forces only consists of approximately 6,500 personnel with an additional 2,000 yearly conscripts. They also face a modernization issue. In October 2022, Moldovan Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii said that roughly 90% of Moldova’s military equipment is of Soviet origin, ranging as far back as the 1960’s. However, it would be counter-productive for Russia to send forces to Transnistria when they are facing such significant troop and artillery loss in Ukraine. Doing so would only further strain Russia’s army, diverting it away from Ukraine, and further Western involvement in the conflict.

Now, why must the issue of Transnistria be dealt with? Most simply put- Moldova’s current westward trajectory is fundamentally incompatible with the existence of a Russian-occupied Soviet state.

From the Russian perspective, there is Russia’s russkiy mir and sphere of influence ambitions. Russkiy mir or translated “Russian world” refers to a policy and cultural belief that all Russian speakers globally are part of Russian civilization and therefore must be protected against “persecution.” Unlike Ukraine, which has contended with conflicting claims over Kyivan Rus, Moldova has almost always been considerably distinct from Russia. The Principality of Moldavia was formed in 1346 and existed until 1859 when it formed with Wallachia, the geographical area of modern Romania. Today, the western section of Moldavia is part of Romania, and a portion of the eastern section is now Moldova. The Russian Empire did hold Bessarabia, a section of Moldavian territory in 1812, however it was ceded back in 1856. The native population spoke Romanian, although it was banned in 1836 as part of forced Russification. Stalin also mandated Moldovans to write Romanian in Cyrillic, a process which continued to drive a wedge between Moldova and its cultural ties to its western neighbor. As per the Moldovan 2014 census, (excluding Transnistria,) 4.1% of the population identified as Russian. In Transnistria, 29.1% identified as Russian. In the same census, 90.1% of Moldovans who reported to be religious self-identified as Eastern Orthodox; another key component of russkiy mir. With a respectable Russian minority and a majority Orthodox faith, Moldova, and more specifically Transnistria, have all the makings of a state to be incorporated into the “Russian World” that Putin so desires.

With NATO expansion also being a key player in the Russo-Ukrainian conversation, it can argued that Russia is looking to prevent NATO expansion, and Western influence further eastward. As of 2022, Russia is surrounded by NATO on its western side. Despite Moldova being considerably smaller than Belarus or Ukraine, the “loss” of it to either NATO or the European Union would be antithetical to Russia’s desire to maintain and even expand its sphere of influence. Russkiy mir is even enshrined in Russia’s national security policies. The National Security Strategy outlines the perceived threat to russkiy mir as “the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the weakening of the unity of the Russian Federation’s multinational people by means of external cultural and information expansion (including the spread of poor-quality mass cultural products), propaganda of permissiveness and violence.” Although the population of Transnistria is only 475, 373, it remains of symbolic importance to the Kremlin’s ideas of preserving Russian culture and influence.

From the Moldovan perspective, the shift westward has already begun. The beginning of this change could be felt when Maia Sandu was first elected in 2020. Running on a pro-Western campaign, she won with 57.7% of the vote against Igor Dodon, who was backed by Russia. This was further reinforced with parliamentary election results in 2021. Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won 63 of 101 seats in Parliament with 58% of the vote. The Party of Action and Solidarity is pro-European, and prior to the invasion of Ukraine had the long-term goal of Moldova’s accession to the European Union. The success of the PAS in the parliamentary elections was broadly considered to be detrimental to Russia’s influence in Moldova.

The invasion of Ukraine has expedited Moldova’s political movement westward. In March, the Moldovan Parliament passed a bill which formally restored Moldova’s national language to Romanian. Although 80% of Moldovans speak Romanian as their native tongue, the official language of Moldova was legally “Moldovan” which remained until March 2023 as a cultural relic of Stalinism. While the linguistic differences between Romanian and Moldovan are negligible, the change in policy represents a substantial distancing of Moldova and its ties to Russia. Other significant policy maneuvers include submitting Moldova’s official application for European Union candidacy in the early days of the Russo-Ukrainian war. As of April, the European Union agreed to accelerate European Union-Moldovan entrance negotiations to take place before the end of 2023.

While Sandu is facing falling approval rates because of high inflation and multiple energy crises; general approval of Moldova joining the European Union remains steady among the Moldovan population. The International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research reported that in November of 2022, 36% of Moldovans were reported to “strongly support” Moldova joining the European Union, and 27% “somewhat supported” this motion. In the municipality of Chisinau, 42% of respondents strongly supported accession, and 37% somewhat supported it. The study also showed that Moldovans believe the European Union is Moldova’s strongest political partner, with Romania placing second and Russia third. In 2019, The European Union and Russia were tied in the IRI’s data on top political partner to Moldova. In 2018, Russia placed higher than the European Union. While Russia remains of political importance in the eyes of Moldova, it clearly has been losing primacy to Moldova’s Western neighbors.

However, the question of whether or not the issue of Transnistria can actually be solved remains.

In October 2017 (the last year that the IRI asked about Transnistria in annual polling,) 70% of Moldovan respondents said that Transnistria should be a regular region in Moldova, without autonomous designation. This is the largest percentage since 2010, with numbers dipping as low as 48% in March 2016. This would indicate that Moldova would like to see Transnistria be reintegrated into Moldova. But what about Transnistria? Unsurprisingly, Transnistria has remained politically inclined towards Russia since its inception. Russia originally backed Transnistria during the civil war and has continuously provided economic support, despite not formally recognizing Transnistria’s statehood. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Transnistrian officials appealed to the Duma to consider accepting Transnistria into the Russian Federation. Political scientist Antoly Durin, who himself is from Transnistria, said of public opinion, “people here feel Russian. Not just as a nationality, but as a people who love Russia and want to be part of a Russian civilization.” So, while Moldova, (as an entity separate from Transnistria,) does not wish to be part of the Russian world/russkiy mir, Transnistria regards itself as intrinsically Russian.

This creates a scenario wherein the existence of Transnistria diametrically opposes Moldova. This opposition, combined with the economic and militaristic realities of Moldova, Transnistria and Russia means that despite all the posturing and polling numbers, Transnistria may very well remain frozen for the foreseeable future. There are multiple hypotheticals about what could happen, all under different sets of circumstances.

The scenario wherein Transnistria agrees in diplomatic negotiations to be reabsorbed into Moldova is currently too unlikely to be discussed here.

A second possibility is another civil war. Moldova could attempt to use military might to forcibly reunite Transnistria with Moldova. This scenario also seems unlikely. Any military action taken by Moldova that is “unprovoked” would greatly jeopardize Moldova’s foray into the Western European community. There has also been no rhetoric from the Moldovan government that would indicate a desire to utilize military action. In fact, the rhetoric has been the opposite, with Maia Sandu reaffirming her commitment to diplomatic resolution throughout her presidency. With Moldova facing a cost-of-living crisis, and increasing concerns over inflation, avoidable conflict would be highly unpopular. Additionally, Neither Moldova nor Transnistria have the military capacity to engage in unnecessary conflict. If there was conflict between them, Russia would likely get involved to support Transnistria. However, Russian involvement in a conflict would divert resources and attention away from Ukraine, which is of higher importance to Russia.

The third scenario is that an economic collapse in Russia and/or Transnistria would force the dissolution or reintegration of Transnistria and Moldova. Transnistria has a semi-independent economy; however, it remains reliant on Russian support. As with other quasi-states, Russia acts as a “patron” of Transnistria and subsidizes a large portion of the Transnistrian economy. This allows Transnistria’s continued existence despite their lack of international recognition. In February of 2023, a leaked contract between Russian company Gazprom and Moldovan company Moldovagaz unveiled that Transnistria owes roughly 7 billion dollars in gas bills. Russia has continued to supply Transnistria with gas, even though (as of 2019,) Transnistria had not paid for gas since 2009. In Moldova, it costs approximately $1,000 per thousand cubic meters of gas. In Transnistria, the same amount of gas is estimated to cost around $168. Russia also provides millions annually to Transnistria in humanitarian support, which keeps the economy afloat. In the event of a Russian economic collapse, the Transnistrian economy theoretically could collapse as well. If Russia forces Transnistria to repay their gas debt, or can no longer subsidize the Transnistrian economy, the Transnistrian economy could give way. An economic collapse could force Transnistria to reintegrate into Moldova.

However, a Russian economic collapse does not seem to be predicted any time soon. When Russia initially invaded Ukraine, it was predicted that the economy would contract by 10%. A contraction of 10% would have effectively crippled the Russian economy and potentially had rebound effects on the Transnistrian economy. However, heavy western sanctions have only been marginally successful in stifling the Russian economy. In the first 2023 fiscal quarter, the Russian economy contracted by 2.2%. Organizations like the International Monetary Fund are projecting that the Russian economy will recover in the coming year as a result of military production and mass amounts of state spending.

So, what does all of this theorizing accumulate to?

For better or worse, it seems that the situation is too tumultuous to make a long-term prediction. What can be said is that given the paradoxical nature of its existence, Transnistria will be stuck in its interjacent state until it is galvanized by external circumstances. As a quasi-state, it has not made any recent moves to change its status. Despite saying that they wish to join the Russian Federation, Transnistria has not properly attempted to join, nor provided military support to Russia.

In all, the answers to the question of Transnistria can only be found in due time. There is not a singular clear path for the future of Russia, Moldova, or Transnistria. Time will tell how the domino effect of events in Ukraine will play a role in the future of its neighbors. What can be said is that the global community must continue to monitor the situation in Transnistria. One day Transnistria will be called out of its intangible state, and when it is we must all watch with a critical eye.

Guest User 10/27/23 Guest User 10/27/23

Heavy Metal Harvest: Impacts of Heavy Metal Soil Contamination on the Food and Health in China

Staff Writer Sofiya Cole examines the implications of growing soil contamination on China for the food chain and public health.

In ancient Chinese literature, one of the oldest and most influential pieces of divination text is the I Ching, or Book of Changes. It features the story of Shennong, the first Yan Emperor and the “Divine Husbandman”, who taught the Chinese people agriculture:

“When Pao Hsi’s clan was gone, there sprang up the clan of the Divine Husbandman. He split a piece of wood for a plowshare and bent a piece of wood for the plow handle, and taught the whole world the advantage of laying open the earth with a plow.”

- I Ching, Book II: The Material

It is likely the Divine Husbandman believed China would continue to use his knowledge to cultivate the land indefinitely. Thousands of years later, however, it is beginning to look like this will not be the case. Heavy metal soil contamination, caused mostly by industrial activity, means that the percentage of arable land in China is decreasing. This is increasing health risks of consuming crops grown in this poisonous soil and threatening the stability of the food chain as

The origins of soil contamination

Before the 20th century, China was a completely agrarian society. However, the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spurred a new age of industrialization within the country. Development of the country came in several phases. Communist leader Mao Zedong ushered in the first phase with the first Five Year Plan (1953-57), the goal of which was to increase industrial production and output. The subsequent phase, called the Great Leap Forward (1958-1950), intended to continue advancement of industry within China. However, due to imbalances between industrial and agricultural growth and inflexibility of leadership, this plan was largely a failure. In fact, it caused the largest man made famine in history, killing an estimated 45 million people.

In the 1960s the second Five-Year Plan was able to recover some of the devastation of the preceding years, but it wasn’t until Mao Zedong’s death and new leadership was assumed within the CCP that the country completely made up for their losses. Beginning in 1978, the Chinese Communist Party reformed their economic policy. The CCP targeted deficiencies and imbalances in production, with the goal of growing exports. Unlike previously, however, this time was met with success. For about the next 30 years, China’s economy would grow about 10% each year, bringing with it a whole slew of environmental issues.

The uninterrupted expansion of China’s economy has since winded down, but the environmental impacts of that period of unchecked growth have not. One of the most pressing consequences of this has been heavy metal contamination of soil. Heavy metals are naturally present in soil in small quantities, however, certain human activities can introduce higher than normal levels into the soil. In 2013, the Ministry of Environmental Protection produced a book stating that one-sixth of China’s arable land - nearly 50 million acres - was polluted with dangerous metals like arsenic, cadmium, and nickel. This caused nationwide panic as the government had always kept information on the state of the environment tightly under wraps, leaving most people unaware of the true scale of pollution. But these “state secrets” were finally starting to reveal themselves and the true extent of heavy metal contamination was beginning to be uncovered.

Food chain dilemmas

China’s per capita land area is less than half of the world average, meaning that it cannot afford to lose any of that valuable property to pollution. So far, China has been able to utilize this small fraction of the world’ arable land to feed nearly 20% of the world’s population. The country produces ¼ of the world’s grain, reaching a 686.53 million ton output in 2022. In addition, it is the top global producer of cereals, fruit, vegetables, fishery products, meat, poultry, and eggs. However, over the last two decades, China has begun to rely more and more on food imports, indicating that they are no longer able to produce a sufficient harvest to support their population.

Heavy metal soil contamination is known to decrease productivity of cropland. Excess heavy metal in the soil is taken up into plants through their roots, accumulating and causing damage. They decrease seed germination, root elongation, plant biomass, and chlorophyll biosynthesis.

In 2000, China’s food self-sufficiency ratio was at 93.6 percent. In 2022, it was 65.8 percent. The ratio is predicted to decrease about 10% more by 2030, largely in part to reduction of safely cultivable land. Still in the shadow of the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward, China cannot afford another food security crisis. Recent events have already begun to unveil how sensitive China is to food distribution disruptions. Supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic caused food shortages and frantic appeals from people starving under lockdown. More recently, the Russian war on Ukraine has again demonstrated China’s food instability. Ukraine is one of the largest corn exporting countries, and China is its biggest buyer. Ukrainian grain production suffered a heavy blow due to the Russia-Ukraine, and China was not left undisturbed by this.

Health risks and “cancer villages”

A 2022 study found the main sources of soil heavy metal pollution in China to be metal mining and smelting, industrial activities, power generation, agricultural activities (e.g. utilization of fertilizer and animal manure), waste disposal, urban development, and transportation. Certain areas of the country constitute heavy metal contamination levels greater than others. Hunan Province in central China, for example, has some of the worst soil in the nation. This is mainly due to the area being a top provider of nonferrous metals. Byproducts associated with production of these metals, including industrial and mining wastewater, as well as dust released during mining and smelting, lead to toxic levels of heavy metals into the soil. This has severe implications as nonferrous metals are not the only major contribution of the region. Hunan Province also makes up around 15% of China’s rice production. In 2021, the region produced 26.83 million metric tons of rice. Grain samples collected and tested for heavy metals from various locations around China revealed that rice originating in Hunan Province contained the highest levels of cadmium and lead. In addition, several other provinces were discovered to have grain samples that contained greater than acceptable levels of multiple heavy metals.

One could imagine the implications of crops being grown in such poisonous soil. Crop production does decrease from heavy metal contamination, but the plants that do survive will contain a dangerous accumulation to toxins. Humans who then consume these plants are exposed to their effects. For example, cadmium is a probable human carcinogen that also causes kidney disease and weakened bone structure after long periods of exposure. When ingested, it causes stomach irritation, vomiting, and diarrhea. Another example, lead, is a probable human carcinogen and that can accumulate over time, wreaking havoc on the body. It is especially detrimental to young children, causing brain and nervous system damage, learning disabilities, delayed growth and development, and hearing and speech problems. For both lead and cadmium poisoning, there are no cures, with the only available option being to manage symptoms as they arise. Other heavy metals cause similarly disastrous effects.

Many studies done in China have suggested higher health risks associated with heavy metal soil pollution in China. Some of the most pressing evidence comes from the so-called “cancer villages”. Various sources claim that there are around 400-500 different cancer villages in China, which are locations in which an unusually high level of cancer cases are recorded, most likely having to do with environmental problems. These villages first started appearing in the 1980s, which coincides with the time when the Chinese Communist Party revamped their economic policy and industrialization really began to take off. The Chinese government has admitted to the existence of these villages, but has continued to keep information about them shielded from the public. A 2015 study attempted to use the limited available data on these villages to create a map of their locations. They concluded that cancer villages tended to cluster around major rivers and their tributaries, almost always densely populated and near industry facilities. In addition, the researchers noted that the highest levels of cancer morbidity came from grain producing regions in China. Hunan Province was one such region where the densest locations of cancer villages were found.

Current efforts and future actions

In February of 2015, the documentary “Under the Dome” went viral in China, revealing shocking portrayals of soil contamination, as well as air and water pollution, within the country. Within one month the Chinese government blocked access to the film. This extreme censorship makes it very difficult to gauge the levels of heavy metal soil contamination in China, let alone solve it. Despite this, it seems like the government is beginning to understand the severity of soil contamination within the country. In 2019, the Chinese government declared a “farmland redline” policy stating that China’s total arable land should never fall below 120 million hectares. In February of 2022, the government announced the first national soil survey in 40 years. The survey will take more than four years to complete, but when finished it should give the country a better understanding of what they are dealing with.

The future of China’s soil in the face of heavy metal soil contamination is largely unknown. We do not know for sure whether the country will fully commit to their pledge of reversing the damage caused by industrialization and heavy agriculture. It remains to be seen whether Shennong, the Father of Agriculture’s, legacy will remain within the soils of China.

Guest User 10/27/23 Guest User 10/27/23

The Ghosts of Past and Present - Why the US and Iran Can’t Find a Way to Revive the Iran Nuclear Deal, and its Haunting Implications

Staff Writer Diya Jain analyzes the Iran Nuclear Deal and its implications for U.S.-Iran relations.

How long does it take to bring a treaty back to life? As diplomats from Iran and the United States work to renew a version of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, they are finding out that the answer may be longer than the world would have expected - and longer than it can afford. Tehran and Washington continue to duck in and out of negotiations as pressure from their constituents and their people continues to mount. Disappearing and appearing like apparitions, the two have left political analysts puzzled about the prospect of new nuclear policy. Although 2023 has marked a promising turn of events in rekindling diplomatic relations between the two after eight years of hostility, disagreements and demands small and large keep the two powers from coming together to revive their 2015 deal.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was an agreement between Iran and member nations of the UN Security Council in collaboration with the EU. Encompassing issues from uranium enrichment to sanctions relief, it was able to broadly address the various complexities of the situation at that time. The 2015 deal made significant strides towards limiting Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities: it saw strict restrictions on the construction of nuclear centrifuges, limits on uranium enrichment and plutonium, two key components powering nuclear warheads, and an extensive monitoring and verification system, amongst other terms. In return for Iran’s compliance with these requirements, many of the sanctions levied against the nation by the EU, US, and UN would be raised, and progress would be made towards lifting the arms embargo on Iran’s transfer of military weaponry.

Two years after taking office, however, former President Donald Trump terminated US involvement in the deal, calling it “defective at its core.” Spurred on by hardline Congressional Republicans who claimed the 2015 negotiations represented a striking loss of ground and a sullying of American power on the world stage, he cut diplomatic ties with Iran and reinstated crippling sanctions on the nation’s trade capabilities. According to UN reports, European leaders and UN representatives condemned Trump for abandoning a commitment to global security. Meanwhile, Iran itself lamented the US’s departure from the agreement, with then-President Rouhani pledging to continue to abide by its terms in the hopes that cooperation may be revived. In the years following the 2018 scuffle, Iran struggled to find its direction for the future.

Their direction was charted in 2021 with the election of President Ebrahim Raisi. A political hardliner and staunch combatant of Western influence, Raisi’s nuclear policies are in striking contrast to those of his relatively progressive predecessor. The US Institute of Peace has estimated that within the first year of his leadership, Iran had exceeded the amount of enriched uranium permitted by the 2015 deal by over 18 times. Particles enriched up to 84% were found in late 2022, per a report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); these levels draw dangerously close to the 90% purity mark necessary for its use in a nuclear warhead.

Rather than quell proliferation efforts, the past year’s negotiation attempts seem to have only further fueled Iran’s dash towards nuclear capabilities. In August of 2022, talks between Tehran and Washington nearly resulted in a deal that would restore key components of the JCPOA. Negotiations fell apart at the last minute due to disagreements over investigation and verification practices, however, and by November of that year, Iran had unveiled plans for the construction of fourteen new nuclear centrifuges. In a blatant nod towards the failure of the summer 2022 talks, the government also suspended safeguard arrangements, rendering nuclear energy inspectors from the IAEA unable to access and determine the status of Iran’s centrifuge workshops and uranium mines.

The threat of Iran holding nuclear warheads extends beyond distrust of the government’s intentions or the paranoia of other world leaders, although both play a meaningful role in the issue. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy points to the potential for an arms race to break out as other Middle Eastern nations seek defensive measures against Iranian nuclear weapons. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman has stated unequivocally his intentions to begin nuclear proliferation should Iran obtain a bomb. “If they get one, we have to get one,” he posited in a recent interview, citing their need to maintain balance of power in the region. A nuclear arms race in a region already rocked by conflict and instability has the potential to produce catastrophic consequences; thus, a nuclear-armed Iran must be looked at in the context of other key players in the region.

Issues also lie within the nation itself. Tehran is known to be one of the most notorious state sponsors of terrorism, having been found providing groups like Hamas and Hezbollah with weapons and funding. For the government of Iran to possess large amounts of weapons grade uranium means the risk of some of it ending up, intentionally or not, in the hands of terrorist organizations. If they are able to construct even small-scale, rudimentary nuclear weaponry, these groups would shatter the nuclear security of the world like a glass pane, rendering established concepts like “mutually assured destruction” and “no-first-use” inapplicable. The scope of the danger of terrorism would explode, driven by the threat of future attacks that are unprecedented in death and destruction.

As world leaders grapple with these possibilities, looking to the UN Security Council to intervene, US President Joe Biden has seen diplomatic efforts hindered by conflicting interests within government. Hardline Congressional republicans, many still proponents of Trump-era political sentiments, have criticized the Biden administration for participating in negotiations with Iran in the first place. They argue that the US has already afforded Iran far too many concessions and that compromising with the Iranian government would represent a significant blow to America’s image and perceived power on the world stage. Just last year, forty-nine out of the fifty Republican senators in office pledged to vote against any revived version of the JCPOA unless its terms are akin to that of a harsh crackdown, placing strain on Iran’s self-determination and their allocation of resources. Promoting this iron-fisted approach in lieu of collaboration has, as in years past, antagonized diplomats in Tehran and left multiple empty seats at recent attempted peace summits. Given that any new deal would have to gain a ⅔ majority for approval and confirmation, the Biden administration faces the puzzling task of forging a deal that would be amenable to both its domestic constituents and to the Iranian government.

President Raisi faces similar struggles in reconciling disputes with Iranian legislators. Despite his belligerent political reputation, the leader of Iran has begun to demonstrate a willingness to participate in peace talks, understanding the importance of extending communication with the West after a challenging past few years. After the US abandoned the JCPOA in 2018, sanctions levied by the Trump administration plunged Iran into a deep, lengthy two-year recession. One of the world’s largest exporters of energy, Iran’s sales of oil and gas across the world represent a whopping 47% of its national revenue and comprises 1/5th of its foreign exports, making it a prime target for strict embargos. Their economic woes worsened as EU nations joined in to implement more restrictions, angered by Raisi’s efforts to reinvigorate his country’s nuclear program. The extent of trade sanctions were staggering: Iran exported an average of 2.1 million barrels of crude oil each day while the JCPOA was in effect. Post-2018 restrictions saw this rate plummet to just one hundred thousand barrels daily. Coupled with social and economic strife from the Covid-19 pandemic, government officials have recognized the pressing need to finalize a resolution that would grant them relief from Western sanctions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, a branch of the Iranian armed forces with significant influence in government and policy-making, however, remain staunchly opposed to cooperation with the global West. They claim that retaining control of their nuclear program is essential to Iran’s national autonomy and dignity. These ideas echo the sentiments of other non-nuclear regimes across the world who seek nuclear capabilities, citing their importance in deterring attacks from foreign adversaries, maintaining national security, and balancing out global power inequities. Iran, in particular, emphasizes their precarious position in a highly volatile Middle East, arguing that their nuclear program will act only as a mechanism of protection and national defense.

Due to Iran’s bifurcated government structure, Raisi’s administration also has to contend with the interests of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who holds the final say in all matters of domestic and foreign policy and who, unfortunately for world leaders, stands by the Revolutionary Guards in opposing compromise with the US. At each turn in negotiations, Khamenei has fended off proposals and pledged not to sign an agreement until significant concessions are provided to bolster Iran’s power - that is, the complete lifting of sanctions, the reintegration of Iran into the world financial system, and a decrease in oversight regulations demanded by the US. With Iranian interest groups attempting to stretch their benefits beyond even the scope of the 2015 Nuclear Deal and US congressional Republicans hesitant to even approach the JCPOA’s level of compromise, negotiations and even informal talks between the two leaders drag on without resolution. With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip region, the diplomats on either side have had to table their efforts to revive an agreement, dashing global hopes that a rekindling of communication between Iran and the US will translate into a new frontier in nuclear security.

Today, debate continues over whether the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be deemed successful. Critics argue that the deal provided Iran too many concessions because it still permitted some quantities of uranium enrichment. Proponents, on the other hand, point to the agreement’s unprecedented verification system, which ensured there would never be enough resources available for an Iranian warhead. Regardless, it remains the only comprehensive and successful approach towards preventing nuclear proliferation in Iran in history, and today’s no-deal world faces pressing dangers as relations between the parties break down, economic strain from sanctions mount, and nuclear operations in Iran continue at a faster rate than ever. Despite popping in and out of negotiations repeatedly, the two phantom-like powers seem unable to reach a point of alignment in their paranormal game of peek-a-boo, never sticking around long enough to work together and form a resolution. Until they emerge from the shadows and meet in the middle, the world will have to continue with bated breath for an answer to their question - how long will it take to resurrect the Iran Nuclear Deal? And if they stop playing altogether and the ghost of the JCPOA fades away, they will never get an answer; instead, they will face even more daunting questions and haunting uncertainties regarding the state of global security itself.

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